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ABSTRACT 
Afghanistan's history is quite unique where it's pohtical- internal and external 
affairs were always mired in the projection of regional and super powers. Since 
ancient time Afghanistan had always been the land of conquest for other powers. 
Afghanistan's strategic location between Central and South Asia is of immense geo-
strategic significance for the landlocked countries of the Central Asia. The resurgence 
of great powers' interests in Central Asia in recent years has made Afghanistan once 
again a much coveted strategic pivot in the current Great Game. It's very geographical 
location as a buffer state plunged it into the ground of proxy politics of super powf •-
during the cold war period. After the end of the cold war once again it plungef' 
Civil War which was exploited by regional powers as a vehicle to settle the' 
against their rival states. In 21^' century the Afghan's wounds which sufferei '* 
long battle history is not yet better. After the event of 11 September 2001 or / '• 
Afghanistan became the military base/ground for the U.S. for hunting down / > 
bases/groups with a long term plan to secure military base in order to proi. ' - ^ '-" 
energy interest. It also could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves • 
.J gulf 
start depleting seriously by the middle of the next century. 
This thesis is a modest attempt to study the U.S. Afghanistan policy whi-.Ji has 
remained involved in its affairs since pre-World War II. The event of 11 Sept .i\ber 
2001 has rekindled the U.S. interest in the region once again. This thesis is divided 
into five chapters. The first chapter deals with historical background of the U.S 
Afghanistan relations since pre-World War II to the end of World War II. In modem 
time the U.S. started considering the importance of Afghanistan's geo-strategy since 
the outbreak of World War II. The advance of German forces towards Stalingrad led 
to the fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to allies, and 
hence eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered as significant locales for 
an alternate route. In 1942 the U.S. formally established diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan. After the end of World War II the containment, circling and rolling back 
communism became major U.S. foreign policy concerns. The U.S. tried to bring 
countries settled along the Soviet Union border (it was well-known southern fi-ontier) 
into its miHtar> alliance which Wv -Id be an effecti containment of the Soviet Union 
on its southern frot^ tier. Afgha* crjt -aach country close to Soviet Union 
border. It was considered suitable for rolling back the spread of communism in this 
region. In 1979 when Russian army invaded Afghanistan it became a buffer zone and 
proxy war ground. The U.S. and its allies supported Afghan Muslim guerrillas, 
ranging from indirect financial assistance, weapon, and military training support to 
encourage the influx of foreign volunteers from different countries to join with the 
Mujahideen forces (Islamic guerrilla) for sucking the Soviet into Vietnamese 
quagmire. 
The second chapter deals about the involvement of the U.S. in the Afghan 
civil war (1992-1996). This chapter attempt to find out why, how and with what 
political objectives the U.S. came to involve in the Afghan civil war. The end of Cold 
War which followed with the collapse of the Soviet Union finally led to an end of 
Afghan-conmiimist regime in 1992. The civil war in Afghanistan soon became the 
ground of proxy war of regional powers who exploited the factional rivalry in 
Afghan's civil war as their vehicle to preserve their interest or to use against its rival 
state. The fall of pro U.S Shah regime in Iran caused the U.S. to worry about the 
security of this region. Therefore containing Iran became a major U.S. foreign policy 
goal in this region. The U.S. sympathy with Taliban (Sunni) group was because of its 
rivalry with pro-communist Russian group (Northern Alliance) and their anti-Iran 
stance. 
The third chapter deals about the U.S., Afghanistan and the problem of 
terrorism (1996-2001). This chapter traces the rise of Islamic extremism in 
Afghanistan. It seeks to find out how the U.S. got involved with Islamic extremist 
group (Taliban). It is also attempted to see why and how this Islamic extremist group 
turned against the U.S. and how the U.S. handled such forces in Afghanistan. After 
the end of the Cold War the U.S. has been gradually under attack by Islamic extremist 
groups both within the country and also in foreign countries especially in Middle East. 
The Islamic fighters who had come from different countries used Afghanistan as their 
base for training and to carry out global jihad of which the U.S. and Israel were the 
prime target. The U.S. alleged that the extremists were commanded by Bin Laden and 
had collaborated with Taliban regime. Taliban provided all facility and basic need to 
run their camp. In fact the Islamic extremists had developed its global Jihad agenda 
since 1989 and after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Mujahideen turned their 
jihad against the U.S. and Israel and pledged to root out U.S. influence in the Middle 
Eastern countries. After several incidents of terrorist attack on the U.S. especially 
after its embassies in Nairobi and the Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania were bombed in 1998, 
the U.S. alleged that Bin Laden was masterminded behind the scene. The tension 
between the U.S. and Afghanistan (Taliban regime) over Bin Laden's extradition 
continued till 11 September 2001 terrorists" strike on the U.S. in which about 5000 
people were killed. This incident confirmed that the U.S. homeland itself was 
vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies 
could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon U.S. cities. Terrorism replaced 
communism as the source of fear and loathing the war the U.S. has been fighting 
abroad since 1947 had finally reached its shores. This event, the U.S. alleged, was 
launched by Afghanistan based Al-Qaeda group. Thus the U.S. moved its forces to 
attack Afghanistan in order to root out AI-Qaeda base and to replace hostile regime 
with a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan. 
The fourth chapter deals about the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan after the event 
of 11 September200I. This part of the study primarily focuses on the U.S. war on 
terror. It examines the U.S. claim that it acquired the right to attack and remove Al-
Qaeda base in Afghanistan after it was attacked by terrorist group on 11 September 
2001. This incident triggered the U.S. and some of its allies fi-om NATO to move with 
large number of forces to set up its military base in Afghanistan in order to tackle the 
problem of terrorism emanating firom Afghanistan effectively. 
The event of September 11, 2001 and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan 
signified not only the beginning of a new era in world politics, but also led to struggle 
for influence in new energy resources heartland - Central Asia. As the geography of 
Central Asia is a land lock nature it has to be depend on another country to run its 
energy through pipeline route to the world market. There is a plan of construction of a 
massive new oil and gas pipeline stretching along East-West energy corridor that will 
link Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Afghanistan is one country which 
could provide an alternate rout outlet to Arabian Sea via Pakistan port. But the 
success of the project of oil pipeline which would pass through Afghanistan depends 
on stability in Afghanistan. The events of 11 September 2001 provided opportunity to 
the U.S. to replace Afghanistan's hostile Taliban regime with a pro-U.S. government 
so that the project of running oil and gas pipeline from Caspian Sea and Central Asia 
to southward (Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor or even beyond to India's port) would be 
easier. 
The movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan is perceived as 
an integral part of the U.S. plan to meet new security challenges of the 21^' century. 
Nuclear Issue is an important factor which has influenced the course of international 
politics and diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. The West fears the threat which 
comes from nuclear proliferation by a number of third world countries, including the 
South Asian neighbours India and Pakistan. The U.S. believes that the spread of 
nuclear technology know-how and weapon capability to these countries would pose a 
threat to its own security and the world. The growing instability in Pakistan where 
Islamist groups have been challenging the Government is also a cause of concern. If 
Pakistan's government is captured by some party which opposes the U.S. and nuclear 
arsenal falls in this group's hand or some group having sympathy with Al-Qaeda or 
Taliban it will be dangerous situation so far as the U.S.'s interest in this region is 
concerned. If the Pakistani government looses control over nuclear proliferation by its 
scientist Abdul Qadir khan it could be sold to Iran, Libya or Al-Qaeda group. The 
U.S. is more worried about a scenario when such lethal weapons fall in the hand of its 
enemy. 
The movement of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan after 11 
September was also perceived as a part of a long term strategy to contain Iran and 
enhancing security in the Gulf and the Middle East. Since Iranian revolution, which 
overthrew pro-U.S. regime (Shah) in 1978, up to now Iran has remained a threat to 
the strategic balance in West Asia, and being an obstacle to the U.S. hegemony in the 
region. Various issues make the U.S. worry about of Iran's behaviour. Such as, it has 
been trying to get nuclear weapons which could disturb the balance in the region. Iran 
has also been backing Islamic groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter 
the aggressive Israeli behaviour toward Palestinians, Lebanon and unknown Arab 
countries in future. Moreover, the U.S. is more concerned about Iran playing vital role 
in Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project to supply its energy resources to South Asia 
and probably would extend beyond to China which will be a major setback for the 
U.S. policy to exclude Iran from this region. Iran could also play key role in 
transporting energy resources of Central Asian countries where it could provide outlet 
route to the sea via its port. Iran and Russia are also playing vital role over energy of 
Caspian nation and both of them are against the presence of outside powers in the 
region and more concerned with preventing the U.S. from straddling the Caspian and 
the energy flows from the region. 
The U.S. is worried about security of oil flow in the Arabian Gulf water that is 
the Strait of Hormuz Sea lanes through which passes the bulk of the global oil, could 
be blocked by Iran on the day the U.S. and Iran enter into serious conflict. The U.S. 
has been trying to do everything to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and 
dominating the region. Therefore the movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into 
Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 was possibly as an integral part of a long term 
plan to contain Iran and preparing to invade Iran or to use forces to manage Iran if the 
situation necessitates. 
The current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan especially after 11 September is 
also perceived as an integral part of a long-term plan to contain China. From 1991 to 
2000 the security competition among the great powers was not obsolete, either in 
Europe or in Northeast Asia. The rise of China is the most dangerous threat to the US. 
Though Russia was defeated in the long-cold war but it still backs China to be a super 
power state as a counter-balance to the U.S. in this area. The growing industrial base 
makes China to look aggressively for energy resource to fuel its industrial need. China 
has replaced U.S.'s import market in many areas such as in Iran and Africa. Some 
Arab countries have also started looking east over their oil export market, especially 
in Central Asia and Caspian Sea. China had made agreement to import energy from 
this region through its pipeline to west of China. Recently China signed an energy 
agreement with Iran which involved constructing an oil pipeline from fran to the 
Caspian Sea, from there would link up with the planned pipeline from China to 
Kazakhstan. China has also planned to build railway track to connect western China-
Pakistan and Iran so that China could transport energy from Iran by land which is 
easier than through the Sea. The close boundary of China with Cenfral Asian 
countries make China easy to fransport whether by railway linkage or Pipeline. China 
has also revived the ancient Great Silk Route which will open up China's northern 
land border for direct links with Europe and the Middle East via Cenfral Asia. 
The most concerned thing for the U.S. about China is its key role in 
developing the lethal weapons and civilian nuclear project of Iran. China-Iran 
cooperation threatened to diminish the military advantages the U.S. enjoyed vis-a-vis 
Iran and increased Iran's ability to threaten the Sea-lanes and oil supplying states of 
the Persian Gulf This conflict between China and the U.S. was manifested in the 
areas of nuclear energy, guided and ballistic missiles, and dual use goods relevant to 
production of chemical or advanced conventional weapons. China regarded that Iran 
could play key role to counter the U.S. hegemony in this region. Such behaviour made 
U.S. aware about China's role in this region. Thus there was little doubt that the 
movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 September seemed 
centered on its security establishment and focused on the alleged threats firom major 
rival states notably China and Russia. Moreover, the presence of the U.S. in this 
region could lock out China from the energy business as the U.S. feared that China 
could assist the Central Asian Republics in setting up their own oil companies. 
The movement of U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 Sept 2001 
was also perceived as an integral part of a plan to round up or circle the influence of 
Russia which has been creeping in Central Asia's region. Among the major U.S. 
foreign policy concern after 11 Sept was to establish its influence in newly 
independent nations comprising the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) or 
Central Asia. The U.S. would maintain the new world order by rooting out and 
limiting Moscow's influence in this region. 
Russia has huge reserved energy resources. It will play a key role in European 
market by selling its energy to EU market. Russia used energy as a weapon against 
U.S. hegemony in Europe. Russia attempted to control the flow of oil and gas from 
Caspian Sea and Central Asian countries. It has been viewed in the west as an attempt 
by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines via 
Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control over the flow of oil and 
gas to western markets and will make the west vulnerable to Russia's political whims. 
Russian energy policy could also be part of an overall policy which aims to keep the 
west out of Cenfral Asian countries preserving it under an exclusively Russian sphere 
of influence. While Russia tried to establish monopoly over energy resources of this 
region and dismantle U.S. position in the region. Therefore, denying Russia the right 
to influence the regional economy and politics seemed to be the major concern of the 
United States. The scrambling over energy resources in Central Asia and Caspian Sea 
made Afghanistan never end from being a proxy war ground when the U.S. was 
looking for the way to make Afghanistan as a land-bridge to build pipeline route from 
Central Asia to world market through Afghanistan to Pakistan's or India's port. 
Recently Russia has been moving spirit behind the idea of gas OPEC an 
organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a 
meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 
2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which account for 60 per cent of global gas 
reserve, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. The idea 
of a gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as it would shift the alignment offerees 
in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. Russia has been trying to offset 
Western efforts to control the energy markets. Russia using energy resources and 
arms export potentially to project its influence across the world. The political 
objective of Russia is to control Middle East petroleum and to deny to the NATO 
members and to Japan, in a prelude to a general conventional war, and in contriving 
interruptions in supply that could be turned to the Soviet advantage by splitting allies 
from the United States in a divisive tactic to create oil shortages as a means of 
weakening allied commitments to the U.S. led security arrangements. 
Apart from this recently Russia defied U.S. efforts to isolate fran, by 
supplying $ 700 million worth of Tom 1 advanced air defence missile systems to 
Tehran in 2006. It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and 
Tehran since 2000. Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy 
strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. Russia also supported 
Iran to build a railway line along the Caspian linking Iran with Russia. It will be part 
of the north-south transport corridor, a joint project of Russia, Iran and India. 
Thus after the 11 Sept event the U.S. and NATO forces moved into 
Afghanistan, to replace U.S. hostile regime with a pro-US one and to set up its 
military base in Afghanistan probably as a long-term plan to ensure its presence in 
this region to contain Iran, Russia, and China. 
The fifth chapter deals with the concluding remarks and the major findings. 
The study found that Afghanistan has always been mired in the complicated 
projection of the super powers since ancient time. The geographical location of 
Afghanistan has made it a strategically important area for the United States to 
maintain its political and economic interest since the end of World War II. During the 
Cold War Afghanistan had been a buffer zone to contain the spread of communism 
into Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War 
Afghanistan also had been the ground of proxy war for the U.S. to threaten Iran. After 
a pro-US regime of Shah of Iran was overthrown by anti-US Islamic extremist group 
in 1979, Iran became a prime threat to its economic interests and political hegemony 
in the Gulf region. In the ftiture Afghanistan might serve as a military base for the 
U.S. to attack Iran if it becomes necessary. Afghanistan could also be a base for the 
U.S. to monitor Pakistan's nuclear threat in future when internal political instability 
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might lead to a situation where power is captured by a party having sympathy with 
Taliban. In the 21^' century the world enters into an energy war era where Afghanistan 
lies on the path of energy pipeline from newly independent Central Asian Countries 
and Caspian Sea which have huge reserves of energy resources that made the west to 
believe that it could make the region as the Persian Gulf of the next century. It could 
also serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the gulf start depleting seriously 
by the middle of the next century. Therefore in the future Afghanistan might still be 
under the complicated projection of not only the United States but also of the new 
rising powers and regional states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Afghanistan's history is quite unique where it's political- internal and external 
affairs were always mired in the projection of regional and super powers. Since 
ancient time Afghanistan had always been the land of conquest for other powers. 
Afghanistan's strategic location between Central and South Asia is of immense 
geostrategic significance for the landlocked countries of Central Asia. The resurgence 
of great powers' interests in Central Asia in recent years has made Afghanistan once 
again a much coveted strategic pivot in the current Great Game. It's very geographical 
location as a buffer state plunged it into the ground of proxy politics of super powers 
during the cold war period. After the end of the Cold War once again it plunged into 
Civil War which was exploited by regional powers as a vehicle to settle their score 
against their rival states. Even in the 21^ * century the wound of Afghan people who 
suffered a lot ft'om long battles in the past has not yet healed. The event of 11 
September 2001 once again made Afghanistan the battle ground of energy war of this 
century. 
This thesis attempts to study about the U.S. Afghanistan policy which has 
remained involved in Afghanistan affairs since pre-World War II. The event of 11 
September 2001 has rekindled the U.S. interest in the region once again. In order to 
make systematic presentation of the issues discussed, the study is divided into five 
chapters. The first chapter deals with historical background of the U.S.-Afghanistan 
relations since pre-World War II to the end of World War II. The first chapter seeks to 
find out when, how, why, and what mattered to the U.S. in dealing with Afghanistan 
during said period. The U.S. came to involve with Afghanistan's affairs since it was 
under the pressure of expansion of British India and Czarist Russia. Afghanistan 
started looking for a third power which could serve as a balance of power. 
Afghanistan was afraid of the fact that once it enters into any alliance with the U.S. it 
could enable British India and Czarist Russia to intimidate it. Consequently during 
this period there was no major breakthrough in diplomatic relations between the U.S. 
and Afghanistan as the U.S. was also aware of the fact that Afghanistan was under 
Russia influence. Moreover, after communist revolution the U.S. attitude towards 
Russia has been remained hostile. However, in 1942 the U.S. and Afghanistan 
formally established diplomafic relations on very firm basis. The advance of German 
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forces towards Stalingrad led to the fears that the logistic link through western Iran 
would be denied to allies, and hence eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were 
considered as significant locales for an alternate route. The presence of the U.S. in 
Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. In June 1942, the 
first US ambassador was dispatched to Afghanistan. The main reason behind the U.S. 
decision to forge close relationship with Afghanistan was more because of its strategic 
significance. 
The next part of chapter one deals about the U.S. policy toward Afghanistan 
after the end of World War II up to the end of cold war (1945-1989). This part of the 
study try to find out why and how the geo-strategy of Afghanistan came to play key 
role for the U.S. in pursuing its policy of containing, encircling and rolling back the 
spreading of communist Russia. It also seeks to analyse how the U.S. turned 
Afghanistan to be the ground of proxy war to suck the Soviet troops into Vietnamese 
quagmire. After the end of World War II the containment, circling and rolling back 
communism became major U.S. foreign policy concerns. The U.S. tried to bring 
those country which settles along the Soviet Union border (it was well-known 
southern fi-ontier) into its military alliance which would be an effective containment 
of the Soviet Union on its southem frontier. Afghanistan was one country which has 
geo-strategy close to Soviet Union border suitable for rolling back the spreading of 
communism in this region. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the 
U.S. was quick to support Muslim guerillas (Mujahideen) ranging from indirect 
financial assistance to the weapon support and encouraging the influx of foreign 
volunteer from different countries to join with the Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan 
to fight and suck the Soviet troops into Vietnamese quagmire. It was the pressure of 
heavy arms supported by the U.S. and its allies to the Muslim guerillas (Mujahideen) 
which caused Soviet Union to withdraw its military from Afghanistan in 1989. 
The second chapter deals about the involvement of the U.S. in the Afghan civil 
war (1992-1996). This chapter attempt to find out why, how and with what political 
objectives the U.S. came to involve in the Afghan civil war. The end of Cold War 
which followed with the collapse of the Soviet Union finally led to an end of Afghan-
communist regime in 1992. The civil war in Afghanistan soon became the ground of 
proxy war of regional powers who exploited the factional rivalry in Afghan's civil 
war as their vehicle to preserve their interest or to use against its n\al state. The U.S. 
got involved in supporting factional group in Afghanistan in order to preserve its 
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various political objectives and interests. The discovery of huge energy resources in 
Central Asia and Caspian Sea was one of the most important reasons of the U.S. 
involvement with Afghan factional group. The U.S. knew that Afghanistan could be 
an alternative route to flow energy resources to the world market through pipeline 
from Central Asia via Afghanistan to Karachi port or India port. As Afghanistan was 
plunged in to factional rivalries it was bound to cause difficulties in running this 
project. The stability in Afghanistan was a pre requisite for the U.S. and its allies and 
therefore they started searching for a factional group which could bring stability to 
Afghanistan so that the pipeline project would easily be built. 
After the end of Cold War dual containment of Iran and Iraq became a major 
U.S. foreign policy goal. The U.S. (during Clinton administration) was clearly 
sympathetic to the Taliban as they were in line with its anti Iran policy. Taliban forces 
were supported by many Arab militants most of them were strongly anti-Shiite; they 
contributed accentuating the common prejudice among Afghan Sumii against the 
Hazara Shia, which was backed by Iran with the aim to counter the Pushtun Sunni 
(Taliban) that was supported by the United States, Saudi, and Pakistan. Fight fire with 
fire, was the U.S. reasoning: combat the militant Shiism of the Iranisins with even 
greater militancy and violence by some groups which were considered as orthodox 
Sunni Muslims. Taliban also served as bulwark to counter the Russia's influence in 
this region. 
The third chapter deals about U.S. and the problem of terrorism (1996-2001) in 
the context of Afghanistan. In this chapter endeavor is made to find out when, why 
and how Islamic jihad group (Al-Qaeda) came to play an important role in 
Afghanistan's affairs during Cold War time. How did the U.S. deal with Islamic jihad 
group/ Al-Qaeda/ in Afghanistan during Cold War? How Al-Qaeda group came to 
collaborate with Taliban in Afghanistan? After the end of Cold War why and how the 
Islamic Jihad group (Al-Qaeda) along with Taliban group turned against the U.S.? 
What is Al-Qaeda"s ideology and its political objective? Why the U.S. became the 
prime target of Al-Qaeda? How Afghan veteran (Al-Qaeda) commits its operation 
against the U.S. and its interest out of Afghanistan? How the U.S. handles with this 
terrorist group? During cold war time the proxy war tactic was a major instrument that 
was used by the U.S. to counter the expansion of communism around the globe. 
Afghanistan dunng 1979-1989 was one country that became the ground'of proxy war 
where the U.S. backed Islamic fighters Mujahideen from around the world who had 
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come to Afghanistan to suck the Soviet troops into Vietnamese quagmire. It was 
following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989 that the secret development 
of Islamic radical camp took place in Afghanistan. Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) saw 
the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total victory. Thereafter they advanced their 
world wide Jihad and where the next global primary targets of the Mujahideen were 
Israel, the U.S. and its interests which exist around the world. 
Once Taliban established its complete control over Kabul in 1996 these groups 
of Jihad continue to use Afghanistan as the ground and base for training their men 
who came from different countries to carry out their global jihad. Since the defeat of 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. had gradually been under the attack 
from terrorist group several time whether in its homeland itself or in foreign countries 
and whether on its military or its civilian especially in Gulf countries and Africa. 
After several incidents of terrorist attacks on the U.S. especially after its embassies in 
Nairobi and the Dar-es-salam, Tanzania were bombed in 1998, the U.S. alleged that 
Bin Laden was masterminded behind the scene. The U.S. demanded that the Taliban 
must hand over Bin Laden to appropriate authorities but the Taliban ignored to do so. 
The tension between the U.S. and Afghanistan (Taliban regime) over Bin 
Laden's extradition continued till 11 September 2001 terrorists' strike on the U.S. in 
which about 5000 people were killed. This incident confirmed that the U.S. homeland 
itself was vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined 
enemies could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon U.S. cities. Terrorism 
replaced communism as the source of fear and loathing the war the U.S. has been 
fighting abroad since 1947 had finally reached its shores. This event, the U.S. alleged, 
was launched by Afghanistan based Al-Qaeda group. Thus the U.S. moved its forces 
to attack Afghanistan, to root out Al-Qaeda base and to replace hostile regime with a 
pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan. 
The fourth chapter deals about the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan after the event 
of 11 September2001. This part of the study primarily focuses on the U.S. war on 
terror. It examines the U.S. claim that it acquired the right to attack and remove Al-
Qaeda base in Afghanistan after it was attacked by terrorist group on 11 September 
2001. This incident triggered the U.S. and some of its allies from NATO to move with 
large number of forces to set up its military base in Afghanistan in order to tackle the 
problem of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan effectively. 
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After 11 September 2001, the U.S. led its forces to attack the Taliban regime in 
an attempt to destroy the foundations of Al-Qaeda. This was the first lime since the 
Vietnam War that the U.S. led its military to attack a sovereign country under the war 
on terrorism. The U.S. tried its best to project its war in response to the 9/11 as part of 
a global war on terrorism, though the real motives included the projection of military 
power in the heartland of Asia, in the Caucasus and m the Middle East especially after 
the discovery of large energy resources m Caspian Sea and Central Asia. A land lock 
country has to be dependent on another country to run its petroleum energy resource 
through a pipe line route to the world market. Due to such geographical difficulties, 
countries around Caspian Sea and Central Asian region came to play important role in 
transporting energy of these land lock countries. One of these countries is Afghanistan 
which could provide a land-bridge from Central Asia to South Asia to flow their 
energy to the world market by running energy pipeline through Pakistan and Indian 
ports. 
Energy security is an integral part of the U.S. war on terror. The U.S. is 
currently facing with new threats which challenge its energy security. In Saudi Arabia 
the main oil exporter to the U.S. it is facing various factions of Islamist groups who 
are opposed to U.S.'s hegemony in the Arab world and these groups try to pressurise 
Saudi government to keep distance from the U.S. as they feel disappointed due to the 
U.S. stance on Palestinian-Israel dispute. Another threat perception to the U.S. 
hegemony could be the fran factor which is on the verge of developing nuclear 
technology which would create an imbalance in the region. In addition, it is believed 
that Iran was backing Islamic groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter 
aggressive Israeli behaviour towards Palestinians. 
The U.S. administration is also worried about the growing instability in 
Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalist groups are posing a stiff challenge to the 
Government. The U.S. knows that if political power in Pakistan is captured by a 
group or a party which is opposed to the U.S. and if Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falls 
down in their hands or if Al-Qaeda expands its influence in Pakistan, it will be a 
serious danger to the U.S. interests in the region. The failure of Pakistan government 
to control the activities of its nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan, who could sell 
nuclear technology to Iran, Libya or an Al-Qaeda group which, would be a disaster 
for the United States. 
China as a big economic and military power with its fast growing industrial 
base is aggressively campaigning for searching an alternative energy resource to fuel 
its industrial needs. China has surpassed the U.S. as the biggest exporter of goods in 
many areas such as in Iran and Africa and some Arab countries have begun looking 
toward east for their oil export markets, especially in Central Asia and Caspian Sea 
region. China had entered into an agreement to import energy from this region 
through its pipeline in west of China. As china has close proximity with Central Asian 
states, it is more convenient and economical for it to transport it both by rail and 
through a pipeline. In addition, China has allegedly played a key role in developing 
lethal weapons and civilian nuclear projects of Iran, because China think that Iran 
could play a key role in countering U.S. hegemony in this region. 
Moreover, after the break-up of the USSR, the re-emergence of Russia as a 
major economic and military power after a decade of instability has fiirther 
compounded the U.S. woes. Russia has a huge reserve of energy resources which 
could be used as a weapon to play a key role in the European market. In addition, 
Russia has devised a plan to play a key role in transporting energy resources of 
Central Asia and Caspian Sea to European market through its territory. Moreover, 
Russia has recently been the moving spirit behind the idea of a Gas OPEC, an 
organization of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a 
meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 
2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which together account for 60 per cent of 
global gas reserves, with Algeria, Venezuela and Cenfral Asian gas exporting 
countries. Russia has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and 
downstream projects with all of these countries. The idea of a Gas OPEC has rattled 
the U.S and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and 
leave them out in the cold. This plan would offset Western efforts to control the 
energy markets. Russia is expected of using energy resources and arms export 
potentialities to project its influence across the world. Moreover, Russia defied U.S. 
efforts to isolate Iran by supplying $ 700 million worth of Tor M 1 advanced air -
defence missile systems to Tehran in year 2006. It was the biggest of several defence 
contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000. Notwithstanding the nuclear 
controversy, Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy 
strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. 
XI 
The fifth chapter offers concluding observations, briefing and summarization of 
overall U.S. policy towards Afghanistan since pre-world war II up to the 11 
September 2001. 
The study used the descriptive method based on documentary analysis 
procedures. The study data is primarily based on books, journals, magazine, articles, 
newspapers and internet resources. Most of sources collected from Indian libraries 
such as Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) New Delhi, Jawahalal 
Nehru University New Delhi. Maulana Azad Library AMU, Aligarh, and Jamia Milia 
Islamia New Delhi. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
The U.S. - Afghan Relations: Historical Background 
I. From Afghan Independence to the End of World War II 
The situation of Afghanistan is somewhat unique in the Mushm world. Its 
existence as a political entity to the rivalry between foreign imperialist powers made 
it a harmless buffer state.' For over a century Afghan policies had been almost 
entirely dictated by the country's position between two aggressive and antagonistic 
powers and the necessity of preserving its independence." In 1919 Afghanistan 
under Amanullah's leadership declared war against British Empire. TTiis less known 
third Anglo-Afghan war consequently led to the conclusion of the treaty of 
Rawalpindi in August 1919. Though largely dictated by the Britain this treaty 
finally gave Afghanistan the freedom to conduct its own foreign affairs. But the 
British concession was ambiguous, and the Afghans hedged their bets by sending a 
mission to the newly installed Bolsheviks in Moscow in October 1919. During this 
visit Russia obtained Afghan support for the Bolsheviks in Muslim central Asia in 
return for assistance against the British.^ 
In July 1921 a delegation from Afghanistan led by Wall Muhammad arrived 
in Washington after making a tour of European capitals, with the objective of 
establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. However, the delegation 
reception was not auspicious, as the U.S. government merely expressed regret at the 
death of Amir HabibuUah, and congratulated king Amanullah on his accession. The 
delegates left Washington extremely disappointed, for Amanullah had hoped to 
avoid his country's dependency on Britain or the former Soviet Union by 
introducing the United States as a balancing third power and as provider of Western 
know-how to fiirther his policy of modernization.'* 
Haunted by continued British pressure, and cautioned by historical Russian 
ambitions, Amanullah desperately wanted to forge close ties with the United States, 
for two important reasons. First, the USA was physically distant great power, 
capable of helping a country like Afghanistan without acquiring the geographical 
leverage which had enabled British Lidia and Tsarist Russia to intimidate it. Second, 
the USA had a relatively unblemished colonial image, which protected, Kabul from 
criticism for dealing with a colonial power. Indeed initially Washington showed 
1 
some receptiveness President Warren G. Harding received Waifs mission on 26 
July 1921, which some Afghans construed as US recognition of both AmanuUah's 
government and Afghanistan's independence But unfortunately both countnes 
could not proceed further on diplomatic front for many years ^ 
It is interesting to note that even after independence the Bntish government 
evidently used their diplomatic muscle in whatever way possible to keep the Afghan 
leadership weak and incapable of having any regional impact This was manifested 
most sharply in Bntish efforts to frustrate Kabul's urgent search for wider 
international recognition of Afghamstan"s independence and alternative sources of 
foreign aid, partly to counter what it perceived as the persistent Bntish menace 
To execute their plan to accompany independence move with substantial 
modernization steps AmanuUah needed to gain as much international recognition 
and support as possible Immediately following the signing of the treaty of 
Rawalpindi, they dispatched mission, headed by Mohammad Wall a leading figure 
in the negotiations with the Bntish, to Soviet Russia which was the first to recognize 
the sovereignty of Afghanistan, and established diplomatic relations in 1919. 
Hoping for permanent relations with the Bolsheviks he on the same day wrote 
letters to Japan, Amenca, Persia (Iran), France and Turkey on behalf of "the 
independent and free government of Afghanistan" ^A mission was sent to Tashkent 
and Moscow, led by Mohammad Ah, and it was received by the Soviet authonties, 
as It was carrying a letter from king AmanuUah to Vladimir Lemn seeking Soviet 
assistance in the emancipation of Afghanistan A Soviet diplomat, Michael K. 
Bravm, was sent to Kabul to prepare the w ay for the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, to be followed by a Soviet delegation charged with negotiating a treaty of 
friendship .The result was the Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, by which 
the two states recognized their mutual independence and agreed to be bound not to 
enter into any political or military accord with a third state that might prejudice 
either of the signatones The terms of the treaty had senous implications for the 
content of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, under which Bntain endeavored to 
exclude Russia from involvement in Afghanistan ^  
A friendship treaty signed in Moscow on February 28, 1921, formally sealed 
the friendship and mutual sympathies which had been developing and strengthening 
between Afghanistan and Russia since last two years. Lenin wrote to AmanuUah 
that the Bntish felt they were being beaten in their own game Incidentally, the 
British refused even to call Amanullah "His Majesty" and had not formally accepted 
Afghanistan's independence.^ The main aim of the British was to keep Afghanistan 
under its thumb and torpedo any close understanding between Afghanistan and 
Soviet Russia. Meanwhile the British officers were planning a diplomatic blockade 
while some of them, like general Malleson, were thinking in military terms. The 
Soviet leadership suggested to Amanullah a friendship treaty between Afghanistan 
and Soviet Russia. This scared the British and shattered their diplomatic blockade.'° 
The establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between the Two great nations 
opened up broad possibilities of mutual assistance against any encroachment by 
foreign predators upon other people's freedom and possessions." 
It became clear to Amanullah and his supporters and all along the Soviets" 
gestures of friendship and good will had not really been meant to facilitate Afghan 
independence but to assist themselves in domestic consolidation and socialist 
empire building, with a special imperative to avoid British opposition through 
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghan leaders were in no position to change the 
situation radically. To confront the Soviets, they needed substantial Western 
support. They made some efforts to secure it, but to little avail. Ironically, even then 
neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to respond positively to 
Kabul's call for more cooperative relations. In order to attract American friendship 
and ensure equilibrium in Afghan relations with Moscow, Kabul in 1925 even went 
as far as to forward the U.S. State Department through the Afghan Minister in Paris 
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to make a draft treaty of friendship with the US but Washington never responded. 
However, the close scrutiny of Amanullah's objectives clearly establishes 
that his leadership wished only to pursue a balanced and neutral foreign policy and 
friendship with Soviet Russia was intended to aid the promotion of this policy, 
which was expected to provide Afghanistan with an anti-British lever, and, by the 
same token, to induce Britain and other Western powers to put their relations with 
Afghanistan on a similar footing, this is why, despite all the British discouragement, 
Amanullah"s leadership never abandoned its efforts to seek American and German 
friendship. Nor did it ever waved in its staunch ideological opposition to "Godless 
communism" thus setting limits on the extent to which relations with Moscow could 
develop. It never envisaged friendship with Soviet Russia as an end in itself, but 
merely as a means to strengthen a neutral and balanced independent foreign policy 
for Afghanistan in a Zone of sustained great power rivalry. '^  
A. The establishment of the U.S.-Afghanistan diplomatic relations 
Second World War provided the motivation for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Afghanistan when in 1942 the 
German advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran 
would be denied to the Allies. Eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered 
as ideal locales for an alternate route and the U.S. presence in Kabul was seen as an 
essential prerequisite for securing this route. On 6 June 1942, Cornelius Van Engert 
became the U.S. first resident ambassador in Afghanistan.'"* 
In fact Afghanistan had shown its interest to establish diplomatic relations 
with Afghanistan soon after its independence. But the USA was reluctant as it 
viewed that Afghanistan was still within the British sphere of influence. Since 
imperial era Americans and British seemed to perceive the world similarly if not 
identically, and it followed that they should co-operate as best they could in their 
common interests.'^ By the begirming of the twentieth century, the two countries 
became associated on various policies. 
Despite granting independence to Afghanistan Britain still tried to use their 
diplomatic muscle in whatever way possible to keep the Afghan leadership weak 
and incapable of having any regional impact. Britain continued its efforts to 
frustrate Kabul's urgent search for wider international recognition of its 
independence and alternative sources of foreign aid partly to make up for the loss of 
British support and partly to counter what it perceived as the persistent British 
menace. British continued to accept only a settlement that retained Afghanistan 
within the sphere of British colonial interests. 
Disappointed with continued British pressure even after independence king 
Amanullah sent a mission to the newly installed Bolsheviks in Moscow in October 
1919. This visit had in fact been preceded by a Bolshevik mission to Kabul to obtain 
Afghan support for the Bolsheviks in Muslim Central Asia in return for assistance 
against the British. In July - August 1920 Lenin took the position that the 
communist parties would assist bourgeois nationalist liberation movements in their 
struggle against imperialism and even to form alliances w ith such movements. This 
was to define Soviet attitudes towards the national revolutions then taking shape in 
Ataturk's Turkey, Reza Shah's Iran, Amanullah's Afghanistan and Sun yat sen"s 
China.'^ 
In the very early years of Soviet rule the West got scared of the spread of 
Bolshevik doctrines about property, religion, and the relationship of the individual 
to the state, through propaganda or the communist international established by 
Lenin in Moscow in 1919.'^ During 1920 s and 1930, the Soviets had called for the 
world revolution, the destruction of capitalism and the economic system of the 
United States. The Soviet leadership viewed the capitalism as the chief obstacle 
to humanity's liberation movement. From the moment the Soviets seized power its 
leaders continued to see the capitalist states as enemies and the Soviet relationship 
with them as one of constant struggle.'^ The United States, however, found it 
impossible to reconcile itself to the ideology and practices of Soviet Russia, which 
seemed more alien, and more hostile to democracy, than the ideology and practices 
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01 czars. 
Indeed initially Washington showed some receptiveness to Afghan requests. 
President Warren G. Harding received Wali's mission on 26 July 1921, which some 
Afghans construed as U.S. recognition of Amanullah's government and 
Afghanistan's independence, and promised to consider seriously the question of 
U.S. diplomatic representation in Afghanistan, but unfortunately nothing more 
happened for many years. Another reason which made U.S. to delay its decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was Afghan - Soviet treaty of 
friendship of 1921, by which the two states recognized their mutual independence 
and agreed to be bound not to enter into any political or military accord with a third 
state that might prejudice either of the signatories. The terms of the treaty had 
serious implications for the content of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, under 
which Britain endeavored to exclude Russia from involvement in Afghanistan. 
On May 27, a message from Lenin and Kalilin greeted the "independent 
Afghan people heroically upholding their freedom against foreign enslaves" and 
proposed an exchange of representatives, "the establishment of permanent 
diplomatic relations between the two great nations will open up broad possibilities 
of mutual assistance against any encroachment by foreign predators upon other 
people's freedom and possessions,'' it said . Tarzi in his note to Chicherin said: The 
main inducement to my government to conclude a treaty of friendship with the 
government of Russian Soviet Republic was a common policy of overthrowing 
imperialist despotism all over the world and especially the policy of emancipation 
of all the peoples of the East, without distinction of nationality and religion, from 
the rule and tyranny of world predators. 
On the other hand the US astonishingly displayed as mush insensitivity as 
the British to Afghan needs. The US position was influenced by its ambivalence 
towards the communist regime in Russia; its perception of Afghanistan as 
unimportant to USA; its treatment of Afghanistan as part of the British sphere of 
influence and therefore British responsibility; and more importantly as some 
informed Afghan sources believe, London's constant advice to Washington not to 
help Amanullah get off the British hook- the British continued to give advice until 
the mid 1930s. The USA neither officially declared support for Afghan 
independence for another decade nor established full diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan until 1942.^' 
After being freed from their efforts in repressing anti-Bolshevik forces 
elsewhere in the former czarist empire Bolsheviks started re-conquering Central 
Asia. This caused serious concern for Afghan rulers and Amanullah once again 
started looking towards the West for assistance^^. The expanding of Russia's actual 
control to the current border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics 
had disturbed Afghans.^ ^ This development seriously perturbed the Afghan 
government, which rapidly became disillusioned with and distrustful of the Soviets. 
It became clear to Amanullah and his supporters that all along the Soviets' gestures 
of friendship and good will had not really been meant to facilitate Afghan 
independence and modernization but to assist themselves in domestic consolidation 
and socialist empire building, with a special imperative to avoid British opposition 
through Afghanistan. However, the Afghan leaders were not in position to change 
the situation radically. To confront the Soviets, they needed substantial Western 
support. They made some effort to secure its but to little avail, fronically, neither the 
British nor the Americans responded positively to Kabul's call for more cooperative 
relations. In order to again attract American friendship and ensure equilibrium in 
Afghanistan relations with Moscow, Kabul in 1925 even went as far as to forward to 
the U.S. State Department through the Afghan Minister in Paris (then General 
Mohammad) Nadir a draft treaty of friendship with the USA; but Washington never 
responded.^" 
In 1928, both France and the United States signed a treaty renouncing the 
resort to war as a national policy. It came to be known as Kelloge-Braind pact. The 
U.S. ambassador, Amour, in Paris was instructed by the State Department on 22 
September, 1928 to transmit two authenticated copies of this treaty to Minister of 
Afghanistan in Paris. The acting Afghan Minister in Kabul had expressed 
Afghanistan's readiness to adhere to, and earnestly participate in the Kelloge-Briand 
pact (1928). Thus, indirect diplomatic relations were in auguries between Kabul 
and Washington through Paris. The French Minister in Kabul was fiirther urged to 
"make the decision of the Afghan government, officially known to the government 
of the United States of America.^ ^ However, the establishment of direct diplomatic 
relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan still bare no fruit. There were many 
factors behind the U.S. reluctance to establish direct diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan under AmanuUah's leadership as they found his nationalist militancy 
seriously vulnerable to Bolshevik influence. Other factors included - Amanullah"s 
Islamic rhetoric, anti-British and anti-colonial and pro-independence agitation and 
the British still making "sphere of influence" claim on the country.'^ 
However, the process of normalization of Afghan-U.S. relations suffered a 
setback in 1928 following the downfall of AmanuUah. Though there was no 
immediate success in this regard, the United States had started dealing with the 
government of Afghanistan through French legation in Kabul.^ ^ After the overthrow 
of AmanuUah in 1929, the British supported a tribal coalition led by the future ruler 
Nadir Shah. Within six months Nadir Shah came back via India and assumed 
power in Kabul as king. He got generous help from Britain both in cash and 
armaments." During Nadir's rule he adopted a foreign policy of "positive 
neutrality" and reciprocal friendship with all states. He sought to achieve two 
immediate objectives "non-provocative' balanced relationships with both Britain 
and the USSR, and acceptance by the Muslim states.^'' Nadir Shah had appointed his 
half brother Muhammad Aziz, to be ambassador to Moscow in recognition of the 
significance of the post. Nadir Shah opened up negotiations for a review of the 1921 
treaty, and the new Afghan-Soviet treaty of mutual neutrality and non-aggression 
signed on 24 June 1931 included a clause specifically calling for the prohibition in 
both states of activities that might cause either military or political damage.^' 
Further Nadir found it expedient to confirm all AmanuUah's treaties with Moscow. 
And he also supported Soviet initiatives at a number of international conferences. 
One of the clauses of non-aggression pact stipulated a ban on activities of 
organizations hostile to one of the contracting parties on the other's territory. 
In order to strengthen Afghanistan's independence and international profile 
Nadir started wooing European powers such as France and Germany. The idea of 
rapprochement with Berlin was particularly attractive to him, by the same token, he 
was interested in establishing ties with the USA, but it did not find it feasible to 
create a mission in Kabul.^ ^ 
There were many factors behind the U.S. decision about not establishing 
direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan during Nadir rule. First, as U.S. 
administrafion still opposed relafions with Russians."AS discussed earlier that after 
Nadir had become ruler of Afghanistan he did not only review the 1921 treaty 
(which was done by Amanullah) but also a new Afghan treaty was signed on 24 
June 1931.^ ^ The new ruler Nadir Shah continued to rely primarily on Germany 
and the small but vital colony of Germany. Nadir Shah even planned to make Berlin 
the chief outpost in Europe of Afghan trade, instead of London or Moscow. But 
such outcome was checked by a dramatic series of events which harmed Afghan-
German relations, although German responsibility was in fact only of the most 
indirect kind.^ ^ 
An important factor was a fiiendship treaty with Japan signed in 1930, and 
development of limited trade and educational ties, between them, but Japan ran into 
the same reservations and difficulties that faced the United States. These factors 
caused U.S. reluctance to establish a mission in Kabul, because, in the state 
Department's opinion, Afghanistan was "the most fi-antic, hostile country in the 
world today". In its opinion Nadir Shah (the Afghan king) was not able to control 
the tribes and would soon fall. Nonetheless, U.S. recognition was definitely a boost 
to Nadir's regime. As a whole there was no major breakthrough in the efforts for 
establishing direct relations with the United States.^^ 
After Nadir Shah's murder, real power came into the hands of his brothers. 
The boy king was no more than a convenience.^^At that time the new king was 
Mohammad Zahir Shah, the -19 year old son of Nadir Shah, who was educated in 
France, from 1933 to 1953. It was three royal uncles, who ruled through Zahir Shah 
until 1963 when the king became his own Master. Through most of this period it 
remained an axiom of Afghanistan's foreign policy to limit dependence on either of 
the over-powerfiil, neighbors British India and the USSR.''^  In addition, the new 
regime faced with a problem; on the one hand they were determined not to accept 
aid or technicians from the Soviet Union and on the other anti - British feeling were 
now so strong.^^According to Frank A. Clement, in this time, Afghanistan made 
further overtures to the United States and tried to use commerce to forge closer links 
by offering attractive incentives to U.S. companies, However. Britain negated some 
of attractiveness of these commercial agreements by creating problems in term of 
access from Indian ports, insisting that all goods had to be transported by Indian 
railway even vehicles capable of proceeding under their own power. The US Consul 
at Karachi was approached about establishing diplomatic relations during a visit to 
Kabul in 1931, but he could give no reason to the Afghan government for the 
unwillingness of the United States to open an embassy in Kabul.''^ 
During 1934-35 the communist approach shifted from condemnation of 
social democracy, collective security, and Western militarism to collaboration with 
other anti-fascist forces in popular fronts, alliance systems, and rearmament. The 
United States and the U.S.S.R. established diplomatic relations for the first time in 
November 1933, and in September 1934, the Soviet joined the Lea,gue of Nations, 
where Maksim Litvinov became loud proponent of collective security against fascist 
revisionism."" 
Afghanistan's continued attempt to obtain prestige grew increasingly 
difficult in the face of the impending war. In 1937, Afghanistan signed the treaty of 
Sa'adabad with Turkey and Iran, a harmless pledge of mutual non-aggression that 
nevertheless marked the first time that either the Turks or the Afghans had shown 
any fiiendship for their Persian neighbors. During this period Afghanistan had its 
first taste of diplomatic relations with the United States. Although the latter had 
been one of the first countries approached by the Afghans after they gained their 
external independence, their overtures had been rejected by Harding administration. 
In July 1934, after the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United 
States recognition of the Soviet Union, a note went to the U.S. Department of state 
suggesting that it might be well to '"strengthen the political and economic relations"" 
which Afghanistan had and still has with the high government of the United States. 
But it was not until 1936. that the United States charge- d- affairs in Iran visited 
Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of fiiendship. No diplomatic section was set up; 
however, the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan through British 
offices.''^  
Afghanistan under Zahir Shah emphasized the need to strengthen the 
poHtical and economic relations with the government of United States. Zahir Shah 
in his personal letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt informed the latter 
about the death of his father king Nadir Shah and added that "we are pleased to 
notify the desire of the Afghan government to strengthen the political and economic 
relations with the government of United States." And President Roosevelt in his 
reply to Zahir Shah informed that: "'I cordially reciprocate the sentiments which you 
express and, in extending recognition to your majesty's government, take this 
opportunity of assuring you of my hope that friendly relations will always exist 
between the United States and Afghanistan." Thus, it was for the first time that the 
United States announced its recognition of Afghanistan. Immediately thereafter, 
Afghanistan proposed a fiiendship treaty between Afghanistan and the United 
States. Consequently, on 26 March 1936, the agreement was signed between Kabul 
and Washington at Paris. Thus, by March 1936, Afghanistan's government had been 
recognized by the United States."*^  Afghan government demonstrated its confidence 
in America altruism by granting a 75 year concession. A concession was signed and 
ratified with the Inland oil Exploration Company in April 1937, but the company 
withdrew fi-om the concession in 1938 because of the international situation in 
Europe.'*^ 
The Second World War brought with it a challenge in the sphere of the 
government's foreign relations. Before the war, the Afghan had accepted economic 
assistance only fi-om countries that were geographically remote enough (like 
Germany, Italy and Japan but not Britain and Russia) not to be able to influence 
their political independence."*^ In October 1936, Germany and Afghtmistan entered 
into a confidential protocol '"under which Germany provided Dm 15 million of war 
materials on credit, to be repaid in part with products from Afghanistan. German 
become an important player in the economy of Afghanistan and was regarded as 
politically significant in the country's attempt to balance the influences of Britain 
and Russia. In 1937, the German airline, Lufthansa, established a regular service 
between Berlin and Kabul, with a view to extending the service into China, and in 
the summer of 1939, a German delegation arrived in Kabul with the objective of 
exploring the possibility of expanding Trade."*^  
On 22 June 1941, the Nazis attacked the USSR. Stalin entered into an 
alliance of necessity with old rival Britain, against the common enemy.'*'' In the 
Second Worid War, maintenance of the allied coalition of the United States, Great 
Britain, and Russia required exacting exercises of the art of diplomacy.**^ For both 
powers, close Afghan-German ties became unacceptable, and they demanded 
expulsion of all Axis citizens from Afghanistan, despite Afghan hasty proclamation 
of complete neutrality in the World War. Iran's refusal to obey a similar order led to 
its occupation by the Soviet and British forces in August 1941. To avoid a similar 
fate, but Afghan acquiesced to the Soviet British pressure on condition of providing 
safe conduct to Germans, Italians and Japanese to their countries. A move that 
Afghanistan resented as an infringement of its sovereignty but still complied with 
and all Axis nationals left for India under the promise of free passage to a neutral 
country. Although Axis diplomats were allowed to remain, their attempts to foment 
an uprising against Britain among the Pushtun tribes on the Indian side of border 
were unsuccessful, despite sympathy for the Germans because of their traditional 
enmity with Britain.^ '^ As during the World War II, Afghanistan briefly became the 
Switzerland of Central Asia in a new game of intrigue as Allied and Axis coalitions 
jockeyed for position in the region. One of the reasons of German to be in 
Afghanistan was its geopolitical importance in this region.^' 
In time of war, this Afghan connection was regarded with even greater 
suspicion by the British; Kabul was full of hostile embassies so nervous were the 
British about the harmful influence the Axis powers could have at Kabul and 
indirectly on the frontier, that presence of any foreigners on the frontier was 
regarded with the utmost suspicion.^^ 
World war II provided the motivation for the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Afghanistan when, in 1942, the German 
advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran would 
be denied to Allies. Eastern Iran or Western Afghanistan were considered as ideal 
locales for an alternate route, and a U.S. presence in Kabul was seen as an essential 
prerequisite for securing this route. On 6 June 1942, Comelius Van Engert became 
the U.S. first resident ambassador in Afghanistan, even though the German defeat at 
Stalingrad meant that Afghanistan was not needed as a supply route for the Allies."^ 
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Thus during World War II, Afghanistan maintained a policy of strict 
neutrality. The government in Kabul realized that its alignment either with Axis or 
Allied powers could endanger the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan. 
The Afghan policy of strict neutrality won appreciation and recognition from the 
victorious Allied powers.^ '^  The neutrality remained constant throughout the war, 
although it was strained by an Allied demand, made in the fall of 1941, for the 
expulsion of all Axis nationals. Not only was this ultimatum a blow to national 
pride, but it demanded the violation of one of Afghanistan's strongest traditions-the 
law of hospitality, many of the Afghan leaders advocated resistance, but Hashim 
Khan (one of uncles of Zahir Shah ) saw the situation more clearly; the fate of Reza 
Shah Pahlavi in Iran was an object lesson.^' 
Thus so far, we have seen that the advent of US-Afghan relations before the 
Second World War commenced on the basis of mutual desire for friendship and 
cordiality. Prior to First World War, both the United States and Afghanistan were 
pre occupied with their regional and domestic roles. Random efforts were made by 
both the countries to forge closer relations. The subsequent period especially 1930s 
and 1940s marked a watershed in US-Afghan relations when both side reciprocated 
positively to each other's friendly gestures. The beginning of 1940 was marked by 
establishment of relations between Washington D.C. and Kabul at ambassador level. 
By this time, the Second World War concluded, the US-Afghan relations had been 
foimded on very firm basis.^^ 
B. United States and Afghan's Modernization and Economic Development 
The U.S. involvement in modernization and economic development of 
Afghanistan can be traced back to the reign of king Habibullah whose contribution 
to the process of modernization was not substantial, despite his personal fascination 
for Western technical inventions. His father had set up workshops with foreign help 
to manufacture shoes, soup and other articles for his harem and the ladies of the 
court. He had hired foreign technicians and advisers to assist in introducing new 
technology in some limited fields, such as mining. Habibullah commissioned an 
American engineer to build the country's first hydroelectric plant, to supply power 
to palaces and public buildings in Kabul. To indulge in his passion for motor cars, 
he had also built a road. But the plan got a set back as the Worid War I broke out.^ ^ 
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Thus during Habibullah's reign we do not see any major breakthrough in the 
Afghan's modernization and its economic relations with the U.S. 
During the reign of king AmanuUah (1919-1929) Afghanistan gained 
independence from British colony as a result of the third Anglo-Afghan war of 
1919, and the king sought to open up diplomatic relations with the major powers of 
the world. In addition, the king desperately needed expertise to develop his 
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modernization projects. The United States had shown no interest in establishing 
diplomatic relations with Afghanistan following its independence. A variety of 
factors contributed to this reluctance, the foremost being the view that Afghanistan 
was still within the British sphere of influence. In addition, Afghanistan was not 
seen as a market for U.S. exports or as a source of strategic raw materials. It is also 
true that most Americans had little or no knowledge of the country, and there was 
no public interest in the region. Washington therefore had to rely on Britain for 
information about the area, and the British government had no desire to encourage 
U.S. competition in Afghanistan. 
In 1921, a delegation from Afghanistan, led by Wall Muhammad, visited 
Washington with the objective of establishing diplomatic relations with the United 
States. But no result was achieved. Amanullah had hoped to avoid his country's 
dependency on Britain and the Soviet Union by introducing the United States as a 
balancing third power and as a provider of western know-how to further his policy 
of modernization.^^ However, during king Amanullah's reign no major 
breakthrough in Afghan-US economic relations was achieved.^ '^  
The Afghan efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Europe yielded 
some result. In 1923, the German Minister plenipotentiary, Fritz Grobba, was sent 
to Kabul, and it was clear that Afghanistan and Germany had mutual interests, as 
the king desperately needed expertise to develop his modernization projects. 
Germany offered to provide industrial hardware and skilled engineers and 
technicians at highly competitive rates. The commercial relations between the two 
countries developed through a consortium of German companies. But due to one or 
other reasons other European powers did not show any interest in theses 
modernization projects.^' 
Further more, on January 5, 1928, Amanullah left for Europe. In Italy he 
negotiated about arms purchase, bought 150 fiat cars and arranged for Italian 
engineers to be sent to Afghanistan which he wanted to modernize at the earliest. 
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And from Italy he went to France where he signed a treaty with France for some 
projects, ordered consignments of rifles and ammunition, arranged for more Afghan 
students to come to France and more French teachers for Afghan schools. 
Amanuliah then moved to Germany where he signed a preliminary agreement for 
giving concessions to German and French firms to build railways in Afghanistan. 
He also placed orders for 200 cars and two aircrafts for starting an Afghan civilian 
air service, an idea which the Germans enthusiastically welcomed.^ ^ 
After dawn fall of king Amanuliah Nadir Shah became the king of 
Afghanistan. Nadir Shah and his successors were more successful in encouraging 
the growth of an alternative source of state revenue, through direct and indirect 
taxes on joint-stock companies, these companies were chiefly engaged in trade, 
organizing the export of the valuable karakul sheep skins fi"esh and dried fi^aits, 
cotton and wool. They operated largely under the aegis of the private Bank-i-melli, 
established by the leading Afghan entrepreneur, Abdul Majid Zabuli. It was Zabuli 
who, as minister of national economy, had visited Washington in 1948 to seek U.S. 
assistance in the financing of a modest development plan.^ ^ At the same time, 
Afghanistan made fiirther overtures to the United States and tried to do more 
commerce with U.S. companies. However, Britain negated some of the 
attractiveness of these commercial agreements by creating problems in term of 
access fi-om Indian ports, insisting that all goods had to be transported by Indian 
railways, even vehicles capable of proceeding under their own power.''"^  
In July 1934, after the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United 
State's recognition of the Soviet Union, a note went to the U.S. Department of State 
suggesting that it might be well to strengthen the political and economic relations 
with Afghanistan. But it was not until 1936 that the United States charge d affaires 
in Iran visited Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of fiiendship. No diplomatic 
mission was set up, however, the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan 
through British offices. Same year the Afghan government demonstrated its 
confidence in American altruism by granting a 75 year concession to the Inland 
Exploration Company of New York for the development of Afghanistan's presumed 
petroleum deposits, the first and only time that such a concession had been given. 
But the threat of war made American investors reluctant and in 1939 after a few 
preliminary soundings the Inland Exploration Company gave up its concession.^' 
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Under this agreement the American company had acquired the rights of 
exploring oil in Afghanistan. This agreement was quite useful for the company. 
Reports indicated that German foreign office and Berlin based Soviet Ambassador 
made frantic efforts for thwarting the conclusion of this agreement. Seeing that their 
efforts in thwarting the conclusion of the said agreement could not succeed, the 
Soviets adhered, to other techniques of pressurizing Afghanistan. Consequently, 
Moscow laid claim over Afghan territory along the Afghan-Soviet border, which 
was refuted by the then Afghan government. 
After American company had concluded oil exploration agreement with Iran 
and Afghanistan the Afghan Ambassador in Moscow told the former that the Soviet 
officials were aimoyed because of having not been consulted by Tehran and Kabul 
in cormection with conclusion of such an important agreement. Such an attitude by 
the Soviet might have been governed by the fact that as they regarded some area of 
both Iran and Afghanistan reportedly under Soviet influence and under these 
circumstances they could not afford to be ignored. 
Because of these reasons, the Soviet did not allow transition facilities to 
Afghanistan. There also existed no treaty or agreement between Moscow and Kabul 
in this regard. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow is on record of having said that 
it would have been better if the American did not use Russian rail transport for 
supplying their material to Afghanistan, otherwise Moscow could exert pressure on 
Afghanistan. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow further told that Russia was not 
prepared to provide transition facilities through its territory because Moscow was 
trying to impose a trade agreement on Afghanistan which was detrimental to the 
latter's interests.^^ 
Even the global situation was not conducive for foreign investments during 
that period. By 1938, the possibilities of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe had 
become almost certain. The Inland Company thought that, in the event of war, oil 
field in Afghanistan could be vulnerable to Soviet or Iranian attack and only British 
help could save them. The US decision served a blow to Afghanistan's policy of 
seeking support, services, and investments from distant countries which were, it was 
hoped, politically disinterested in Afghan affairs. Seeing the US disinterest in large-
scale and long-term investments, Afghanistan became detenmined to refiise 
concessions to the Russian and British nationals into the country in significant 
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numbers, and thought of rather relying on Germany, Itahan, Japanese and Czech 
investments and technicians.^^ 
The outbreak of World War II had adverse effect on Afghan economy. Due 
to war the exports of karakul to the western countries from Afghanistan had almost 
stopped. At this crucial juncture, the United States came to Afghanistan's rescue 
and helped the latter in exporting Karakul to American markets. In December 1942, 
the State Department of the United States mooted the idea of constructmg a road 
passing through India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Russia to reach China with a 
view to supply material to China through road transport. Consequently, one Gordon 
Bowles, a US citizen was sent to India to explore the feasibilities of such a plan. But 
Soviet refused to permit any American national even for survey purpose in its 
territory; consequently, Washington shelved this plan. 
In April 1944, John L. Savage, an engineer belonging to the United States 
Bureau of Land Reclamation paid a visit to Afghanistan with a view to help the 
latter in devising irrigation plans. In 1945, many countries signed an interim 
agreement with the United States pertaining to international civil aviation matters. 
The purpose of this agreement was to establish an international organization for 
civil aviation. Afghanistan also signed this agreement. During the same year, the US 
Ambassador in Kabul presented a memorandum to the government of Afghanistan 
urging the latter to bring the production of opium in that country under strict control 
for exclusive use in medicine and other scientific purposes. The Afghtm government 
accepted the American request, and declared that it was going to ban the production 
of Opium from 21 March 1945. Later the World War II helped in cementing the 
bonds of friendship between Washington and Kabul.^* 
II. U.S.-Afghan relations after the end of the World War II 
After the end of World War II United States of America had emerged as the 
world leader. The Soviet Union had survived the war. It also resulted into the end of 
British and was quietly preparing to leave India forever.*^ It was the tnne when the 
Monroe Doctrine had become an intellectual lodestone for U.S. policy makers 
seeking to stabilize the Middle East after 1945. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a 
region whose strategic importance was fast becoming unparalleled, the White House 
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agreed in March 1947, to assume Britain's long-standing commitments in Greece 
and Turkey under the auspices of Truman Doctrine.''*' 
After World War 11 the shattered and broken British, German, France and 
other imperialist powers receded. The Americans began to advance the theory of 
"filling the power vacuum". The US was interested in acquiring influence in 
Afghanistan more especially because it was strategically important for the post- war 
Western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. It had a key position in 
any military advance toward the Soviet Union whether from Iran or from Pakistan. 
Attempts were therefore, made to draw the country into the new military pact, 
Baghdad treaty.^' The Afghans quickly realized that the power of Great Britain as a 
barrier against Soviet expansion had been replaced by that of the United States of 
America. The reputation of the United States then enjoyed in Asia for its position on 
imperialism was still important from the Afghan point of view. 
A. The U.S. as a balancing power 
In the post-World War II period Afghanistan first tried to keep balanced 
relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, which now replaced Britain 
as the leading Western power. ^ ^ In the countries lying between the Turkish straits 
and the Himalayas, the United States had largely taken over Great Britain's historic 
policy of curbing Russian expansion in the direction of the Mediterranean, the 
Persian Gulf and the plains of India. As the decline of British power in the area 
became more apparent the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry had broadened into an 
opposition - animated by somewhat altered conceptions on both sides. The primacy 
of American responsibilities in Western Asia was formalized by the commencement 
of the Greek-Turkish aid program in 1947. In Iran and Afghanistan it was signalized 
by no such dramatic event, but American involvement perceptibly increased as 
British influence waned. ^ '' 
In the period 1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain balanced relationship 
with Soviet Union and the United States, engaging both in its economic and 
infrastructural development. It refused to join the chain of anti-Soviet alliances 
forged under American initiative; a military alliance between Kabul and 
Washington was forbidden under the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931, which was still 
in force. Immediately after World War II, however, the Afghan king appeared to be 
looking up to the United States as a protector of its independence from a Soviet 
threat. The imminent withdrawal of British imperial power from the Indian 
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subcontinent left Afghanistan without its traditional policy of balancing Russian 
influence with British.''^ Further more, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the 
Indian peninsula has changed the relationship and has altered any ability of 
Afghanistan to play one side against the other. The country's willingjtiess to accept 
aid and support from the United States represented the desire to find an alternative 
against Soviet pressures.^^ 
As the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmad Khan, son of king Zahir Shah, 
declared in 1946 that he was: "Convinced that America's championship of the small 
nations guarantees my country's security agamst aggression. America's attitude is 
our salvation. For the first time in our history we are free of the threat of great 
powers' using our mountain passes as pathways of empire. Now we can concentrate 
our talents and resources on bettering the living conditions of our people." Though 
the American response was initially lukewarm it changed significantly after the 
promulgation of the Truman Doctrine. Consequently, between 1949 and 1979, 
Afghanistan received massive American economic aid.^ ^* 
B. The U.S. policy of containment and Afghanistan 
Soon after World War II, the cold war developed between the Soviet Union 
and its former allies. ^ ^The United States and the Soviet Union both fought on the 
side of the allies during World War II. But after the war, the two countries became 
bitter enemies. The Soviet Union, as a communist country, opposed democracy. It 
helped communists take control of most of the countries of Eastern Europe and also 
aided communists who seized control of China. 
The Soviet Union and China then set out to spread communism to other 
lands. The United States as the world's most powerftil democratic nations was 
threatened by communist take-over. And hence the containment of communism 
became the major goal of U.S. post-war foreign policy.^ ^ 
Cold war is the term used to describe the intense rivalry that had existed 
since the end of World War II between groups of communist and non-communist 
nations. On the one side were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its 
communist allies, often referred to as the Eastern bloc. On the other side were the 
United States and its democratic allies, usually referred to as Western bloc. The 
struggle was called the cold war because it had not actually led to fighting or hot 
war on a wide scale. The cold war has been charactenzed by mutual distrust. 
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suspicion, and misunderstanding by both the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and their allies. The United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand 
communism throughout the world. The Soviet meanwhile, charged the United 
States with practicing imperialism and with attempting to stop revolutionary activity 
in other countries. The United States wanted a world of independent nations based 
on democratic principle. 
Though the cold war did not begin until the end of World War II, in 1945 the 
U.S.-Soviet relations had been strained since 1917. In that year, a revolution in 
Russia established a communist dictatorship there. During the 1920's and 1930"s, 
the Soviet called for world revolution and the destruction of capitalism, the 
economic system of the United States.^ *^  Furthermore, the Soviet leaders viewed 
capitalism as the chief obstacle to humanity's liberation. From the veiy moment the 
corrununists seized power in Russia they defined capitalist states as enemies. Since 
the Soviet defined the capitalist states as foes, the relationship between it and them 
would be marked by conflict until the victory of what the Soviet call socialism and 
the defeat of capitalism. The Soviet relafionship with them was one of constant 
struggle." 
During World War II, many communists fought alongside the allies, some of 
which were colonial powers. But after the war, the communists called for an end to 
colonialism and sought power for themselves. In 1941, during World War II, the 
Soviet Union joined the Western Allies in fighting against Germany, it seemed 
possible that a lasting fiiendship might develop between the United States and the 
Soviet Union based on their war time cooperation. However, major differences 
continued to exist between the two, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. As a 
result of these differences the United States adopted a '"get tough'" policy toward the 
Soviet Union after the war ended. The Soviets responded by accusing the United 
States and the other capitalist allies of the West of seeking to encircle the Soviet 
Union so they could eventually overthrow its communist form of government.^^ 
And the United States began to advance the theory of "filling the power vacuum". 
The US was interested in acquiring influence in Afghanistan more especially 
because it was strategically important for the post-war western policy of encircling 
and rolling back communism. It had a key position in any military advance towards 
the Soviet Union whether fi-om Iran or from Pakistan.*'' 
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American initiative evolved gradually during 1946-1947 and was 
precipitated by Stalin"s attempt to extend Soviet influence beyond Eastern Europe, 
and then the Soviets began moving forward the Persian Gulf and into the 
Mediterranean Greece. Turkey and Iran were the first to feel Soviet pressure. The 
pressure on Iran began in 1946, when the Soviets refused to withdraw their troops 
from that country. These troops had been there since late 1941, when the Soviet 
Union and Britain had invaded Iran to forestall increased Nazi influence. The 
Soviets had occupied northern Iran and the British the central and southern sections. 
When the British withdrew, the Soviets sought to convert Iran into a Soviet satellite. 
During this period the Soviet Union also exerted pressure on Turkey. By 
now, the United States was convinced that the Soviet goal was nothing less than 
domination of Turkey and fulfillment of the historic Soviet ambition to control 
Constantinople and gain access to the Mediterranean. Control of turkey, of course 
would have left Moscow in a better position to intimidate Iran and Greece. The 
Soviet Union was also demanding military base in Turkey*^ the proximity of the 
Soviet union was something that Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were never allowed 
to forget, and there were signs that Moscow might be planning a more determined 
bid for the favour of the Arab peoples than it had seen fit to make while the fate of 
Palestine was in the balance. ^  
After World War II The Soviet Union not only moved to Middle East but 
before the war ended, the Soviet union had already absorbed three nations along the 
Baltic sea- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The communism also gained strength in 
the far East. The Soviet Union had set up a communist government in North Korea 
after the war. In China, Mao Zedong's communist after replacing Chiang Kai-
Sheik's nafionalist armies had joined the communist world bloc.^ ^ In all these 
situations, the American government was once more confi"onted with the need to 
support Britain the tradifional guardian of area.^ ^ 
At the same time United Stated being conscious of the oil of the Middle East 
being occupied by Soviet, began to think about the doctrine of containment for the 
security of Middle East as Britain had reluctantly begun its slow motion retreat fi-om 
the region giving chance to U.S. to promote its interest in the region.^"l t was in the 
years after World War I that Americans first became conscious of the oil of Middle 
East; Bridsh and French interests were on the ground first. In Southern Iran the 
British, through the Anglo-lranian oil company, attained and held a monopoly; but 
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in Iraq and in the little Sheikdom of Kuwait American companies won a part 
interest, and in Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Island field, they secured complete 
control. World War II, with its terrific drain on the petroleum resources of United 
States and Caribbean fields, emphasized the dependence of Western Europe, and 
even perhaps the future dependence of the United States, on the Middle East. 
Washington knew the importance of Middle Eastern oil which was 
evidenced in the plan, proposed in 1944, but finally set aside, to build pipeline from 
the Arabian field to the Mediterranean. The U.S. was also aware of the danger of 
Soviet to seeking influence in the region. The Soviet troops had remained in 
northern Iran after the end of Second Worid War had been withdrawn only as a 
result of pressure applied through the United Nations. At the Potsdam Conference 
(1945) and later, the Soviet had asked a trusteeship in the Mediterranean and a 
major share in control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Denied these requests by 
western governments, the Russian had pressed Turkey for a new regime for the 
straits and for cession of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan at the eastern end of the 
black sea. At the same time, the communist were seeking to control of Greece 
through aid to native guerillas and infiltration. It was these communist pressures, 
and Great Britain's confessed inability to give fiirther aid in resisting them that led 
to the setting forth of the Truman Doctrine and the granting of American aid to 
Greece and Turkey. The Middle East and Gulf oil countries were so important for 
both U.S. and Russia that each tried its best to control this region and to be under its 
sphere through political or military alliance. 
After 1945 U.S. defined the Soviet Union as a mortal threat to the United 
States and that dictated global vigilance against Russian-backed communist 
subversion. U.S. policymakers from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter waged a cold 
war against the Kremlin from the sun-drenched shores of the Eastern Mediterranean 
to the snow capped mountains of Afghanistan. Some historians point to the Red 
Army's belated departure from Iran in early 1946 and to its sudden arrival in Kabul 
in late 1979 as proof of Moscow's unwavering drive to dommate the Middle East.^ ^ 
According to Tucker one of the major turning points in U.S. foreign policy 
after World War II was the containment policy which became a capsule 
characterization of post-war American policy toward the Soviet Union. The main 
aim of this policy was containing wherever possible the expansion of Soviet 
influence as well as the expansion of communism in general or a policy of moderate 
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containment that may prove inadequate to sustain the power and discipline even to 
protect interests on which United States essential security depends.^ 
The cold war complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan because, in its 
quest for allies to contain the Soviet Union, the United States would not guarantee 
to protect Afghanistan against Soviet aggression. It preferred to deal with Pakistan 
for the defense of the Indian subcontinent. As a consequence, Pakistan became a 
member of the Baghdad Pact, and Afghanistan was forced to adopt a policy of 
positive neutrality, which gradually led to a growing dependence on the Soviet 
Union. However, the United States continued to provide assistance lo Afghanistan 
via loans and grants of $286 million between 1950 and 1971, with an emphasis on 
aid for communications infrastructure, education, and agriculture. But it did not 
provide military support to guarantee Afghanistan's independence. "* According to 
Frank A. Clements, the Afghans were dismayed that the United States repeatedly 
refused to provide Afghanistan with arms - a decision motivated by the belief that 
such assistance was more likely to be used against Pakistan as both Afghan and 
Pakistan having clash over Pustunistan issue.'^ 
According to Gorge B. Cressey, if Afghanistan appeared remote, and 
perhaps unimportant, its problems were nevertheless real to the Afghans. It is well 
to remember that this country, along with Turkey and Iran, represented almost the 
only section of the entire Soviet frontier where there was no cushion of buffer of 
satellite communist states. In his view Afghanistan's significance to the free world 
should not be undervalued.^^ 
C. The U.S. and Pushtimistan issue 
After the partition of India a new Muslim state of Pakistan was formed. 
This new states faced with a serious problem of linguistic provincialism especially 
among the speakers of Pashto (pushto, pakhtu) who wanted that their entire area, 
which lies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, to be a single political unit.^ ^ But Pakistan 
announced its "one unit"' plan calling for the merger of the provinces of West 
Pakistan. This decision disturbed the Afghans, to whom the elimination of the North 
West frontier province seemed part of a move to destroy the identity of the eastern 
Pushtun. And undoubtedly this was one of the motives behind the plan, for incipient 
sectionalism remained Pakistan's most serious problem.'^ While, Afghanistan came 
to be substantially synonymous with the Pushtunistan issue, the argument that all of 
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Pushtun areas of Pakistan should belong to Afghanistan, or at least be independent, 
claiming that a large chunk of Northwest Pakistan belongs rightfully to Afghanistan. 
The Pushtunistan issue had been an important item in Afghanistan politics for 
years. "^ ° Afghanistan had long standing claim to the Pushto-speaking areas of 
Pakistan. The Afghan ruler in 1949 denounced the frontier agreements with the 
departed British and demanded that the Pushtunistan speaking areas in Pakistan be 
given independence as a sovereign state of Pushtunistan. In response, Pakistan 
closed the border, on which Afghanistan depended heavily for imports. Thus ensued 
a verbal war of attrition between the two Muslim neighbors. The United States, 
considering Pakistan's participation in a chain of military alliances ringing the 
Soviet Union could not but turn down Afghan requests for military aid. 
The United States, the new colonialist power, seemed to be more interested 
in geography than history. Its aid to the new states was not intended for the 
establishment of democratic institutions or the solution of regional problems, but to 
create a military line-up against the Soviet Union through defense-treaties. Pakistan 
was an early recruit to his crusade against communism.'°' After World War II, the 
United States, as the world's most powerful democratic nation was threatened by 
communist takeover. The containment of communism became the major goal of 
U.S. post-war foreign policy.'°^ The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over 
Pushtunistan issue, brought the two sides very close to a major war, on the one 
hand, and plunged Afghanistan into a serious economics crisis, on the other. 
Meanwhile Afghanistan quickly realized that while Moscow was prepared to side 
with Afghan on the crisis and to provide him an expensive alternative air transit 
route, it was disinclined to support Afghan in a war, for two main reasons: first, 
Pakistan by now was militarily far more powerful than Afghanistan and Afghan 
defeat could land the Soviets in a major regional conflict, from which the USA, as 
an ally of Pakistan, could not remain aloof, second, as the Afghan-Pakistan crisis 
peaked, with no solution in sight despite an offer of mediation by the Shah of Iran, 
Moscow found itself embroiled in a more dangerous confrontation with the USA 
(the Cuban missile crisis), the fallout from which prompted Soviet caution over the 
ensuing months.'°^ 
Pakistan retaliated by putting impediments in the way of Afghanistan's 
imports and exports, a large proportion of which went through the port of Karachi. 
Afghanistan, for its part, indulged in spasms of anti-Pakistani and anti-British 
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feeling, accused the U.K. of encouraging Pakistan's hostile attitude, and evinced 
some dissatisfaction also with the supposed pro-Pakistani sentiments of the United 
States, possibly by way of warning gesture, the Afghan government found 
employment for a group of Russian technicians and received an official Soviet trade 
mission in Kabul.'°'* 
After world war II, the South-Asian state with which the United States 
wished to build a close political -military relationship was Pakistan and it appeared 
to be far more attractive to Americans than Afghanistan or even Iran in the late 
forties as the key nation that could make the United States a key lever in the 
stability and security of the Persian Gulf-South Asian region, and in this major 
policy decision the United States was strongly influenced by the British foreign 
office.'°^ The US, strategists for their part viewed Afghanistan as of negligible 
importance to long-term American interests. Since the USA was already treaty-
bound with Pakistan on military co-operation it did not feel the need to nurture 
Afghanistan. The Afghan government, however, saw a clear need to build up its 
military strength in order to avoid any external incursion into its tenitory and any 
undermining of its national interests. Since it conflict over Pushtunistan with 
Pakistan, various regions in Afghanistan felt the need for a powerful ally. And the 
Soviet Union was a natural choice.'°^ According to Arnold Fletcher, Soviet Union 
had a willingness to support the Afghans against Pakistan over Pushtunistan 
conflicts.'°^ 
United States tried to persuade Afghan to solve the problem of Pushtunistan 
issue with having a talk with Pakistan as US feared that Afghan would turn to 
Soviet helps. In the words of a senior US State Department official: "'we attempted . 
. . to dissuade the Afghans from pressing this issue, since it could have led to war 
with Pakistan and created opportunities for Soviet intervention in both countries.'" 
Iran also tried to persuade Daoud to keep distance from Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union had supported Daoud over Pushtunistan issue.'°^ In 1954, the United States 
concluded a military treaty with Pakistan, and the later joined the chain of 
interlocking alliances forged by Washington to contain Soviet influence. That year 
1953, was also the year of the death of Stalin. By 1954, the Soviet Union had 
entered a new era in foreign and domestic policies with Nikita Khrushchev as leader 
of the CPSU. The Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931 was extended. In 1954 the Soviet 
voiced support for Pushtunistan, thus trying to draw Afghanistan toward its 
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influence as the United States brought Pakistan into own. The Soviets began to 
extend economic aid to Afghanistan.'°^ According to Mary Bradley, after Pakistan 
refused to discuss the fate of their Pushtun subjects the irredentist movement had 
taken on international overtones. American military aid to Pakistan had been cited 
as influencing and fortifying Pakistan's stand. The Russians support to Afghans on 
Pushtun issue encouraged the Afghan government to encourage the movement. 
Soon after the takeover by the Ayub government, tension between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan aggravated after the modernization of Afj^ han army and 
the open support it was receiving from the Soviet Union, reached new heights. In 
the fall of 1960 and again in 1961 open conflict again over Pushtunistan issue. 
(Bajaur fighting ). The Afghans reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with 
Pakistan. Consequently, the end of diplomatic relations closed the border and 
blocked Afghanistan's major shipping route. This caused Afghan to turn to Soviet 
Union, which thus became Afghanistan's sole means of contact with the outside 
world. Although Pakistan's actions were bound to be injurious to American interests 
in the area, its dependence upon United States aid was not sufficient to prevent its 
persisting in them indeed , when the United States protested the use of its planes and 
military equipment in the Bajaur fighting. General Ayub Khan rejected the protest 
closing the border and halted shipments from the United States for its projects in 
Afghanistan, since it refused to avail itself of the Soviet route, with the result that 
the U.S.S.R. gained an enormous advantage over the competition m its economic 
program.'" 
Daoud expected this development to exert pressure on Washington to soften 
Pakistan's opposition on Pushtunistan issue. As Washington remained reluctant to 
mediate, Daoud's tough approach back fired. The result was an escalation in the war 
of words between Kabul and Karachi, on the one hand, and plunged Afghanistan 
into a serious economic crisis, on the other. Meanwhile, Daoud quickly realized that 
while Moscow was prepared to side with him on the crisis and to route,"^ this issue 
had created opportunities for Soviet intervention in Afghan again. 
The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over Pushtunistan issue had 
erupted again, in 1973. The Baluchi provmcial government formed by the 
opposition National Awami Party (NAP) was suspended by the federal prime 
Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the populist leader of the Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP). This action led to an armed insurrection by the Marri and the Mengal tribes 
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in the form of terrorist attacks, one of which took the life of the local PPP leader, 
Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, who was promptly declared a Pushtun martyr of the 
federalist cause. 
The situation in Pakistan held out opportunities for Daoud. He quickly 
established a camp in Kandahar for the training and arming of Baluchi freedom 
•fighters.'"^ The Pakistan People's Party of late Bhutto has taken a softer line on 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and there was evidence of Soviet mterest in 
supporting the PPP. Wall Khan and his supporters had always been believed to have 
a pro-Soviet orientation. The Pakistan army had shown it to be coup-prone and there 
had been reports of successive unsuccessful plots against General Zia. Daoud 
cane more closer to the USSR and increased his support to the Pushtunistan 
movement, so much so that in 1975, Pakistan's Bhutto accused him of training 
15,000 Pushtun and Balochs in Afghanistan for infiltration into the two Pakistani 
provinces - the North West Frontier and Balochistan."^ Bhutto retaliated by 
encouraging Islamic and other anti-Daoud factions to stage armed insurrections in 
1975. These turned out to be uncoordinated and ineffective. They were ferociously 
repressed. Hundreds of Islamists were executed or imprisoned, or fled into exile in 
Pakistan."^ 
In 1976, after Jimmy Carter had entered the White House, American 
diplomacy became somewhat active in Afghanistan. The National Security Council, 
headed by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, devised the concept of regional influence by 
letting Shah of Iran to play a greater role in the intermeshing region of the Persian 
Gulf and South Asia. Afghanistan provided the link between the two even more 
than Pakistan. The Carter administration encouraged the Shah to take over a large 
share of the American burden of policing the strategic region of the Gulf The Shah 
sought to build bridges of friendship with Afghanistan. He wanted the Persian Gulf 
and South Asian regions to be less polarized between the two superpowers, and 
wanted countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to draw a little 
distant from their respective superpower patron. At the superpower level, the Soviet 
Union was trying to persuade the Shah to be less dependent on the United States, 
while the United States pleaded with India and Afghanistan to be 'genuinely non-
aligned" between Washington and Moscow. 
Daoud was also persuaded to be truly non-aligned and was made to realize 
that support for Pushtunistan made him excessively dependent on the Soviet Union. 
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Shah tried to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and was not 
entirely unsuccessflil. Daoud halted Afghan mass media attacks on Pakistan and, in 
1977, was said to be close to reaching an understanding with Bhutto on the basis of 
which he could "expel" the Pushtun and Baloch partisans who had fled to 
Afghanistan and were allegedly being trained by the Afghan army. 
Within the year Daoud was willing to make a momentous bargain with the 
Bhutto government and the late Shah of Iran. The Shah and Bhutto jointly began 
negotiations with the Daoud regime in Kabul and an agreement was finally reached 
between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Daoud was willing to accept the Durand 
line as international boundary in exchange for the Pakistani commitment that it 
would implement the regional autonomy guarantees of its 1973 constitution. The 
carrot of agreement was a massive aid programme to Afghanistan from Iran nearly 
US $3 billion in aid for Kabul. It included a commitment to build a rail line South 
from Kabul through the cities of Kandahar and Heart to the Iranian border directly 
linking Afghanistan to the Gulf ports, thus ending Afghan dependence on trade via 
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Soviet and Pakistani territory. 
In Daoud's strategy, he hoped to obtain economic benefits and more 
propitious regional environment. Daoud and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto exchanged visits in 
1976. The changes in the situation in Pakistan where the elections of 1977 led to Zia 
ul Haq"s successful coup as well as changes within Afghanistan in the end 
prevented the finalization of an agreement. Daoud visited Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, confirming the re-direction of his foreign policy towards the conservative 
states of the region, and his decision to keep his distance from the socialist camp. It 
was in this spirit that he attacked Cuba's adherence to the Soviet line during the 
preparafions for the non-aligned summit of may 1978. These internal and external 
developments m Daoud's foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with 
his communist allies."' 
After down fall of Daoud's regime a Marxist regime came to power. 
Afghanistan raised the controversial issues of Baluchi and Pushtun self -
determination at the 1978 session of the UN General Assembly. The old geopolitical 
tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan were renewed, with the difference that 
there were now in Kabul a Marxist regime potentially more capable of exploiting 
the divisions and discontents in Pakistan's two most sensidve minority ethnic 
provinces, Balochistan and the NWFP. After the movement of Soviet troops into 
27 
Afghanistan for two years Gen. Zia had been asking the United States, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and other countries for money and weapons to halt the spread of Soviet 
influence from the Durand line to the Arabian Sea.'^° Moscow assured Pakistan that 
it had no wish to violate the Durand line, Soviet troops operating in Afghanistan 
scrupulously refrained from crossing the border in pursuit of the Afghan rebels. 
Pakistan denied the Soviet allegation that it was feeding the insurgency and made an 
offer of its cooperation in bringing international peace force to be stationed in 
Afghanistan to see that no foreign power interfere in its internal affairs. 
Major U.S. newspapers agreed that Zia was now seeking some 
accommodation with the Soviets because of his alarm at the possibility of hot 
pursuit, his fear of his complications with India, the Islamic world and the third 
world, and his perception of the inadequacy of the aid amount. In the American 
press there was an understanding of Zia's predicament but little credence in his anti-
Soviet intentions. The Washington Post said that if Zia made Pakistan the American 
surrogate in Southwest Asia, he would expose the smoldering protest movement of 
the Baluchis to Soviet encouragement. The real Soviet threat to Pakistan was not of 
a direct invasion but of 'meddling'. However, Zia was aware about the growth of 
pro-Soviet constituency in the country as well as among Pakistanis living in 
England. This constituency's strongest base was the Baluchis. It was spreading to 
the cadres and supporters of the suppressed Pakistan People's Party and had already 
enlisted its ranking leaders. Intelligence reports reaching New Delhi suggested that 
in the middle and junior ranks of the officers of the Pakistani armed forces, there 
were factions that would heed to Moscow because neither the US nor China had 
given Pakistan a fair price for its friendship.'^^ There were warnings that 
Brezezinki's strategy might prove counterproductive. William Hyland, Kissinger's 
former deputy, for instance, writing in the Strategic Review of fall 1979, said of 
impact of the China card on the Soviet Union: these maneuvers must be viewed in 
the broader context of Soviet global strategy surveying the new quadruple entente. 
The Soviets could easily perceive that one of the gaps in the 'encirclement" was the 
area that the British used to call "the northern tier", the string of Middle Eastern 
states running from Turkey to Afghanistan (more recently termed the "arc of crisis". 
The Soviet seemed to have made a strategic decision to exploit this gap. Their 
moves included the remarkable new relationship with Afghanistan; the switch in 
support from Somalia to Ethiopia and the related intervention with Cuban troops. 
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the signing of a friendship treaty with Turkey in June 1978, the Soviet - inspired 
coup in South Yemen in the same month, and some probing for an accommodation 
with Pakistan.'^^ 
The Soviet entry into Afghanistan in December 1979 created a new situation 
and increased the interest of the Soviets and the United States in this area which 
now had assumed strategic importance.'"'* It is known to have unexplored mineral 
resources of copper, fluorite, limestone and oil. It is estimated that known gold 
deposits in Balochistan exceed the value of twelve billion dollars, and the proven 
Iron-ore deposits are in excess of twenty-three millions tons. It has the reserves to 
expand considerably its existing production of namral gas, coal, limestone, 
magnetite, marble, sulphur and barite. Balochistan has a coastline of 750 miles. Its 
port of Gwadar which, because of Chinese help in its development has acquired 
greater importance is barely some 250 miles from the straits of Hormuz, the focal 
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point in the oil route from the Russian Gulf to Western Europe and The East. By 
1981 the great powers" policy towards Balochistan became clear. The United States, 
after the induction of President Reagan's Republican administration, decided to 
prop up Zia ul Haq's regime with military and economic aid and use Afghanistan as 
a lever to bleed the Soviet Union the way the later had bled the United States in 
Vietnam. The United States did not wish to see the Soviets increase their influence 
in Balochistan and took comfort in the thought that communist cadres or 
communism had made no inroads into the feudal pattern of Baloch Society. 
D. The U.S. aid programme to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan 
Large scale foreign aid began during World War II (1939-1945). From the 
early 1940s to the mid 1960s, the United States gave or lent about $140 billion in 
foreign aid. At one time or another, almost every country in the world has received 
U.S. aid since World War II. About a third of all U.S. aid has gone to help other 
nations build up their armed forces and to build up national wealth and income in 
poor countries. The threat of communism changed the emphasis in foreign aid. 
Americans were concerned about the communist take-over in China in 1949, the 
Korean War in 1950"s and increasing cold war tensions between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. To stop the spread of communism, the United States had 
found the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) and pledged military aid to 
NATO members. It gave military and economic aid to developing countries facing 
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Soviet or Chinese pressure. The United States gave mutual security aid to those 
countries which considered being of major political importance. The Soviet Union 
also embarked upon the policy of military and economic aid. It provided aid to 
several countries, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, India, North Korea, and 
Vietnam.'"^ 
The underlying objective of the U.S. aid operations in the developing world 
was not only to save them from communism, but to retain them under their own 
thumb by keeping their leases on the soil and by exerting, through aid, all - round 
poUtical, economic and military pressure on them. From 1949 to 1985, the US 
government spent more than $100,000 million on arms, military equipments and 
ammunitions in 86 countries. 
The loans were used to interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient 
countries. They are usually granted on the condition.'^^ In cold war period the third 
world became competition place of superpowers in 1950s when the USSR first bid 
for allies and client states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America the superpower had 
wrested for influence through program of military and economic assistance, 
Afghanistan was one under Soviet influence.'^^ 
The auspicious rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
being fought out through competition in the field of aid, and at least in the short 
term Afghanistan gained the benefit. From 1950 relations between the great powers 
were regulated by an informal agreement between the Soviets and the Americans 
which defined their zone of influence, respectively to the North and South of the 
Hindu Kush. As U.S. was alarmed by the speed of Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan Washington attempted to counter it by expending its economic aid to 
the country, which by 1979 amounted $520 million in total. Much of the money was 
spent on infrastructural projects proved to be beneficial to the Afghans, and it 
enabled the USA to secure enduring leverage in Afghanistan. The two American 
projects an international air port in Kandahar and an agro-irrigational venture in 
Helmand turned out to be prohibitively expensive white elephants. The United 
States failure to provide military aid and to mediate actively in the Afghan-Pakistan 
dispute, the very two areas that Moscow had deftly used to penetrate in Afghan. '^' 
In the same, Soviet desired to counter the activity of the Ifnited States in 
Afghanistan, where it was a potential threat to the sensitive area of Soviet Central 
Asia. Another motive was the desire to put pressure upon Pakistan, and thus to 
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render its United States bases more vulnerable. Soviet aid to Afghanistan was to 
stimulate an anti imperialist movement and it was directed against the expansion of 
these monopolies in the East. The Soviet Union usually made capital investment and 
provided military assistance. The United States had indeed provided capital to 
Afghanistan, but this had been in the form of loans and grants rather than capital 
investment while American military assistance had been negligible. 
It seems likely that the extent of Soviet aid to Afghanistan was a practical 
rather than ideological attempt to tie the developing Afghan economy to that of the 
Soviet Union. The extent of Soviet aid and the closing of the Afgham export-import 
route through Pakistan brought about a major shift in Afghanistan trade with most 
of Afghanistan's exports and import going to or through the U.S.S.R. Some western 
observers pointed out that Afghanistan had become so economically dependent on 
the Soviet Union that the latter could establish political control if it chose.^ ^^ There 
can be no doubt that the beginning of Soviet aid to Afghanistan was what chiefly 
fostered the interest of the United States in the country, and the creation of what 
Henry A. Byvoade, American ambassador to Afghanistan from 1959 to 1961, had 
called an economic "Korea". In this new economic battleground of the cold war, the 
USSR has had the advantages of proximity to Afghanistan. The USSR quickly 
agreed to finance the paving of the streets of Kabul, a relatively, inexpensive 
project, after the United States had refused to do so.'^^ 
Though the US denied giving military aid to Afghanistan but it had provided 
aid in other fields. Aid fi-om the Americans had been generally in the field of 
communications,'^'' infi-astmcture, education, and agriculture.'''"' Education aid 
programme included grants to Afghan students to study at American universities.'^^ 
The US-Afghan relations in field of educafion had begun in the early of 1930's 
when Afghan students began to go to smdy in the United States. By 1935 Afghan-
American diplomatic relations were established, and in 1942 an American 
delegation was opened in Kabul. In 1946 the Ministry of Education, admiring 
American methods and achievements, decided to introduce to some extent, 
American educafional methods. The United States has been active ever since in 
numerous aspects of Afghan education.'^'' 
Kabul University opened a faculty of medicine in 1932 during the reign of 
king Nadir Shah. Other faculties were established in 1946. The institute of 
education created in 1955, to assist the Ministry in many phases of planning and 
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improving teaching technique. One young member of the Royal family, who 
worked at the institute, visited to the United States on a tour of American schools 
and colleges. Following this visit the Ministry of Education made major decisions 
regarding the budget, inspection of schools and general maintenance. At the institute 
they worked with members of the Columbia University teacher college team, first 
through a training program, followed by a term abroad for further study. Then they 
returned to become full-fledged members of the institute.'^^ In addition, American 
aid was also sought in the field of education through the US Department of State. A 
number of teachers were recruited for service in Afghanistan, usually on three year 
contracts most of these were assigned to Habibia, the oldest and largest of Afghan 
schools, although a few went to conservative Kandahar. Dr. Paul Bushnell, 
professor of education at Wooster College, Ohio, was chosen to direct Habibia 
College, which soon had fourteen American instructors, including four women.' 
In the 1950s and 1960s when Kabul University grew rapidly, many of the 
departments, called faculties, were supported and staffed by foreign universities. 
The faculty of medicine, for instance, was aided and staffed early on by Lyon 
University, France, agriculture by the University of Wyoming, fi-om 
USA. Economics (1957, Bochumbonn), education (1962, Columbia University, 
USA which also sponsored the Ibn Sina teacher training institute in Kabul) and 
Engineering (1963, US engineering team, formed by a consortium of nine US 
institution.)'"*' By 1962 over one thousand Afghans had received some American 
education. These students had been sent to The United States under the auspices of 
their own government. In addition, the international cooperation administration, and 
private foundations as the American Friend of the Middle East, with assistance fi^om 
the US government, had signed contracts with Columbia and Wyoming Universities 
to bring a number of American teachers to Afghanistan, some of these were 
assigned to the Afghan School of Vocational Education ( Originated by an 
American , Richard Soderburgh), and others to the University of Kabul, the 
technological institute, and the teacher training School.'''^ 
In field of transport aid programme US funds had helped in launching 
Ariana the first Afghan Airline which operated between the major Afghan cities, 
with flight to Delhi, Beirut, Mecca, Tehran, Prague, and Frankfort.'''^ This was 
supported by a US company of Pan-American World Airways which had held a 49 
percent interest in Ariana Airlines since 1957.''*'* Another U.S. aid in the field of 
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transport was for building canals and some 450 kilometers of inter-project 
highways.''*^ The vast new network of roads to the south and south -west was built 
by American companies.'"*^ The US also built a highway between Kabul and 
Kandahar and an ambitiously modem airport in Kandahar that turned out to be a 
white elephant.''*^Another aid form was agriculture project which US offered 
instead to finance new contracts for an American engineering firm that had been 
commissioned by the Afghan government in 1946 to assist in the planning and 
implementation of a muhi-purpose agricultural project in the Helmand valley. On 
November 24, the U.S. Export-Import Bank armounced that it was authorizing a $21 
million line of credit to finance hydraulic and irrigation works in southwestern 
Afghanistan's Helmand River valley.'"*^ This project started first by the Afghans 
alone and later employing Japanese technical assistance, to reclaim the great river 
basin where ancient irrigation systems had been destroyed. It was a controversial 
undertaking which required close to $ 150 million of Afghan and American 
resources during a fifteen year period. In 1946 the Morrison-Knudsen company took 
a $ 17 million contract to construct new and repair existing irrigation dams.' 
Water ft-om dam was to be carried for and wide by a new network of canals-the 
Baghra and Nadir Shah- which in the words of American water men, would 'bring 
water to the thirsty land'.'^' 
Military aid programme- There were many factors that influenced the 
Afghan decision to seek military aid fi-om the USA. Afghanistan had sent a mission 
to make a special plea for the supply of weapons to defend its territory in case of 
Soviet aggression in the wake of the British withdrawal fi-om India sub-continent 
and to maintain internal security against tribal insurrections.'^^ Obviously, the 
existence of large semi-independent groups of well-armed men in the country 
remained a constant threat to the central government. The mischief of which many 
the tribal leaders, particularly the unalterably reactionary mullahs, were capable had 
been amply demonstrated in 1947. In addition, the Afghan leaders feared that the 
tribes east of Durand line might once again be bribed or induced to invade 
Afghanistan, as had happened in the past. These groups believed that Pakistan was 
behind it. '" And Afghan fears regarding the USSR were not without foundation, in 
view of what had occurred since 1945, and what was happening in eastern and 
southern Europe. Furthermore, the communist parties of Asia, with Soviet support, 
appeared to be in the ascendant.''^ As Afghan realized ftilly that, without the 
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powerflil British presence to balance Soviet pressure to the north, their freedom 
would be undermined and that they would be easily crushed by Moscow. Drawing 
from their experience of gi eat game diplomacy, they attempted to negotiate another 
set of deals with the United States to counterbalance their dependence on Soviet 
Union. With this aim in view, in 1954 the government of Prime Minister 
Mohammad Daoud approached the Eisenhower administration in Washington for 
limited military aid to update its vintage and often obsolete military hardware. 
The Afghan government had sought military aid from the United States in 
the hope of modernizing the Afghan army, whose equipment was almost ludicrously 
antiquated. The infantry still carried rifles of Snyder and Lee Enfield type, dating 
from the nineteenth century, and ammunition was so scare and unreliable that few 
soldiers were even able to fire their weapons. The twelve biplanes of which the 
Afghan air force consisted dated from World War I, and the artillery was equally 
antiquated that some of the Pushtun tribes were better armed hardly contributed to 
the stability of the government. 
The consistent reftisal of the United States to provide weapons left 
Afghanistan the only non communist nation on the Sino-Soviet periphery that had 
been so neglected. To the argument that such arms would be used against Pakistan 
rather than the Soviet Union, the Afghans insisted that they had no intention of 
attacking Pakistan. And without question, however much the hostility between 
themselves and Pakistan played apart in their desire for a larger and better equipped 
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army. 
After British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Afghan 
ruling envisaged creating an American military connection as crucial defense 
against Soviet power. Despite its prodigious security assistance efforts elsewhere, 
the Truman Administration remained unimpressed either with Afghanistan's 
sfrategic importance or with the efficacy of American military aid containing Soviet 
expansion in that theater.'^^ These Afghan demands for economic and military 
assistance from the United States were therefore highly political. In their concern to 
maintain their traditional neutrality and independence, the Afghans were only trying 
to bring into partnership, as they had done in the 1930s with Germany, Japan and 
Italy, a geographically remote world power that had the capacity to assist. 
Again in October 1954 Mohammed Naim, the Foreign Minister (and 
Daoud's brother) went to Washington to appeal once again for military assistance. 
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The reply of Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John foster Dulles, was negative. But 
in turn, instead of asking for arms, Afghanistan should settle the Pushtunistan 
dispute with Pakistan. In Dulles's Manichaean world view, Afghan neutrality meant 
non-alignment a status that had no value to him at a time when he was busily 
forming military alliances like SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) to 
contain the Soviet Union. Pakistan had joined SEATO in September 1954. It was to 
adhere to the Baghdad Pact a year later. Pakistan as a potential ally was not to be 
antagonized.'^^ The US did, however, propose to Afghanistan that if it wished to 
obtain American arms, it should join the Baghdad pact. Daoud could not do so 
because of Pakistan's presence in the pact.''^Afghanistan was determined to keep to 
a position of non-alignment or neutrality in its relations with the superpowers. 
However, Washington was particularly uninterested in providing military aid and in 
mediating actively and impartially between Kabul and Karachi. It regarded 
Afghanistan as strategically less important than its two neighbours. In the U.S 
opinion Afghanistan was not of any great importance to the United States nor was 
the United States in a position to dislodge the Soviet Union from the vantage point it 
had achieved since the early fifties. Robert G. Neumann, who was United States 
ambassador to Afghanistan from 1966 to 1973, has recorded that John Foster Dulles 
had turned down Afghan requests for military aid because of the location and poor 
communications of Afghanistan which would require the United States to undertake 
an enormous logistic effort risking an escalation of the cold war with the USSR. 
Neumann's successor, Theodore L. Eliot, jr., gave two additional reasons for the 
conclusion reached by Dulles. The first was the close relations the United States had 
build up with Pakistan. The second was that sending military equipment to 
Afghanistan would so alarm the Soviets that they would make some kind of move 
against Afghanistan. 
It was a formal decline of Daoud"s request led to the latter and his brother 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, not only to feel 
insulted, but also to interpret the rejection as an ominous sign of Washington's 
growmg commitment to Pakistan against Afghanistan (as well as India). A U.S. 
diplomatic observer noted in April 1954 that: a belief is growing in Afghan 
governmental circles that the US has turned its back on Afghanistan. 
Daoud now found it imperative to play their 'Soviet card' by turning to 
Moscow for aid. In essence, Daoud's neutrality in foreign policy clashed with 
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Washington's global resolve to help only those states which were prepared to 
embrace the United States anti-Soviet stance. While, fearing US encirclement and 
the probability of Washington's establishing strategic military bases in Iran and 
Pakistan, the Khrushchev leadership welcomed Afghanistan's request for support in 
1955 and with a long-term view of Soviet interests to exploit the window of 
opportunity presented by the developments in Afghanistan. Moscow not only began 
a generous programme of economic and military aid to Afghanistan, but also 
supported Kabul in its claims against Pakistan. 
The underlying Soviet aims were clear to counter-balance the American 
penetration; to exert pressure on the regional states not to allow the USA to 
establish missile bases on their soil; and to secure a bridgehead in Afghanistan in an 
attempt to strengthen Moscow's bargaining position in the event of fortuitous 
developments in the region. Such development was a distinct possibility in view of 
the regional states fragile social and political structures, historical disputes with 
each other, and involvement with the USA.'^ ^ 
III. United States and Saur revolution 
The so called 'sour revolution' was in fact a military coup carried out by 
leftist officers of the armed forces under the direction of the PDPA. It is generally 
agreed by the two PDPA factions that putsch was planned for the late summer of 
1978.'^In Afghanistan, Parcham and Khalq reunited in July to oppose the regime of 
Daoud Khan. Thus was the rebirth of the PDPA. with Noor Mohammad Taraki and 
Babrak Karmal as its first two front-rank leaders. Reports indicated that the two 
Afghan Marxist groups had reunited under Moscow's pressure. The truth probably 
was that the Marxists themselves realized the need to combine forces to be able to 
defeat Daoud's plans to eliminate their influence in Afghan politics, and the CPSU 
encouraged them to reunite.'^^ 
The conflict between Daoud's government and PDPA began with Daoud's 
foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with his communist allies 
Daoud attempted to make regional agreements, with the aim of accelerating 
Afghanistan's development and bringing it out of its seclusion. In 1976 the country 
took a step toward the recognition of the Durand line as the international frontier. 
This was a move towards abandoning its irredentist ambitions, tending to wards the 
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resolution of the old quarrel with Pakistan. An agreement would have represented a 
decisive change in Daoud's strategy, from which he hoped to obtain economic 
benefits and more propitious regional environment during a visit to Iran the same 
year, Daoud obtained a promise of aid for the construction of a railway in westem 
Afghanistan. The following year, in 1977, Daoud visited Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, confirming the re-direction of his foreign policy towards the conservative 
states of the region and his decision to keep his distance from the socialist camp. 
These internal and external developments in Daoud's foreign policy were destined 
to precipitate his break with his communist allies.'^^ In addition, Daoud's regime 
was in miserable economic shape; a situation which the U.S. government tried to 
exploit. This time, however, interference in Afghanistan was carried out in a 
massive way, and in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, through the then Shah of 
Iran. The Shah offered $ 2 billion in aid to Afghanistan-for a certain price; 
Afghanistan had to move away from being a non-aligned country with close ties to 
the Soviet Union which included military cooperation and training to become a pro-
U.S. country.'^^The tilt that Daoud wanted to introduce in the Afghan non-
alignment had been prevented from the view-point of Washington it was an 
unfriendly act and tantamount to walking into the enemy camp. If you are not with 
us you are against us-that has been the attitude of the USA towards all the nations of 
the world. John Foster Dulles had made it most explicit when he characterized 
nonalignment as inmioral. 
Daoud accepted this conditional aid, and the Shah began to exercise 
increasing power in Afghanistan, especially through his CIA trained secret police, 
SAVAK. In spite of this aid Daoud did not solve his country's economic problems 
and was faced with mounting opposition. He tried to crush this resistance through 
increased repression, carried out largely under the guidance of SAVAK. In early 
April, 1978, one of Afghanistan's popular leftist leaders Mir Akbar Khaiber was 
assassinated by the Daoud regime (the Afghan police were, at the time, trained and 
devised by West German police officers).'^ To this day no proof has come to light 
of the identity of the killers, or whose purposes they were ftil filling - whether the 
murder was done by agents of the Daoud regime, or of the US or Soviet embassies, 
or indeed whether the murder was yet another example of bitter intra-factional 
rivalries inside the Afghan left wing itself But in the highly-charged atmosphere of 
Kabul, the assassination was immediately seized upon as proof positive of 
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American interference, and the left wing was able to mount massive demonstrations 
two days later, at the burial, the biggest ever seen in Kabul, estimated by many 
observers as up to 15,000 strong. A focus of the marchers was the US embassy, 
where slogans against the CIA and imperialism were enthusiastically shouted by the 
youthful mourners.'^° A few days later Daoud had virtually arrested all leftist 
leaders. As they were about to be executed, anti-Daoud section of the Afghan 
military revolted and ousted him. Noor Mohammad Taraki, a civilian, took power, 
and Babrak Karmal became Vice President.'^' 
The Saur revolution of 1978 itself was frowned upon by not only her 
neighbors-Iran and Pakistan, but also by China and the USA. While, the neighbors 
feared that the success of the revolutionary government would encourage similar 
developments within their own countries, Washington and Peking looked upon it as 
a gain for the USSR in this part of the world and sought to reverse it. The US Vice 
President Rockefeller made a significant remark while talking to pressmen in 
Peshawar: '"All this is contrary to our thinking'". Later disclosures clarified the 
frustration of USA because Washington itself had plarmed to overthrow Daoud and 
install his army chief Gulam Hyder Rasooli in his place. The Saur revolution had 
upset the whole plan. 
The April Revolution had led to frantic consultations between Washington, 
Beijing, Tehran and Islamabad. Immediately thereafter the Shah had meeting with 
Pentagon experts about the role of CENTO in the context of Afghanistan 
developments. About the same time the Chinese Foreign Minister paid a visit to 
Tehran and had discussions about doing something in Afghanistan.'^^ hi spite of this 
the other countries 'directly interested in the developments in Afghanistan' were 
found to 'over look these factors'. The specters of a leftist government in Kabul, in 
close relationship with the USSR, Sinha remarked, "appeared to western observers 
and many others as an extension of the Soviet 'menace' advancing Moscow one 
step further in its historical ambition of getting access to the warm waters of the 
Arabian Sea". As a super power the United States of America was obviously 
interested in Afghanistan, the US policy towards Afghanistan, generally speaking 
has been aimed at enabling Afghanistan to avoid being pushed completely into the 
Soviet orbit. It was officially reiterated that the policy of the US toward Afghanistan 
was aimed at 'promoting Afghanistan's independence and her genuine policy of 
non-alignment.' But the kidnapping and killing of Adolph Dubs, US Ambassador to 
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Afghanistan, in Kabul on 14 February by four Afghan terrorists marked a distinct 
worsening of relations between the two countries. This unfortunate incident 
occurred at a time when he US was attempting to placate the moderates in the 
government of Mr. Taraki and 'isolate the extremists' in it. The US policy after that, 
stiffened: ''As a sequel, on 22 Feb., came President Carter's order to severely reduce 
its civil aid programme in Afghanistan.'^^ 
Russia before the October Revolution, was perceived as a rival imperialism 
and, thereafter, as an obstruction to imperialist advance. In its propagtinda the West 
still maintained the myth that the USSR, even after the Revolution was successor 
imperialist and had the same designs in the region as the Czarist Russia had. Its 
fiiendly relations with Afghanistan or with any other country for that matter, had 
always been frowned upon by imperialism whoever developed such friendship or 
cordiality was declared an enemy. That was so with AmanuUah's Afghanistan and 
Jawaharlal Nehru's India. And that was so with Indira Gandhi's India and Kamal's 
Afghanistan.'^'' 
The psychological operations of the Department of the Army, was published 
by the cenfral office of the US army in Washington, had spelt out the details as 
follows: "'Psychological operations are actions designed to influence foreign 
nations. Psychological activities are those carried out in peace time or in place other 
than war theaters, planned and carried out to influence the feelings, attitudes, 
behavior of foreign groups in a manner favorable to the achievements of the policies 
of the United States. The element of psychological warfare can only be developed 
successfiilly if the daily life of the nation is kept in a state of commotion." Strategy 
for this include: (I) create discouragement, demoralization apathy,(2) discredit the 
ideology of the popular movement, (3) promote disorganized and confused 
behavior, (4) encourage divisive and anti-social actions to undermine the political 
structure of the country, (5) promote and support movements of resistance against 
the authorities.'^^ That is why Soviet and Afghanistan recognition of this change (in 
US stance) was marked shortly thereafter by accusations that the resistance was 
being inspired, supplied and even conducted by Americans presumably in concert 
with Pakistanis, Iranians, and Chinese who had already been publicly blamed. 
The anti-Afghan operations, it must be understood was not an isolated 
operation. It had wider ramifications than just curbing the freedom of Afghanistan. 
It was a part of the US aggressive strategy in Asia, components of which were the 
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development of the central command, further militarization of the military regime in 
Pakistan, introduction of the Mossad in Sri Lanka and development of new military 
collaboration with China.'''^ 
After the revolution, it took the Khalqite leadership only seven months- until 
the last week of November 1978 to complete its reforms and get rid of its Parchamit 
rivals.' With the proclamation of the Democratic Afghan republic, the PDPA took 
care to assure the Afghan people that the State would protect their religious faith 
and that they would be free to observe their religious rites and customs. 
Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the 
clergy rose in protest, and by January 1979, the traditional ruling elements-the 
property-holders and the clergy joined together to mobilize large segments of the 
urban-rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist 
regime.'^* The Russians were identified with the repression of the Khalqis. The 
growing dependence of the Taraki regime on Soviet advisers, arms and finance, 
when combined with the openly avowed sympathies of Khalq leaders for the 'Great 
northern neighbors' ( as the Soviet Union was styled) had resulted in popular 
suspicions that Russian communists were now ruling Afghanistan.' 
The reforms, on the other hand, provoked unprecedented tension in the 
countryside. The pressure brought on them forced many tribal chiefs and their 
followers to move into Pakistan where they received with open arms by the 
unpopular Zia-Ul-Haq regime, eager for an anti-communist cause to support and the 
means to consolidate its rule with international assistance. Pakistan also claimed to 
have spent the equivalent of $ 145 million on "humanitarian assistance' to the 
Afghan refiigees. In the meantime the forces of opposition were rallying in Pakistan. 
Eight training camps were established in the North West frontier province to turn 
simple Afghan refiigees into guerrilla fighters.'^'' 
The new government had failed to energize the masses in support of the 
revolution. It had also failed to persuade the United States, China, Pakistan, and Iran 
to end their opposition to the new order in Kabul. While, financial help from the 
United States, other westem countries and Saudi Arabia had dried up, enough 
money had already begun to flow to the regime's enemies. To counter tliese external 
and internal challenges, the regime turned to Moscow.'^' Before Taraki and Amin 
were going to make a new treaty with Soviet a large numbers of Soviet military and 
civilian advisers were already present in the country. Its signature was also a signal 
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to the US and its Pakistani ally that their support of counter-revolutionary forces 
would bring in the Red army.'*^ The Afghan - Soviet treaty of cooperation and 
friendship signed on 5 December 1978 was an offspring of Afghan government's 
military, political, economic cultural, ideological and psychological needs and 
shortcomings. Under one of the treaty's articles, Afghanistan could call on Soviet 
military assistance in its hour of need. 
In 1978 eight training camps had been set up by the new military regime of 
Pakistan to turn simple Afghan refugees into guerillas. According to western 
sources, the number of these armed insurrectionists was around 5,000. They 
attacked Asadabad the principal touTi of the province, and successfully occupied an 
important and strategically located fort.'*'* 
The Soviet foreign policy since the Bolshevik Revolution had been 
dominated by a deep fear of military encirclement. International considerations 
therefore certainly played a part in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. As 
Brezhnev told Pravda after the Soviet invasion, there had been a real threat that 
Afghanistan would lost its independence and be turned into an imperialist military 
bridgehead on our southern border. A more immediate cause for concern was the 
tacit US backing, through its Pakistani and Saudi allies, of the Peshawar-based 
Afghan Islamist parties. The establishment in Iran of a radically Islamic regime that 
was as stridently anti- communist as it was anti American, as well as the prospect of 
an Islamist Afghanistan could have serious repercussions in the contiguous Soviet 
republics of Central Asia where Muslim revivalist movements were gaining 
influence.'*^ In addition, Soviet fear of encirclement had increased during the 
previous few years, following the rapprochement between China and the USA, and 
the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship (August 1978). The year 1979 had 
begun with an invasion on a grand scale - that of Cambodia by Vietnam, the Soviet 
Union's client state in the region. China's response to that challenge was the 
'punishment' of Vietnam, by sending a punitive expedition into Tonkin. 
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was unavoidable if Kabul 
were to be saved from the rebels. In the words of Pravda, 'the fiery ring of counter 
revolution backed actively from abroad became tighter round the capital . . . the 
terse announcement of 27 December stressed the intervention's legitimacy as well 
as objectives. Legitimacy rested on the Soviet - Afghan treaty of 1978. The request 
for military help came from the 'political leadership' of the Saur revolution rather 
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than from the government headed by Amin. The objective was to 'defend the gain 
of the April revolution." and to prevent the imperialist powers from converting a 
'neighborly' country with a border of great length into a bridgehead for penetration 
of imperialist aggression against the Soviet State.'^^ The Soviet fear of fierce 
resistance by Muslim tribesmen to radical and anti - religious reforms had created a 
situation in which it looked as if the Soviet - supported regime might fall, perhaps 
the Soviet feared that the Islamic fundamentalism then sweeping Iran and Pakistan 
might also engulf Afghanistan, which lay between these two countries, creating an 
insecure situation on the Soviets" southern border where it might affect the 
approximately 50 million Soviet Muslims living in the area.'^^The Soviets reiterated 
their determination to defend legitimate interests of national security and a fraternal 
revolution. The burden of Moscow's carefiiUy orchestrated articulations was that the 
United Stated was turning Wilson's blind eye on the changes that had occurred to 
the global balance, that it was determined to take the world back to the wasted 
epochof cold war. 
For Soviet strategists, at least, intervention in Afghanistan was a defensive 
move, primarily. However, odd and incomplete the socialist revolution had proved 
under Taraki and Amin, Afghanistan since 1978 was considered by Moscow as part 
of the 'Marxist" grouping of progressive states. Afghanistan was tied to the Soviet 
Union and other Socialist states by a whole range of agreements. There was by the 
end of 1979 a heavy Soviet investment in 'socialist' Afghanistan, to be reckoned not 
in capital alone, but in prestige; thousands of Soviet advisers, civil and military, 
were propping up the Kabul government, of whom scores had already been killed in 
the civil war. If Amin's regime was toppled by the insurgents, then at local levels 
Soviet soldiers and civilians alike would lose their lives in the general hatred, 
regardless of what Afghan opposition leaders intended. The Soviet Union offered 
three basic grounds for its intervention in Afghanistan: 
1. A request for military assistance from the Afghanistan government. 
2. The Soviet Union's commitment to give that assistance by the 1978 
Treaty. 
3. Self- defence against foreign armed aggression in accordance with 
the UN chatter (article 51). 
42 
Meanwhile, Amin had repeatedly declared in 1979 that the Afghan army alone 
would combat the opposition, and the military situation had by no means 
deteriorated sharply by the winter of 1979. '^ ^ 
With factional fighting among Afghan communists undermining the war 
against the Islamic radicals and weakening Moscow's influence, on Christmas eve 
the Kremlin airlifted thousand of Russian commandos into Afghanistan, where they 
installed a staunchly pro - Soviet regime "in this extremely difficult situation, which 
has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our 
national security.' Brezhnev told the Politburo a week later, "a decision has been 
made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet army to Afghanistan". It was 
probably a defensive maneuver and not the first step in a Kremlin master plan to 
drive the United States out of the Persian Gulf'^° According to Raja Anwa the real 
background of the military action of 27 December was not short fanciful 
interpretations of the Soviet move. Amin until then described as a diehard 
communist, butcher and Russia's puppet; became overnight a 'gxeat nationalist' and 
'martyr' it was said that the Soviet Union had invaded Kabul because Amin had 
refused to allow Soviet bases on Afghanistan soil: in order to get rid of the 
nationalist Amin, the USSR had invaded Kabul and put its real pawn (Kamal) on the 
Afghan chessboard. It was also argued that by taking the US embassy staff hostage 
in November 1979, the Iranian students had created a situation where armed 
American intervention in Iran could take place any time. The Soviet Union, it was 
alleged, had demanded the Shin Dan air base near the Iranian border so that it could 
exercise effective control over the Gulf region and perhaps also discourage the US 
fi-om attacking Iran. Amin's rejection of the Soviet request for the Shin Dan base, it 
was stated, had become the direct cause of his fall.''' 
The situation looked different from Washington's suspicion on Soviet 
action. The military move into Afghanistan was the first step in a colossally 
ambitious strategy of regional domination the 'drive to the south; the taking of 
regional domination the "drive to the south; the taking of a 'warm water port" on the 
Indian Ocean and to control (or even to annex) oil-rich states of the Gulf'^^ The 
Iranian crisis had led to the collapse of the balance of power in southwest Asia. 
Brzezinski informed his boss a few hours af^ er the red Army arrived in Kabul, "the 
age - long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have 
been fulfilled at America's expose. Historically, the British provided the barrier to 
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that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer states, and it could produce Soviet 
presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman g^lfs." Carter had to 
move decisively to create a new security framework. Brzezinski insisted not only to 
reassert U.S. power and influence in the region but also to demonstrate his genuine 
toughness. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, on the other hand, counseled restrained. 
•'My view was that Moscow has acted as it did . . . to protect Soviet political 
interests in Afghanistan which they saw endangered". He recalled in his memories 
"They feared that the regime would be replaced by a fundamentalist Islamic 
government and that this would, in turn, be followed by a spread of "Khomeini fever 
to other nations along Russian's southern border."'^^ 
IV. United States and Afghan Crisis: Middle East Factor 
Stability in the Middle East has been a vital area of concern for US policy 
makers since 1946. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a region whose strategic 
importance was fast becoming unparalleled, following a decade of ugly Anglo -
Arab confrontations that undermined regional security and invited Soviet meddling, 
in 1957 U.S. policymakers unveiled the Eisenhower Doctrine. This made 
Washington the senior member of the Anglo - American partnership in the Middle 
East. When Britain liquidated its last imperial outposts in the Arabian Peninsula and 
the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s, U.S. officials edged toward what come to be 
known as the Nixon Doctrine, which envisioned regional proxies such as Iran and 
Saudi Arabia serving as junior partner against the Kremlin. When events in Iran and 
Afghanistan showed that America's proxies simply could not do the job, Jimmy 
Carter promulgated his own doctrine and, with a bow to Harry Truman, informed 
the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interest in the 
Middle East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or 
not.'^^ 
On March 25. 1979 in a special coordinating committee meeting Brzezinski 
circulated a report on the general direction of American foreign policy. It warned 
that "'our policy is neither coherent nor constant; on a number of specific issues, 
notably Iran and the Middle East; we are in fact losing momentum with potentially 
very destructive consequences for our interests." The policy paper called for a 
unifying theme to give clarity and purpose to American policy. He stressed that the 
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan must focus our attention on a major new order of 
politico - economic, military threat to the non - communist world security and 
Soviet domination of Middle East oil. To counter Soviet aggression according to 
Brzezinski report, "The United States had to dramatically reassert in its global 
leadership thfough an "integrated approach and demonstrate it deterrent capabilities 
so that we can sustain a credible overall response".'^^ 
In addition, the U.S. fear of Soviet foreign policy was a deadly mix of 
traditional Russian expansionism and the revolutionary drive of ideological 
communism. It was imperialism multiplied by a factor of two, even without 
communism, Russia would still be an expansionist power. Communism however, 
added impetus to the quest for global predominance. For the Soviets, expansionism 
was the status quo. As Khrushchev told President Kennedy at Vienna in 1961, "the 
continuing revolutionary process in various countries is the status quo, and anyone 
who tries to halt this process not only is altering the status quo but is an 
aggressor'".'^^ According to George B. De Huszar, from the Soviet point of view, 
the Near and Middle East contains attractive assets. Since Bolshevik revolution in 
1917 its basic interest in the Middle East, has not changed. The Soviet Union 
therefore, has sought to covert Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan into satellite states 
similar to those which existed in Eastern Europe. The Soviet aims looking toward 
the security of oil installations in the Baku region, an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and 
pressure on Turkey for a more favorable straits regime and a pro - Soviet 
orientation in Turkish policy. Soviet political interests seem equally obvious, 
involving political "conquest'" or subversion of the Middle East. The fact was that 
the Middle East was the greatest oil bearing region in the world; it was obvious that 
the Soviet would be interested in controlling the oil pipelines or denying their use to 
others. 
It seems clear from the policies it has pursued, as well as from the obvious 
interests involved - strategic, political, and economic that the Soviet Union in one 
way or another, looked toward the domination of the Near and Middle East in order 
to achieve its objectives in the world, the strategic position of the Near East, 
together with the resources it commands, made it an obvious place from which the 
USSR could reach out into South Asia and Africa. It should also be remembered, 
however, that in the event of such control, the Near East would become a 
springboard for worid revolution in the interest of the Soviet states.'^^And 
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furthermore, because of its geographic position, the Kremhn could choose the 
particular region where the least opposition was offered. In the west it was near to 
western Europe; in the south it was close to nations located in the Near and Middle 
East; it was also close to India, and through its Chinese ally it was close to South 
East Asia and Japan. The Kremlin was putting pressure on Iran and other. Near 
Eastern countries were active in Afghanistan which would enable Soviet Russia to 
dominate the Khyber Pass through which Pakistan could be menaced.'^^ 
Apart from U.S. fear of Soviet foreign policy and its proximity to the Middle 
Eastern oil producing countries there were still many events that could lead to 
inviting Soviet influence in this region .South Yemen, under the leadership of the 
revolutionary Abd-al-fatah Ismail, seemed intent on subverting North Yemen and 
spreading revolution throughout the peninsula. Soviet bases were being built in 
Ethiopia and South Yemen. The opposition of the Camp David by Saudi was 
another important factor. Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal mentioned the "positive" 
Soviet role in the area. Fahd also referred to the importance of the Soviet role but 
said that talk of diplomatic relations was premature.'^^ In late 1970s Saudi leaders 
distanced themselves from the American camp, and showed an increasing 
independence in conducting their foreign affairs. By now Moscow had learnt that 
Saudi Arabia had a unique position in the Arab world and shared goals in common 
with those of the Soviet Union: containment of Israel, establishment of a Palestinian 
homeland, and exclusion of Jerusalem from Israeli control. 
In the late 1970s the other prominent state in the Arabian Peninsula which 
actively shared these objectives with the USSR was Kuwait. The presence of a large 
Palestinian community in the country and the Soviet bloc becoming more 
supportive of the PLO, the Kuwaiti government improved its relations with the 
socialist states. In 1976 it followed up a modest arms deal with Moscow with trade 
pacts with east European countries. Nearly three years later the Kuwaiti army had 
tested Soviet made ground to ground lunar missile as part of military exercises. 
Soviet also expressed the hope that these missiles would be available "on the 
expected day of liberation of the Arab land under Israeli occupation. "^ '^ '^  
Another event that fhistrated the U.S. administration in the Middle East was 
civil war between Christian and Muslims in Lebanon that each side was supported 
by an external power. As a result, Israel and Syria almost came to direct 
confrontation in 1981. It was feared that such a military clash would inflame 
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regional tensions and would place the Soviet Union in vital position with which 
Syria had a treaty of friendship. 
Another important development was attack on Iraq by Israel as it suspected 
Iraq of producing nuclear weapons which would be used against it. Iraq also had 
rejected the Camp David process. This thing became politically damaging as it 
revived the Arab perception of Israel as the prime foe. This was a set back for U.S. 
effort to portray the Soviet Union as the chief threat to the region and to forge an 
anti - Soviet alliance with moderate Arab states. It also endangered further efforts 
toward achieving a broader Arab - Israel peace. 
The 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon to crush the PLO and solve the political 
problem of the Palestinians by purely military means dramatically underlined the 
question of U.S. - Israel common interest. In Arab eyes the United States had tacitly 
approved the Israel invasion because it had failed to stop it. It now appeared to U.S. 
that the Palestinian problem could not be subordinated to regional anti - Soviet 
policy.^"' With the worsening relationship between Israel and the Arabs and the 
continued crisis in U.S. - Iranian relations, Foreign Ministers of 40 Islamic 
countries assemble in Islamabad grappling with the Afghan question. The PLO 
delegate warned not to make "to much of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; it 
would only weaken the Arab's ability to fight for a national home for Palestinians. 
The foreign minister of Iran accused both superpowers of harboring parallel 
aggressive designs against the Persian Gulf and Arabia.^" And Syria sought to 
counter US efforts to arouse Islamic nationalism against the USSR.'^ °^  
In late 1970s, the Kremlin deployed a pincer movement against the gulf. It 
was an example of Soviet military activity in the early and mid 1970s. According to 
reports in 1975 Soviet intelligence - gathering vessels were maintaining a constant 
surveillance of the straits of Hormuz. Soviet Mig 25 reconnaissance aircraft made a 
number of flights over Iran. The troop movements along the Soviet - Iranian border 
was also reported several times in 1970s.^ °^ Again in 1978, Soviet transports 
airlifted twenty thousand Cuban troops into Ethiopia, not only to assist its 
communist government in its war with Somalia, but also to establish military 
facilities across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Later that year, a pro - Soviet 
group in South Yemen took power, thereby giving Moscow a beachhead on the 
Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen soon launched an overt military attack on North 
Yemen. From South Yemen terrorists launched operations against Saudi Arabia and 
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guerrillas conducted attack in a border province of Oman. Same year Soviet 
Union had signed a treaty of friendship with Turkey. And some probing for an 
accommodation with Pakistan was also witnessed.^°^ In 1978, a military coup put 
into power the Afghan communist party, which quickly signed treaties with 
Moscow. When a popular rebellion threatened to topple the communist regime the 
Soviet Union invaded the country putting its fighter bombers within reach of the 
straits of Hormuz from their newly acquired Afghan bases. Kremlin leaders were 
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extending their reach to get their hands on the oil jugular from both directions." 
The taking of American hostages in fran was also exploited, not without 
cynicism, as a target of opportunity. Shortly after the crisis erupted, the New York 
Times ran a front page story by Hedrick Smith headlined "Iran is helping the U.S. to 
shed fear of intervening abroad." Smith reported "an important shift of attitudes in 
Washington that many believe will have a significant long - term impact on the 
willingness of the United States to project its power in the third world and to 
develop greater military capacities for protecting its interests there." One 
policymaker said that we are moving away from our post - Vietnam reticence. 
Democratic National Chairman John White stated that "we may have reached a 
turning point in our attitude toward ourselves and that is a feeling that we have a 
right to protect legitimate American interests an3^where in the world". Senator Frank 
church indicated support for military intervention in the Middle East if our interests 
were threatened.^"^ According to Warriors, "the search for military bases in the 
Middle East and the general program of militarization of American society are 
defensive measures taken to protect potential victims of Russian aggression," And 
according to the Wall Street Journal, measures should include: establishment of 
U.S. bases in the Middle East, development of new weapon systems, unleashing of 
the CIA and to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels. Brown's 
statement laid bare that the real reason behind the Carter Doctrine was not only 
"invasion of Afghanistan but rather to continued expansion of U.S. private 
investments in this area of the world as well as protection against indigenous 
popular opposition movements fighting repressive U.S. backed regimes.'" When 
The Islamic states met in Islamabad to condemn the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan, they did not fail to wam against U.S. intervention as well, the Gulf 
countries were more worried about the potential reaction of the U.S. to the crisis 
than they were about Soviet intervention itself ^ '^  
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The Americans who were aware of their criminal role in the usurpation of 
Palestine wanted to usurp the Islamic will and to distort its aspirations by dragging 
it into the American fold and exploit it to serve American policies and goals. The 
American game of instigating the Soviets to intervene militarily in Afghanistan was 
completely exposed when it was ascertained how they tried to exploit their 
fabricated crisis with Iran in an ugly, opportunist and vulgar manner. In addition, to 
Brown's revelation about the real aims of U.S. foreign and military policy, it was 
the case that month before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
and the National Security Council proposed to Carter that a new security framework 
be established in the Middle East. 
Even without a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Carter Doctrine was 
needed to maintain U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. When the Shah of Iran was 
toppled from his throne on January 4, 1980, President Jimmy Carter denounced the 
presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as "hazed aggression" and as a "deliberate 
effort of a powerfiil atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic 
people''. This speech launched a large scale media campaign which was marshaled 
to portray the events in Afghanistan in such a way that the "crisis"' there can be used 
as a pretext for increasing U.S. military presence in the Middle East/South Asia 
region, and for creating an "interventionist mood"' in the U.S. public given this 
governmental manipulation of the media."'^ 
The Carter Doctrine was a symbol of America's vital interest in the area. 
The establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force, the search for bases in Kenya, 
Somalia, and Oman; the modernization of the base on the island of Diego Garcia in 
the Indian Ocean; the presence of sizable U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean - Persian 
Gulf area; and the discussions of possible military cooperation with Egypt were part 
of an effort to establish an American presence and to balance Soviet power in the 
area.^'^ 
Tucker states correctly that "it is the Gulf that forms the indispensable key to 
the defense of the American global position; in fact there is no doubt that U.S. 
global dominance in the postwar period has closely linked to control over the major 
energy reserves of the world, which must remain under U.S. control if this global 
position is to be maintained. The first priority then for a resurgent America is the 
restoration of American power generally and above all, in the Persian Gulf"""'" 
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In the case of Gulf oilfield the Carter administration decided to establish a 
joint task force of 50,000 for safeguarding Gulf oil supplies, and to build up the 
American fifth fleet, operating from the Island of Diego Garcia, near Mauritius, in 
the Indian Ocean. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the proclamation of the 
Carter doctrine, added urgency to the newly - formed force, now called the Rapid 
Deployment Force. There was plan to make it 300,000 strong by the mid - 1980 and 
increased efforts were made to secure American military bases in and around the 
Gulf. 
The Reagan administration went a step beyond, as American Deputy 
Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci asked NATO allies to station troops in the Gulf 
He secured the immediate support of the British under Secretary of Defense. British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also responded positively to this plan. And a few 
days later the U.S. Secretary of Defense publicly called for permanent American 
military bases in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But Saudi quickly responded in negative. 
While, Oman's pro - west stance decided to form a joint task force for the Gulf with 
American.^'^ Undoubtedly President Carter had no difficulty in rallying support 
for his policy statement, made in the aftermath of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
- and contained in his State of the Union message to Congress in January 1980 that 
America would act militarily to defend the Persian Gulf region if it became a target 
of external aggression. Carter's objective was to convince Moscow that America -
with or without allies would respond militarily to any aggression that might threaten 
the Gulf or Arabians oil fields. 
With these reason U.S. came to be involved in supporting Afghan 
Mujahideen to counter Soviet troops when Soviet invaded Afghanistan. As 
Afghanistan was located in frontier area or buffer zone state of Gulf countries, 
containing Soviet cross into Gulf country was important. Wall Street Journal, said: 
"clearly we ought to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels." Thus 
Afghanistan became an important place for the U.S. in containing Soviet 
communist. 
V. The U.S. backing of Mujahedeen against Soviet troops 
In April 1981, after elections Reagan became the president of the United 
States. The basic outline of Reagan's foreign policy was also two fold: the 
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reestablishment of American economic and military strength and the roll - back of 
Soviet influence across the third world. 
The second of these policies came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, 
which sought to provide assistance to anti communist guerillas and government with 
arms, finance, training and facilities, to note a few examples, the Reagan's 
administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua, the anti- Marxist guerillas in 
Angola, the right - wing government in EI Salvador, the Mujahideen in 
Afghanistan, and the guerillas coalition in the Cambodia.^'^ The central tenet in his 
foreign policy was anti Sovietism and the imperative of standing up to the Soviet 
threat and take responsibility for containing Soviet expansionism in any part of the 
world.^^° In addition, the Reagan Doctrine developed, as the basis, not only for 
taking a harder line on global containment, but going further than ever before 
toward roll - back, ousting communist who had come to power. According to 
George Shultz, who saw Reagan foreign policy from the inside, records that he 
•'changed the national and international agenda on issue after issue" notably by 
challenging conventional wisdom on the possibility of movement toward fi-eedom in 
the communist - dominated world.^^' For Paul Nitze, former director of the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the ''principal task'" of America in the 
early 1980s was to "check, blunt.. . and frustrate . . . Soviet strategies," which carry 
in their womb four foreign policy goals - the political separation of NATO Europe 
from the United States, Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf, and the 
encirclement and neutralization of China.^ ^^ Combined with effort to play the 
Beijing against Moscow, forcing the Soviet Union to build up its military defenses 
against NATO, Japan, as well as China, neo- conservatives hope to roll back, if not 
implode, the Soviet empire. Through a window of vulnerability during the 1980s, 
the committee for the free world (founded in 1981, now deftinct) helped to lead anti 
- communist crusades in Afghanistan, Angola and in other countries in Africa, and 
in Central America. 
In this regard, the Reagan Administration adopted the doctrine of ''horizontal 
escalation"' which was intended to roll back post - 1975 Soviet throughout the 
world. The strategy was based upon the concept that rough US - Soviet nuclear 
parity, with the US even turning toward superiority in delivery capabilities (but not 
necessarily in explosive "'throw - weight") would be able to match soviet threats 
across the board without escalating to nuclear war. Here, the Reagan administration 
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largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet backed regimes or Soviet -
supported movements. U.S. support for anti - Soviet movements would not so 
inadvertently set off a number of seemingly permanent brush fires throughout many 
regions even after the cold war was over.^ '^* The implications of total confrontation 
with the USSR had generated a debate in the US foreign policy establishment on 
how much and what kind of confrontation should be practicable in the 1980s. Three 
positions seem to have emerged. The hardest position, represented by one of its 
protagonists, Norman Podhoretz, was that the current confrontation was, or must be 
one between two irreconcilable ways of human existence, two ideological universes 
that just caimot live together as equals. '"In resisting the advance of Soviet power . . . 
we are fighting for freedom and against communism, for democracy and against 
totalitarianism," while, Robert W. Tucker, who has been persistently pressing since 
the mid seventies for a formidable American military presence in the Persian Gulf, 
which would virtually amount to American military control of the region's 
petroleum, called in 1981 for "a limited policy of containmenf rather than a 
strategy of total confrontation in the present circumstance.^^^ 
With such policy there was no doubt that Afghanistan became buffer state 
for U.S. to block Soviet access into Gulf oilfield and South Asia. Carter's advisers 
were asking themselves a question when Ayatollah Khomeini brought the Iranian 
revolution to a crescendo in early 1979 "how U.S. policy interest be preserved if the 
Shah Fall's?" Anarid landlocked, and mountainous kingdom, Afghanistan had 
always been a buffer state, first between the expending British and Russian empires 
and then, after 1945 between the free world and the Soviet bloc. As was the case 
next door in Tehran, rapid modernization generated serious political turmoil in 
Kabul where Afghan communist seized power in a bloody coup in April 1978. 
Nine months before the Red Army rolled into Kabul, Brzezinski had expressed 
•'concern over the Soviets creeping intervention in Afghanistan" and insisted that 
Washington must be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to 
pressure their country's independence, the Pentagon's Walter Slocomb agreed and 
wondered whether clandestine US support for Muslim guerillas might succeed in 
"sucking the Soviet into Vietnamese quagmire'". In April 1979 the special 
coordination committee an inter-agency group chaired by Brzezinski, instructed the 
CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed by the 
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United States, ranging from indirect financial assistance to the insurgents "to 
weapon support.'^ ^^ 
The US policy of supporting the anti - Soviet resistance in Afghanistan 
represented revenge for Soviet support to Hochi minh and the North Vietnamese; 
yet its implications have been even more for reaching. As an additional element of 
its cold war strategy of containment, the US effort to undermine the soft Islamic 
underbelly of the Soviet Union was in many ways, the key to not just rolling back 
Soviet global outreach, but also to impel the implosion of the Soviet empire itself 
The US clandestine support to Islamic Mujahideen in Afghanistan against 
the Soviet regime which came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, echoed 
president Jerry Ford's post - Vietnam approach. The United States would not send 
troops around the world to fight in regional conflicts unless the United States faced 
direct threat. Instead, the United States would send guns and money to anti -
communist "freedom fighters." So among other actions, the Reagan administration 
- with the general support of both parties in Congress - armed Islamic 
fiandamentalists in Afghanistan to fight a guerilla war against the Soviet Union. 
Once again top American policy makers decided that it was easier to see Red than 
try to gain a clear view of Islamic green.^ ^^ 
Evidences clearly show that US was backing Muslim insurgent to fight 
Soviet communist and spread the ideology of hates and anti-communism. This was 
an important factor in the development of today's terror phenomenon. The Iranian 
revolution of 1979 brought to life a new breed of fanatical religious terrorists and 
the subsequent rise of fundamentalism, which spread rapidly across the Islamic 
world. The crucial pan Islamic movement, however, was the jihad against the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 where, as was well known, U.S. and British 
intelligence services were working hand - in - glove with the Jihadists, all the while 
being well aware of the latter's extremist tendencies. There are evidences to 
suggest that that U.S. tried to exploit the religion of Islamic against communist 
ideology in central Asian population after the outbreak of Iran's Islamic revolution 
in 1978-79 which put an end to a decade of relatively stable relations between the 
Soviet authorifies and Islam. The news of the Islamic revolutionary success in Iran 
seemed to have helped trigger a series of anti - Soviet demonstrations and riots in 
Dushanbe, Alma-ata, and other cities. Although not all disturbances had religious 
cause, Islamic ideology played a role in inciting the masses. 
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Soviet responded to the strengthening of security and law - enforcement 
aspects in the Muslim republics. The close proximity to Iran, quite expectedly, 
caused serious concern over the possibility of foreign ideological subversion 
destabilizing the region. The head of the Turkmenistan KGB, Major General Z, 
Yusef Zade, went so far as to blame the United States for "'trying to exploit the 
Islamic religion - especially in areas where the Muslim population lives - as one 
factor in influencing the political situation in our country." The first Secretary of the 
Turkmen communist party, Gapurov, is quoted to have warned the central 
authorities of the foreign propaganda activities being conducted by individuals who 
had exhibited pan - Turkish or pan - Islamic tendencies. He went to say: '"Muslim 
pseudo confessors, champions of old, reactionary principles and rites, operating 
willfully in the so called 'holy places, are trying to kindle religious fanaticism, fuel 
feelings of national narrow mindedness and instill in family relations harmful feudal 
survivals and rituals, consequently, extra security measures were taken along the 
southern borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and the KGB's presence was 
substantially increased in the Muslim republics. This policy continued until the mid 
1980s.^ ^^ Thus the Soviet action in Afghanistan was aimed at preventing a spill -
over of Islamic revivalism to the Tajik and Turkmen republics of The Soviet 
Union.^ ^° 
A. Who are Mujahedeen? 
In this war against communist, the United States supported the Jihad spirit 
which led to the fall of Marxist regime in Afghanistan and the spectacular rise of the 
Taliban. The youth that the United States had helped were educated mostly in the 
madrassas of the NWFP and Balochistan. They had been well trained and motivated 
by the time the Taliban came to power.^ '^ But it was not all madrassas located along 
Pakistan's border that were engaged in such work. Actually several of fighters were 
trained in simply makeshift schools intended to train fighters in the war against the 
Soviets, where Islam was taught simply in order to strengthen the spirit of Jihad 
against the Russians. These have been loosely and incorrectly described as 
'madrassas". In actual fact, they were not even conceived of as religious schools. 
Rather from their very inception they were intended as militant training camps, but 
were sought to be passed off as 'madrassas' in order to legifimate their operations 
and to solicit funds from Muslim states. The rapid growth and spread of such 
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schools must be seen in the context of cold war rivalries, and it is obvious that they 
had the blessing of the Americans, who through the CIA, pumped in large amounts 
of weapons and cash to assist the Mujahideen. 
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were two types of 
madrassas that participated in the U.S. and Saudi backed jihad. One group of 
madrassas had been specifically established to produce jihad literature, mobilize 
popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to recruit and train 
Mujahideen. An example of such madrassas is the Jama'at-i- Islami"s Rabita 
madrassas. The Jama'at-i- Islami has never been a madrassa - based party. The 
madrassas that it did establish were predominantly a product of jihad in Afghanistan 
during the Soviet occupation. The second group comprises various independent 
associations of madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-ulama Islam. As an 
institution, JUI was a partner in Afghan jihad. There were also some foreign 
Mujahideen who came to participate in the Afghan effort. Such as Arab volunteers 
who come to study in Karachi and Muslim males from Central Asia, North Afiica, 
the Caucasus,^ ^^and from Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Mindanao. Osama bin 
Laden, together with the radical Palestinian preacher Abdallah Azzam, founded the 
Maktab al- Khidmat (office of service), through which they recruited and controlled 
foreign Mujahideen volunteers.•^ '^* 
Madrassas such as those of Haqqaniya at Akora khattak particularly 
benefited from Middle Eastern fiinding because these madrassas had long -
established ties with the University of Madina. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had a deep 
stake in promoting the jihad effort in Afghanistan. 
The massage that was disseminated at the various madrassas was originally 
intended to be anti - communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits 
to the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the 
proliferating refiigee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it were these camps and schools 
that became the cradle of the Taliban. International patrons (the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated-^ fc^uSttts with-aimfe^^nd text 
books.-^^ Lj-C—. /^r-N \<'-jr\\ 
B. Sources of finance and arms \ V •' ^ - II 
As stated earlier nine months before the red Army rolled irrte^Cabuliompril 
1979, the special coordination committee, an interagency""gronpaiaired by 
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Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in 
Afghanistan backed the United States, ranging from "indirect financial assistance to 
the insurgents to weapons support"'^ ^^ President Carter had clearly stated that the US 
had "a moral obligation to help the Afghan resistance.'" The US Congress in a rare 
show of bi- partisanship, and promoted by friends of the Afghan resistance such as 
Charles - Wilson, Gordon Humphrey, Orrin Hatch and Bill Bradley, also took the 
lead in voting more money for the Mujahideen than the Reagan administration 
requested, sometimes by diverting fiinds from the defense budget to the CIA. Its 
director. Bill Casey, was also able to persuade sympathetic Arab governments to 
contribute to a reserve fund that could be kept secret from Congress and the State 
Department. According to Amey, Saudi Arabia flinneled more than half, a billion 
dollars to CIA accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. One of the biggest 
operators was the Saudi businessman, Adnan Rashoggi, who openly helped in 
procuring and distributing weapons and munitions to the Mujahideen through the 
ISI. He was an agent of the head of the Saudi intelligence agency, Prince Turki, and 
also acted as a watchdog on the expenditure of Saudi funds. 
The CIA"s as well as Saudi payments for the arms supplied by the various 
leaders were made out of special Afghan war account managed by the Geneva based 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Its head was a Pakistani 
banker from Karachi, Abedi. BCCI's major owners were Saudi and Arab Emirate 
political and banking figures. Abedi had close ties with President Zia and the ISI's 
General Akhtar who handled the whole supply network to the Afghan resistance on 
the ground.^ ^^ 
The US and Pakistan were also backed by the efforts of Osama bin Laden 
who was primarily a financier of the Afghan resistance, Makhtab -al- Khidmat 
(MAT).^ ^* He was among the first to put those dollars to good use against the Red 
Army. In late 1982, deputy national security adviser Robert McFarlane asked Prince 
Bandar bin Sultan, the House of Saud's representative in Washington, and they 
channeled almost $ 30 billion into the CIA's covert crusade in Afghanistan. In 
addition, the U.S. sponsored Mujahideen who fought against the Soviet Union 
supplemented the funds they received from the U.S. and the Gulf Sheikhdoms with 
production and sale of heroin to the tune of $ 20 billion annually, a large network of 
heroin factories cropped up in the North West frontier province, Balochistan and 
even Karachi.^''° 
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With the cold war in foil swing, Washington was anxious to check Soviet 
expansionism, and the fall of the Shah of Iran left Pakistan as its only ally in the 
region. Under the Reagan administration that the Mujahideen cause was really 
embraced and in the autumn of 1981 a six - year package of S 3.2 billion in 
economic and military aid to Pakistan was agreed. As it was a covert war against the 
Soviet Union, the massive CIA weapons pipeline that was put in place to arm the 
Mujahideen was completely managed and supervised on the ground by the ISI. 
giving the agency enormous power. The weapons came firom China, Israel, Egypt, 
Poland, and factories set up to copy Soviet arms to disguise their provenance.^'" And 
CIA put through a program of fonneling Soviet - made arms, purchased from Egypt 
and Somalia.^ '^ ^ 
In the beginning of the year 1979, Zia Nassery, as representative of the 
"Committee for Struggle" visited New York and Washington and met with two 
American Senators, Frank George and Jacob Frantz. After the meeting Zia Nassery 
said: "'I have come to the USA for receiving political and financial support for 
resisting the Afghan authorities. We need money to buy enough quantities of 
weapons." 
The procurement of weapons was entrusted to the American company called 
'"Interarms" based in Manchester, Britain, and headed by Samuel king. The time 
magazine reported in 1980 that the main supplier of armaments for the Afghan 
counter - revolutionaries was a company named "Interarms" which possessed 
stocks of arms in different places in the world, and had been operating under the 
chairmanship of Samuel king, a former employee of the CIA. Such kind of job was 
possible only with the help of agencies like the CIA and the Pentagon. According to 
a report he got a part of the armaments from Pentagon and with the certification of 
Pentagon he sold them in different part of the world.^ "*^  
Much of the controversy about the covert American role centers around the 
quality as well as the quantity of CIA weapons actually reaching the Mujahideen. 
Some accounts of CIA successes in this regard have been overblown. But according 
to a reliable Washington, D.C. - based source Sam - 7s and 82mm medium range 
Soviet - made mortars, the later "Stinger," or British "Blowpipe" surface to - air 
missiles and the longer, range British or Finnish 81 mm medium rang mortar were 
supplied. Furthermore, such weapons as anti - tank and anti - personnel mines had 
also reached into the hands of Mujahideen. 
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While some western supporters have called for widespread introduction of 
the "stinger'' a more advanced shoulder fired heat seeking missile a few of these 
weapons had reportedly found their way to the Mujahideen According to the Times, 
however, a new version of the Soviet weapon, the Sam -7, was created by forces 
sympathetic to the resistance, paid for by the United States Anti - DRA forces in 
late 1984 were reportedly being trained in Egypt on the missile's use"'*'* The 
acquisition of the better weapons was directly linked to the provision of aid by 
Western and Arab countnes Between 1980 and early 1992, when military aid 
officially ceased, the Umted States gave $ 2-3 billion to the Mujahideen, to which 
can be similar sum from the Arab countnes. However, President Reagan had been 
highly cautious dunng his first term, in spite of his anti - communist rhetonc For 
1983 the CIA asked for a budget of $ 30 million for the Mujahideen (compared to $ 
24 million for the contras in Honduras) Charles Wilson, a Democratic Senator, 
obtained an additional $ 40 million and some Swiss anti tank guns In 1985 a 
distinct turning - point was reached, with a budget of S 200 million, which was to 
reach $ 280 million by 1989 The other western countnes, especially France and 
Bntain, did not publicized the level of their military aid to the Mujahideen, but 
fighters were trained in Europe and Pakistan, while equipment such as radios, 
missiles and anti - tank weapons were distnbuted to the parties Around 80,000 
Mujahideen were reported to have been trained m Pakistan, mainly by Pakistani 
officers, as well as more unusually by Amencans.^''^ However, U.S. was aware of 
the fact that factions within these forces of jihad would soon thereafter turn their 
fiiry on the United States.^ '*^ As Congressional debate over the sale of shoulder -
held stinger ground to air launched missiles, for example, was symbolic of fears that 
US military support for a radical pan - Islamic factions might ultimately turn 
against Amen can mterests.^ "*^ But US chose to give military support to Mujahideen 
because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan At the end of 1979 US made a long -
term policy response to Islam as a geopolitical reality in the region more difficult 
yet, Amencan policy makers still focused on the cold war threat of the Soviets That 
IS why they chose to arm the Islamic fundamentalists fighting Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan '"^ ^ 
It was clear that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was coming to an end 
due to pressure from the Mujahideen forces operating from within Afghanistan and 
from bases in Pakistan "^"^  In February 1989 the Russian army withdrew from 
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Afghanistan, having failed to get control of the first third world country it 
occupied.^ ^° A turning point came in mid 1986, when the United States began to 
supply the Afghan rebels with surface - to - air stinger missiles, which forced 
Soviet aircraft and helicopters to suspend their low - level raids on rebel villages 
and strongholds. In January 1987 Najibullah announced a cease - fire, but the rebels 
refused his firms, and the war continued. In February 1988 Gorbachev conceded the 
need to extract Soviet forces from the stalemated conflict. In April 1988 
Afghanistani, Pakistani, and Soviet representatives in Geneva agreed to a 
disengagement plan based on Soviet withdrawal by February 1989 and non-
involvement in each other's internal affairs.^ '^ But Soviet refused to halt its own 
military supplies to Kabul, arguing with some plausibility that its own obligations 
dated back to the Soviet Union's treaty of peace and friendship with Afghanistan 
concluded in 1920. On 14 April 1988, just before the signing ceremony at the Palais 
de Nations in Geneva, the UN Secretary General received a formal notification that 
the United States reserved the right to continue supplying the Mujahideen, although 
it could meet with Soviet restraint. The United States and the Soviet Union 
pledged to guarantee the settlement in a separate document. The Accords were 
universally acclaimed by the international corrmiunity and many exaggerated claims 
were made regarding their significance - but they guaranteed the continuation of the 
Afghan civil war. Afghan academic Amin Saikal has rightly viewed the Afghan 
crisis more as a proxy conflict between the super powers than as one with political 
and social origins within Afghanistan itself. 
During the operation over the past eight years, the United States had sent 
hundreds of millions of dollars in covert operation. This not only created the 
possibility of rolling back a forward position of the Soviet empire but also inflicted 
such cost on the Kremlin that its leaders will have to think twice before again 
embarking on such an adventure in the future. Brzezinski wrote that "our ultimate 
goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops fi-om Afghanistan . . . Even if this is not 
attainable; we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible."^^^ 
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CHAPTER- 2 
The U.S. and Afghan Civil War 
I. The U.S. and Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal 
The conflict in South Asia in the last two decades of the 20'*' century witnessed 
the emergence of holy war - jihad against the Russian invaders of 1979. As a result 
the invaders were defeated and sent back home in 1989 At home Russia faced a 
collapsing Soviet society and break down of empire. And in the United States 
President Reagan's Vice President George Bush, won the Presidential elections held 
in November 1988, and his administration was installed on January 1989 But new 
2 
actor did not bnng about any radical changes in U.S. policies towards Afghanistan 
According to one analyst "in its contemporary version, the Reagan Doctnne, the West 
should be encouraged by the success of the Mujahideen and the change in the Soviet 
stance towards the third world more generally, to press more vigorously its support 
for anti - communist or anti - Soviet forces in other third world troubled spots, in the 
3 
name of self determination and democratic values"'. The Reagan administration 
adopted the doctnne of "honzontal escalation" which was intended to roll back post-
1975 Soviet gains throughout the world The strategy was based on the concept of 
U.S.-Soviet nuclear panty along with of U S. ventunng in delivery capabilities (but 
not necessanly in explosive "throw-weight")would be able to match Soviet threats 
across the board - without escalating to nuclear war. The Reagan administration 
largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet- backed regimes or Soviet-
supported movements The U S support for anti- Soviet movements would not so 
inadvertently set off a number of seemingly permanent brush fires throughout many 
regions (as in Angola) that would be difficult to put out, even after the cold war was 
4 
over 
A totally different course was pursued by the then ruling circles of the 
impenalist states, above all the U S who were trying to use the developments 
occumng in the Moslem world to their advantage. Holding forth the common values 
of the Chnstianity and Islam against the atheistic Communism and flirting with the 
political and religious leadeis of the Moslem world Western strategists were meant to 
66 
create a wave of controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union to half circle the 
USSR with 'crescent of instability". International reactionary circles spearheaded 
Moslem movements against the progressive forces within the Islamic world, and also 
against the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union. 
The outcome in Afghanistan reflected certain of those wider influences which 
resulted out of universals application of the Reagan Doctrine. It prompted support for 
hard line anti- Soviet factions in the Afghan resistance. This line was favoured by 
President Zia of Pakistan. A policy which on the one hand sought to ease the way for 
Soviet acceptance of self- determination in Afghanistan, and on the other hand it was 
likely to go along with a global policy which looked towards a reciprocal reduction in 
pressures for competitive interventions. It was only this way that one could envisage 
an early breakthrough to a political settlement in Afghanistan. The altemate Western 
(and Mujahideen) strategy pointed towards protracted violence and political 
stalemate. 
With the collapse of bi-polar world and the contours of a multi polar world 
order yet to attain definite shape the role of the U.S. as the sole superpower in any 
area of the world gained added importance. In most states, especially developing ones, 
American entry and continued presence has been guided by its long term national 
interest. And that overriding interest appears to be continuation of a uni- polar world 
order, where United States is the sole and ultimate power influencing not only the 
course of international politics but also having a crucial say in the international 
developments among countries across the world. This grand strategy of U.S. foreign 
policy to dominate the world may not be blatantly apparent in all its foreign policy 
moves because foreign policy of any states is shaped at a given moment by 
multiplicity of factors but that does not negate its existence. By backing the Afghan 
Mujahideen it achieved its prime cold war objective of rolling back communism and 
7 
containing the Soviet Union till its fmal disintegration in December 1989. 
Although, after an accord (Geneva Accord of April 1988 ) signed between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, guaranteeing non - interference and non - intervention in 
each other's affairs; a similar agreement was signed between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in which both promised about non ~ intervention in Afghanistan and to 
act as guarantors of the Accord. This Accord paved the way for Soviet withdrawal 
fi-om Afghanistan, which was completed in February 1989. But a friendly pro -
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Soviet Government had remained in power in Kabul after Soviet troops had left. 
Najibullah was Gorbachev's chosen leader who announced his programme of 
"National Reconciliation' comprising three key elements; a six- months unilateral 
ceasefire, the formation of a government of "national unity" and the return of over 5 
million refugees fi-om Pakistan and Iran. 
But Najibullah's proposals were turned down with disbelief and contempt by 
9 
members of the seven- party alliance in Peshawar. As the Soviet Union tried to adopt 
a two- fold strategy, one dimension was to deliver things possible to unify the 
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under Najibullah. And the other 
was to engage in an accelerated scheme to strengthen the PDPA"s military capability. 
The Soviet Union helped not only in setting up an elite presidential guard under 
Najibullah's direct command and tightening the efficiency of the regime's brutal 
secret police and the special militia of Sarandoy, but also supplying the regime with 
three to four times more weapons than its standing army required. Some of the arms 
supplied were among the most sophisticated ones in the Soviet inventory. Thus the 
Soviet Union laid the groundwork for the war to continue after their withdrawal. 
Moscow's efforts, nonetheless, exacerbated two pre-exist schisms within the 
Afghan resistance. They not only intensified divisions in the resistance along 
leadership on traditional ethno- tribal and linguistic lines, but also aggravated the 
sectarian Surmi-Shiaite split, which could easily be manipulated by the element from 
inside and outside Afghanistan for self- serving purposes. Furthermore, they brought 
to the fore the rival and conflicting interests of the Mujahideen's regional 
supporters. Whereas, the Islamic parties forged together into an "alliance" by the ISI 
at the behest of General Zia to fight jihad, the parties also owed their "influence" to the 
fact that they served as somewhat porous conduits for the US and Saudi funds and 
weapons channeled to the resisfing fighters inside Afghanistan by Pakistan's 
ISI. Saudi Arabia augmented her support for their favorite Mujahideen leaders. 
From amongst the seven Pakistan- based Sunni resistance groups, Iran sought to 
single out the Shiite Mujahideen group of wahdat (unity) as its preferred platform for 
exerting greater influence than the total demographic strength of the Shiites would 
12 
warrant in the politics of post- Soviet Afghanistan. 
Factionalism had resurfaced again and became one of the important challenges 
faced by Najibullah government. Coup attempt made by General Shahnawa Tanai the 
68 
then Defence Minister with the support and use of air force, in March 1990, was the 
most important threat faced by NajibuUah. This threat came from within the 
government from Khalq faction because of the Khalq - Parcham rivalry which caused 
the fall of NajibuUah regime in April 1992. This also became inevitable with the 
Soviet Union consigned to history in early 1992 and no ftirther aid flowing from 
14 Russia to support pro- Soviet regime in Afghanistan. There were many reasons for 
the Soviet Union to withdraw the force out. The worsened situation in the Soviet 
Union and the anti communist revolution taking place in East Europe threatened the 
disintegration of the Soviet socialist system. This compelled the Soviet Union to pull 
out the forces from Afghanistan at any cost. The fall of NajibuUah regime in April 
1992, put an end to the communist era in Afghanistan. However, the power vacuum 
resulting from the quick Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan resulted into not only 
human tragedy but fierce regional struggles between tribal lords for influence. The 
Americans first used the Afghan people as a caimon fodder against their arch rival and 
then left them. 
In 1979, when the Afghans had declared jihad against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan it was transformed overnight to a cold war battle ground. The Afghan 
anti-Soviet fighters became the American heroes and America started giving 
economic and military aid to Afghanistan and actively encouraged the influx of 
foreign volunteers to join forces with the Mujahideen. A trend set which it found 
detrimental to its national interest in fiindamental way. 
In September 1988, Geneva Accords were signed between Bush and 
Gorbachev, whereby they pledged to terminate assistance to Mujahideen and 
government forces respectively. United States became increasingly preoccupied with 
the post- Soviet scenario that presented unlimited opportunities for it to explore and 
influence in the European part of the world. As winds of change swept through 
Eastern Europe and violent conflicts erupted in the Caucasus and Balkans, 
Afghanistan was pushed into oblivion. However, according to John J. Marshier, 
"the basic structure of the international system did not change with the end of the cold 
war, and that there is little reason to think that change is in offing". He attempts to 
show the considerable evidence from the decade 1991-2000, that security competition 
among the great powers is not obsolete, either in Europe or in Northeast Asia. And he 
69 
also argues that a rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United 
17 States in the early twenty- first century. 
The process of reassurance was essentially completed in 1989. However, after 
George H.W. Bush took office in January, his administration initiated a '"pause" while 
it reviewed its policy towards the Soviet Union. The new National security Adviser, 
Brent Scowcroft was especially skeptical of the recent arms control treaties, however, 
the new Secretary of State, James Baker, favoured a more active policy. A new policy 
document, NSD-23 drafted in March 1989, coined the phrase 'beyond containment" to 
summarize the new U.S. policy. The document suggested that it might be possible to 
shift to a strategy which "actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into 
18 
the intemational system. According to Dominic Lieven, '"the grand alliance of 
Western states which far out-weighed and finally defeated the Soviet Union in the 
cold war remains basically united and would stand together against any Russian 
. . ^ . 1 9 
attempt to regain its former empire. 
The Soviet withdrawal ft^om Afghanistan left with divergent results flowing 
fi-om the geopolitical end-game in Afghanistan. The U.S. could get an unsurpassed 
opportunity to redress U.S. overextension in parallel fashion or alternatively, it could 
construed as an unprecedented opening to push ahead spread of Western values, as 
well as to deliver a knockout blow to godless communism, enabling the United States 
to fulfill Henry Luce's vision of an American century. While the unfinished business 
of the war remained, there were a number of elements that constituted unfinished task. 
It was possible that other form of Soviet intervention could remain or even increase as 
troops were withdrawn. One should not forget that the horrifying legacy of 
superpower intervention which consist of a disrupted political, economic, cultural and 
20 
social order continue even after the end of the intervention. 
The U.S. foreign policy had been shaped during half a century of cold war. A 
generation of diplomats had been raised in the shadow of 'soviet containment'. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union left them in a political vacuum, without specific 
guidelines to fill it. American diplomacy turned to business. The political elite became 
ambassadors and diplomats of the strong Washington lobbies. Almost overnight, it 
became apparent that U.S. foreign policy had turned into powerftil vehicle for 
American cooperation, seeking opportunities everywhere instead of promoting 
. ^ ^ ^ * ™ 
international stability. Sadly, this imperialist approach is still the engine powering the 
foreign policy of George W. Bush. 
In the early 1990s, impelled by the oil lobby, George Bush had underestimated 
the consequences of the disintegration of the equilibrium in Central Asia, a balance of 
power forged in 1945 at Yalta. The dismantling of Soviet power was perceived as the 
beginning of a lucrative period of exploitation, with U.S. oil companies controlling 
the vast energy fields of the region. So confident was the White House in this context 
that Washington even did not bother to create a political framework for the region, or 
even could issue guidelines for the post Soviet era. America's interest in the 
Afghanistan crisis had been by and large driven by hard economic interests in the 
Soviet days. It was bitter super power rivalry that brought the Americans to 
Afghanistan. With the Soviet break up the immediate compulsion for intimate 
involvement in Afghanistan had been removed and America had indeed moved away. 
But soon the possibility of the power vacuum being filled by actors totally beyond US 
22 
control would push Afghanistan back into the forefront of US foreign policy. 
Following the collapse of the USSR, the oil reserves of the Caspian region were 
initially estimated at around 150 billion barrels, half of Saudi Arabia. The new states 
in the region after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan felt uncertain where to anchor 
their security. The commonwealth of independent states (CIS) was important to 
maintain the links with the Russian economy. The US government was slow to pick 
up the importance of the region. The private western entrants into the 'new great 
game' included well placed individual's maverick companies and large oil companies 
in that order. It was not until Clinton's globalization offensive of 1994 that the US 
23 developed its own geopolitical offensive to wrest control of the region from Russia. 
The independence of Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union added 
a new factor to the vortex of regional power rivalries in which Afghanistan found 
itself Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan share not only borders but also 
ethnic, cultural, and religious affinities with Afghanistan and its people. The role of 
the Central Asian states may acquire greater significance if the ethnic split between 
Afghanistan's Uzbek and Tajik groups, on the one hand, and the Pushtun on the other 
hands, became unmanageable. Ethnic bonds, with family and blood ties, may push the 
Uzbek and Tajik minorities of Afghanistan toward their co- nationals across the 
border in the event current power struggle in Kabul results in resurgence of the 
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Pushtun element. Thus there may be considerable opportunities for trade and the 
Central Asian states may pay increased attention to political events in Afghanistan. 
With the barriers previously erected by Moscow now fallen, one might see the 
transformation of the entire region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan 
into a zone of economic and political cooperation. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Tajikistan had already joined the Economic cooperation organization formed by Iran, 
Pakistan, and Turkey. The consensus on economic and political forms and on states 
identity was yet to emerge in all of those states, but the need for economic 
reconstruction in Afghanistan and Central Asia in line with regional and global trend 
toward marketization and liberalization may bring these countries closer to one 
, 24 
another. 
However, regional powers including the Russian Federation were more active. 
Afghanistan became an arena in which regional rivals were competing for influence, 
with some regional powers favoring certain groups involved in the struggle to 
influence favorite group as stage to preserve its geopolitics and its interest in 
25 Afghanistan. For the United States probably Pakistan would play important role 
again as it used to play in the cold war year. It could quietly fit into American political 
and strategic objective in Central Asian region which would provide vantage ground 
for preventing Russian hegemony in the region, containing Iran and playing a 
balancing role against emerging powers like China. The control over the Pakistan 
Afghanistan corridor and creating an opening from the south would be vital for the 
West in gaining access to the oil and natural gas resources of the region, probably in 
this context with large support to Pakistan it could be frontline state again. There is 
no doubt that in 1995 the Afghan civil war became a mini-great game for regional 
powers. Their policies were influenced not only by developments in Afghanistan but 
also by one another's actions as competition among them had increased. For some, the 
war became in part a proxy fight. Pakistan was the most important outside player in 
Afghanistan but Iran- whose relative importance grew during the year Saudi Arabia, 
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Uzbekistan, Russia and India were other important players. 
To complicate the situation further, the USA had its own regional and 
international interests. Since Washington's counter-interventionist policy had all 
along been guided more by how it could benefit the USA against the Soviet Union 
rather than by what might be conducive to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. In 
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the process Washington neglected to give sufficient thought as to what could become 
of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. This was evident in its policy priorities 
and distribution of weapons to the Mujahideen. It channeled arms through Pakistan 
more specifically through Pakistan's military intelligence (ISl) to those Afghans who 
received ISI endorsement. 
Immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, little attempt was made to focus US 
energy and aid either on creating the conditions and mechanisms for ensuring a 
relatively bloodless transfer of power to the Mujahideen or on catering the Afghan's 
28 humanitarian needs during a transitional phase. There is no doubt why a successfiil 
guerilla movement could not turn into a cohesive political force. The designs and 
agendas of external powers coupled with the ambitions of self-serving Mujahideen 
warlords and leaders effectively blocked any attempt at national consolidation. In 
short Soviet invasion not only strengthened the old tribal and ethnic loyalties, but 
helped ethnic solidarity to be used for inter-ethnie wars. This would have significant 
29 bearing on the period following the soviet withdrawal. 
II. Afghan Civil War -The Key Factors 
During the anti -Soviet war in Afghanistan and later the guerrilla war against 
the pro-communist regime in Kabul, the frontline divided almost all ethnic groups and 
the larger tribes. In all those groups there were collaborators of the socialist regimes 
and some fierce enemies of these regimes; and people who decide to wait and see who 
would prevail. Some family fever to communist some fever to Mujahideen of 
favorites. Some hoped for the achievements of socialism and for the brotherly help of 
the USSR to transform Afghanistan into a supra-ethnic class society and eventually 
into a harmonious socialist union; the others expected that grand jihad against the 
formidable common enemy to do the job of creating one Afghan nation. As the war 
dragged on, it became obvious that the Kabul regimes and the Mujahideen were 
divided into numerous hostile factions. It also became obvious that ethnicity and 
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tribalism were contributory factors to this process, but not the most important ones. 
A. Internal factors 
The present civil war in Afghanistan has frequently been analyzed as an ethnic 
war: the Pushtuns against the Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbek or others. Each of these 
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groups fighting separately under its own commanders and military structure, the 
predominantly Pushtun Taliban are believed to aim at printing their ethnic stamp on 
all other ethnic groups of the country, and non-Pushtun are supposed to fight against 
31 Pushtun dominance and against their ethnic marginalization. Pushtun ethnic groups 
are estimated to account for between 40 per cent of Afghanistan nationals and the 
Pushtun themselves subdivided into thousand of tribes. There is no doubt that the 
Taliban polarized the country between a predominantly Pushtun south and east on the 
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one side, and the other one. 
Hazara, is an ethnic group whose members play a major role in the civil war. 
Groups live in various part of northern Afghanistan, and in the major cities, 
particularly in Kabul as well as in Quetta (Pakistan) and mashad (Iran). An unifying 
factor is the popular dislike of Pushtun. In the post 1992 civil war pressure fi-om Iran 
drove them together politically. Only of the pro-Iranian Hezb-e-wahadat (party of 
unity). The Hazara may become the first major ethnic group and strong unit against 
33 Pushtun (Taliban). Iran and Hazara ethnic relations not motivated by ethnic 
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solidarity but rather by religious connection. 
Uzbek speak their own Turkish language, adhere to Sunni Islam, their number 
equal roughly those of the Hazara living in North Afghanistan for centuries. During 
the Soviet-Afghan war, some of the Uzbeks sided with pro-Soviet government or 
rather with pro-minority policy of the new government and were militarily organized 
under Rashid Dostum's Jawani militias: others sided with the Mujahideen mainly 
under the Harakate-e-Enqelab of malawi Mohammad Nabi Mohainmadi whose 
leaders, but not commanders, were almost exclusively Pushtun. 
None of these groupings had ever developed a decision making institution 
which could express the will of the whole ethnic group or at least larger part of it, and 
which could lead such people to any concerted political or military action. The 
Pushtun are said to have ruled the country for 250 year. In fact it was not the Pushtun, 
but Pushtun rulers, who governed a wide range of different people, but never thg. 
Pushtun, not even a majority of them. Such a simplification is of little help in 
evaluating the prevailing situation in Afghanistan. The civil war in Afghanistan will 
rather depend on whether the protagonists continue using ethnicity as a psychological 
weapon which invariably backfires against those who use it. It will also depend on 
Afghanistan's neighbors and on the regional powers who not only confinue to fuel the 
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Afghan civil war but also make things worse by applying ethnic criteria while 
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choosing their friends. 
B. Regional Powers and their Rivalries 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the neighboring powers - Iran, 
Pakistan, and Uzbekistan became more important. Each of these three countries is 
linked to one of the parties in Afghanistan: Pakistan with the Hezb-i-Islami, Iran with 
the Hezbe-i-wahdat and Uzbekistan with the Jumbesh. Their relations are a matter of 
reciprocal manipulation: each tries to command the other to ftirther its own interest. 
The three neighboring powers all opposed the rebuilding of the Afghan state by the 
coalition, led by the Jamait-i-Islami, but they could not agree on a common course, 
the division among the three states correspond to those between their client parties; 
one can see the assumption that eliminating certain actors in the new- regionalized 
conflict in Afghanistan will automatically ensure stabilization. 
The basic objective of Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan is to weaken the 
Afghan state, which since 1947 has favored an alliance with India. As India's 
approach overlooked the probability that the fiature politics of Afghanistan would be 
more complex than the simple altematives between secularism and fundamentalist 
Islam. The fall of Marxist regime and formation of the Mujahideen government in 
Kabul may influence the political and psychological dynamics of on going conflict in 
Kashmir, where India and Pakistan have fought three costly wars. Long before 
capturing power in Kabul, the Mujahideen leaders supported the liberation of 
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Kashmir. In addition, India's policy was based on the principle of opposition to all 
religious fundamentalisms which was espoused by most of the Indian nationalist 
leaders. Some American analyst feel that India was watching and waiting in order to 
be sure that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would be successful. Had it happened, 
it could lead the formation of an independent Pakhtoonistan or could put pressure on 
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Pakistan to change its policy toward India. While, Pakistan's military and political 
support for the Hez-bi-Islami is thus partially attributable to the Hezb's lack of 
nationalist rhetoric (the party even went far as to advocate confederation between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan). This consistent backing of one party has in practice 
contributed to destabilization which, incidentally, undermined Pakistan's pretensions 
to play an important role in post-communist Central Asia, since Afghanistan is a 
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crucial passageway to that region. Further more, the permanent strategic goals of 
Pakistan in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal are: 
- to have a friendly government in Kabul to prevent the reconstruction of a 
Kabul - New Delhi axis 
- To establish strategic depth against India, by using Afghanistan territory a 
corridor towards Central Asia this could be used to import gas and oil. 
- To enact a Sunni Islamic policy which is the very basis of Pakistan's 
legitimacy, secular Pakistani government to enlist the support of the 
increasingly effective and numerous militant religious networks inside 
40 Pakistan and divert them from domestic politics to regional militancy. 
hi addition, Pakistan now lacked a viable Afghanistan policy to enable it to 
secure a receptive government in Kabul to settle once and for all the long Standing 
Afghan - Pakistan border dispute in line with Pakistan's interests. After the Soviet 
withdrawal, Islamabad essentially would have liked to see an enmeshing of the 
identity of Pakistan's and Afghanistan into a Pakistan influenced Pushtun ruled 
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enclave to assist it with wider objectives. And Pakistan also fitted in American's 
new political and strategic agenda in the region - that of preventing Russian 
hegemony, containing Iran and playing a balancing role against ambitions powers as 
42 China. Stability in Afghanistan was the main variable in this strategy. Domination 
in Afghanistan was important to exercise powerfiil control over the Southern corridor 
to Central Asia. This was the only way to enhance Pakistan geopolitical standing with 
the West in shaping the fiiture evolution of Cenfral Asia. This by itself would get 
Pakistan economic and political rewards "by creating a regional dependence on 
Islamabad to ensure safety for traffic - in other words, the international acceptance of 
Islamabad's hegemony over the Southern approaches to Central Asia and the Western 
gateway to China'. The control over Pakistan-Afghanistan corridor and creating an 
opening from the South would be vital natural gas resources of the region, probably in 
this context one may see the Brown Amendments largesse, as US's subtle renewal of 
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support to Pakistan as a frontline state again. 
Iran chose to support Hez-Be-Wehdat. Since the Soviet withdrawal, Iran's 
policy toward Afghanistan has been to avoid establishment of a Saudi-backed Islamic 
regime in Kabul which would mean the isolation of Afghanistan's Shiites, who 
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constituted the only card Iran now holds in the country. The, Sau^j funding for tlteW 
I 
Afghan faction of Mujahideen came primarily due to its desire to have a domii)ant/ 
influence in the Islamic world, undermining Iran and to establish--a' Smfn 
fundamentalist movement in Afghanistan. Saudi's political and religious 'finotives 
went beyond Afghanistan and it was making of efforts to expand influence in Central 
Asia as well. Saudi money and Afghan Mujahideen were believed to be behind Tajik 
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civil war also. Furthermore, the Islamic revolution in Iran had challenged Saudi 
Arabia's pre-eminence. Indeed Tehran argued that monarchy was incompatible with 
Islam and that Saudi Arabia's close relations with the United States were against the 
interests of the Moslems. Saudi believed that Iran will pose a great threat to them. 
Saudi Arabia also promoted the Surmi Islamic fundamentalista within Afghan 
resistance and deliberately emphasized the Sunni and Shiite division in Islam. During 
1988-1992, Saudi Arabia wanted to consolidate the influence by insisting on the 
establishment of a pro-Saudi Arabia and pro-Pakistan Islamic government in Kabul 
after withdrawal of Soviet. In the rise of Taliban it was believed that Saudi's 
supported financially to the Taliban. When Taliban entered Mazari's Hezb-e-wahdat 
forces both allies of Iran in the Southern and Western outskirts of Kabul, murdered 
Mazari and threatened to capture Kabul fi-om Rabbani and Massoud. It was at this 
juncture that the Taliban movement emerged as a serious contender for national 
46 power. Iran started seeing Taliban as an anti-Shia and anti-Iran force. Iran strong 
suspicion for the Taliban tied not only to Pakistan but to Saudi Arabia and the United 
States. It feared that the US might be planning to turn Afghanistan into an anti-Iranian 
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state. Tehran attached greater importance to the interests of the state and nationalism 
in its foreign policy. Iran also emphasized on the rights of the Afghan Shiites. During 
period 1988-1992, Iran encouraged the Iran-based Shiites organizations in 
Afghanistan to demand 25 per cent of the representation in the institutions and in any 
future government in Kabul. The Shiites demand was forcefully rejected by the pro-
48 Saudi and pro-Pakistan Sunni resistance organizations in Peshawar. Whereas, the 
formation of the Hez-Be-Wehdat in 1990. was largely Iranian initiative, aimed at 
bringing together all Shiites in Afghanistan, or at least the Hazaras. But the Hez-Be-
wehdat's departure from the government alliance had indirectly weakened Iran's grip 
on the party. 
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The UzJjek government key external objective was to guarantee all international 
frontiers to prevent the destabilization of Central Asia. The border with Afghanistan is 
particularly important; President Islam Karimov"s secular regime feared an Islamic 
contagion emanating from Afghanistan (or, indirectly, from Tajikistan, where an 
Islamic insurgency rages). Uzbekistan backed the Jumbesh in Afghanistan in the quest 
for a reliable ally to guard its Southern border-not because of ethnic solidarity with 
Uzbeks in Afghanistan. So long as the Jumbesh controlled an important piece of the 
border, Uzbekistan's border was assured. The risk for the Jumbesh was that it would 
remain confined to a small part of Afghanistan. For Uzbekistan the danger was being 
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shut out of fiiture political developments in Kabul. 
Russia - The down fall of pro-Soviet regime (Najibullah) fallowed by the 
disintegration of former Soviet Union, posed new challenges to Soviet military 
establishment. The conditions of Afghan war worsened by the ethnic conflicts within 
the military, the Afghan war not only exacerbated the ethnic conflict, but it also 
jeopardized the assets of the Soviets structure in Central Asia. The impact to Afghan 
war was more prominent on Central Asians countries due to the similarities in culture, 
religion and ethnicity of their Afghanistan counterparts. Therefore, the Central Asians 
covmtries were not comfortable with the Soviet Afghan policy. Apart from the Central 
Asians countries the Afghan war created anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments 
among other ethnic minorities. What Soviet wanted after its withdrawal from 
Afghanistan was first, Afghanistan would be an independent non-align country, 
fiiendly toward USSR. Secondly, it would have a government of national 
reconciliation in which the Marxist PDPA would share substantial power with non-
Marxist groups including resistance groups that might join the process of national 
reconciliation but to no gain as many hard line Pushtuns reduced their offensive 
against these states. But by and large the country remained divided, even at the height 
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of the Mujahideen offensive against the Soviet forces. 
The Soviet feared the spread of 'ftindamentalism' (a word that was closely 
identified with Western fears) and the instability in the Ferghana valley, and the near 
civil war conditions in Tajikistan. The instability in Afghanistan boded ill for the 
Russian first circle of security the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). As far 
as that country was concerned, the borders of CIS were to be protected as before, a 
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policy that was reinforced after Tajikistan's conflict flared after 1993. Since the 
USA was trying to use the developments occurring in the Moslem world to its 
advantage. Holding forth upon the common values of the Christian and Islamic 
civilizations as opposed to atheistic communism and flirting with the political and 
religious leaders of the Moslem world, Western strategists tried to drive a wave of 
controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union, to half circle the USSR with 
crescent of instability: the American 'aim' could only be countered by those who were 
prepared to give up their principles to suit Washington's interests. 
International reactionary circles were trying to point the spearhead of Moslem 
movements against the progressive forces within the Islamic world, and also against 
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socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union, ( though the CIA had launched the 
jihad in the then Soviet territory as early as 1987). The border, (especially towards the 
mountains) proved to be ideal guerrilla territory with opposition forces given shelter 
mainly by the Tajik groups led by Massoud (though initially they seemed having been 
patronized by all groups). It was argued stridently and frequently in Central Asia as 
well as in Moscow that Tajikistan's civil war originated and continued so long 
basically because of interference from Afghanistan. 
For Russia, Tajikistan was its only remaining foothold in Central Asia: Moscow 
maintained the 20th division and border guards, where the rank and file were usually 
locals under Russian coirmiand, while it had neither troops nor even military advisers 
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Despite so called 'Islamic threat" Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan refiised to allow Russian troops to be in their countries and stayed away 
from any practical military co-operation with Moscow. Russia did not have any 
strategic interests inside Afghanistan, but wanted to keep Tajikistan outside Uzbek 
influence and pressure. Hence, the use of the 'Islamic threats' made sense as Russia 
had a pragmatic approach to the Afghan conflict: its only goal was to maintain its 
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military presence in the area at the lowest possible cost. It became obvious that 
ethnicity and tribalism were contributory factors to this process, but not the most 
important ones. 
The future of Afghanistan will rather depend on whether the protagonists 
continue using ethnicity as a psychological weapon which invariably backfires against 
those who use it. It will also depend on Afghanistan's neighbors and on the regional 
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powers who not only continue to fuel the Afghan civil war but also make things worse 
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by applying ethnic criteria while choosing their "friends' 
C. The Discovery of large Sources of Energy; The Oil and Gas m the Newly 
Emerged Central Asian Countries 
After the end of the cold war, Afghanistan had lost its strategic importance. But 
the break down of the Soviet Union, the emergence of Central Asian states, the 
discovery of large quantities of oil and gas in the Caspian area, Afghanistan 
possibility could be an alternative gateway to Central Asia, that revived Afghanistan's 
strategic importance for Iran, India, and Russia on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan and the United States on the other. This did not bode well for peace and 
stability in Afghanistan. The conflict continued for quite a while, not only because of 
dispute among Afghanistan's but also because of intense rivalry among foreign 
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There were thus considerable opportunities for trade; the Central Asian states 
could pay increasing attention to political events in Afghanistan. With the barriers 
previously erected by Moscow once fallen, one might even see the transformation of 
the entire region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan into a zone of 
economic and political cooperation. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have 
already joined the economic cooperation organization formed by Iran, Pakistan, and 
Turkey. Consensus on economic and political forms and on state identity has yet to 
emerge in all of these states. But the need for economic reconstruction in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia in line with regional and global trends toward marketization and 
liberation may bring these countries closer to one another. 
The Central Asian states with the rich resources are looking for a way to escape 
the Russian stranglehold on their economy and communications. They welcomed 
Pakistani overtures to economic cooperation, just as they welcomed Iran's hand of 
friendship. However, both countries were left without doubt that none of these states 
welcome either one"s brand of political Islam, nor did they evince an interest in a bloc 
based on religion or ethnic communality. The chief concern here was for economic 
outlets - pipelines, roads, railways, all leading to the markets of the world, an access 
denied them by circumstance and geography. What was assessed to be the next largest 
oil and gas reserves, the region did not suffer unduly from lack of foreign interests. 
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Western oil men were soon to be seen in all the newly independent stares, but 
problem that confronted them was the lack of a reliable access. 
III. The U.S. Involvements in Afghan Civil War 
A. The U.S. Bid to Contain Iran's Involvement in Afghanistan's Affairs 
The problems between US and Iran started as early as in 1953 when the 
Americans intervened in the internal affairs of Iran by overthrowing the democratic 
government and reputing the Shah. However, in late 1970s, the two countries had 
managed to clear up a lot of misunderstanding, followed with the split between the 
modernist forces and those favouring Islamic regime. Islamist groups and 
organisations were in existence in nearly every Muslim country. The struggle between 
the two forces was going on with the vision of their countries' progress. In Iran, things 
began to change and the balance began to shift in favour of the Islamist organisation 
from the mid-1970s. The Saudis, flushed with petrodollars, after the oil crisis of 1973 
began to support the Islamist groups and organisations in Muslim countries to spread 
their own version of Islam. This evidently weakened the modernist. The US was 
ambivalent towards this because Saudi Arabia was one of the two pillars of American 
policy in the Middle East. Iran's effort to spread its own version of Islam after its 
revolution was bound to result in fierce competition with the Saudis and consequent 
and deterioration in their relations and rise in tension in the Islamic world. As Iran 
posed a frontal challenge to the existing order and to the United States' hegemony in 
the region in particular, Iran's defeat became the focal point of the American policy. 
After the fall of Pro-American regime (Shah) to the anti-American Islamic 
fimdamentalist revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, not only the United 
States lost a strategically located ally, but the whole American psyche was deeply 
shaken by the November 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran and the taking of 
more than seventy Americans as hostages. Ayatollah Khomeini justified the hostage-
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taking as action against the great Satan-America. Pro-Iranian Shiites militant 
beholden to revolutionary and clerical regime which had overthrown the Shah were 
bombing US marines and kidnapping Americans and others Westerns in 
Lebanon. Those developments were quite traumafic for Americans, unaccustomed to 
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sense of vulnerability that the Iranian hostage crisis evoked. Thus shock waves were 
felt - strategic and politically. It caused US lost of friend in helping stabilizing the 
entire oil-rich Persian Gulf region. 
The United States had secretly setup a number of intelligence posts along Iran's 
northern border with the Soviet Union. In addition, what America faced as a severe 
blow by the changes in Iran was that the American influence had to retreat from Iran -
Soviet border down the Southern shore of Persian Gulf. The lost of its control over the 
strait of Hormuze which is the strategic passage for the Persian Gulf oil transport 
route- A US ally and gendarme, who used to guard the American interests in the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East, turned into its foe; the US companies were forced 
to withdraw firom Iran, and the US traders had to evacuate the Iranian market. And 
more important thing was that US lost is monitoring sites. They monitored Soviet 
communications and missile telemetry emitted from the Soviet missile and space base 
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at Tyaratam, in Central Asia. 
During this period America was facing with Arab (OPEC) embargo on their oil 
to America, the only Persian Gulf producer (Iran under Shah Period) was to defy the 
OPEC embargo and ship oil to the United States after the October war. The Iranian 
crisis of 1978 stunted Washington, where the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations 
had applauded the Shahs efforts to modernize his realm through a top-down white 
revolution financed by petrodollars. Although the most obvious short-term impact of 
the Islamic upheaval that swept the Shah from power in January 1979, the rejection of 
modernization and Westemizations by Ayatollah Khomeini, whose theocratic 
woridview was antithetical to the secular democratic creed that the United States had 
been preaching in the third world since early 50s. Because free elections, free 
markets, and free people had long been articles of faith among US policy makers and 
the social scientist who frequently advised them, their rejection by Islamic radicals 
constituted a ftindamental challenge to the core beliefs that shaped American relations 
with the Middle East. By the late 1980s the conflict between traditional Islam and 
modem America had become so intense that some pundits spoke of 'a clash of 
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civilizations . But in others views, the taking of the American hostages in Iran was 
also exploited, not without cynicism, as a target of opportunity in the process of 
overcoming the 'Vietnam syndrome' shortly after the crisis erupted, the New York 
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times ran a front-page story by Hedrick smith "' Iran is helping the US to shed fear of 
intervening abroad"'. Smith reported "an important shift of attitudes in Washington 
that many believe, will have a significant long-term impact on the willingness of the 
United States to project its power in the third world and to develop greater military 
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capabilities for protecting its interests there'. 
However, US regarded Iran an important location to maintain her geo political 
strategy and economic interests there. The Carter doctrine was required to maintain 
U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. When the Shah of Iran was overthrown, and US 
military and intelligence installations were put out of order as Pentagon official 
worded it '"the US government was left without any coherent imperialist strategy in 
the Middle East"; and there was no immediate surrogate who could take over the 
Shah's role. Therefore, the US government had to reassert a stronger military 
72 presence. 
After the Islamic revolt against Reza Shah Pahelvi's regime in Iran which was 
considered as pro American, Khomeni Ayatullah the spiritual leader had argued that 
'the imperialism, the oppressive and treacherous rulers, the Jews, Christians, and 
materialists are all attempting to distort the truth of Islam and turn the Muslims astray 
'he cautioned". . . the entire contemporary international system are totally illuminate, 
for they perpetuate an unjust order imposed on 'oppressed' Muslim by the 
'oppressive' great powers. Muslims are therefore obliged to 'overthrow the oppressive 
governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic 
government for justice that will be in the service of the people'. An Islamic world 
order would see the territorial state transcended by the broader entity of the 
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umma. Further more, After Khomeini riding victoriously it was necessary to 
eliminate all things westem. He said it was time to launch a holy war against the West 
and the traitors of Islam. 
Robin Wright (1986) makes this point in her examination of Shiite Islam titled 
Sacred Rage. According to Wright, the Ayatollah Khomeini was guided by the 
message of Karbala. Along with the Shiite clergy of Iran, he believed the Iranian 
Revolution was the first step in purifying the world. Israel must be eliminated and 
retumed to Islamic rule. The west had become the handmaiden of the Jews, but the 
west was and remains the source of imperialism. Its influence is satanic and must be 
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destroyed. Holly warriors were called to battle. Wright says Iran exportrd terrorism in 
this vein with revolutionary zeal. 
The primary target of Iran's external religious zeal has been Lebanon. Shiite 
fundamentalists began to flock to Lebanon in 1982 after the Israeli invasion, and Iran 
helped establish two terrorist organizations to support them, the Islamic Jihad 
(Islamic holly war) and Hizbullah (party of god). By 1996, both groups, though still 
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supporting terrorism, were capable of acting as autonomous militias. 
In addition, Khomeini made his God promise of exporting the struggle. In 
November 1979 and February 1980 wider spread riots erupted in the Shiites towns of 
the oil - rich Saudi province of Hassa, in Bahrain, while Kuwait became the target of 
a sustain terror and subversion campaign. In June 1979, the revolutionary regime 
began publicly urging the Iraqi population to rise up and overthrow the socialist and 
secular Ba'th regime. Tehran escalated its campaign by resuming support for the 
rebellious Iraqi Kurds (which had been suspended in 1975), and initiating terrorist 
attacks against prominent Iraqi officials. These pressures eventually led the Iraqi 
75 invasion on Iran in September 1980. The US having long record of Iran backing 
terrorist groups to further its perceived strategic interests, containing Iranian influence 
in West Asia became major U.S. foreign policy objective, and there was increasing 
evidence that covert war was growing in scale. 
Media reports suggest the US was making use of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq - a 
far-right organization complicit in the 1991 anti-Shia massacres in Iraq, and 
designated a global terrorist organisation in 1997 - for attacks inside Iran. US covert 
support was also thought for a Kurdish terrorist group that had executed strikes 
against Iran. On April 13, Iran announced the arrest of 90 Jundulloh cadres, who were 
reported to have created stockpiles of weapons and explosives. Iran's Intelligence 
Minister, Mohseni Ejeie, also pointed to the threat from the west. The United States 
itself was willing to back "radical" Sunni Moslems as well as Saudi-backed, Wahabist 
movements against pan-Shiites Iran, which was regarded as the "greater"' of two 
'•evils."' By 1982-83, the US along with Saudi Arabia, fully supported Saddam 
Hussein"s war with the ayatollah Khomeini, which was instigated in reaction to 
Iranian support for Shiites and Kurdish faction in Iraq, while Washington looked the 
other way, Saddam Hussein engaged in horrific war crimes in fighting Iran and 
against Kurdish and Shiites factions, and other groups regarded as alighted with Iran' 
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in the war of cities, (a war resulting in the loss of over a million people). From other 
point of view, Saddam Hussein had hoped to take advantage of Iran's revolutionary 
state; it's extremely weakened military capabilities, and its international isolation, and 
further more he was supported by the United States, which had welcomed Iraq's 
invasion as an increased pressure on Iran to release the embassy hostages. War was 
launched against Iran to bring an end to any threat to Iraq from the export of the 
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Islamic revolution; and possibly to overthrow the clerical government. 
After eight years of bitter fighting with Iraq, Iran accepted United Nations 
Security Council resolution to ceasefire with Iraq, and soon after international 
Isolation, it mended fences with the Gulf States, re-established diplomatic ties with 
the major West European powers, and even eluded with the United States, the 'Great 
Satan'. When a combination of international and regional developments offered new 
opportunities in the early 1990, the AyatoUah's imperialist ambitions were quickly 
enforced and expansion of the country's military arsenal was accompanied by 
sustained efforts to project Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, 
as well as in Central Asia and the Trans Caucasus. 
While, Iran renewed and substantially accelerated it's nuclear development 
programme. There was a strong concern among intelligence services and arms control 
agencies around the world that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons. Iran was known to 
have been shopping for nuclear know how and material in the West, the successor 
states to the Soviet Union, especially Russia - from which Iran had acquired two 
reactors of four hundred megawatts thermal each and selected third world countries, 
such as Brazil, North Korea, and China, which had long been involved in the franian 
programme. On their part, the Ayatollahs made no secret of their interest in the bomb, 
at least until they came under heavy American pressure to bridle their nuclear 
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ambitions following the 9/11 attacks. 
The question of US interest fit in factional rivalries in Afghan's civil war to 
contain Iran was seen in the background of Iran-Iraq war explosion, where "the United 
States itself was willing to back "radical'" Surmi Muslims as well as Saudi -backed 
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Wahabist movements against pan-Shiites Iran". And during Gorge Bush regime 
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where he himself denounced Iran's oppressive regime for Middle East and again 
during Clinton administration after Gulf War, he denounced "dual containment 
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82 policy" against Iran and Iraq. Speaking at conference of former American and 
Soviet officials involved in the Afghan crisis in Norway in September 1995, General 
Valentin Varennikov said that Soviet leaders feared and were militarily prepared for 
US invasion of Iran to overthrow Khomeini regime, however, according to KGB 
defector, Vasily Mitrokhin the KGB was alarmed by the prospect of improvement of 
relations between Iran and Afghanistan or taking place of an Islamic revolution in 
83 Afghanistan. 
With the growing Iranian influence in Afghanistan affairs, in the absence of 
major powers involvement in the Afghanistan's conflict, Iran assumed a larger role by 
84 backing the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. During the war of resistance to 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Shi'a Hazaras group was largely dismissed by fellow 
Mujahideens belonging to the non-Shiait camp. But the external donors such as the 
United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan excluded Hazaras from receiving any 
military and financial aid. The contrary they promoted Pushtun Mujahideens over 
their Hazara counterparts. Caught in this internal sectarian and external ideological 
85 divide the Hazaras were left confined to rely upon Iran for their cause. Iran's 
involvement in the Afghan conflict primarily to secure the interests of the Afghan 
Shiites as particularly the Hazaras went through two distinct phases. In the first phase 
during the resistance to Soviet occupation, Iran selectively helped only the Hazaras. 
Iran's ability to arm and fiind the eight Afghan Shia groups was officially recognized 
by Tehran. In 1988 with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Iran immediately 
worked to unite those recognized groups into a single Hizb-e-wahdat party. It then 
pressed for the Wahadat's inclusion in the international negotiations to form a new 
Mujahideen government. As the Afghan war intensified between 1992 and 1995 so 
did the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistani attempts to bring all those 
factions together always had sidelined the Hazaras and Iran. In the Peshawar Accord 
(between the groups of Mujahideen on power sharing in Kabul) or the Jalalabad 
Accords to end civil war, this trend prevailed. Iran over the years came to realize that 
its exclusive focus on the Shiites factor had left it with little effective say in 
Afghanistan developments. This caused Iran shift in its policy on Afghanistan, Iran 
started backing not just the Afghan Shias but all the Persian speaking groups who 
were resisting Pashtun domination Iran has natural link with the Tajiks, they originate 
from the same ancient race and spoke the same language. In late 1991 Iran signed an 
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agreement with Tajikistan and Afghanistan's Jamiat-e-Islami to strengthen its 
influence on Persian speaking Sunni Afghans. Iran also contacted the Ismaili Shiites 
and Uzbeks in Afghanistan. Their effort was to combine together to oppose Pushtun 
hegemony. As a strategist, they were most organized and effective. Their motivation 
and dedication to their resistance movement was spurred by their vision of having a 
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central role in post-Soviet Afghanistan and replacing the rival Pushtuns. In addition, 
as Professor James clad of the Georgetown University pointed out that "... Iranian 
meddling in religious disputes within Pakistan (which pitted Shia against Sunni) there 
was the vexatious Iranian patronage of ethnic Tajiks combatants in Afghanistan, 
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partisans war against Islamabad's preferred factions in that country's civil war." 
Iran's interest in Afghanistan was to counter the interests of the Saudi -
Pakistan - US combine for obvious reason. USA refused to accept the Islamic 
revolution in Iran; the Saudi's used their money power to foment counter 
revolutionary forces that would dislodge Iran from the high pedestal it gained after the 
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revolution and Pakistan joint its interest with these two. 
The Clinton administration, which was following a policy of dual containment 
of Iran and Iraq, saw the increasing Iranian role in Afghanistan as a disturbing one in 
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the ground of rising Iranian influence in Central Asian republics as well. After the 
collapse of Soviet Union, the birth of five Central Asian states gave Iran a new 
impetus to end its international isolation. Iran moved to gain footing in Central Asia. 
In November 1991, an agreement to build a railway line between Iran and 
Turkmenistan was signed. In its Central Asian foray Iran was however, carefiil not to 
antagonize Russia. Tehran declined to support Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia 
even though 20 per cent of Iranian population is Azeri; Tehran also helped Russia and 
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the UN to end the civil war in Tajikistan. One may see, the US approach to Central 
Asia was also driven by overarching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying 
goal of containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the newly- independent states in 
1991, US policy toward Central Asia centered on security relationship with 
Kazakhstan. US focus to secure Kazakhstan's nuclear arsenal and in December 1993, 
resulted in the signing of a cooperative threat reduction (CTR) agreement to dismantle 
and destroy the country's more than 100 SS-18 missiles. 
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By 1994, the US cemented its bilateral security cooperation with Kazakhstan 
through a defense doctrine and training the neighboring states of Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also joined Kazakhstan in entering NATO's partnership 
for peace program (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO (PFP) served as 
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the main avenue for Western security engagement. As a result the United States 
gave Pakistan a free hand in Afghanistan and indirectly supported the Pakistani efforts 
to build up the Taliban militia as a counterweight to the Iranian - backed Rabbani 
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regime. The United States regarded Pakistan as a strong ally throughout the cold war 
then continued to act as a frontline state for America and America increasingly 
viewed Afghanistan through the Pakistani prism. One needs only to recall Robin 
Raphael's sfrong plea before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee to revise the 
1990 Pressler Amendment which had ended all military and economic assistance to 
Pakistan. Pakistan however, always had its own axe to grind in neighboring 
Afghanistan. American interest in Afghanistan renewed only when it became 
increasingly clear that Pakistan's protege Hekmatyar had failed to capture 
94 Kabul. And because Hekmatyar was suspected of harboring Islamic terrorists who 
had carried out attacks against western targets and his increasing closeness with Iran 
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was also viewed with alarm. In 1990-91 he had backed Iraq in the Gulf war. The 
USA stressed to Pakistan that, in view of his divisive attacks on other Afghans, 
Hekmatyar was not to receive US aid. Hekmatyar's failure to support Saudi Arabia 
against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait cost him heavily from a power that had seen 
him as their chosen instrument to combat Iranian power in Afghanistan. 
The final step against Hekmatyar came from Pakistan. Pakistan (or more 
precisely, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan) had also long seen 
Hekmatyar as their chosen policy instrument in Afghanistan. But his divisive ways 
hurt Pakistan's position in newly independent Central Asia and the desire to end war 
in Afghanistan led the Pakistan starting to cut off Hekmatyar from their support in late 
1991. But he did not lose all his foreign supporters. Arab supporters, who agreed with 
his stand over the Gulf war, continued to provide suitcases of dollars. Libya provided 
both ftinding and terrorist style urban combat training; it remained an ally. There were 
even unconfirmed reports of an attempted Hekmatyar rapprochement with Iran's long 
88 
96 
time opponent. The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban as 
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they were in line with its anti - Iran policy, as Taliban forces were supported by 
many Arab militants most of them were strongly anti-Shiite; they contributed 
accentuating the common prejudice among Afghan Sunni against the Hazara Shia, 
which led to various massacres of civilian Hazaras living in Kabul after the fall of the 
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city in May 1992. Fight fire with fire, was the US reasoning: combat the militant 
Shiaism of the Iranians with even greater militancy and violence by some groups 
which were considered as orthodox Sunni Muslims. 
This served well the purpose of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were troubled by 
Iran's power, even though that power had been reduced through Iran's virtual defeat 
by Saddam Hussein in the 1980-88 war in the Gulf. The Saudi rulers were also vexed 
by the 'heresies' of its own persecuted Shiites minority centered in the sensitive 
region of the eastern oil fields. Anti- Soviet and simultaneous anti-Shiite policies did 
suite Saudi objectives perfectly. Pakistan anxious to exclude both Russian and Iranian 
influence from its region and thus secured trade routes to the west markets of Central 
99 Asia. And Taliban could be a counterweight for Pakistan for its keenness to achieve 
success depth in the strategic confi^ ontation with India over Kashmir Issue, and 
Taliban as an alternative to the unreliable Hekmatyar, whom they had earlier selected 
as their point man because Hekmatyar had failed to capture Kabul and later he 
jumped side, to be a client of Iranians. 
The emergence of the Taliban was closely related to the balance of power and 
an evolution among the fundamentalist movements. While the Hezb had been 
supported by Pakistani Jamaat-e Islami, the Taliban had been helped by more 
conservative fimdamentalist movement fi-om Pakistan, namely the Jamit-e Ulema-I 
Islam. They received discreet support from Saudi Arabia, who became estranged from 
more radical Islamists like Hikmatyar. The Americans then strongly opposed to 
radical Islam, might have been in search of another Muslim card in line with Saudis, 
with the aim of not leaving Islamic ftindamentalism with no other choice than to move 
closer to Iran. Pakistan was still playing the Islamic card in Central Asia and also 
needed Islamic leverage in its policy to establish a corridor from its territory to 
Central Asia through Afghanistan. This allowed Pakistan also to play on the Pushtun 
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connection (since many high -ranking military officers and civil servants in Pakistan 
were Pushtun). 
The Taliban which took shape in mid-1994 and began to spread their influence 
in the large part of the country had backing of Pakistan and the Saudi governments. 
The US also had supplied Taliban with military equipments and weapons through 
104 Pakistan, the US long supplied arms and training to the most ferociously 
reactionary fighting forces in the Islamic world, including those Mujahideen who 
spawned a second generation reform movement known as the Taliban to that extreme 
that Ayatollah Khomeini condemned them as a branch of Islam-i limrikai, "American 
Islam.". While, Saudis were betting heavily on the Taliban to eliminate all traces 
to Iranian influence, mainly in the form of the Shiite factions which the Saudis, as 
well as Zia al-Haq always opposed. This effort suited Israel also, as some Jewish 
lobbies in the USA were not initially critical of the Taliban. In line with the US State 
Department Israel saw the Taliban as an anti- Iranian force which could be used to 
undermine Iranian influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Israel's intelligence 
agency Mossad developed a dialogue with Taliban through Taliban liaison offices in 
the USA. Pakistan's ISI supported this dialogue even though Pakistan did not 
recognize Israel. The ISI had developed links through the CIA with Mossad during 
the Afghan jihad. But as US policy toward the Taliban shifted so did Israel's as the 
Taliban gave refiige to Bin Laden and encouraged the drugs trade. Turkey convinced 
Israel that the Taliban were a security threat to the region. Mossad opened contacts 
with the anti-Taliban alliance. Israel now had an interest in seeing that the Taliban did 
not take control of the whole Afghanistan, even though it remained suspicious of 
Ahmad Shah Masud's support from Iran. Both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance 
were to accuse each other for receiving Israeli supports. 
While, fran perceived the Taliban to be a creation of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
with US support. It was also convinced that the Taliban was put together not just to 
contain the Iranian role in Afghan affairs, but the Taliban were perceived to be a 
'trap' set up by the US, Saudi and Pakistan to drag Iran Into war with Afghanistan. A 
'conspiracy theory', sought to explain that since the Gulf war of 1991, the US was 
seeking to lure Iran into some war or the other that would serve as an opportunity to 
destroy its renovated military machine and further to exhaust its economy - with the 
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over all objective of restoring Iran to its former status as a piece of US strategic chess 
- board. And since the US would prefer to distance the war as far as possible from the 
Gulf region - to avoid repercussions that might prove hard to control later on - a war 
between Iran and Afghanistan would be ideal. 
Iran shares a 900 km long border on the east with Afghanistan. The relations 
between the two slipped to lowest point in late 1998, when ten Iranian diplomats and 
journalist in Mazare Sharif went missing and were presumed to have been 
108 killed. After the Taliban stormed Mazar- i-Sharif, it was later reported that 2,000-
6,000 Shia Hazara civilians had been systematically massacred by the guerillas after 
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recapturing the city Iran amassed 70,000 Revolutionary guards and conducted the 
largest ever ground and air exercise on its Afghan border. 
However, in mid-October the Taliban agreed to fi-ee all Iranian prisoners who 
were held in Afghanistan and to punish only those found responsible for the killing of 
the Iranian diplomats (or military advisors, according to Taliban). By the end of the 
year the situation became calmer, with the Taliban having expressed regret for the 
deaths of the Iranian nationals, and Iran too having scaled down its border forces and 
announced that it had no intention of invading Afghanistan. 
B. The U.S. Attempt to Prevent Iran from being Alternate Oil Pipeline Route 
Apart from political aspect, the Talibans were also used as a southbound route of 
the Central Asian oil and gas, a route that would be projected and promoted in lieu of 
the Iranian route. Certainly the Taliban appeared to serve the US policy of 
isolating Iran by creating a firmly Surmi buffer on Iran's border and potentially 
providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Iran's monopoly on 
112 Central Asia's southern trade routes,' wrote Reuters. 
Such a project was aimed to deprive Iran of fransit fees: it also aimed to deprive 
Iran of South Asian markets for its oil and gas. And most importantly, it aimed to 
deprive Iran of a potential political and trade influence in South Asia. Technically 
speaking, Iran would be the cheapest long-term export route option for the Caspian 
Sea Republic. Moreover, Iran was interested in playing an active role in solving the 
problem of transportation of oil and gas resources of the Caspian republics of the CIS 
to world markets. Russia could gain if they would support project meant to transport 
oil and gas of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through Iranian territory onwards to 
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potential markets of South and South-East Asia. Iran was also keen to export natural 
gas to Pakistan and India. Both South Asian countries could benefit from the proposed 
$ 5 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, which was expected to cost around 
$700 million revenue per annum to Pakistan - S500 million as annual transit fee and 
additional $200 million saved through cheaper gas. Pakistan is geo-strategically 
located as a transport corridor for supply of gas and also in a position to obtain it at 
cheaper prices from Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan. This pipeline holds greater 
prospects than the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline. Originally, the 
Iranian Gas company plaimed to deliver 2 billion cubic feet of gas daily to Karachi 
and Multan with an option to extend it to India and onwards to some countries in the 
Far East. However, Indian had reservations about this land route as in their view it 
would pass through 'hostile' Piikistani territory. This India looked for an alternative 
sea route being developed by the Russian company Gazprom that has a 10 per cent 
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share in the South Pars offshore gas fields of Iran. In addition, in the first phase of 
its programme, Iran proposed swapping its crude oil with Central Asian crude. Since 
1998 crude oil fi-om Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has been transported across the 
Caspian Sea to Iran's Caspian port of Neka, where it is refined and consumed in Iran. 
In exchange Iran allowed companies to lift oil fi-om Iranian ports on the Gulf With 
pipeline projects indefinitely delayed, this appealed to the oil companies who, despite 
US pressure not to do so, began to negotiate further swaps with Iran. Two US 
companies. Chevron and Mobil who had oil concessions in Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan applied to the Clinton administration in May 1998, for a license to carry 
out swaps with Ian - a move that created a major policy headache for Washington and 
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would become a test case for the future of US sanction against Iran. 
Whereas, the west had tried to exclude Iran, having influence in this region 
since post-Soviet era by encouraging the politics of pan Turkish ideas. It received 
boost from western policies that supported pro-Turkish tendencies against 
reemergence of Iranian interest in the Turkish region of the former Soviet Union. 
Turkey herself was not reluctant to adapt itself to this new international atmosphere 
and forged new links with the countries in this region. The Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organizafion (BSEC) was found in 1992. The BSEC handled small 
projects and sought to develop transportation, communication and environmental 
projects. The BSEC, initially founded by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran during the late 
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1960's was expanded by the addition of five Central Asian States, Azerbaijan and 
Afghanistan in 1993. This became a catalyst for building private sector banking for 
building infrastructure and scientific technical cooperation. The Turkish world was 
expanded from Europe to Eurasia. 
One could notice that US did not want energy resources pipeline go through 
Iran. A serious conflict between China and the US rose over this, as China's support 
for the extension of pipeline routes from Central Asia through Iran had the potential to 
generate conflict between Beijing and Washington. China's oil agreements with 
Kazakhstan included a Chinese pledge to help construct pipeline from Kazakhstan to 
the Kazkh-Turkman border with the goal of eventually extending it through an Iranian 
port. This could run counter the US policy of denying Iran access to Central Asia 
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oil. 
In the months before the Taliban came to power, the then US Assistant 
Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphael, waged an intense round of shuttle 
diplomacy between the powers with possible stake in the UNCAL project. 'Robin 
Raphael was the face of the UNCAL pipeline; said an official of the former 
Afghanistan government who was present at some of the meetings with her. In 
addition tapping new sources of energy, the project also suited a major US strategic 
aim in the region: isolating its enemies Iran and stiffing a frequently mooted rival 
pipeline backed by Iran. It would eliminate the need to deal with Iran, a country 
towards which Washington nurtured deep antipathy and resentment, and gave the US 
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and its partner's control of the new supply of energy. 
Pipelines through Afghanistan would exclude the possibility of direct supply by 
Iran of resources to meet Pakistan's energy needs, and the consequent flow of foreign 
exchange earnings into Iran's coffers. The Isolation of Iran was not especially an 
obsession of the State Department, but there were such strongly anti-Iranian attitudes 
in sections of Congress, reinforced by the lobbying of pressure groups such as the 
America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), that a President had litfle 
incentive to take his political life in his hands by exploring the possibility of a less 
antagonistic relationship with Iran. The policy of "dual containment' of Iran and Iraq, 
initially articulated on behalf of the Clinton Administration by Australian bom former 
lobbyist Martin Indyk, was providing increasingly creaky. The Irony in the case of 
Afghanistan was that the attempt to exclude Iran by means of the expansion of 
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118 Taliban power had adverse effects on Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan revived 
the Iranian suspicion regarding the pipeline; it feared long term US hegemony in 
Afghanistan and a fierce competition for Central Asian energy resources among 
American multinational companies. In view of the US determination to block the 
route through Iran, the Afghanistan - Pakistan corridor could emerge as the only 
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alternative to unleash Central Asian energy potential. 
C. The U.S. Support to Afghan groups in order to secure oil and gas pipeline 
route through Afghanistan. 
The post-cold war model of war was seen as quite a less threatening, more 
difilised, and less intense. The military and intelligence posture were to deal with the 
Soviet threat as unnecessary. Indeed, the fundamental threats to American national 
security no longer arose fi^om military challenges but from economic challenges. The 
entire sphere of military challenge was degraded to the level of subsidiary threat, 
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while the perceptions of national interest shifted to the economic sphere. The 
defeat of America's cold war enemy blinded the US political elites to the extent that 
US policy failed to adapt the new world order. 
America's foreign policy had been shaped during half a century of cold war. A 
generation of diplomats had been raised in the shadow of Soviet containment; the 
dismembering of the Soviet Union left them in a political vacuum, without specific 
guidelines. To fill that vacuum, American diplomacy turned to business. As such they 
became ambassadors and diplomats of the strong Washington lobbies that backed 
their own parties. Almost overnight, it became apparent that US foreign policy had 
turned into powerful vehicle for American cooperation seeking opportunities every 
where instead of promoting international stability. This imperialist approach was an 
engine powering the foreign policy of George W. Bush. 
In the early 1990s impelled by the oil lobby, George Bush Sr. underestimated 
the consequences of the disintegration of the economic equilibrium in Central Asia. 
The dismantling of Soviet power was perceived as the beginning of lucrative period of 
exploitation, with US oil companies controlling the vast energy fields of the 
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region. After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, little attempt was made to focus 
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on US energy. Even though after the collapse of bipolar worid and the contours of 
94 
a multi polar world order American continued entry and continued presence in any 
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region was guided by her long-term national interest. 
The United States was actively involved in the region since early 1990s. 
Beginning in the 1970s the US government and private Foundations funded detailed 
research on the region. From the late 80s the regions newspaper and journals were 
regularly collected translated and analyzed. At the time of the independence of the 
Central Asian Republics (CARs) the United States was among the first to set up well-
staffed embassies throughout the region. 
One of the key concerns for the American policymakers was how to secure 
access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of the 21st century. The 
answer laid in the Central Asia and Caucasus. This was the primary reason why the 
United States was among the first to engage with these states soon after they declared 
independence. The Caspian Sea reserves were estimated to hold 100 billion to 200 
billion barrels of oil. Natural gas reserves were estimated at 7.9 trillion cubic 
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meters. According to Kees Van der pijl, the oil reserves of the Caspian region were 
initially estimated at around 150 billion barrels, half that of Saudi Arabia or equals to 
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the reserves of Iraq and Iran combined. Western experts believed that the untapped 
hydrocarbon resources of the Central Asia Republics could make the region the 
Persian Gulf of the next century. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan oil fields are believed to 
have significant amount of oil reserves and the largest gas reserves are believed to be 
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (see annex-1). 
In the earlier phase of its engagement with the region, the United States 
encouraged the newly independent states (NIS) to adopt western style economic 
reforms. Economic growth and the integration of the CARs was to serve a very 
important purpose: ensuring the economic sovereignty of the NIS, and the eventual 
elimination of the Russian and Iranian influence, while at the same time securing 
127 lucrative markets for US goods and services. 
The end of the confi-ontation with the Soviet Union created opportunities for the 
United States to redeploy as effectively as possible the considerable resources these 
were no longer needed to deter or counter Soviet aggression those resources included 
not only steel and coal, oil and food, and fibers and plastics, but also the effort and 
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talent of scientists, engineers, and many other people at the skill level in both public 
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and private sectors. 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and following the collapse of the 
USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed. While the 
Central Asian states were eager to invite the overseas oil companies for commercial 
deals because they hoped that the export earnings would then put substantial funds at 
their disposal for reconstructing their post-Soviet economics. They also considered 
that as a way of reducing their dependence on Moscow which, in spite of their 
independence cornered them in a tight noose. The Central Asian states also required 
an access to the sea for their trade. The existing routes involved long distances, and 
were prohibitively expensive. Just by way of illustration, Dushanbe, capital of 
Tajikistan as located by road some 3,200 km from Bandar Abbas in Iran, 3,400 from 
Odessa in the black sea and some a 500 km Vladivostok in the pacific. In this regards 
the Pakistani ports in the South Karachi, port Qasim, Pasni, Gwadar, Jewani and 
Ormara in the Arabian Sea - was thought to be an alternative proposition. In 
comparison Karachi being around 2,720 km from Dushanbe and from Ashkabad, 
capital of Turkmenistan, about 2,000 km. These attractions had opened up the 
possibilities for the Central Asian states to avoid dependence on any one state for 
ports and pipelines. Therefore, they were opened to options and follow policies which 
would allow them to deal with anyone. This was demonstrated in Turkmenistan's 
broader policy of "positive neufrality' which had allowed it to build political and 
economic interests with Iran on the one hand and the US on the other. For Central 
Asia states the location of Iran was very useful. It could help them by providing 
access to the sea. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan viewed Iran as a better 
route through which its gas and oil could be exported to western markets (see arniex-
2). Not withstanding its espousal of Shia fundamentalism, Iran was accepted as a 
more stable economic partner by all Central Asian states. In this regards Russia and 
India were also not opposed to the engagement with Iran and viewed this possibility 
in their own economic and strategic interests. However, the US in furtherance of its 
containment policy on Iran was determined to shut Iran out of the emerging oil game 
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in Central Asia With these reasons the US government was slow to pick up on the 
importance of the region (and those former Soviet republics) forged relations with US 
business. The US approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching 
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geopolitical considerations with an underlying goal containing the influence of China, 
Iran and Russia. 
Another US policy was even more ambitious with long term goals of 
democratization and marketization, a consolidation of regional security and 
cooperation and an open unfettered environment to allow the development of the 
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regional energy resources. The pnvate western entrants mto the new great game 
included well - placed individuals, maverick companies and large oil companies - in 
that order. It was not until Clinton's globalization offensive of 1994, that the US 
developed its own geopolitical offensive to wrest control of the region form 
132 Russia. The discovery of new hydrocarbon reserves led Central Asian region to 
gain in importance as it could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the Gulf 
start depleting seriously by the Middle of the next century. The assessment of the 
hydrocarbon reserves of the region had been speculative, but in anticipation of the 
potential oil and gas resources, a subtle yet big battle had started to establish control 
over these energy resources. The export routes out of Central Asia had then become 
one of the central issues in post cold war politics. It was in this context that Central 
Asia was again emerging as a murky battleground among big powers. The agenda was 
being set by geopolitics and oil. 
The object of the revived game was twofold: firstly, to establish friendly 
relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil and gas 
resources. Secondly, to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. The 
landlocked nature of the Central Asian states created obstacles to proposals for 
creating new alternative routes. The major existing pipeline systems ran north through 
Russia. Both passed through Chechnya where one system serves Russia and the other 
the export market, via the Russia black sea port of Novorossisk. But at present there is 
no pipeline heading south. 
While, Turkmenistan as a gas-rich country avoided ifs dependence on Russia 
which was keen to export it to Pakistan and India and then onwards to South-East 
Asia. The proposed $2 billion trans-Afghanistan pipeline covering 1,464 kilometers 
was a 48-inch diameter pipeline that was proposed to connect the Daulatabad gas 
fields in Southern Turkmenistan to Multan in central Pakistan. It was proposed that it 
may be extended 600 km into India after traversing 750 km in Afghanistan. 
Reportedly, the expected supply of gas would be at the rate of 2 billion cubic feet per 
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day. The Turkmenistan government on its part had guaranteed deUverabiUty of 25 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas exclusively for the Central Asian gas pipeline. It had 
signed a deal with the consortium comprising UNOCAL, Turkmenistan government, 
Delta of Saudi Arabia, Stochu of Japan, Gazprom of Russia, Inpex of Japan, Hyundai 
of South Korea and Crescent of Pakistan. Talks on the above proposal between 
Turkmenistan and Pakistan had gone on for many years but had been hampered by the 
then ongoing war in Afghanistan. For countries like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
the preconditions for societal uplift were to build gas and oil pipelines as soon as 
134 possible for transportation of their hydrocarbon assets to the outside world. 
While, the US oil production began to decline and the American companies 
began to plan for replenishing reserves by investing in friendly countries, the Central 
Asian republics looked more lucrative than even the Middle Eastern allies due to their 
refusal to 'countenance foreigners running their oil industries in 1993, the American 
oil company Chevron concluded a deal worth $ 40 billion to develop Tengiz oil field 
on the north eastern shore of the Caspian sea. However the deal required construction 
of oil pipelines which in turn depended on regional stability. Peace and stability in 
Afghanistan was a prerequisite to the construction of pipelines through alterative 
routes other than through Iran. Subsequently, when the Central Asian republics 
became a hunting ground for the international companies with their governments 
looking for ways to break the Russian monopoly to lower the cost of delivering their 
oil to the outside world by construction of alternative oil pipelines the American 
companies also stood in the queue. One of the US companies, UNOCAL had planed 
for the construction of an oil pipe line through Afghanistan at a cost $ 8 billion. The 
Clinton administration had openly applauded the UNOCAL project (see map-1). 
The United States was by then, after a period of neglect, trying to revise its 
contacts in Afghanistan with the new foray into the former Soviet republics in the 
Caspian area. Afghanistan became important once again. During the first 
presidency of Bill Clinton Afghanistan was conspicuous by its absence. It would 
however, be incorrect to state that Washington had nothing to do with Afghanistan 
after Soviet withdrawal. On the contrary Pakistan which was a strong ally through out 
the cold war now continued to act as a fi-ontline state for America and America 
increasingly viewed Afghanistan through the Pakistani prism. After the end of cold 
war US had halted ifs military and economic assistant because of its breaching 
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nuclear proliferation issue. But later US had to turn to Pakistan again when US found 
its interests in Afghanistan, because Pakistan always played important role in 
neighboring Afghanistan. American interest in Afghanistan renewed only when it 
became increasingly clear that Pakistan's protege Hekmatyar had failed to capture 
Kabul and America's calculation of gains from Central Asia's oil and gas 
transportation appeared to be in jeopardy. But by and large America's understanding 
of the area continued to be influenced by Pakistan's reading of the situation. Thus, 
when Pakistan created and promoted the Taliban, America went along with the 
exercise sharing Pakistan's belief that they would be able to provide some governance 
and stability in Afghanistan that would allow ambitious oil projects to take off 
Oil has been a major US concern. America was in serious search to set itself 
free from 'OPEC tentacles'. Refusal of Middle Eastern allies to agree to foreigners 
running their oil industry forced US to look around for alternative sources. Newly 
137 independent states of Central Asia provided a willing alternative avenue. As 
Massoud the leader of a group rival to Taliban defined the goal of Taliban and their 
foreign patrons in the following words- "As always, it is the question of money. 
Western companies are interested in resources-rich territories of northern 
Afghanistan. They also want to penetrate the adjacent countries of Central Asia: 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan for Gold and aluminum but most 
importantly-oil and gas. All theses, according to the plans of the true instigators of 
war, must go by the shortest route-through Afghanistan - to the Pakistani seaport of 
Karachi. This is the essence of the war, not the struggle for the "true faith'. The Holy 
138 Quran and jihad are, unfortunately, only cover in this rather dirty affair". 
The Clinton administration, writes Ahmad Rashid, 'was clearly sympathetic to 
the Taliban, as they were in line with its anti-Iran policy and were important for the 
success of any Southern pipeline from Central Asia that would avoid Iran. 
139 Turkmenistan would be the supplier of the gas. In fact from the Iranian coast oil 
and gas could be shipped via the existing Iranian network. But US companies were 
prevented from using this route by the Iran-Libya sanctions Act (ILSA), which 
prohibited commercial ventures with those two countries. The cost of longer route 
through Afghanistan to the Pakistani was more expensive but considerably more 
advantageous for the US. It would eliminate the need to deal with Iran, a country 
towards which Washington nurtured deep antipathy and resentment, and gave the US 
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and its partner control of the new supply of energy. Since the mid-1990s the 
Americans had been pursuing that avenue. The US government was impressed by the 
ruthlessness and willingness of the then emerging Taliban (movement) to cut a 
pipeline deal. The state Department and Pakistan's inter services intelligence agency 
agreed to funnel arms and funding to the Taliban in their war against the ethnically 
Tajik Northern Alliance. Until 1995, US taxpayers paid the entire annual salary of 
every single Taliban government official. 
The UNOCAL deal was also regarded as the jewel in the crown of what was 
known in Washington as the strategy of the silk route this policy pursued the 
exclusion of Russia fi-om the Asian pipelines: the energy highway that travel from the 
basin of the Caspian Sea westwards and from Central Asia, South and eastwards. 
Finally, by establishing a strong presence in these areas, the US wanted to lock Iran 
and China out of the energy business in the region, since Washington feared they 
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could assist the Central Asian republics in setting up their own oil companies. 
The award-wiiming JoumaJist, described that: When the Taliban took Kabul in 
1996, Washington said nothing why? Because Taliban leaders were soon on their way 
to Houston, Texas, to be entertained by executives of the oil company offered them a 
generous cut of the profits of the oil and gas pumped through a pipeline that the 
Americans wanted to build across Afghanistan. This was going to be an underground 
highway that would connect the rich energy fields of Turkmenistan with the coastal 
shores of Pakistan and India. Naturally, the US would have had full control upon it. 
The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudi did, commented a US diplomat; 
summarizing in this sentence the hopes of the white House Washington envisaged 
141 Afghanistan as an American oil colony. As pointed out by Professor William O. 
Beeman, an anthropologist specialist in Middle Eastern studies at Brown university, 
"US support for the Taliban had nothing to do with religion or ethnicity, but only with 
the economics of oil the UNOCAL consortium which feared that as long as the 
country was split among squabbling warlords, the pipeline would never be built. 
Political stability was required to implement the S 4.5 billion project and the US 
believed that the Taliban regime would be the most suitable government to achieve 
such a goal. Thus, in the aftermath of the Taliban's conquest of Kabul in 1996, the 
State Department avoided criticizing the methods the Taliban used to establish control 
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over the country". John K. Cooley writes that '"by 1989, the US having at first 
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sympathetically watched (if not helped) the nse of the Pakistani created Taliban, was 
observing with a mixture of sympathy and trepidation, the US oil company, 
UNOCAL, as it sought to negotiate with the Taliban authonzation for energy pipeline 
from the ex-Soviet now independent, republic of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. If successful such agreements would probably be viewed by Brzezinski 
the multi-national energy firms and like - mined economic and political strategists as 
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one of the positive long-range outcomes of the Afghanistan conflicts''. It could 
therefore, be argued that the US administration's endeavor to secure its oil base led it 
to support the UNOCAL project and the Taliban advent on the Afghan scene with a 
promise of stability in 1994. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 Chns Targert, 
a UNOCAL executive said that pipeline project would now be easier to implement. 
The US administration was not far behind to appreciate the development within hours 
of Taliban capture of Kabul. US State Department announced that it would establish 
diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul. State 
Department spokesman Glyn Davies said that the US found nothing objectionable in 
the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law, to him; the Taliban appeared to 
be anti- modem rather than anti-western which was not perhaps as womsome. Senator 
Hank Brown who favored the UNOCAL project also assessed the advent of the 
Taliban as a positive development in Afghanistan. The good part of what had 
happened was that one of the factions at least seemed capable of developing a 
government in Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary of the State for South Asian Affairs 
Karl Inderfurth testimony before the Senate Committee in July 2000 which recalled 
the high hopes that greeted the Taliban movement in 1996 clearly indicated the US 
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line that time. 
D. The U.S. policy of containing Russian dominance in oil rich Central Asia 
The US approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching geopolitical 
considerations with an underlying goal containing the influence of China, Iran and 
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Russia It was not until Clinton's globalization offensive of 1994, that the US 
developed its own geopolitical offensive to wrest control of the region form 
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Russia 
In the earlier phase of its engagement with the region, the United States 
encouraged the newly independent states (NIS) to adopt western style economic 
reforms Economic growth and the integration of the CARs was to serve a very 
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important purpose: ensuring the economic sovereignty of the NIS, and the eventual 
elimination of the Russian and Iranian influence, while at the same time securing 
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lucrative markets for US goods and services. One might see that US involvement 
with factional rivalries in Afghan's civil war fit with US strategy to contain Russia, in 
Cogan's analysis of American motives, and their possible consequences including the 
alliance with the Islamists than senior figures like Brzezinski. As some very senior 
CIA and other administration officials had serious reservations and apprehensions. 
Cogan acknowledged that the Americans, as well as the Soviets, had already in 1979, 
become victims of the tide of Islamic revivalism sweeping the Muslims world. Main 
antagonists of the Americans were the Shiites Muslins, followers of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini of Iran; whereas the main adversaries of the Soviets were the Sunni 
Muslims - doctrinally and in many other ways quite different from the Shiites of 
South and Central Asia. Cogan quotes "an unnamed CIA colleague, still active in the 
Agency's clandestine operations in 1993, describing the CIA - Islamist partnership; 
"we took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, 
for purposes for which we agreed." 
Brzezinski's goals were, and remain for more grandiose and truly strategic. 
Asked whether he regretted favoring extremist Islamism or arming and training future 
terrorists, his reply was, '"which was more important in world history? The Taliban or 
the fall of the Soviet empire? A few over - excited Islamists or the liberation of 
Central Europe [Brzezinski's original Polish homeland was of course in Eastern 
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Europe; perhaps this is what he meant] and the end of the cold war?" 
No super power could afford to ignore a region which held immense energy 
potential further, it would not be in its own strategic interest to allow any other power 
to gain influence on the region. US interests in Central Asia were keen similar to 
Russia's. While, like Russia, it could not lay historical claims but it definitely had the 
capacity and make every effort to insinuate itself as the principal power broker for the 
region on the line of the role it had defined for itself in the Gulf It would not only like 
the export routes to be controlled by any one other than itself but also the control over 
the oil reserves that would help the US to perpetuate its influence over Russia. 
But what those states regarded as hardheaded commercial interests was viewed 
by Russian as incipient interventionism. Russia was worried about theses 
developments and the possibilities of hostile hands on pipeline taps. Russia had 
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histonc and legal claims to the Caspian Sea and had insisted that it must be made a 
party to any agreement on shanng oil and natural gas resources of the region Russia 
had attempted to have a finger in the pie. But the Russian ambition and determination 
to control the flow of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan had 
been viewed in western perceptions as attempts by the Russian secunty establishment 
to impose a single direction for the pipelines north via Russian temtory This uould 
give Russia tremendous control over the flow of oil and gas to western markets and 
would make the west vulnerable to Russia's political whims Russian energy policy 
could also be part of an overall policy which aims to keep the west out of the Central 
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Asian states preserv ing it under an exclusively Russian sphere of influence With 
this scramble over energy resources in Central Asia Afghanistan become nvalry place 
again 
Like before, as the battle between Bntish hidia Empire and Tsar"s Russian 
empire over communication links as both empires indulged in massive railway 
projects The Russian buih railway lines across Central Asia to their border with 
Afghanistan, Persia and China, while the Bntish built Railways lines across kidia to 
their border with Afghanistan. The centre of gravity for both powers was Afghanistan 
The Bntish feared that a Russian thrust on Herat fi-om the Turkmen region could 
threaten Bntish Baluchistan, while Moscow gold could mm Kabul's rulers against the 
Bntish. Russians feared that the Bntish would undermine them in Central Asia by 
supporting revolts by Muslims tnbes and the rulers of Bukhara and Kokand against 
Russia In another replay in the 1980s, the USA encouraged the Afghan Mujahideen 
to cross into Central Asia and attack Soviet army posts. And m replay Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan frequently called the Mujahideen 'Bashmachis " 
The current great game was between expanding and contracting empires As a 
weakened and bankrupt Russia attempted to keep a gnp on what it still viewed as its 
frontiers m Central Asia and controlled the flow of Caspian oil through pipelines that 
traverse Russia, the USA was thrusting itself into the region on the back ot proposed 
oil pipelines which would bypass Russia Iran, Turkey and Pakistan were building 
their own communication links with the region and wanted to be the preferred route of 
choice for ftiture pipelines heading east, west or south The strategic interest of 
Washington and the US oil companies in the Caspian was growing and Washington 
began to snub Russia Turkmenistan's economic plight was worsening due to its 
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inability to sell its gas. For the USA the prospects of a gas pipeline through 
Afghanistan was not only attractive because it avoided Iran, but it would signal 
support to Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Taliban while clearly snubbing Russia and 
Iran. 
From a geopolitical point of view. Afghanistan formed a potential 'land bridge 
for bulk trade or oil and gas pipelines to be constructed from the Central Asian states 
to markets in Pakistan, India and elsewhere in the world via Karachi or another 
Pakistani port on the Arabian sea. Irrespectitive of which government was in place in 
Kabul, Afghanistan's territory could provide access to world markets and an alternate 
152 
to total dependence upon Russia s monopoly on trade routes. 
The civil war (1992-97) between the neo-communist government and an array 
of Islamist forces devastated the country of Tajikistan. Once again thousands of Tajik 
rebels and refugees found refuge in northern Afghanistan, while Tajik government 
forces were backed by Russian troops. President Boris Yeltsin declared in 1993 that 
the Tajik Afghan border was in fact Russia's border and the 25,000 Russian troops 
stationed there would be defending Russia. It was a reassertion of Moscow's role in 
Central Asia. And another change to be as a pretext for Russia to influence in this 
region that found some groups of Islamic movement which linked Taliban against the 
secular government of Karimov. This underground radical Islamic groups some of 
them Wahabist, entered in the Ferghana valley. Many of those Uzbek militant trained 
153 in Afghan Mujahideen camps in the 1980s. In addition, the Kremlin's senior 
planners had plenty of reasons to fear the backlash of the Afghanistan war in 
Chechnya. Immediately afler the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Grozny, the 
Chechen capital, became a transit point for the Afghan veterans, especially the Arab 
ones. In August 1995, a spokesman of the Russian federal security service reported 
that units from Afghanistan and Jordan - which had a large and influential Chechen 
community in residence - were fighting on the side of Chechen. There were said to be 
about 300 foreign mercenaries at that time, out of total Chechen guerilla force of 
6,000. Shamil Basayev, the leader of the seizure of the Buddenovsk hospital and a 
right hand man of Dudayev, was reported by the Russians to have been trained in 
Afghanistan by none other than the disciples of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 
A diffused anti - Russian terrorist organization in Chechnya was believed by 
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Moscow to have links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Russians had a much 
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more serious Islamist problem in Chechnya. In the Russian view, the main problem in 
Chechnya was "Wahabi outsiders" shorthand for Islamist Saudis. The Russians also 
regarded the Wahabis as behind the Taliban regime. Chechen fighters were a very 
serious unit, very well -trained, very well prepared possibly by Pakistan's ISI and 
American CIA during the 1979-89 jihad. The Russians believed that the United 
States was backing the Chechen rebels in order to get a lock on regional oil supplies. 
The United States had extremely close relations with Edvard Shevardnaze, president 
of Georgia. The arms were being smuggled into Chechnya from Georgia and that this 
was one of the main supply routes to the Chechen rebels. The Russians also believed 
that the Americans knew this and supported it because the Americans wanted an 
independent Chechnya. 
The USA could not develop strategic clout in Central Asia without Uzbekistan, 
the largest and most powerfiil state and the only capable of standing up to Russia. 
Both cautiously wooed each other. Karimov became supportive of NATO plans to 
build a Central Asian NATO battalion, a move that was vehemently opposed by 
Russia. 'We don't accept NATO in our backyard. The US must recognize that Central 
Asia will remain within the near a broad Russia's sphere of influence. By late 1995 
the West and most notably the US had clearly chosen Uzbekistan as the only viable 
counterweight both to renewed Russian hegemonies and to Iranian influence; wrote 
Dr Shireen Hunter. 
Thus there were the makings of two coalitions emerging in the region. The US 
lining up alongside Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and encouraging its 
allies - Israel, Turkey and Pakistan - to invest there, while Russia retained its grip on 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The USA was now prepared to confront 
Russia as the battle for the Caspian's resources escalated. While US policy makers 
certainly did not want to see a hegemonic Russia, the potential costs of such 
hegemony became far greater if Russia was able to dictate the terms and limit western 
access to the world's last known oil and gas reserves. Even minimum US involvement 
there provided for maximum Russian suspicions; said Dr Martha Brill Olcott, a 
158 leading US academic on Central Asia. US oil companies were faced with what they 
could not do, rather than what they could do since they were forbidden to build 
pipelines through Iran and Russia. When Washington finally articulated its policy of 
transport corridor from the Caspian to Turkey (avoiding Russia and Iran) the oil 
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companies were reluctant to oblige, given the costs and the turbulence in the region 
The essential issue which the USA declined to tackle was peace- making in the 
region Until there was an end to the civil wars in Central Asia and the Caspian 
(Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Chechnya, Nagomo Karabakh, the Kurdish issue) 
and there was a broad consensus with Iran and Russia, pipelines would neither be safe 
to build nor commercially feasible, as every step of the way Iran and Russia would 
159 block or even sabotage them As said by President Bons Yeltsin in 1998. by 
keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia kept the region unstable and 
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has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the Central Asian Republics. 
It was in the interest of Iran and Russia to keep the region unstable by arming 
the anti -Taliban alliance Russian also reportedly had a hand in backing northern 
alliance when Taliban forces assaulted on the Shias of Hazara. They saw that Pakistan 
interference in Afghanistan through the Taliban provided an opportunity for Amencan 
influence in the region. Its political and economic interest lied in denying the 
Amencans presence in Kabul. Russia was backing Iran in that design. Russia also sent 
military supplies to northern forces through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan by road 
Russia had built a bndge over the Amu Darya in Tajik controlled Takhar 
province to provide a land route through Badakashan This allowed Russian trucks by 
passing Mazar-e-Shanf and the Salang highway which had always been pnme 
Dostum temtory. US satellite pictures were claimed to have shown Toloquan being 
developed as a strategic rear base for Massoud, in an effort that seemed to replicate 
his moves in the begirming of the war. With this effort US pipeline plans could 
never succeed Even today the USA is muddled on the cntical question of whether it 
wants to save Central Asia's depressed economies by letting them export energy any 
way they like to keep Iran and Russia under blockade as far as pipeline are 
, 164 
concerned. 
It became apparent that the strategy over pipelines had become the dnving force 
behind Washington's interest in the Taliban, which in turn was prompting a counter -
reaction from Russia and Iran The old associations between the intelligence 
agencies continue, Hamson said, 'the CIA still had close links with the ISI" that 
money and those weapons had helped built up the Taliban, Hamson said, 'the Taliban 
are not just recruits from madrassas but are on the payroll of the ISI " Hamson further 
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said that UN Security Council Resolution Number 1333 called for an embargo on 
arms to the Taliban "but it is a resolution without teeth because it does not provide 
sanctions for non-compliance; he said 'the US is not backing the Russians who want 
to give more teeth to the resolution."' 
Now it is Pakistan that "holds the key to the future of Afghanistan, Harrison had 
said "the creation of the Taliban was central to Pakistan's pan -Islamic vision". The 
creation of the Taliban had been actively encouraged by the ISI and the CIA. As 
Pakistan looked across the frontier to Afghanistan, they saw a nation that had been 
occupied by the Soviets, thereby putting Pakistan into a buffer between Soviet and 
Indian forces - making Pakistan heavily dependent on United States. Pakistani 
military and intelligence leaders wanted to secure their western flank. They saw in the 
Taliban movement the only tool available to unify Afghanistan into a long-term buffer 
for Pakistan. Moreover many ISI leaders, who had worked under CIA control during 
the Afghan war, were close to leaders of the Mujahideen who were advising and 
fighting alongside the Taliban. There was much history there. Therefore, Pakistan did 
everything it could, to bring the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. Behind the 
scenes in the United States, however, there were even then some fairly obvious clues. 
Americans then also thought they would serve a bulwark against Russian. In fact, 
the Taliban movement was the only contemporary Islamic movement whose basis was 
a network of rural madrassas. Afghanistan was also one of the few countries where 
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the Islamist fought mainly against communist or at least pro-Soviet forces. 
In addition, there was one point of major subsequent difference. As the captured 
US classified documents published in Tehran in 1979, it was an integral part of the 
US design that the Mujahideen (Taliban was a factional group of Mujahideen) could 
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not form their own government after the eviction of the Soviets and the US 
administration fundamentally came around to the view that it was important to secure 
first of all the withdrawal of Soviet troops as the precondition for any settlement of 
the Afghan problem, and in the process also to try to moderate the Islamic tone of the 
Afghan resistance so that a Mujahideen - led government should it eventuate after the 
Soviet pull out, would not be as extreme as that of the anti-American AyatoUah 
171 Khomeini in Iran. In contrast, the Taliban not only succeeded in attaining their 
aforementioned objective by evicting different factions and in the process also 
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serving the (actual) major US interest - eviction of the Moscow-Kabul-Tehran nexus 
under the Rabbani / Massoud government in Kabul and eviction of the pro-Iranian 
warlord controlling Western Afghanistan. But unlike the Mujahideen, even after the 
capture of Kabul (September 1996). the Taliban showed no signs at all of any internal 
disunity or disarray. In fact, unity of their political and military command kept getting 
stronger day by day. Besides, their success m bringing peace and order to the territory 
under their control attracted volunteers from other factions including even the fonner 
communists. All these factors clearly showed that the grass root support and 
organizational competence of Taliban enabled them to establish a durable government 
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m the country. 
However, the policy of making Taliban strong appeared broken down shortly 
after the seizure of Kabul. The Taliban proved markedly less sensitive to US political 
interests than some one in Washington had hoped. The most mortifying example of 
this was the hospitality which the Taliban provided to the Saudi billionaire Osama Bin 
Laden, who was suspected by US agencies of having financed anti-American 
outrages, such as the bombing of a barracks in Saudi Arabia, in which US military 
personnel were killed. The report by Steve Levine that Bin Laden had been a 
significant source of the monies which funded the Taliban's final thrust to Kabul 
helped explain the hospitality, but did not lessen the American mortification given 
Washington's strong stance against sponsors of terrorism. More seriously, some of the 
Taliban's powerfiil Pakistani supporters also adopted a hosfile stance towards 
Washington, notably Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jamiat-e Ulema -Islam, who 
made a vituperatively anti-American speech following the murder in Karachi in mid-
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November 1997 of four staffs of US Oil Company. 
It was at this juncture that the US Taliban policy underwent a visible change in 
1997, applying various modes of coercion and sanctions to pressurize Taliban into 
polifical subordination, if not subjugation; albeit, also ensuring at the same time not to 
completely lost them. And this time there was a lobby especially comprising the 
Afghans settled in the West which is presenting serious misperceptions about the 
Taliban, persuading the US policymakers to adopt a completely anti-Taliban 
policy. 
US policy took fresh direction with appointment of Madeline Albright as 
Secretary of State in early 1997, and the replacement of the entire chain of command 
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responsible for Afghan affairs at the State Department by experienced staff, who had 
little experienced staff, which had little experience about Afghan realities. The new 
Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, made a clear policy 
statement to the US Senate in October 1997. He said that Washington's objective was 
"an Afghan government that is multi-ethnic, broad-based, and that observed 
international nontis of behaviors. The reasons that made US not to recognize the 
Taliban was that suppress on women rights, as Albright replied when she was asked 
about the reason that US opposed Taliban, by a local reporter during her visited to an 
Afghan refugee camp in Peshawar '". . . because of their approach to human rights, 
their despicable treatment of women and children, and their general lack of respect for 
human dignity". While, the Clinton administration was no doubt also beginning to 
feel the pressure in an election year of American feminist groups that condemned the 
Taliban for their treatment of women. 
The Taliban's treatment of women, widely publicized following the fall of 
Kabul, was a provocation to key values, for which the United States avowedly stood. 
Women's groups which previously had not been involved with the Afghanistan issue 
voiced their solidarity with Afghan women, and in the run up to presidential election. 
This effectively blocked any rapprochement with the Taliban for which the oil 
companies and their bureaucratic sympathizers might have hoped. Albright 
statement was seen as a significant indicator of the US distancing itself both from the 
Taliban and Pakistan's support for them. Yet the Taliban appeared least concerned 
about these international pressures and in fact generated greater anti-western feeling. 
The Ulema in Pakistan and Kandahar told Omar that he should throw all aid agencies 
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out of Afghanistan because they were spies and the enemy of Islam. 
However, Gill Dorronsoro writes "the split with the United States was 
precipitated more by the presence of radical groups (which Taliban had inherited the 
networks and training camps which had been established in the 1980s when 
collaboration between Islamic movements and the Afghan parties had been actively 
encouraged by the United States) on Afghanistan soil rather than human rights 
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violations or drudges. 
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CHAPTER-3 
U.S., Afghanistan and the Problem of Terrorism (1996-2001) 
I. History of U.S. involvement with Islamic radicals/Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
We have tried here to understand the nature and dynamics of contemporary 
Islamist movements, in order to comprehend the basis, structures and strategies of 
these movements from localized and regional manifestations of protest and 
confrontation to an international phenomenon of rebellion and terror. 
Broadly, these movements may be placed in three different phases of history. 
The first phase may be located in the break - up of Ottoman Empire after World War 
I and the subsequent period of struggles for colonization. The second phase may be 
located in the post-colonial period and the emergence of Muslim countries as 
independent sovereign states. The third and most crucial phase starts off from the time 
of convergence of global Islamist groups in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation 
and ultimate break - up of Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. It is equally 
important to note that during this phase which is still continuing, the Islamist 
movements shifted their main operational bases from the boundaries of Arab Muslim 
world to none Arab Muslim world in a big way. 
During the colonial phase instances are available which indicate that Islamist 
movements did organize themselves to challenge imperialism and colonialism 
directly. The slogan of Jihad raised by Jamaluddin Afghani against British 
imperialism in the nineteenth century, the Mehdist movement in the nineteenth 
century in Sudan, the participation of Islamists in the struggle for independence in 
Algeria, and the active participation of Islamists belonging to the Deobandi sect of 
Muslims in Indian national freedom movement against the British colonialism are 
some examples of such movements. The Islamist which evolved during the twentieth 
century acquired varied experiences of assertion and operation until they joined the 
Afghan war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. These movements in different 
regions of the world lead to an international coalition during the Afghan war. 
The root cause of Islamic radical movement in Afghanistan could be traced back 
to 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, partly to 
2 
settle in fighting between rival factions in the communist leadership in Kabul. With 
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the proclamation of the democratic Afghan RepubHc the PDPA assured the Afghan 
people that the states would protect their religious faith and they would be free to 
observe their religious. Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented 
in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and by January 1979, the traditional ruling 
elements, the property holders and the clergy, joined together to mobilize large 
segments of the urban - rural people m all Afghanistan to offer amaed resistance to 
the Marxist regime. 
This situation gave a change to US to carry out its foreign policy to contain the 
spread of communism. Since World War II. the United States had to assume 
leadership of the ''free world" in order to contain the communists. The United States 
did everything in its power to prevent the spread of communism in Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Latin America, as well as in Europe. It included the formation of 
alliances on the perimeter of the communist bloc, generous military and economic aid 
to allies, vigorous measures to maintain a favorable climate for American investment 
abroad and covert operations to prevent communist and other anti - American leader 
4 
from coming to power. The primary goal of neo-conservative agenda during the cold 
war was to impel democratic change in the Soviet system and among other 
communist states. During Reagan Administration the basic outline of US"s foreign 
policy was reestablishment of American economic and military strength and the roll -
back of Soviet influence across the third world and standing up to the Soviet threat 
and to take responsibility for containing Soviet expansionism in any part of the 
7 
world. It sought to provide assistance to anti communist guerillas and government 
with arms, finance, training and facilities, to note a few examples, the Reagan 
administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua, the anti-Marxist guerillas in 
Angola, the right-wing government in El Salvador, the guerillas coalition in the 
Cambodia and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. 
In the Muslim world, particularly Middle East, Islam was utilized by US in 
collaboration with its allies to deal a deadly blow to communism and its adversary, 
9 Soviet Union. USA was trying to use the developments occurring in the Moslem 
world to their advantage holding forth upon the common values of the Christian and 
Islamic civilizations as opposed to atheistic Communism and flirting with the political 
and religious leaders of the Moslem world. Western strategists were trying to drive a 
117 
wedge of controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union, to half circle the 
USSR with crescent of instability. Internationally reactionary circles were trying to 
point the spearhead of Moslem movements against the progressive forces within the 
Islamic world, and also against the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union. 
In this regard the Reagan administration adopted the Doctrine of "horizontal 
escalation" which was intended to roll back communism. Reagan administration 
largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet-backed regimes or Soviet 
supported movements. Nine months before the Red Army rolled into Kabul 
Brzezinski had expressed "concern over the Soviets creeping intervention in 
Afghanistan" and insisted that Washington must be more sympathetic to those afghans 
who were determined to pressure their country"s independence, the Pentagon's Walter 
Slocomb agreed and wondered whether clandestine US support for Moslem guerillas 
might succeed in "sucking the Soviets into Vietnamese quagmire". On April 1979, the 
social coordination committee an interagency group chaired by Brzezinski, instructed 
the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed by 
the United States ranging from "indirect financial assistance to the insurgence "" to 
12 
weapon support. The jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 -
where, as was well known, US and British intelligence services were working hand -
in-glove with the Jihadists, all the while being well aware of the latter extremist 
tendencies. By the time that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, 
whole generations which were radicalized by Islamic indoctrination and militarized 
training of religiously inspired terrorists had been produced and subsequently 
13 dispersed across the globe. 
When the Soviet Union took control of Afghanistan and the United States 
decided to support Ziaul Haq, a natural ally, to engage the Soviet Union in a proxy 
war in Afghanistan, the United States received powerful support from its ally, Saudi 
Arabia which provided fiands to establish a wide network oiMadrassas in the country 
and to the Mujahideen in their Jihad in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, along with the 
United States financed the ISI in training and arming the anti- Soviet 'jihadis' in 
14 
Afghanistan. US Casey committed CIA support to along - standing ISI initiative to 
recruit radical Muslims from around the world to come to Pakistan and fight with the 
Afghan Mujahideen. The ISI had encouraged this since 1982, President Zia aimed to 
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cement Islamic unity, turned Pakistan into the leader of Muslim world and foster an 
Islamic opposition in Central Asia. As Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, (the head of 
the IS I of Pakistan) replied to Ahmed Rashid in his interview about the fiiture 
dissention of Islamic radical "we are fighting a jihad and this is the first Islamic 
international brigade in the modem era. The communists have their international 
brigade, the West has NATO, why can't the Muslims unite and form a common 
front?'' In addition, Zia claimed shortly before his death, as part of a strategic 
realignment, an Islamic state and an Islamic confederation, part of a pan - Islamist 
renaissance. It would comprise - apart fi-om an Afghan Pakistani federation -
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and possibly Iran and Turkey. While, Washington 
wanted to demonstrate that the entire Muslim world was fighting the Soviet Union 
alongside the Afghans and their American benefactors. And the Saudis saw an 
opportunity both to promote Wahabism and get rid of its disgruntled radicals. 
Pakistan already had standing instructions to all its embassies abroad to give 
visas, to any one wanting to come and fight with the Mujahideen. In the Middle East 
the Muslim brotherhood, the Saudi - based World League and Palestinian Islamic 
radicals organized the recruits and put them into contact with the Pakistanis. The ISI 
and Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami set up reception committees to welcome, house and 
train the arriving militants and they encouraged them to join the Mujahideen groups, 
usually the Hizb-e- Islami. The funds for the enterprise came directly fi-om Saudi 
intelligence. French scholar Oliver Roy describes it as a joint venture between the 
Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI. 
Between 1982 and 1992 some 35,000 Muslim radicals fi-om 43 Islamic countries 
17 in the Middle East, North and East Afiica, Central Asia and the Far-East came there 
as the Afghan war was a jihad, pure and simple logical coexistence with other battle 
18 fields-Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia or Mindanao would pass their baptism under 
fire with Afghan Mujahideen. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim radical came 
to study in the hundreds of new Madrassas that Zia's military government began to 
19 fiind in Pakistan along the Afghan border. As Soviet invaded Afghanistan Pakistan 
became a "frontline" state. The United States along with Gulf States such as Saudi 
Arabia was keen to invest in the Madrssa infi-astructure to chum out Mujahideen to 
fight in Afghanistan. During the subsequent six years, as the US backed Mujahideen 
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effort in Afghanistan continued to gather momentum, 1,000 new Madrassas were 
established. There were two types of Madrassas that participated in the US and Saudi 
backed jihad. One group of Madrassas had been specifically established to produced 
jihad literature, mobilize popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to 
recruit and train Mujahideen. An example of such Madrassas is the Jama"at -i-
Islami's Rabita Madrassas. The Jl has never been a Madrassas-based party. The 
Madrassas that it did establish were predominantly a product of the Jihad in 
Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. The second group comprises various 
independent associations of Madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-Ulama 
Islam as an institution. 
The massage that was disseminated at the various Madrassas was originally 
intended to be anti-communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits to 
the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the 
proliferating refiigee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it is these camps and schools that 
became the cradle of the Taliban. Intemational patrons (the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated schools with arms and text 
books. Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact 
21 
with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the Jihad. In the contrary. 
wrote Yoginder "it is important to remember that not all schools in the Pathan 
borderlands that look part in the Afghan jihad and later associated themselves with 
militant activism and terrorism elsewhere were actually established traditional 
Madrassas. Several of them were simply makeshift schools intended to train fighters 
in the war against the Soviets, where a mattering of Islam was taught in order to 
strengthen the spirit of jihad against the Russians. These have been loosely and 
incorrectly described as 'Madrassas" in actual fact, they were not even conceived of a 
religious schools. Rather fi"om their very inception they were intended as militant 
training camps, but were sought to be passed off as Madrassas in order to legitimize 
their operations and to solicit funds fi-om Muslim states. The rapid growth and spread 
of such schools must be seen in the context of cold war rivalries, and it was obvious 
that they had the blessings of Americans, who through the CIA, pumped in large 
22 
amounts of weapons and cash to assist the Mujahideen. 
In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, theses radical met each other for 
the first time and studied, trained and fought together. It was the first opportunity for 
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most of them to learn about Islamic movements in other countries and their forged 
tactical and ideological links that would serve them well in the future. The camps 
23 become virtual universities for future Islamic radicalism. 
During the Afghan war, the Reagan administration supported the activities of 
Usamah Bin-Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam. Azzam himself toured the US in the 
24 
early and mid 1980s to recruit fighters. Former Associate deputy FBI Director 
Oliver B. (Bukck) Revell, interviewed on Emerson's PBS program, agreed with 
Emerson's assessment. Revell stated that once the Mujahideen and their associates 
came to the United States, they found a hospitable environment. They could raise 
money, film videos, run printing presses, and eventually attack the very country 
whose freedom they enjoyed. Ravell said that for the first time in American history, 
the United States housed a terrorist infrastructure that stretched from the American 
heartland all the way through the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Ravell stated that it 
was the most global network of terrorist the United States ever faced 
Emerson credits Abdullah Azzam for completing the most important 
infi-astructure. Azzam left his homeland to join the Mujahideen in the early 1980s. 
Centering his activities in Pakistan, Azzam soon came to understand the vast amount 
of support the United States was furmeling through the area. Leaving Pakistan he 
helped establish the Alkifah Refugee center in New York. According to Emerson, 
American officials did not realize the Alkifah Refugee center was the front for 
another organisation, an organization calling for jihad. Infact the Alkifah Refugee 
center's Arabic letterhead called for holly war. 
In 1989, with the Soviets in disarray and their political system on the verge of 
collapse, Azzam turned his attention to the United States. According to Emerson, 
Azzam spread his jihad network through 38 states, with multiple bases in 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, Texas, and the New England states. Azzam 
retumed to Pakistan in 1989, only to be killed by an assassin, but his work was 
completed by several supporters, including his cousin Fayiz Azzam. 
Emerson names several prominent officials working in various radical groups in 
the domestic jihad. Tamim al-Adnani was the most vigorous recruiter and successful 
ftindraiser among all the leaders. Emerson says Tamin al-Adnani has assisted in 
25 domestic terrorist incidents, including the world trade center bombing. 
Azzam founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (office of services) through which they 
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recruited and controlled foreign Mujahideen volunteers. But few years later reportedly 
Azzam wanted to take the jihad from Afghanistan to the oppressed Muslims 
worldwide, especially in Kashmir and Chechnya, whereas Bin Laden wanted to 
concentrate on attacks on the United States and the destruction of pro-Western Arab 
regimes. However, after the death of Azzam in 1989, Osama bin laden took over 
Azam"s organization and set up Al-Qaeda or military Base as a service centre for 
Arab - Afghans and their families and to forge a broad - based alliance amongst 
them. With the help of Bin laden several thousand Arab militants had established 
27 bases in the provinces of Kunar, Nuristan and Badakshan. 
The US long supplied arms and training to the most ferociously reactionary 
fighting forces in the Islamic world, including those Mujahideen who spawned a 
second - generation reform movement known as the Taliban. As journalist Ahmed 
Rashid, observes that the Clinton Administration was clearly sympathetic to the 
Taliban, as they were in line with Washington's anti - Iran policy and were important 
to the success of any southern pipeline that would avoid Iran." He also speaks of '"the 
CIA - ISI ( Interservice Intelligence, Pakistan) pipeline" that supported the more 
radical Islamic parties" moreover, '"what Washington was not prepared to admit was 
that the Afghan jihad, with the support of the CIA, had spawned dozens of 
fundamentalist movements. 
It was likely that Bin laden had much cozier ties with the ISI than the CIA itself; 
this should hardly give US intelligence a solution for its role in strengthening both the 
ISI as well as jihad international. Even Bin Laden gave US operatives credit for their 
helping hand in constructing his Afghanistan operation ''I set up my first camp where 
these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers. The weapons were 
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supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis." According to Amin Saikal, 
after coming into close contact with a number of Pakistani radical Islamists, it was in 
29 Peshawar that bin laden set up the original cell of his al-Qaeda network. According 
to a policy brief prepared for the Kennedy school of government, concurred with bin 
laden's version of events: "the US provided the weapon's and the know - how, the 
Saudis provided the fijnds, and we provided the traming camps and operations base 
for the Islamic legions in the early 1980s and then for the Taliban." In contrast to the 
tendency of Huntington's followers to see Islamic militancy as part of the religion's 
own inner dynamics, Rashid carefully sketches the sequence of events that facilitated 
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its triumph, including the CIA - IS I nexus. Beyond Southwest Asia Washington had 
given valuable support to rightist Islamic forces throughout the Middle East in often 
successful efforts to smash once powerful socialist movements and ideologues of pan-
Arabism. 
However, following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, Yael 
Shahar (1998) says the Mujahideen saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total 
victory. The Soviet Union had not collapsed under the weight of political, economic, 
and military factors but in the mind of the Mujahideen, it fell by the hand of God. The 
Soviet retreat was a sign of God's power, and if God could bring down the Soviet 
Union through the work of the Mujahideen, other evil nations were doomed to 
destruction. The primary targets of the Mujahideen were Israel and the United 
31 States. 
Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, Bin Laden turned to Saudi 
regime for being corrupt and against the USA for maintaining such a regime and 
enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam's third holiest city after 
Medina and Mecca) and. its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. When the 
Saudi authorities stripped him of his citizenship, he first moved to Sudan but, by 
1996, he had returned to the country that he knew best: Afghanistan yet this time he 
returned to an Afghanistan where a new ISI - run militia - that is the Taliban, which 
was ideologically very amenable to Bin Laden's brand of Islam - had seized power in 
Kabul. The ISI wanted to use his wealth and Arab coimections in support of the 
militia's adventures and also therefore in support of Pakistan's expanded regional 
policy goals. 
Bin Laden forged an organic alliance with Mullah Mohammad Omar, based on 
the Saudi dissident providing the Taliban with money and Arab fighters and the 
Taliban giving the Saudi dissident and his supporter's sanctuary, aid and all the basic 
support that they needed to set up tertorist training camps and expand al-Qaeda into a 
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trans-national network. Islamist extremist from around the world - including North 
America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South and South East Asia -
continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their 
world wide terrorist activities in 1999. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan 
territory, permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilifies for non-
Afghans and provided logistic support to members of various terrorist organisations 
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and Mujahideen including those waging jihads in Chechnya, Lebanon, Kosovo, 
33 Kashmir and elsewhere. 
Later, Al-Qaeda reshuffled the entire understanding and assessment on terrorism 
by creating a complex "confederation" of militant groups and aggregating support 
networks" of Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin laden brought disparate Islamist 
groups from the Middle East, Asia and the Hom of Africa together by creating by 
common platform and a common agenda. Al-Qaeda"s rallying point revolves around 
the call for universal jihad against the United States, its allies and regimes, including 
moderate Muslim governments, accused by the group of imposing dysfunctional and 
34 immoral ways of life across the globe. 
A. Al-Qaeda's Ideology 
The Jihadist stream gathered momentum in the Afghan war during the 1980s 
when it found a new champion in Abdullah Azzam , a Muslim Brotherhood 
37 Palestinian propagandist for the Afghan cause. That time the process for recruiting 
Mujahideen around the world to come to fight with Afghan Mujahideen, in Middle 
East was opened mainly channeled through the Muslim Brotherhood. The hub of 
these informal networks was established in Peshawar through the office of services 
(Mektab al-khadamat), headed by Abdullah Azzam. in close conjunction with the 
Saudi activist and tycoon Osama Bin Laden who founded the "House of Auxiliaries 
38 (Baytul-ansar). And through the Saudi based World Muslim League and Palestinian 
Islamic radicals organized the recruits and put them into contact with the Pakistanis. 
The ISI and Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami set up reception committees to welcome those 
and train the arriving militant and encouraged them to join the Mujahideen groups. 
The ideology of using violence to oppose oppressive government has already 
39 been in Salafism where jihadi ideology gradually gained ground in Afghanistan and 
eventually merged with Salafism. Its chief proponent was Abdullah Azzam who in 
1984 founded the Maktab al-Kidmat (MAk) an office for recruiting Arabs to fight 
against the Soviet in Afghanistan. Azzam had a decisive influence on Osama bin 
Laden. In his work, the main obligation of Muslims is to defend the land of Islam. 
Azzam writes that jihad is moral obligation for all Muslims, the sixth pillar of the 
faith. Using epic and mystic language he sets out a vision of the world based on strict 
Salafism and calls for martyrdom stressing the permanent state of humiliation 
124 
suffered by the umma, as a result of the actions of "crusaders and Zionists". His work 
had a decisive influence on the jihadi radicalism of the 1990s. 
The global proliferation of fighting Salafism and its fusion with jihadi ideology 
were further consolidated under Bin Laden. His declaration of war on the West -
backed by the creation in 1998 of the World Islamic front for jihad against Jews and 
crusaders - caused groups that had originally been set up to provide logistical support 
to Al-Qaeda and had originally sought to purify and punish society, to now set their 
sights on the West. The struggle was no longer confined to the nearest enemy but also 
to those further away fighting Salafism assumed the role of globaUzing the jihad bom 
out of the Afghan experience and became the core ideology of the new radical 
Islamism. 
Militant Islamists hate the United States primarily for its secularism. Within the 
Islamic fold the Salafis have been a religious movement committed to returning Islam 
to a pure form as practiced by Muhammad and his early followers. The Salafis have 
been strong in Egypt since the Second World War and include the Wahhabis, a 
puritanical Sunni sect and the official religion of Saudi Arabia. The most important 
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theorist of the extreme Salafis, Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian, recognized the threat that 
the West's secularism posed to the Middle East. Qutb believed that only a revolution 
against the secular regimes of the Middle East could prevent the corruption of Muslim 
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societies, and he advocated a vanguard movement in theory to lead the revolution. 
Qutb's ideology that was written in the book name Milestones; this book was 
dedicated to the exposition of his vision of the necessity for revolution in order to 
create a truly Islamic society ruled by Islamic law. This revolution was to be carried 
out via jihad as holy war, which was declared to be the ongoing permanent duty of 
Muslims as they engaged in the cosmic battle or good versus evil, played out in 
everyday life in the struggle of Muslims against non - Muslim governments and 
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ideologies. This ideology Sayyid Qutb elaborated from Ibn-i-Tammiya, where he 
propounded the ideological underpinning which created a moral and political space 
for radical Islamists to operate. In this context, Fiyaz identifies that two concepts, 
Hakmat-i-illahya (Sovereignty of God) and Takfir(committing sin in violation of 
Islamic tenets) propounded by Ibn-i-Tammiya and generally relied upon by the 
extremist Islamists the world over to justify their actions need to be revised and 
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related forcefully. Theses concepts were also elaborated by Abdul Ala Maududi in 
45 Pakistan providing intellectual base for extremism. 
The involvement of Egyptian and Saudi extremists in 9/11 has set off a debate 
on the ideological foundations of extremist Islamists. According to Wael Al-Abrashi: 
the extremist religious groups had moved from the stage of Takfir to the stage of 
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annihilation and destruction in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qaeda. 
However, Qutb's vision of global jihad was developed at a time of conflict 
within a specific environment - Nasser's secular Egypt and its persecution of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, yet it was precisely because of this context that his work has 
been taken as an inspiration for contemporary jihad. Oriented organisations see 
themselves in similar battles against secular ideologies and repressive authoritarian 
governments fi'om North Africa to the Middle East to Central and South Asia. The 
experiences of many of the adherents of these movements fighting for the Mujahideen 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s resulted in practical 
experience and victory in the cosmic battle of good (Islam) versus evil (atheist 
communism). Osama bin laden has emerged as the most prominent warrior of this 
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type. In due respect to the complexity of the concept: if one substitutes seculansm 
for capitalism, Qutb's revolution would be title different in many ways fi-om Leninist-
style revolutions of an early age. 
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A founder of Egypt's Islamic Jihad, Muhammad Abdel-Salam al-Farq 
stressed the importance o^ jihad as a pillar of Islam. Pure Muslims must promote 
jihad for its own sake. Believing that the American creed entails private property, and 
the globalization of the American creed strikes at the core of their identity. In their 
eyes, the United States caused a triple whammy (an unpleasant situation or event that 
causes problem for somebody/something). Many Jihadists believe in the superiority of 
Islamic civilization and justifies violence against both "'infidels"' and "apostates'", 
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since Islam makes no distinction between the religious and political realms. 
Bodansky says Bin Laden was influenced by the Pan - Islamic movement and 
the role of Iran. Putting aside differences between Shiites and Sunnis, radical Muslims 
found Satan arrayed against Islam: Satan came in the form of the United States. Bin 
Laden worked with the Iranians to bring Sunnis and Shiites together in organisation 
called the International Muslim Brotherhood, but he wanted to go fiirther. By training 
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and financing terrorist groups and calling for overthrow of sympathetic Muslim 
50 governments. 
In the same. Khomeini Ayatollah who led Islamic revolution in Iran also was 
influenced by Qutb's ideology when he was exiled in Iraq in 1970. "After Khomeini 
riding victoriously it was necessary to eliminate all opposition if the Islamic 
revolution was to succeed. The starting point was to attack all things western. He said 
it was time to launch a holly war against the West and the traitors to Islam." 
Robin Wright (1986) makes this point in her examination of Shiite Islam in "Sacred 
Rage'. According to Wright, Ayatollah Khomeini was guided by the message of 
Karbala. Alongwith the Shiite clergy of Iran, he believed that the Iranian Revolution 
was the first step in purifying the world. Israel must be eliminated and returned to 
Islamic rule. The West had become the handmaiden of the Jews, but the West was and 
remains the source of imperialism. Its influence is Satanic and must be destroyed. 
Holly warriors are called to battle. Wright says Iran exports terrorism in this vein with 
revolutionary zeal. 
According to Dor Waxman (1998), Iran has moved from a post revolutionary 
nationalist phase to the real politics of Pan - Islam. That is Iranian leaders slowly 
moved away from their blind allegiance to Shiaism and began supporting Militant 
Sunnis and Shiites. Revolutionary Iranians began sending money and support to Sunni 
terrorist groups in Lebanon, believing Iranian Shiites and Lebanese Sunnis were 
. 52 
working for the same cause. Osama bin laden a Saudi Arabian was one such Sunni. 
Khomeini's own interest in creating an Islamist International - it would later be 
known Hezbollah (party of God) apparent in August 1979, in Lebanon. The head of 
Iran's Revolutionary Guards once boasted about having sponsored the attack against 
French and American peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. Western intelligence agencies 
suspect that Hezbollah has been working with Bin Laden on international operations 
since the early 1990s. Hezbollah's terrorist network in Lebanon contains both Shiite 
and Sunni groups, and there is also a Saudi Arabian wing that was involved in the 
Khobar towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. troops in 1996. Also inspired by the 
Iranian Revolution was the independent Sunni terrorist network that later became the 
basis of Al-Qaeda. However, Islamism is a self - consciously pan - Muslim 
phenomenon although Shiite and Sunni have differences along a series of traditional 
religious, ethnic, or political divides (Shiite versus Sunni, Persian versus Arab, and so 
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on). The reason is simple: in the eyes or the Islamist groups their common effort to 
strike at the West while seizing control of the Muslim world is immeasurably more 
S3 
important than whatever might be seen as "dividing" them from one another. 
Furthermore. Al-Qaeda regards that the secular revolutions backed by the 
Soviets, such as Al-Fatah and the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria, and the 
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monarchies, such as the Saudis, backed by the United states had to be destroyed. 
However, The Afghan's militant Mujahideen (who struggle in the name of 
Islam) from various Arab and Islamic states who had fought the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan, and who are now ready to continue the struggle against every 'un-
Islamic' regime in the region, believe that they are warriors for the Islamic faith in 
opposition to forces that seek to threaten or destroy their religious belief. They are 
convinced that their great honour will be to die in battle defending Islam. Indeed, 
martyrdom is intertwined with Islamic teaching: no greater martyrdom is possible 
than that achieved by giving one's life in armed conflict while defending the religious 
order. The mujahid believes he is performing the highest service for God, and that he 
need not fear the consequence. 
B. Al-Qaeda's political objectives and its strategy 
Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, Bin Laden returned to Saudi 
Arabia, where he soon made a public stand against the Saudi regime for being: 
corrupt and against the USA for maintaining such a regime and enabling Israel to 
maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam's third holliest city after Madina and 
Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. In addition. Bin Laden's 
organisation Al-Qaeda's goals, in his own words, are to 'unite all Muslims and to 
establish a government which follows the rule of the Calips.' Bin laden has stated that 
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the only way to establish the Caliphate is by force. But it was simply a means to an 
end. Afghanistan was a useable base because it was so remote and primitive. The 
Mujahideen did not believe that the Caliphate could govern from Kabul, Kandahar, or 
Jalalabad. Afghanistan was usefiil as a base, but it could not serve as the core of an 
international Islamic revival. It provided refuge; and facilities for training and 
planning, but the foundations of the Caliphate would have to be established 
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elsewhere. Al-Qaeda's goals therefore, are to overthrow nearly all Muslim 
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governments, which Bin Laden views as corrupt; to drive Western influence from 
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those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries. 
In addition. Al-Qaeda was trapped between the secular revolutionaries backed 
by the hated Soviets, such as Al Fatah and the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria, 
and the monarchies, such as the Saudis backed by the United States. The Saudis 
themselves were religious of the conservative Wahabi school. But sheikdoms had 
developed a heavy dependency on the United States. They had become complicit with 
the United States in the same way that the Nasserites had become complicit with the 
Soviet Union. In their analysis both had to be destroyed. Al-Qaeda had a much 
more sophisticated understanding of the Islamic world than did the left - wing 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Theses were not Qaddafi or Assad - financed 
groups, trained by communist bloc personnel. Those groups were alien transplants 
into Arab culture - along with the idea of pan-Arabism. Al-Qaeda grew from the 
natural soil of Islamic - not Arab - culture and had roots going back centuries. Its 
dreams were alien to Americans but far more natural to Muslims than the ideologies 
of groups like the popular front for the liberation of Palestine. Put bluntly, Al-Qaeda's 
message had legs, and the likely effect of its actions was much more threatening to the 
United States than that of previous terrorist groups. However, by the time the 
Afghan war ended, the Soviets had been defeated, the Iraqis had been run back from 
Kuwait, and the dynamism of the secularists had declined tremendously. By the early 
1990s the pendulum had swung toward religious regimes. The Mujahideen put them 
as hypocrites. And the greatest hypocrites were the Saudi Royal family, which had 
allowed the United States to use holy ground for its war against Iraq. 
Anti American feeling had been endemic in the Islamic world. It had been 
preceded by anti-British feeling. Waves of aggression from inside and outside the 
Islamic world had created a sense of victimization that had penetrated the marrow of 
Muslims. There were reasons for anti-Americanism, raging from US support for 
Israel, the Arab world has long felt betrayed by Europe's colonial powers, and its 
disillusionment with American begins most importantly with the creation of Israel in 
1948. The anger deepened in the wake of America's support for Israel during the wars 
of 1967 and 1973, and ever since in its relations with the Palestinians. The daily 
exposure to Israel's ironfisted rule over the occupied territories has turned this into the 
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great cause of the Arab - and indeed the broader Islamic - world elsewhere. They look 
at American policy in the region as cynically geared to America's oil interests, 
supporting thugs and tyrants without any hesitation. Finally, the bombing and 
isolation of Iraq have become fodder for daily attacks on the United States. While 
many in the Arab world do not like Saddam Hussein, they believe that the United 
States has chosen a particularly inhuman method of fighting him - a method that is 
64 
starvmg an entire nation. 
Had resentment been a sufficient driver, the Islamic world would have boiled 
over centuries before. The reason it hadn't was that there were two scales operating. 
One was the resentment scale - which had already swung into the red centuries earlier 
and had stayed there. The other measured the sense of helplessness. What had kept the 
lid on the Islamic world as a whole was not a lack of anger but the sense of Islamic 
impotence, the sense that Islam's enemies were overwhelmingly powerful. The 
sentiment for an Islamic renaissance was there. What was missing was any hope for 
effective action. 
This was the perception of Osama Bin Laden - who tried to turn general 
principles into a working organization - and his fellow Mujahideen gathered together 
in Al-Qaeda. From there he set the fuel for an Islamic rising against their own corrupt 
governments. What had to be generated was a sense of hope. The key to this did not 
lie in attacking the existing governments in the Islamic world. The only strength and 
resilience that they had came from their association with the current great power - the 
United States. Therefore, if the United States could be shown to be weak and 
vulnerable, the credibility of Islamic states would be completely undermined, this, 
coupled with built - in resentment, would set the Islamic world on fire and open the 
door to reestablishing the Caliphate. 
This is the key strategic point. Al-Qaeda was not motivated by hatred of the 
United States, American popular culture, or American democracy. Focus, instead, was 
on the Islamic world and its governments. Al-Qaeda viewed the United States as the 
main Christian global power. As such, it had assumed a position as guarantor of 
existing regimes in the Islamic world. Put differently, even if the United States wasn't 
directly responsible, it was viewed as the protector of these regimes by the Islamic 
masses. 
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Already in the Islamic world, there was a latent sense that the United States 
lacked both the power and the moral character to impose its will in the long run. A 
series of incidents had made this point. The US defeat in Vietnam; the humiliation of 
the Iran hostage crisis; the withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 after the Marine barracks 
were destroyed; the withdrawal from Somalia after a handful of Americans were 
killed; the failure to destroy Saddam Hussein in 1991 - all combined to create a 
perception of the United States as having tremendous potential power to strike a hard 
first blow but an inability to force a conflict to successful conclusion. From Al-
Qaeda"s point of view, the latent perception of the United States in the Islamic world 
had to be turned into a self-evident truth. The United States had to be struck by a blow 
that was both enormous, easily understandable by the Islamic masses, and against 
which there was no ready defense. 
Al-Qaeda rejected the secular Arab movements while adopting its operational 
style terrorism. The essence of terrorism is this in a society with many unguarded 
targets a group and explosives is extraordinarily difficult to stop the fewer operatives, 
the harder it is to find them. It is this combination of the sparseness of groups and the 
richness of targets that has traditionally made combating terrorists a nightmare. The 
material damage caused by terrorists was trivial compared to the psychological and 
therefore political effect. The terror could strike where and when they wanted - that 
they were in control and held life or death in their hands. The psychological strength 
of terrorism rested in the idea that no one was safe anywhere - that death was 
omnipresent. You could not protect yourself, and more important the state could not 
protect you. The frequency of attack was less important than their effectiveness. 
hi war, the enemy's next move is usually predictable. War is a game played with 
most of the pieces on the table most of the time. A general can understand and predict 
the behavior of his opponent. What gives terrorism its sfrength is its extraordinary 
unpredictability. In a world of many targets and very few terrorists, the terrorists 
always hold the advantage. Kropotkin wrote; revolutionary terror is propaganda by 
the deed. A terrorist crime is a crime for publicity. When a bomb explodes, people 
take notice, and the explosion may draw more attention than a thousand speeches or 
pictures. If the terror is sustained, more and more people become interested. Many 
wonder why the atrocities occurred and if the "'cause" seems plausible. The 
perpetrators ultimately may gain sympathy, because citizens, although initially 
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repelled by the act of terrorism, may also feel that the desperation of the weak must 
have been generated by monstrously unjust circumstances. Terror publicizes 
grievances, which the terrorist believes would have been unnoticed without his act. 
All things being equal, the more spectacular the outrage, the more likely it is that the 
rest of the world will discuss the grievance and perhaps in time recognize the terrorist 
as the most suitable spokesman for those aggrieved. This was what Al-Qaeda 
wanted to exploit in the United States, but to a degree of effectiveness not hitherto 
achieved. This was the strategic origin of September 11. Al-Qaeda needed to strike a 
blow that would be devastating leaving no doubt as to American vulnerability. 
II. The U.S. and Al-Qaeda operations beyond Afghanistan 
Osama's experiences during the Afghan jihad had a profound impact on him: 
apart from him and Mujahideen who came from Arab and Muslim countries to 
counter these atheist Russians, "Osama discovered that it was not enough to fight in 
Afghanistan but that we had to fight on all fronts, communist or western oppression." 
It was in Afghanistan while fighting the Soviets that Bin Laden heard the call to 
global jihad because it was there that he, along with his Arab Afghans, experienced 
first hand the battle between Islam and atheism, making the cosmic conflict of good 
versus evil. It was in Afghanistan that Bin Laden came to believe that the acme of this 
religion is jihad. For him as for many of the Mujahideen who fought there, 
Afghanistan was not about geopolitics. It was about Islam fighting against unbelief. 
The fact that the Soviet Union was ultimately defeated by forced withdrawal in 
1989 led the Arab-Afghans to interpret their victory as a sign of God's favour and the 
righteousness of their struggle. They believed that the victory over the Soviets was 
due to their efforts alone and ignored the other international and domestic issues that 
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The result was a sense of 
vindicafion - and the belief that this jihad against atheism and the forces of evil had to 
move next onto the global sense in order to establish a truly global community of the 
faithftil. 
It was therefore in 1989 that Al-Qaeda was founded in order to continue the 
jihad against infidels beyond the border of Afghanistan. According to Tim Weiner, 
in those nine years since the Soviet withdrawal thousands of Islamic outcasts, radical 
and visionaries from round the world came to the borderlands of Afghanistan to learn 
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the lesson of war from the Mujahideen. In an interview in 1994, Noor Amin a 
commander loyal to Mr. Hekmatyar told Wiener that the whole country (Afghanistan) 
is a university for jihad or holy war, there are many formal training centers. We have 
69 had Egyptians, Sudanese, Arabs and other foreigners trained here as assassins. 
Al-Qaeda is multi - national, with members from numerous countries and with a 
worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organisation are also senior leaders in other 
terrorist organisation. Al-Qaeda seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic 
groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups where none exist. 
Bin Laden advocated the destruction of the United States, which he sees as the 
Chief obstacle to reform in Muslim societies. Since 1996 his anti - US rhetoric has 
escalated to the point of calling for worldwide attacks on Americans and its allies 
including civilians. In February 1998, Bin Laden announced the creation of a new 
alliance of terrorist organisations, the International Islamic Front for jihad against the 
Jews and crusaders' the front included the Egyptian Al-Gama and Al-Islamiya, the 
Egyptian Islamic jihad, the Harakat ul-ansar and two others groups. The front 
declared its intention to attack Americans and its allies, including civilians, anywhere 
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m the world. 
Bin Laden established recruiting offices in thirty five countries. There were 
thirty offices in US cities alone - and this large network later became crucial when he 
created Al-Qaeda in 1989. He had training camps in Afghanistan, the Philippines 
Sudan, and Somalia over a period of time. Religion was the principal reason 
foreigners volunteered. Initially, they were fighting a jihad against communism, but 
later they evolved into an intemafional brigade espousing a distinctive synthesis of 
exfreme Islam and violence that pitted them after 1989 against the existing Muslim 
states and the United States. The Afghanistan war was the key incubator of Muslim 
fimdamentalism and was crucial in establishing extremist Islamic movements in a 
number of nations. Many thousands - about 2,000 in Bosnia alone - subsequently 
fought in Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, Kosovo, The Philippines, and elsewhere. Some 
remained in Afghanistan joined later by many others, and were crucial in the 
formation of the Taliban regime. Al-Qaeda may have trained up to 70,000 potential 
71 fighters and terrorists and created cells in at least fifty countries. 
The Arab-Afghan and the other Mujahideen, most notably those from Central 
Asia, therefore returned to their respective homes with their own agendas. Global 
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Jihad continued to provide ideological and religious inspiration but each society had 
Its own specific issues that had to be addressed. The common points were the goals of 
overthrowing existing infidel governments via armed jihad and creating Islamic states 
to take their places It was the global vision not the missionary activities of Saudi 
Wahhabis, which resulted in the civil wars and armed insurrections ranging from 
Algena to Uzbekistan and Chechnya These wars have at their roots the common 
perception of unjust, un-Islamic governments repressing religion in the public sphere 
This combined with the dire socio economic conditions and repressive and 
authontanan governments in these societies is at the root of the nse of radicalism in 
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these countnes While, extremist violence has proved to be exceptionally dangerous 
and destabilizing it faces some level of internal and external threat fi"om such 
movements, weather in the Middle East and North Afiica (MENA) and reaches for 
outside the MENA area involving Central Asia, South Asia, and the Islamic countnes 
of Southeast Asia, Europe and North Amenca. 
While militansm and proliferation pose potenUal threats to the region's 
development and energy exports, the most active threat of violence now comes from 
this violent extremism It does not howe\ er, have one source or represent one cause; 
some movements have ansen in response to state terronsm. Some movements have 
ansen in response to regional conflicts like the Israeli - Palestinian war and other 
elements have developed more in response to the pressures of social change. The end 
result is a complex mix of threats including national movements, regional movements 
like AL-Qaeda. 
The ideology and goals of these movements differs from group to group, but 
there are often loose alliances of groups with different goals. What most do have in 
common is that their ideology is based on extremist version of Shiite, Sufi, Salafi, and 
Wahhabi Islam and that the religious goals of each movement are mixed with ein anti 
secular political agenda and rejection of modem economic pnonties and reform. So 
far they are all small extremist groups that do not represent the views and hopes of the 
vest majonty of the people in the MENA region but several have already proven to be 
73 dangerous both inside and outside the Middle East 
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A. Middle East 
Bin Laden" s goal in the early 1990s was to force the United States out of various 
countries in the Middle East. Given the increase in violence by militant Islamists in 
Several Arab states, Bin laden shifted his goals by the mid-1990s to seeking the 
overthrow of secular and moderate governments in the region. By hoping that after 
eliminating the "hypocrites" and "apostates" Islamists would reconstitute the Umma 
(nations of believers) along pure Islamic lines and reestablish the Caliphate ( the 
civilization institution). In contrast to national revolutions, this would be civilizational 
revolutions. Islamists regard the Umma in transnational terms as opposed to the order 
of nation - states foisted on Muslim by the Western '"infidels" given the nature of 
trans-nationalism and the historical legacy of empire in the Middle East. However, 
moderate regimes might not have to be toppled if they and the masses become 
subservient to a defector Caliph. Thus, the Declaration of war on America in 1996, he 
in effect called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime, not just the removal of US 
military forces from the Arabian Peninsula. In interviews he said: "if the US is 
beheaded the Arab kingdoms will wither away and the Saudis would suffer the same 
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Saudi Arabia - By 1990, Bin Laden was disillusioned by the internal 
bickering of the Mujahideen and he returned to work in the family business. He 
founded a welfare organization for Arab-Afghan veterans some 4,000 of whom had 
settled in Mecca and Medina alone. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait he lobbied the 
Royal family to organize a popular defense of the kingdom and raise a force from the 
Afghan war veterans to fight Iraq. Instead King Fahd invited the Americans. This 
came as an enormous shock to Bin Laden as the 540,000 US troops began to arrive. 
Bin Laden openly criticized the Royal family, lobbying the Saudi Ulema to issue 
75 fatyvas, religious rulings against non-Muslims being based in the country. While, 
the Saudis understood the political risks they faced by having US troops on their soil, 
but they also understood the risks they faced if the US did not send troops. The Saudis 
decided to permit the United States to launch first Desert shield - the defensive 
operation - and then Desert storm. 
To Wahabis in the kingdom the decision was outrageous. The Arabian Peninsula 
was the birthplace of Islam where Muhammad launched the campaign that created the 
Islamic empire. It is the home of Mecca and Medina, the holy cities of Islam. The 
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presence of Christian troops on this soil - at the invitation of the Royal family, no less 
- was a ftindamental violation of the law. Moreover, regardless of Saddam's foul 
nature allowing Christians to invade Muslim lands from Saudi Arabia was 
unacceptable. Those Afghan-veterans who were amving home in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere they did not share their elder's sense of vulnerability and dependency on 
the United States. They believed they could deal with this matter themselves. 
Believing that, this was an appropriate time and place to reunite the Saudi - Afghans 
for jihad in defense of the homeland and particularly the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. However Bin Laden's offer was turned down by Royal family, and they 
invited American troops to protect Saudi Arabia instead. Bin laden was furious. 
Bin Laden therefore ended his support for and service to the Saudi regime at this time 
and declared himself £in opponent to and critic of its rule. 
Consequently, following his exile to the Sudan in 1992, Bin Laden began to 
regroup Arab-Afghan veterans who were disgusted with both the American victory 
over Iraq and the support of Arab governments for the Americans in this - inter -
Muslim conflict. 
Bin Laden's opposition to the Royal family led him to create the Advice and 
Reform Committee (ARC) as an umbrella organisation for several opposition group in 
Saudi Arabia, the ARC was founded neither as a revolutionary organization for global 
jihad nor in opposition to the United States. It was founded to call for domestic 
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change. It was not Bin Laden alone doing this job but many Islamists mounted the 
most serious opposition begirming in spring of 1991. After the gulf war Islamists took 
the bold step of sending a letter to the king, urging him to implement several reforms, 
the most important being the creation of an independent consultative council 
responsible for making domestic and foreign policy. With tensions rising between the 
opposition and established clerics (Ulema) Islamists wrote the highest cleric, Shayk 
bin Baz, a 45-page '"memorandum of advice"' in September 1992 that demanded 
opposition clerics in effect be given a veto over government policy and judicial 
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actions. 
In its early years the committee was dedicated to reform through education. 
Some of the proclaimed goals of the organization were (A): to achieve the Islamic 
justice and eradicate all aspects of injustice; (B) to reform the Saudi political system 
and purify it from corruption and injustice; and (C) to revive the hezba system (the 
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nght of citizens to bnng charges against state officials), which should be guided by 
the teachings of the top Ulama. 
Yet the repeated using of the word eradicates left open to interpretation now that 
these goals were to be achieved. Although the goals proclaimed the desire to reform 
and punfy the Saudi system the use of terms and concepts associated with more 
radical interpreters of Islam, the eradication of ignorant (jahiliya) rule espoused by 
Sayyid Qutb and the right of citizens to bnng charges against states officials, 
reminiscent of Ibn Taymiyya's call for the overthrow of un-Islamic governments 
suggested that the committee was not dedicated to the use of peaceful methods alone 
to achieve its goals. The increasingly militant stance of the committee over time 
particularly its calls for war against the "Amencan - Israel alliance and its local 
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supporters suggests that it always recognized the eventuality of armed rebellion. 
However, the conflict between the government and dissident Islamists came to climax 
in September 1994 at Burayda, following a mass protest movement led by the radical 
clenc Salman al-Awdah. Days later the Saudis arrested hundreds, Bin laden has made 
fi-equent references to the dissident Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia and has felt a 
strong identification with its leaders such as Al-Awdah. 
Although those who rallied at Burayda were arrested, the Saudis could not 
prevent organized opposition outside the country. Creating the committee for defense 
of legitimate rights (CDLR) with five other prominent Islamists, Muhammad al-
Mas'ari, a physics professor fled to London in 1994, fi-om where he began sending 
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tapes and faxes back to Saudi Arabia that denounced the regime. 
In addition, after his departure from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, he 
aimounced a new phase in his mission when he issued his "declaration of war against 
the Amencans occupying the land of the two holly places, Bin Laden recited the same 
litany of gnevances expressed in Saudi religious dissident letters and petitions of the 
early 1990s; mismanagement of the economy resulting in inflation, unemployment 
and poverty; calibrating oil production and pncing to suit the interests of Washington 
rather than Muslims and inept handling of national defence. The matenal policy 
dimension of these issues hardly stems fi-om a Wahhabi critique but stand firmly in 
the Muslim brotherhood tradition. Likewise, the declaration echoes the Islamic 
Te\ivalist depiction of traitorous, bypocntica\ Muslim rulers beholden to the West. 
Thus, Bin Laden asserted that Al-Saud had been betraying Muslim cause for sixty 
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years. Abd-al-Aziz-ibn-Saud allegedly helped the British quell the Arab revolt in 
Palestine in 1936 by calming the Mujahideen with false promises. Likewise. King 
Fahd lied when he declared in 1990 that American military forces would stay for a 
very brief time. The religious objections to Al-Saud in the declaration echo Sayyid 
Qutb's accusation that Muslim rulers governed through man-made laws rather than 
the divine law of Shari'a and that they allied with infidel powers against Muslims. 
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therefore. Al-Saud had fallen into apostasy. However, by 1997 Bin laden was no 
longer calling for a resignation. He was calling for an end to the rule of the Royal 
family. 
Between 1995 and 1997, Bin laden shifted his focus from domestic Saudi issues 
to broader international concerns, particularly American foreign policy in the Middle 
East and issues of concern to the broad Muslim community. Most notably the ongoing 
devastation of Iraq and never ending plight of the Palestinians, Bin Laden's critiques 
changed from targeting the Saudi Royal family to targeting the United States and 
Americans everywhere. The reason for the shift was the growing secularity and 
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criticism of Bin Laden by both the Royal family and the United States. This could 
be important strategy for Bin Laden to use Saudi oil as a weapon against American. 
Bin Laden"s publicly stated strategy may ultimately increase the price of oil and deny 
easy access to Saudi oil for the United States if the current Saudi regime is 
destabilized and replaced by a less cooperative one. The use of oil as a foreign policy 
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weapon could have devastating economic costs. 
However, bombing also entered Bin Laden's arsenal of mayhem. In 1995, his 
Afghans killed five American service personnel and two Indian soldiers with a track 
bombing in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. In 1996 with another truck bomb in Dahran, killing 
84 19 Americans. Even after 11 Sept the extremist Islamist confederation pursued their 
agenda, when there was suicide attack in Riyadh on 12 May 2003, breaching the 
security, killing thirty-four people. In this attack the residential compound and the 
offices of Vinnell Corporation were the main targets killing nine of the company's 
employees and injuring several others. Ironically, the attack coincided with the visit of 
the US Secretary of State Collin Powell to Saudi Arabia. This attack was the response 
of extremist Islamists towards American presence in Saudi Arabia and in fact, they 
have been publicly expressing their hostile sentiments in this regard. However, there 
is also another angle of it. The Vinnell Company has been training Saudi National 
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Guards (Hirs-ul-watani) for international security of Saudi Arabia. The primary 
mission was protecting the ruling Saudi Royal family from peacetime internal 
political unrest. In another incident, a commercial officer of British BAE systems, a 
leading technology company in defence and civil aviation sectors, (BAE has been 
providing technical training program and producing qualified Saudi aviation 
technicians for the last thirty five years) was gunned down in February 2003 in 
Riyadh. 
Yemen become a target for Al-Qaeda as by the end of the year many of the 
original Afghan Arabs had left Peshawar, including Bin Laden who had returned to 
Saudi Arabia. Before leaving he had formed his fledging al Qaeda organization to 
coordinate jihad activities beyond Afghanistan. At his home in Jeddah, he tried to 
organize an insurgent army to fight the Marxist government in South Yemen. 
Recent group of Mujahideen Islamic Army of Aden (lAA) a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic 
Army (AAIA) the Islamic Army of Aden (lAA)emerged publicly in mid 1998 when 
the group released a series of communiques that expressed support for Osama Bin 
Laden and appeal for overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against 
U.S. and other Western interests in Yemen. Al-Qaeda engaged in bombings and 
kidnappings to promote its goals, kidnapped 16 British, U.S. and Australian tourists in 
87 late December 1998 near Mudiyah in Southern Yemen. In December 1992, a bomb 
exploded in a hotel in Yemen, a hotel that had been housing American troops. U.S. 
88 intelligence linked the attack to Bin Laden 
Turkey- The Riyadh bombing were followed by two car bomb attacks on two 
synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey on 15 November 2003 which left twenty-four persons 
dead and injured 146 people. Reuters reported that a radical Turkish Islamist group 
known as IBDA/C the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders /Front- claimed responsibility in 
a call to Turkey's semi-official Anatolia news agency. The Turkish interior minister 
did not rule out the involvement of Al Qaeda. The attacks on synagogues were 
followed by two other gruesome truck bomb explosions which wrecked the British 
Consulate and a British Bank, HSBC killing twenty seven people including the British 
Consul General in Turkey and injuring 450 persons in Istanbul on 20 November 2003. 
According to New York Times, Turkey had not seen anything like these bombings in 
its eighty years history as a secular Muslim state, in which more Muslims died than 
either Christians or Jews. 
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During the eariy 1990s, two main Islamist extremist groups, Hizboilah (not 
related to Lebanese HizbuUoh) and the IBAD/C or the Islamic Great Eastern 
Raiders/front emerged in Turkey. However, Turkish analyst maintained that many of 
the members of these groups were trained in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 
past decade and they could have developed ties to Al-Qaeda. According to Turkish 
terrorist expert, Faik Buluk, "we know that they went to areas where Al Qaeda groups 
were active and ideologically they are with them. Experts on terrorism in Turkey also 
89 pointed out that suicide attacks were not the tradition of Turkish terrorists. 
Another group fighting between Turkish armed forces and Kurdistan workers 
party (PKK) separatists heated up in 2005. In April, 21 PKK fighters and 3 Turkish 
soldiers were killed near the border with Iraq in the biggest clash in the area since the 
PKK declared a unilateral truce in 1999. Almost 6,000 PKK guerillas were thought to 
be based in Iraq. 
Iraq- Ansar al-Islam (AI) a.k.a. partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, supporters 
of Islam, is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to 
establish an independent Islamic state in northern Iraq. It was formed in September 
2001, and is closely allied with al-Qaeda. Its members trained in al-Qaeda camps in 
Afghanistan and now provide safe haven to Al-Qaeda fighters fleeing Afghanistan. 
The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from Al-
Qaeda. 
Lebanon- The problem of terrorism in Lebanon is not new thing but it started 
since the creation of Israeli state in Middle East. From 1947 to 1967, the Middle East 
was dominated by a series of short conventional wars; Arabs states that stay around 
Israel state often maintained an £inti-Israeli stance. The amount of tension led to blow 
between Arab country and Israel in 1967 six day War. This time terrorist group 
emerged in this region against Israeli-the Palestine Liberation organisation (PLO) 
began a series of terrorist attacks against civilian Israeli position. It was a turnaround 
from the old tactics of the stem gang and the Irgun and it served to define Israeli 
relation with its Arab neighbors. Even Israel struck back against the PLO. 
In the meantime, some Arab countries after Six Day War, such as Iraq, led by 
Ba'ath party, group of Arab Socialists called for both Arab unity and the destruction 
of Israel. Along with several terrorist groups, they formed a rejectionist front, 
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rejecting any peace with Israel. And again in 1982, Israel launched a major invasion 
of Lebanon followed by a full-scale attack in 1982. 
In the melee of the 1980, middle Eastern terrorism fell into several broad 
categories including suicide bombing and other attack on Israel and Airplane were 
hijacked, airport were attacked: various militants fighting other militants in Lebanon 
and abroad countnes came to play the key roles with different group in Lebanon such 
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as Libya, Syria, and Iran. 
Iran established itself as the patron of Hizbullah whose principal military 
activities target Israeli occupation forces in Southern Lebanon. Iran's ability to 
influence radical Islamic groups derived legitimacy in Arab eyes to the extent that it 
concentrated on promoting anti-Israeli operations. Beyond this Iran had little 
influence on militants in the Arab East, the two Palestinian radical Islamic groups, Al-
jihad-al-Islami and Hamas, cooperated with Iran in view of the latter" s willingness to 
support their operations against the Hebrew state. Hizbullah leaders do not conceal 
that they receive military and financial aid fi^om Iran, this aid is normally channeled 
93 
though Syria. According to Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand: Western 
intelligence agencies, suspected that Hezbullah has been working with Bin Laden on 
international operation since the early 1990, Hezbullah"s terrorist network in Lebanon 
contains both Shi'ite and Sunni groups and there is also a Saudi Arabian wing that 
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was involved in the Khobar towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. troops in 1996. 
Furthermore, the struggle for position in regional politics, not ideology, explains 
why Iran gives material aid to the radicals while Syria provides their leaders with 
shelter Tehran aspires to convince the skeptical United States which seeks to contain 
Iran and weary Gulf Cooperation Council states, that its regional interests threaten 
none of theirs. Iranian support for the radicals serves as a retaliatory message to those 
who attempt to block what Iran regards as its vital regional interests. Similarly, Syria 
attempts to use the radicals as bargaining chips in peace negotiations with Israel, and 
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to reserve a place for Damascus in Middle Eastern affairs. 
Another group of Islamic militants which is linked to Al Qaeda is Asbat al-
Ansar, its members are primarily Palestinians and associated with Osama Bin laden 
and receive money through international Sunni extremist networks and Bin Laden"s 
Al-Qaeda network. 
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B. Africa 
Egypt- In Egypt Osama Bin Laden doest not hold a monopoly on religion and 
violence, Egypt has become the center for two such terrorist organisations. The 
Islamic Groups (IG) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Islamic group is a loose 
confederation of militants who follow the teaching of Sayyid Qutb, a militant who 
was executed in 1966. According to the Institute for counter - terrorism (ICI) (2000), 
the IG grow after many Islamic radicals were released from Egyptian prisons in 1971, 
they created cells with many names throughout the country and bound themselves in a 
theological confederation. Fanatics from the IG assassinated Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat in October 1981. 
ICI expert estimated that they have been the culprits behind bombing and 
assassination attempts in the 1990s, in 1997 they murdered 58 people who were 
touring Egypt to view the Pyramids. In 1999 the IG declared a cease - fire in the wake 
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of over 1,000 victims since 1992. It has external wings with supporters in several 
countries, its senior member signed Osama Bin Laden"s fatwa in February 1998 
calling for attacks against the United States. The Egyptian Government believes that 
Iran, Bin laden, and Afghan militant groups support the organization. 
Another group is Al-jihad a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic jihad, jihad group. Islamic 
jihad. Vanguards of conquest. This group active since the late 1970s, merged with Bin 
Laden's Al-Qaeda organization in June 2001, but may still retain some capability to 
conduct independent operations. Its primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian 
Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack U.S. and Israeli interests 
98 in Egypt and abroad. According to ICI (2000) the group also operates in Sudan, 
Albania and Azerbaijan. The US Department of State says Islamic Jihad is divided 
into two segments. One segment works primarily in Egypt, focusing on individual 
assassinators, it is particularly known for its attacks on Coptic Christians. The other 
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segment operates under Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. The Egyptian 
government and U.S. intelligence services claimed that Iran supports the jihad and its 
merger with Al-Qaeda also boosts Bin Laden"s support for the group. 
Algeria- The Salafist Group for call and combat (GSPC), an outgrowth 
01 Armed Islamic group (GIA) an Islamic extremist Group, is composed of radical 
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Islamists and Algerian veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It 
appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998, and is currently the most 
effective armed group inside Algeria. Its operations are aimed at government and 
military targets, primarily in rural areas. According to press reporting, some GSPC 
members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists 
sympathetic to Al-Qaeda. In late 2002, Algerians authorities announced they had 
killed a Yemeni Al-Qaeda operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside 
Algeria. Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad many residing in Western 
Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian government 
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has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in past years. 
Sudan- Many of the original Afghan Arabs have left Peshawar, including Bin 
Laden who had returned to Saudi Arabia. Before leaving he had formed his fledgling 
Al-Qaeda organisation to coordinate jihad activities beyond Afghanistan. He had 
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already sent people to Sudan to set up operations based there. Before he was 
expelled to Sudan, in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden opposed the presence of U.S. troops in 
Saudi Arabia, consequently he was expelled by Saudi government and left to Sudan. 
There he found friends in the radical government of Sudan. Infact historical 
background of the development of the Islamist movement in the Sudan dates to 1946. 
This date was the beginning of a political process inside the Sudanese Muslim 
Brethren party that transformed it from an elitist group into an Islamist popular 
movement known as the Islamic Charter front, the front under the leadership of Hasan 
al-turabi. And in Sudan he expanded his operations, by the end of 1992. Bin Laden 
had nearly 500 Afghans working for businesses that he established in Sudan. He also 
saw internationalism as the best means for striking the United States, and he refiised 
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to base his operations in any single country. The Sudan under Sheikh Hassan Al-
turabi "s overall influence cooperated closely with Bin Laden during his stays there 
and was suspected of complicity in many terrorist acts and conspiracies, including the 
attempted murder of President Mubarak in Ethiopia and New York bombing 
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conspiracies m 1993. 
In Sudan, Bin Laden went on offensive in 1993. Using his contacts in Sudan, he 
began searching for weapons of mass destruction. His Afghans sought to purchase 
nuclear weapons from underground sources in the Russian federation, and he began 
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work on a chemical munitions plant in Sudan. The Al chifa plant, reported the New 
York Times of August 25, was presumed to be cooperating with the Iraqi chemical 
weapons program and producing an important ingredient of VX nerve gas ethyl 
methylphosphothionate. It was attacked by US missiles after truck bombs divested the 
area around the American embassies in Nairobi. Kenya and Dares Salaam, on 7 
August, 1998. This time Washington, where President Clinton was under heavy fire 
because of his sexual scandal and the perjury accusation against him by independent 
persecutor Kenneth Starr over his affair with former White House intern Monica 
Lewinsky, was galvanized by the attacks. 
Libya - Libyan Islamic fighting group, a.k.a.. Al-Jama" al-Islamiyyah al-
Muqatilah, Libyan Fighting Group or Libyan Islamic Group emerged in 1995 among 
Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It declared the 
government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow 
it. Some members maintained a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organized against 
Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Osama Bin Laden's Al-
Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahideen network. 
Morocco - Islamic combatant group (GICM), the goal of which reportedly 
include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting Al-Qaeda's jihad 
against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the late 1990s and comprised 
Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan. GICM members 
interact with other North Afiican extremists, particularly in Europe. Its location/area 
of operation includes Western Europe, Afghanistan, and possibly Morocco. 
Tunisia - The Tunisian combatant group (TCG), also known as the Jama'a 
combatant Tunisian, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia 
and targets U.S. and Western interests. Probably, founded in 2000, by Tarek Maaroufi 
and Saifullah Ben Hassina, the loosely organized group has come to be associated 
with Al-Qaeda and other North Afiican extremist networks that have been implicated 
in terrorist plots during the past two years. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part 
of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to 
European press reports, TCO members in the past have engaged in recruiting for 
terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected of 
planning an attack against the U.S., Algerian and Tunisian diplomatic missions in 
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Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties with the Algerian 
112 Salafi Group for preaching and combat (GSPC). 
C. East Africa - Conditions in the East African countries are ideal for conducting 
terrorist operations. African government officials have correctly characterized as part 
of the soft underbelly of global terrorism. Porous borders, pervasive corruption and 
the lack of police capacity allow terrorists to move about freely, they find safe haven 
and establish logistical hubs, small arms and other weapons are readily available on 
black markets. A wealth of American, British, and European soft targets, large 
expatriate communities", tourists, and non-governmental organizations, make these 
countries attractive arenas for terrorist operations. Kenya shares a border with 
Somalia, a lawless and disorderly failed state that is widely believed to be a terrorist 
safe haven. Kenya has been a venue for international terrorism since 1980, when a 
Palestinian liberation organisation sympathizer bombed a tourist hotel, killing 16 
people. In recent years, Al-Qaeda has been the international terrorist organization 
with the most significant presence in the region. In August 1998, Kenya and Tanzania 
was the scene of one of Al-Qaeda's most audacious pre-9/11 operations, when 
terrorists carried out near - simultaneous suicide attacks on the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi and Darussalam, killing 303 people and injuring more than 50,000. In 
November 2002 near the coastal Kenya city of Mombassa, terrorist fired surface to air 
missiles at an Israeli jet packed with passengers. Although the missile missed the 
plane a subsequent Al-Qaeda suicide bombing at a resort near Mombassa popular 
with Israeli tourist killed 15 people. According to published accounts, Al-Qaeda has 
established terror centers in the region. "'Sleeper cells"' are alleged to exist in Kenya 
today. Some of the cells appear to be active. 
Somalia - Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) a.k.a. Islamic Union, Somalia's largest 
militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s following the collapse 
of the Sad Barre regime. It aims to establish an Islamic regime in Somalia and force 
the secession of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Some elements associated with AIAI 
maintain ties to Al-Qaeda, conduct terrorist attacks against Ethiopian forces and other 
114 Somalia factions. In addition Al-Qaeda was active in Somalia when American 
troops joined an endemic civil war to bring food to the area. In October 1993, a U.S. 
army black hawk helicopter was downed while on patrol in Mogadishu. U.S. army 
rangers went to the rescue, and a two-day battle ensued in which 18 Americans lost 
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their lives. In an interview with ABC news reporter John Miller, Bin Laden claimed 
that he trained and supported the troops that struck the Americans. 
It was the Bush administration's September 2001 national security strategy 
declaration; in the wake of overthrowing the Taliban, stated that weak state can pose 
as great a danger to our national interest as strong states that most strongly raised the 
possibility that Africa could be the source of considerable international terrorism or at 
least provide sanctuary for those engaged in nefarious acts against other nations. Five 
years after 9/11 Washington planed to create AFRICOM which could have counter -
, . . 116 
terronsm as one of its central missions. 
D. Central Asia and Caucasus 
In the newly independent republics of Central Asia, Islamist movements existed 
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much before the collapse of Soviet Union where Tajikistan, had been a centre of 
the Basmachi movement in the early years of Soviet rule. The Basmachis were local 
guerilla groups led by mullahs, tribal chiefs and landlords who had resisted Soviet 
rule across the whole of Central Asia and continued their unequal struggle until the 
1930s, after the ruthless suppression of the Basmachis, who like the Afghan 
Mujahideen, were inspired by Islam. In 1993 Tajikistan felt in the trap of civil war 
again where it was commonly perceived that the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP) was a ftindamentalist party inspired and sustained by their Afghan counterparts. 
The leader of the Tajik IRP, Mohammad Sharif Himatzade, had fought with other IRP 
leaders in the Afghan Mujahideen. The IRP received support from Hekmatyar's 
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Hizbi-i-Islami and from Massoud, who had become a national hero to the Tajiks. 
In addition, the translations of the works of Maulana Abdul Ala Maududi (founder of 
Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan) were being smuggled and distributed in Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and northern Caucasus for a long time. The ideological inputs to rise in 
rebellion against the Soviets were augmented by a campaign of distribution of 
literature prepared by CIA-ISI during the war in Afghanistan. In the early 1990s the 
Islamists had established their bases firmly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1992, 
Islamist rebels, in whose ranks Pakistan's Afghans Mujahideen from other Islamic 
countries were represented, seized the regional town of Tavildara 145 km east of the 
capital Dushanbe. 
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In Uzbekistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has been conducting an 
armed struggled to remove the secular states in the entire Central Asia and replacing 
them with an Islamic caliphate in the region. The leader of the movement, Takhir 
119 Yuldashev, is based in Kandahar and has close links with Al-Qaeda. 
Afghani brigade or Afghan-veterans turned to violence against their former 
paymasters. There were four reported coup attempts against President Gaidar Aliev in 
October 1994, March 1995, July 1995 and one that had been planned in early 1997. 
Plans to blow up a bridge over which President Aliev was to pass and other plans to 
shoot down his plane with a stinger missile were discovered. No group or individual 
ever claimed these attacks or attempted attacks. The war between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Nagamo-Karabakh lasted in its acute phase from 1988 to 1994. 
Besides the direct action of the Afghan brigade on the Azeri side, there was terrorism 
inside Armenia which smacked of Afghani activity. 
Russia, The Kremlin's senior planners had plenty of reasons to fear the 
backlash of the Afghanistan war in Chechnya. Immediately after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 19991, Groznyy, the Chechen capital, became a transit point for the 
Afghan veterans, especially the Arab ones. In August 1995, a spokesman of the 
Russian Federal Security Service reported that units fi"om Afghanistan and Jordan -
which has a large and influential Chechen community in residence - were fighting on 
the side of Chechen President Joukar Dudayev. There were said to be about 300 
foreign mercenaries at that time, out of total Chechen guerilla force of 6,000. 
Shamil Basayev, the leader of the seizure of the Budenovsk hospital and a right -
hand man of Dudayev, was reported by the Russians to have been trained in 
Afghanistan by none other than the disciples of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 
Anti-Russian terrorist organisation in Chechnya was believed by Moscow to 
have links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They have also supplied with arms, stolen 
from or sold by the Russian military. Aided by the HizbuUah organization in Iran and 
in Lebanon - Dudayev visited Lebanon at least once Afghan war veterans and Iranian 
volunteers entered Chechnya through Dagestan and Azerbaijan. Mikhail Barsukov 
chief of the federal security service in charge of the special units admitted that "the 
Chechen fighters were a very serious unit, very well trained, very well - prepared" -
possibly by Pakistan's ISl and American CIA during the 1979-89 jihad, or afterward 
by the jihad's many alumni. 
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The Russian army's war against Chechen secessionists remained at a stalemate 
in 2001. Tens of thousands of Russian troops stationed in the mountainous republic 
were unable to eliminate the rebels, whose sporadic attacks against Russian forces and 
pro-Russian Chechens resulted in a steady flow of fatalities. Moscow claimed that the 
Chechen rebels had links with Afghanistan's Taliban regime and Bin Laden, which 
made it all the more palatable for Russian press. Vladimir Putin pledged support for 
U.S. President Bush's call for a war on global terrorism. In December Russia stepped 
up military operations in response to Chechen raids on its forces. 
E. South Asia 
Kashmir - The root of jihad ideology in South Asia started in the mid-1920s, 
Maulana Sayyid Abu ATa Maududi, the founder and head of the Jamaat-e-Islami in 
India ( and following partition in Pakistan), began to articulate an ideology of political 
Islam that gave primacy to jihad over and above all the other duties imposed by Islam. 
The four pillar of Islam (prayer, fasting, alms giving and pilgrimage), Maududi said: 
were "'acts of worship" ordained to prepare us for a greater purpose and to train us for 
a greater duty. Jihad of Islam was in this conception, in, irreducible conflict with all 
nationalisms, as well as with every form of governance - whether authoritarian or 
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But the true mobilization of the Mujahideen in Kashmir started converging in 
Kashmir in early 1990s. After Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, 
and in 1990 many South-East and West Asian and worth African Mujahideen had 
retumed backed to their bases in their own countries particularly in Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Somalia, most of them stayed back in Afghanistan. These 
people were later described as Arab Afghans. It is around this time, as maintained by 
noted Pakistani scholar Pervez Hoodbhoy, that around 1990, Pakistan's military 
embarked upon a covert war in Kashmir (in India) using radical Islamist proxies 
trained and based in Pakistan. It was an effort to replay the strategy used by the U.S. 
in Afghanistan against the Soxiets in which Pakistan's military had played a central 
role. 
The foreign militants who participated in Afghanistan's jihad started converging 
in Kashmir in eariy 1990s. In September 1992, Voice of America (VOA) broadcast 
the interviews of an Afghan, an Indonesian, a Malaysian and a Sudanese, who had 
148 
joined militant ranks in Kashmir. In an interview to a local Urdu daily newspaper, an 
Afghan, a Sudanese and an engineer from Bahrain said that after accomplishing the 
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task in Afghanistan they had moved towards Kashmir. 
More evidence showed that Pakistan continued support for a wide range of 
jihadi groups in its covert war against India. Most prominently, no action whatsoever 
has been taken against the fifteen constituents of the united Jihad council (UJC) which 
is responsible for a major proportion of terrorist crime in Jammu and Kashmir: the 
UJC continues to operate openly from Muzzafarabad in Pakistan - occupied Kashmir, 
and receives visible support from the state and intelligence structures there, with 
regard to other terrorist organizations. Nine of these Pakistani groups are currently on 
the US list of terrorist organisations. Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-
Mohammed(JEM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Lashker-e-Jhangri (LeJ) are listed as 
foreign terrorist organisations. The AI-Badr Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami 
(HUJI), Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) Jamait-uI-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan (SSP) are identified as other selected terrorist organizations. Five of these -
the HUM, HUJI and JEM (collectively known as the Harkat traid), The JeM and LeJ -
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are members of Osama Bin Laden s international Islamic front. 
The Islamic agenda in Kashmir was articulated by the prominent militant group 
Hizbul Mujahideen, by asserting that - our aim is the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate world over, the other militant group, JamaituI Mujahideen, asserted that the 
demand of the right of self- determination ( i n Kashmir) was distorting the image of 
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the ongoing movement. It is a struggle for the establishment of Caliphate. 
Bangladesh - The extension of jihad in the neighboring countries became 
gradually visible. The competition for assertion and ascendancy between Bangla 
nationalists and Islamists had started with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh. The strength of Islamists grew gradually; the 
Islamists now assert that they would change the democratic system in Bangladesh 
because they hold existing democracy responsible for anti-Islamisation. The 
formation of Harkat-i-Jihad-i-Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-BD) in 1992 was a 
significant event. This group is believed to have been founded on the financial support 
of Al-Qaeda. The 1990, Maulana Azizul Haq set up Bangladesh Khilala majlis which 
aimed at establishing a global state of Islam (Khilafat). He later set up Islami Oikya 
Jote by incorporating eight Islamist organisations of Bangladesh. According to a 
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report, there are thirteen Islamist extremist organisations operating in Bangladesh. 
The objectives of these groups are Taliban style of government in Bangladesh and 
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assisting the Islamist movements in their resistance in the entire Asian region. 
Myanmar - Al-Qaeda has been long established in neighbouring Bangladesh, 
where thousands of Muslims have taken refuge due to Myanmar"s military 
government systematic repression of its Muslim ethnic minorities. The Bengalis, 
Rohingas, and Kashin. Muslims account for roughly 4 percent of Myanmar"s 
population. Whenever there are aggrieved people who are persecuted relentlessly, 
they will look to any means to fight back. Currently, there are three Muslim - based 
guerrilla movements in Myanmar: the Ommat Liberation Front, the Hawthoolei 
Muslim Liberation front, and the Muslim Liberation organization of Myanmar. The 
government has waged a harsh coxmter insurgency war against these groups and has at 
times tacitly supported local militias to engage in communal violence against Muslim 
communities. 
AI-Qaeda has recruited Myaimiar Muslims from the border region and sent them 
for training in Afghanistan. HUJI (Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami found in Bangladesh in 
1992, led by an associate of Osama Bin Laden. The organization is closely tied to one 
of the Al-Qaeda linked groups in Pakistan/Kashmir. Several HUJI leaders are veterans 
of the Soviet - era Mujahideen. They also recruited Rohingas from Myanmar and sent 
them to fight in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya. 
It is not for the first time that Muslims fi'om Myanmar have been trained in 
Afghanistan. In the 1980s, there were Muslims from Myanmar in Afghanistan 
fighting with the Mujahideen. Networks of people and groups already exist. 
According to Lintner, the foremost expert of insurgent politics in Myanmar, the 
Muslim Liberation organization of Myanmar, 'maintains some contact with Islamic 
circles in Pakistan." On January 19, 1999 for example the police arrested seven Al-
Qaeda members (one of whom was a Myanmar national) who were plotting to blow 
up the U.S. embassy in Delhi. More recently, leaflets calling on Muslims to join the 
127 Jihad against the Americans were reportedly found in Myanmar. 
F. South-East Asia 
In South-East Asia, the process of violent expression of Islamist agenda has 
been quite gradual and the protest movements which were organized on different 
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issues, corruption, authoritarianism and restricted form of civil liberties etc., 
ultimately adopted the radicalized Islamist idiom and utilized the same for 
mobilization and assertion of the war in Afghanistan which attracted volunteers from 
the South-East Asia gave impetus to the process of protest movements transforming 
into Islamist movements. By the time of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the 
South-East Asian Islamist groups had forged closed links with the groups operating in 
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In addition, South-East Asia was appealing to the Al-Qaeda leadership in the 
first place because of the network of Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, 
and economics that already had records of extensive money laundering. Al-Qaeda saw 
the region first and foremost, as a back office for its activities (especially to set up 
front companies, fund-raised recruit, forged documents and purchase weapons) and 
only later became a theater of operations in its own right. And to using South-east 
Asia as a back office for its operations, Al-Qaeda set out to accomplish three major 
goals, first, it sought to draft onto or co-opt preexisting radicals, movement and 
groups. 
The second, goal was to link these groups into a truly transnational network. The 
hall mark of Al-Qaeda activities in most instances the existing radical groups focused 
primarily on their domestic grievances and objectives and tended to have little contact 
with one another. The introduction of Al-Qaeda into the region in the early 1990s 
changed that completely. Suddenly, network between once unconnected groups were 
established as Al-Qaeda imderstood the benefits in educating law enforcement when 
working across borders. 
The third goal was far Al-Qaeda to establish a regional arm of its own that 
would be able to become financially independent and technically proficient enough to 
plan and execute terrorist attacks. The organisations become known as Ja-maah-
129 Islamiya. 
On 9 January 2003 the Singapore government released a white paper on Jamaah 
Islamiya, maintaining that its goal was to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) 
comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, the Southern Philippines Singapore and Brunei. 
Jamaah Islamiya (JI) which had been active since the dependence of Indonesia 
and had established a network throughout South-East Asia had sent its cadres to 
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participate in Jihad in Afghanistan. The JI leader Hambali, who was captured in 2003, 
in Thailand, had forged close links with Al-Qaeda. 
Malaysia - The problem of Islamic militancy is one that plagued Malaysia long 
before the September 2001 world trade center and Pentagon terrorist attacks. As early 
as the 1970s, radical and extremist groups had already started surfacing in this 
Muslim-majority country. The Penang - based movement formed in 1977 claimed 
that the Malaysian government was not giving Islam its proper due and aimed to set 
up a theocratic order by means, of violent jihad. It was only in 1992 that the 
Malaysian government took action to clamp down on the movement. Another group 
whose interpretation of Islam threatened the incumbent regime was the Koperasi 
Angkattan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (KARIM or Malaysian Islamic Revolutionary 
Front) formed in 1974 in Kuala Lumpur, KARIM preached the overthrow of the 
govenunent through violence. It was later baimed its leaders detained under the 
internal security Act. 
In fact, there are many groups of Islamic movement in Malaysia but the group 
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which was joined by Afghanistan-veteran that is PAS party (the parti Islam se 
Malaysia), had many supporters who grew disenchanted with Malaysian politics and 
the democratic process that they felt would continue to maintain the national front 
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monopoly of power. The Malay identity, represented by United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) and defined by democratic pluralists in plural cultural terms is 
rejected by the Islamists represented by Partai Islam se Malaysia (PAS) the latter 
claims that Islam should be the main component of national identity. In November 
2003, as reported by Reuters, PAS published a fifty-three-page document claiming 
that Islamic way of life was the only way to overcome the pitfalls of Western style 
democracy in Malaysia. The document unveiled plans to make Shariah law as the 
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supreme law of the country. A small number of PAS members began to advocate a 
violent jihad and established a covert group, the Kempulan Mujahideen Malaysia 
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(KMM) which is believed to be the armed wing of PAS, this extremist group 
within PAS advocates jihad, and it has passed edicts that U.S. soldiers must be killed 
because they have repeatedly oppressed Islamic countries. 
The Kempulan Mujahideen (some times called the Malaysian Mujahideen 
group) was founded on October 12, 1995, by a veteran of the Afghan Mujahideen, 
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Zainon Ismail. Between 1979 and 1989, two groups underwent military training with 
the Mujahideen; most of the trainers were religious students studying in Pakistan who 
heard the call of jihad. Afghanistan was the core of KMM, some forty-five members 
of the group, nearly half of the membership, had either fought against the Soviets or 
had trained in Al-Qaeda camps there in the 1990s. One of the most important veterans 
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was Nik Adli Nik Aziz, who has led the KMM since 1999, upon returning to 
Malaysia in 1996 from Afghanistan. 
By 1999, Nik Adli had become committed to waging a violent jihad against the 
Malaysian state, which he considered to be secular and oppressive. In 1999 he 
purchased a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including twenty-four pounds of 
explosive, that same year he studied bomb-making with the Moro Islamic liberation 
front in the southern Philippines. He also began to link up with exiled Indonesian 
radicals such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Riduan Isamuddin 
(Hambali), and Mohammad Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), Abdurrahman. The KMM 
dispatched its members to train in MILF camps as well as fight against Christians in 
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the Maluku Islands in Indonesia starting in 1999. 
In addition, the Islamist extremist groups Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM) 
along with another group Al-Maunah are believed to be responsible for the attacks on 
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the places of warship of minority groups. The Deputy Home Minister Datuk 
Zainul Abidin Zin informed parliament that the govenmient had detained some 
members of KMM for an attempted bombing of a shopping mall in Jakarta in August 
2 0 0 1 . " ' 
After the attacks of 11/September, investigations by US intelligence agencies 
and their South-East Asian counterparts uncovered Malaysia's pivotal role as a 
rendezvous point for the planning and facilitation of terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington DC. Indeed, it has been suggested that 'since the early 1990s, Al-Qaeda 
has found Malaysia to be a convenient base of operations, where militant Islamic 
ideology has been able to graft onto a small but growing community of Islamic 
radicals. In truth there were already indicators that Malaysia was proving to be a 
haven for international Islamic militants long before the 11 September attacks. 
Already in 1995, Wall Khan, Amin Shah an international terrorist and a known 
associate of Romzi Ahmed Youssef, the man who was responsible for the 1993 world 
trade center bombings in New York, was arrested in Malaysia. Another known 
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terrorist linked to Ramzi Youssef Khalid Shaik Mohammad, who emerged as a chief 
plotter of the 11 September attacks, was also believed to have operated out of 
Malaysia throughout the 1990s. 
One of the suspects involved m the planning and implementation of the 11 
September attacks Zacharias Massaoui who has been accused of conspiring with 
Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network to launch the attack on civilians in the 
US was known to have entered Malaysia. During his stay, he was tracked by the 
Malaysian intelligence service and believed to have received assistance from a former 
Malaysian military officer, Yazid Sufaat. Yazid was also accused of providing shelter 
to two Yemeni hijackers who participated in the 11 September attacks, Khalid Al-
Midhar and Nawaf Al-Azmi, as well as Taufiq bin Laden Atash, who were later 
identified as one of the masterminds behind the October 2000 bombing of the USS 
Cole in Yemen and according to authority of Malaysia's investigation also found that 
the chief of Jamaah Islamiya , Riduan Isamuddin or(Hambali) used Malaysia as a 
platform for orchestrating the activities of the terrorist organisation, known to be the 
South-East Asian arm of Al-Qaeda. Malaysia was apparently also the location for 
three meetings of the Rabitatul Mujahideen, a coalition of jihadist groups from 
Southeast Asia organized around the Ja-maah Islamiya. In 1999-2000 Malaysia's 
place in the web of international terrorism, could be because Malaysia provided free 
Visa to all Middle Eastern people, as Malaysian security officials do admitted in 
private that Kuala Lumpur's problems are rooted in its "Visa free" policy towards 
most Middle Eastern states that enable Al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers to enter 
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the country in the guise of financials man and tourists. 
Indonesia - The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in May 1998 
gave a fertile ground for resurgence. Islamic radicalism has been one of the important 
characteristics of post-Suharto Indonesia. Radical Islamic groups who were 
suppressed by the Suharto regime have found sufficient freedom to organize 
themselves consolidate their power and actively play roles in the dynamics of social 
religious and political affairs in post Suharto Indonesia. 
Many names have emerged as leading figures in the rise of Islamic radicalism 
among them are Habib Rizieq Shihab of front of defenders of Islam or front pembela 
Islam (FPI), Abu Bakar Ba'asyir of Islamic congregation or Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and the council of Jihad fighters of Majlis Mujahideen, Agus Dwi Kama of Lashkar 
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JunduUah, and other names from Darul Islam tentera Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) and 
Ja'far Umar Thalib of Jihad fighter of Lashkar Jihad. These names have attracted 
much public attention and made headlines in national and international media. They 
have emerged as one significant force in the dynamics of social, religious and political 
change in post Suharto Indonesia. 
The most vocal and controversial groups in post-Suharto Indonesia is Ja'far 
141 Umar Thalib who used to join Afghan Mujahideen during Afghan-Soviet war 
1979-1989. He was the founder and leader of Lashkar Jihad an organization 
established in January 2000 and disbanded in October 2002. 
Indeed, Ja'far believes that the United States, Israel, and Christians are the 
master minds of religious violence in many parts of the world. One particular issue 
that significantly contributed to escalated and passionate public debate about Ja'far is 
an allegation that he has close connections with Osama bin laden, the prime suspect; 
of the September 11, 2001 events, he also was alleged that he played a key role in the 
sending of jihad fighter to various areas in Indonesia where conflicts occurred 
between Christian and Muslims such as Ambon in Maluku and Poso in Sulawasi. 
Many suggest that Lashkar jihad worked hand in hand with Osama Bin Laden as part 
of his terror networks in South-East Asia. Such an allegation was deliberately made 
by foreign media. In a long article, The Times concluded that JaTar has a lot of power 
and influence and controls between 3.000 and 10,000 armed trained and loyal 
militiamen. The Times went on to suggest the U.S. government not take Ja'Far lightly. 
Collectively, it further suggests that JaTar must be taken very seriously by the U.S. 
government because he is as dangerous as Osama Bin Laden. 
hideed US policy makers expressed their deep concerns with the threat of 
Islamic radicalism in Indonesia; especially the threat of JaTar Umar Thalib "JaTar is 
a radical demagogue infiised with a worldwide Islamic credo" said Peter Chalk, an 
analyst with the RAND corporation in Washington. '"Lashkar Jihad" he adds, "is one 
group that might be prepared to aid the logistical relocation of Al-Qaeda forces. Larry 
Johnson, a former state Department counter terrorism official said "' If these groups 
are allowed to grow unchecked by local authorities"' he adds, " they could pose a 
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threat. 
Although Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or free Aceh Movement (GAM), the 
secessionist movement in Aceh formed in 1975, has never been publicly linked to Al-
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Qaeda or other Middle Eastern-based Islamic terronst organisations, it is suspected by 
US officials of having some ties. Many GAM members fought with the Mujahideen. 
So linkages are possible though none have ever been confirmed and the organization 
denies any: "we don't want to have anything to do with an organization that plays the 
religious card like Al-Qaeda. said a GAM spokesman; they are a nationalist not an 
Islamic movement." 
In June 2000, two of the most senior leaders of Al-Qaeda, Mohammad Atef and 
Ayman al-Zawahin, traveled to Indonesia, stopping in Aceh, where they reportedly 
met with Acehnese leaders hoping to establish a base area and training facilities in 
Indonesia, to complement Afghanistan. The two Al-Qaeda leaders were favorably 
impressed by the lack of central government control, the Islamic fervor of the people, 
and GAM's local support. Despite their favorable impression GAM resisted their 
overtures and Al-Qaeda did not establish a base in Aceh. GAM leaders, according to a 
senior U.S. official were extremely sensitive to the U.S. position on this issue and 
were courting U.S. support and recognitions. To date, only limited direct ties between 
143 GAM and Al-Qaeda have been uncovered. 
Another group of Islamic militant in Indonesia is composed of Afghan-veterans 
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where its leader Hambali used to join Afghan Mujahideen dunng Afghan-Soviet 
war in 1979-1989. Younger radicals, notably Hambali wanted to bnng the conditions 
on and have formed a cadre of jihadis to bring about the conditions for their political 
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agenda. Hambali is part of the JI faction that has conspired to take the struggle 
directly against Western interest. 
JI has also been able to take advantage of communal conflicts in Ambon and 
Poso central Sulawasi. Neither was started by JI, but the organization and others 
sympathetic to jihadist goals have attempted to take advantage of both situations. JI 
and its affiliations were able to exploit - and provided further battle grounds for 
joining of Afghan-veterans who have expenence in Afghan-Soviet war. 
JI leaders are linked to the MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia; Indonesia 
Mujahidin Council) and MMI's para-military wing in Ambon known as Lashkar 
Mujahideen. The core of JI met and formed links with Bin Laden's network dunng 
the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan The main tactic of Lashkar Mujahideen 
was hit and run raids against Chnstian leaders and structures, where Lashkar Jihad 
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was involved in the more "conventionar" and high profile objective of taking and 
holding temtory and attempting to force the expulsion of Chnstian residents. 
And recent incident which was earned out by JI, where a major breakthrough 
for secunty forces, in undermining terronst operations in Indonesia, was the arrest in 
June 2002 of senior Al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq who was residing in Bogor 
Omar al-Faruqi"s relations included, involvement in the 2000 Chnstmas Eve 
bombings in which Churches were targeted in ten cities across Indonesia; an 
assassination attempt on Megawati, and plans for large scale terronst attacks against 
U.S. interest, in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippine, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, the goal of these plans, to be earned out by JI, was to create 
an Islamic state in insular South-East Asia 
The Bah blast represented a shift in JI's operations. Although the ultimate goal 
of JI IS the creation of a region-wide Islamic state in Southeast Asia, the Bah blast 
represented more direct sohdanty with AI-Qaeda"s cause as Amrozi one of the 
convicted bombers stated that he hated Amencans and expressed remorse that he got 
Australians instead. Other suspects have, however, confirmed that Australia was the 
target. A threat by Osama Bin Laden to Australia in late 2001, due to Australia's 
involvement in East Timor, adds strongly to the picture that Al-Qaeda and JI have 
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element within the Indonesian public who are doubtful about the nature of JI threat, 
and many interpret the tnal of Ba'asyir as an anti-Muslim act. Media reports suggest 
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that many Indonesians believed that U.S agents were behind the Bah attacks. 
Thailand - There has never been strong ties between the Muslim 
148 insurgency in Thailand and international terronst groups. Although militants in 
Southern Thailand have long been a fact of life, for the most part they have given up 
their campaign to create an independent homeland, most have worked as a logistic 
operative for the Acehnese rebels, GAM (Gerakkan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh 
Movement) and the MILF of the Philippines, serving as an important financial and 
arms conduit It is clear that Al-Qaeda operative have used Thailand as a base of 
operations since the mid-1990s Thailand has been the target of international terronsm 
since March 1994, a plot by Bin Laden operatives to blow up the Israeli embassy in 
149 Bangkok went awry by chance (where in 1994 Ramzi flew to Thailand and swiftly 
recruited a group of devout young Muslims in Bangkok for an attack on the Israeli 
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embassy there. When that failed, Ramzi fled back to Pakistan and then flew to 
Philippines). 
Many members of Al-Qaeda operatives have passed through Thailand. After the 
September 11 attacks, the Thai Supreme Commander General Surayud Chulanont. 
admitted that military intelligence was monitoring a small number of Bin Laden 
operatives operating in Thailand and the government was aware that countries in the 
Middle East provide training, education and financial support for fundamentalist 
groups in the south of Thailand. Likewise, the Secretary General of Thai, NSC 
General Vinai Pattiyakul acknowledged that some southern Muslim radicals had been 
trained in Afghanistan and Libya. 
There are two very small groups, the Wae Ka Kaeh (WKK) and the organisation 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani, that are thought to have some ties to Ja-maah Islamiya and 
Al-Qaeda; and the head of the WWK fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is 
evident fi-om the confession of Omar al-Faruq (Omar al-Faruq is one of the senior 
most Al-Qaeda leaders in Southeast Asia, the Ja-maah Islamiya had tried to establish 
links with Muslim militants elsewhere in the region, including Thailand and 
Myanmar) that the JI was rapidly trying to expand its contacts with the Guragan 
Mujahideen. Another Thai-Muslim militant group Pattani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO), is suspected of having ties to the Abu Sayyaf 
On June 10, 2003 Thai police arrested three JI members in Narathiwat province 
in Southern Thailand. The arrests were a joint operation between Thai and 
Singaporean authorities, following the May 16, 2003 arrest of a senior JI Singapore 
cell member in Bangkok, Arifin bin Ali ( John wong Ah-Hung) who was rendered to 
Singapore, and the three others were planning to execute terrorist attacks against 
Western embassies and tourist venues in Pattaya and Phuket. 
Philippine - In the Southern island of Mindanao Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) has been struggling for an independent state in the island. The Philippine 
government which recognizes MNLF as a representative organisation of Bangsamore 
Muslims of Mindanao concluded a peace agreement with the fi-ont under the 
leadership of Nur Misuari in 1991. The group is also recognized by OIC. The peace 
agreement provided for autonomy and speeding up of the pace of development in the 
island. However, two other groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) the later prefers to call itself AL-Harkatul Islamia, rejected 
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the agreement. Both the groups, which had considerable experience in Afghanistan, 
have been demanding the establishment of an independent Islamic state with a 
complete Islamic system of governance. Out of the two ASG has earned considerable 
international notoriety for its deadly bombings, assassinations and kidnappmgs for 
ransom. The US State Department has listed it as one of the world's most dangerous 
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terronst organisations. 
G. Europe 
The war in Afghanistan provided a stepping stone for escalating violence in the 
Middle East. Apart from the Afghan episode; direct Western aid proved vital for the 
escalation of the militants' operations. A Lebanese daily describes the evolving 
relationship between Islamic fundamentalists and the West as ''yesterday's allies and 
today's enemies. 
A report by an Arab magazine claims that at least fifty radical Islamic leaders 
sought and obtained political asylum in Europe, twelve in England alone. For Muslim 
radicals, Europe is not just a refuge from Arab states intelligence and security 
officers, but an important source of money, training and weapon supplies. In January 
1995, German authorities revealed that some Arabs train in mountain camps on its 
territory. This announcement came after the discovery of traditional training camps in 
Sudan and Afghanistan. Similarly, in March 1994, Algerian security forces seized a 
large shipment of military hardware loaded in a cargo ship originating from the 
Netherlands. Some shipments destined for certain Arab countries were intercepted at 
the French - German borders. Swiss authorities discovered other shipments bound to 
the Middle East. Arrested Muslim radicals have admitted receiving weapons from the 
West through several mafia-type connections. Observers seem to believe that wealthy 
Arab living in Europe, who are sympathetic to the objectives of Islamic militants, 
contribute generous fiinds for clandestine arms purchases in the black market. 
H. United States of America 
Apart from US facing with Al-Qaeda"s threats outside (as mentioned above), its 
homeland it still facing some group of Islamic militants which are suspected to have 
links with Al-Qaeda network within its homeland itself As to how these Islamic 
militants reached America and when, has been studied by Steven Emerson (a network 
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news correspondent who has spent several years, covering the Middle East produced a 
PBS program entitled Jihad in America in 1994) 
Emerson believes group of Islamic terrorists began building networks within the 
United States in the late 1980s, and they did so indirectly with American help. To 
understand this it is needed to briefly recall events in 1979. Former Associate Deputy 
FBI Director Oliver B. (Buck) Revel, interviewed on Emerson's PBS program, agreed 
with Emerson's assessment. Revell states that once the Mujahideen and their 
associates came to the United States, they found a hospitable environment. 
Emerson credits Abdullah Azzam for completing the most important 
infrastructure. He helped establish the Alkifah Reftigee Center in New York. 
According to Emerson, American did not realize that the Alkifah Refugee Center was 
the front for another organisation, an organisation calling for jihad. In fact, the 
Alkifah Refugee center's Arabic letter head calls for holy war. 
In 1989, with the Soviets in disarray and their political system on the verge of 
collapse; Azzam turned his attention to the United States. According to Emerson, 
Azzam spread his jihad network through 38 states, with multiple bases in 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, Texas and the New England states. Azzam 
returned to Pakistan in 1989, only to be killed by an assassin, but his work was 
completed by several supporters, including his cousin Fayiz Azzam. 
Emerson names several prominent officials working in vmous radical groups in 
the domestic jihad. Tamim al-Adnani was the most vigorous recruiter and successful 
fundraiser among all the leaders. Emerson says Tamin al-adnani assisted in domestic 
terrorist incidents, including the world trade center bombing. Fayiz Azzam, Abdullah 
Azzam cousin, gave rhetorical speeches calling for blood and holy war. Elsayyid 
Nossari who was charged with murder of militant Rabbani Kahane and convicted of 
lesser offenses, maintained a clearing house for terrorist literature before his arrest. 
Even in prison Emerson says Nossari helped plan the world frade center bombing. 
Emerson also says well-known terrorist group have established bases in the 
United States. He claims the Islamic Association for Palestine (lAP) is Hamas's chief 
propaganda arm in the United States under the name Asqa vision. Based in 
Richardson, Texas, the lAP is one of several organizations with links to Hamas. 
Islamic jihad has a base in Tampa Florida. Hizballah also has a network in the United 
States. 
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Emerson claims to have found over 30 radical Middle Eastern groups in the 
United States, adding that the FBI has confirmed that terrorist groups have command 
centers in California, Nevada, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey. Buck Revell 
says the intention of these groups is to harm the United States and keep it from being 
able to take international action. 
In addition, the making violence in the United States was done in response for 
the American political, economical and military support to Israeli, as one group had 
mailed letters to five news organisations, claiming responsibility over the incident of 
the bombing of world trade center's North tower killing six people, injuring 1,000 and 
causing $300 million in damage. The letter received by the New York Times reflected 
this; 
"We are the fifth battalion in the Liberation army; declare our responsibility for 
the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the 
American political economic and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and 
to the rest of the dictator countries in the region. Our demands are: 
1 - Stop all military, economic, and political aid to Israel 
2- All diplomafic relations with Israeli must stop 
3- Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries interior affairs. 
If our demands are not met, all of our functional groups in the army will continue to 
execute our missions against the military and civilian targets in and out of the United 
•,155 States . . . ' 
This action is a part of Al-Qaeda political objective, where Bin Laden jusfified 
these attacks in his formal declaration of war in February 1998 calling for a jihad 
against the Jews and the Crusaders and declaring that killing "American and their 
allies, civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in 
any country in which it is possible to do it" 
Bin Laden was indicted by the United States for allegedly masterminding the 
1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Darussalam, Tanzania. 
The United States retaliated with missile strikes near Kabul, Afghanistan, destroying 
what was described by the Pentagon as an extensive terrorist training complex near 
there. 
In November 1999 the United Nafions imposed economic sanctions on 
Afghanistan in response to the Taliban's reftisal to hand over Bin Laden. Gorge Bush 
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named Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda as the prime suspects in the September 11 attacks 
agamst the United States. Bush declared a war against terrorism woridwide and 
demanded that Afghanistan's Taliban rulers deliver Bm Laden and his lieutenants to 
the U.S. government but the Taliban refused. Consequently Taliban regime was 
overthrown by The United States. 
However, whether Osama Bin Laden was behind September 11 or not there is 
an analysis by Waleed El-Ansary about motivation of terrorist to do this thing. Bm 
Laden attempted to convey a message to the entire world in his first videotaped 
statement on Al-Jazeera after 11 September, reiterating his tit-for-tat terrorism 
strategy in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He opened by saying that 
Americans are now experiencing the fear that Palestinians and others have suffered 
for 80 years, and closed by saying that American will not feel secure until Palestinians 
and others feel secure: 
"And this is Amenca filled with fear from the north to south and east to West Thank god. And what 
Amenca is facing today is something very little of what we have tasted . I swear by God the great 
Amenca will never dream nor those who live in America will never taste secunty and safety unless we 
feel secunty and safety in our land and in Palestine " 
hi addition the United States will have an incentive to change its Crusader-
Zionist foreign policy under the right combination of costs and benefits, and threaten 
the American people accordingly. He would certainly be familiar with cost-benefit 
analysis and the importance of "incentive system" because he (Osama) studied 
management and economics at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia while 
obtaining degrees in public administration and civil engineering. He discussed the 
economic impact of military strikes against economic targets in his 1996 declaration 
of war as well as urging that the ''economical boycotting of the American goods is a 
very effective weapon of hitting and weakening the enemy, and it is not under the 
control of the security forces of the regime". 
Therefore, his publicly declared tit-for-tat strategy espousing terrorist attacks 
until the United States stops its current foreign policy is a public threat to induce U.S. 
to adopt a more cooperative foreign policy by changing the current policy's costs and 
benefits. As Bin Laden stated in his December 27, 2001 Videotape release: 
•'They (the 19 terronst) shook Amencan's throne and struck the U.S. economy in the heart this is 
clear proof that this international usunous. damnable economy-which Amenca uses along its military 
power to impose infidelity and humiliation on weak people - can easily collapse . (The attacks) have 
inflicted on New York and other markets more than a tnliion dollars in loses . If their economy is 
destroyed, they will be busy with their own affairs rather than enslaving the weak peoples '" 
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William Beeman points out" . . . if the people of rogue nation expenence enough 
suffenng, they will overthrow their rulers or compel them to adopt more sensible 
behaviour. The terronst actions in New York and Washington are a clear and ironic 
implementation of this strategy against the United States "' Indeed, Bin Laden claims 
the desire to "overthrow of special interest group that is creating the "war against 
Islam" urging the Amencan people to elect a government that acts in their 
.,158 interest. 
III. The U.S. policy towards Ai-Qaeda and Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 
A. U.S attack on Afghanistan - The terronst attacks of September 11 in the U.S set 
off a chain reaction A year that saw the ngid control of the Taliban on the verge of 
total victory also witnessed its military defeat and political marginalization 
Though humanitanan aid continued to reach Afghanistan, Taliban attitudes 
toward the public role of women and sensitivity to foreign influences frustrated the 
work of aid agencies. Its unyielding policies also provoked international 
condemnation and economic sanctions In May the U.S. announced increased 
assistance for Afghanistan but in that same month the Taliban closed several UN 
political offices in the country. UN efforts to distnbute food in Kabul were threatened 
in a dispute over the use of Afghan women in this work In August eight foreign relief 
workers were detained on charges of promoting Chnstianity and threatened with the 
death penalty; after three months in custody, however, they were rescued by U.S. 
forces in November. In spite of this Taliban could eliminate opium cultivation as, UN 
Secretary - General Kofi Annan reported in August that opium poppy had almost 
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completely disappeared from Taliban - controlled areas. 
September 11, 2001, attack confirmed that the US homeland itself was 
vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies 
could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon US cities Terronsm replaced 
communism as the source of fear and loathing in the war the United States had been 
fighting abroad since 1947, and it had finally reached its shores 
President Bush immediately declared a war on terronsm and warned that more 
than sixty countnes might be called to account for the war on terror. It begins with Al-
Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every tenonst group of global 
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reach has been found, stopped and defeated. There would be one battle but a lengthy 
campaign from this day forward, Bush stated, "Any nation that continues to harbour 
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime". The 
Al-Qaeda network was worldwide, and it would continue to exist even if Bin Laden 
was captured or killed. When pressed, the White House admitted that Al-Qaeda" s 
links with other global terrorist organisations were "amorphous". 
Al-Qaeda was "just one of the networks in forty or fifty countries, as the 
Defense Secretary argued and although the war in Afghanistan was "important to the 
credibility" of U.S. efforts, it by no means ended the Pentagon's ambition to root out 
terrorism. Even if Bin Laden were killed, it is more powerful than ever, its credibility 
has been enhanced and since it trained about 20,000 men in Afghanistan alone over 
the past decade; it now exists in many countries. And there are many Islamic Jihad 
groups everywhere that have no direct cormection with it - only their aims are 
•J • , 160 identical. 
The terrorist network that the United States now seeks to eradicate is a product 
of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir and on the West Bank and 
Gaza strip. The September 11 attacks on the United States might never have occurred 
had these violent struggles been resolved. Thus helping to settle protracted civil 
conflicts is not merely good for the world in general: it can also make the United 
States safer. 
Although tragic in purely human terms, losses that the United States has 
suffered till date have not affected its material position or its core national interests. 
The United States is still the leading economic and military power in the world and 
the global consensus that terrorism is serious problem may have enhanced the U.S. 
influence in the short term. Basic U.S. foreign policy goals are also unaffected. The 
United States still wants to discourage security competition in Europe and Asia, 
prevent the emergence of hostile great powers and promote a more open world 
economy, inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and expand 
democracy and respect for human rights. 
The campaign against global terrorism became the central aim of U.S. foreign 
and defense policy, and other international goals will be subordinated to this broad 
objective. In the short term the campaign has two main objectives, the first, goal is to 
eradicate Al-Qaeda both by attacking it in Afghanistan and by eliminating its cells in 
164 
other countries; the second goal is to replace the Taliban government, both to deny al-
Qaeda a state haven and to demonstrate to other government. 
Over the longer term, the United States must also take steps to ensure that new 
Al-Qaeda does not emerge and make it more difficult for potential enemies to acquire 
even more lethal means (such as nuclear weapons). To achieve these ends, U.S. 
foreign policy must focus on (1) managing the anti terronst coalition;(2) enhancing 
control over weapons of mass destruction; (3) reconstructing Afghanistan; and (4) 
rebuilding relations with the Arab world and Islamic world. 
After the September 11 President Bush demanded that Afghanistan's ruling 
Taliban regime hand over Bin Laden to the United States but Mullah Omar reacted 
with outrage; his government was merely honoring the traditional Pushtun code of 
milmastia that demands protection for all Muslims who seeks shelter in their country. 
Even if such shelter means risking the safety of all inhabitants, to violate the code 
would constitute betrayal of a brother and a violation of Islamic teaching, "extraditing 
Osama Bin Laden, Mullah declared is tantamount to leaving a pillar of our religion." 
Following the attack when prince Turki bin Faisal returned to Afghanistan to 
renegotiate the surrender of Bin Laden to Saudi officials, he found the one-eyed 
Mullah a changed man. "'Mullah Omar was very heated" prince Turki later recalled in 
a loud voice he denounced "'all our efforts and praised Bin Laden as a worthy and 
legitimate scholar of Islam. He told me we should not do the infidel's work by taking 
Osama from them" 
The opportunity to separate the Taliban from Al-Qaeda had been lost, and with 
it the possibility of preventing fijture acts of terror. '"Rather than trying to divide and 
conquer,"' Dr. Larry Goodson, professor of Middle East studies at the US army war 
college, said in the wake of the missile attacks ""we adopted the approach to keep 
Afghanistan in a box we were not going to recognize them. We were not going to aid 
them in significant ways. In fact, we took a very hard line toward the Taliban 
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regime, 
Addressing a joint meeting of Congress on September, 20, Bush vowed to direct 
"every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, and every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war . . . to 
defeat the global terror network'". On Oct. 7, with Taliban leaders confinuing to 
^^^Sl^ 
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stonewall the United States and its allies regarding the whereabouts of Bin Laden, the 
^ , • 164 U.S. military launched air strikes against Taliban targets in Afghanistan. 
Within days of the attacks on the world trade center, the Pentagon and NATO 
for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of its charter declaring that the 
atrocities were an attack on the alliance. As a demonstration of support, Australia 
invoked the ANZUS Pact putting elements of its armed forces on high state of 
readiness in case they were called upon to assist the U.S. On September 19 the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) agreed by acclamation to invoke the Rio 
Treaty, also a mutual-defense pact. 
On September 23. President Bush held a highly confidential telephone 
conversation with Russia President Vladimir Putin. The seventy minute conversation 
resulted in an earthshaking shift in the global balance of power that would have a 
profound impact on Bin Laden and the course of the war on terror. Putin gave the nod 
for US forces to enter Afghanistan and Central Asia with some condition. In exchange 
for his consent, Putin gained Bush's approval of the use of its forces to crack down on 
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rebel groups in Chechnya. 
China reacted to this development by moving their nuclear missile and aircraft 
capable of carrying nuclear bombs transported to bases in the Xinjiang region of 
northwest China bordering on the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. 
As Americans sat glued to their television sets for the latest word on the war on 
terror few were aware that the doomsday card had been played and world's three great 
powers-the United States Russia, and China-were scrambling to get their nuclear 
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weapons in place. 
The week after the attacks was a period of shock and rage for most Americans 
but there was also a feeling of helplessness because of great uncertainly about who 
exactly had attacked, where precisely in the world they could be found, and how they 
could be punished. On September 19 the U.S. dispatched more than 100 combat and 
support aircraft to various bases in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. A large 
naval task force was sent to join what was first called operation Infinite Justice but 
later, after complaints were received fi-om Muslims, was renamed operation Enduring 
Freedom. 
Allied air strikes in Afghanistan began on October 7 later U.S. Special Forces 
including Delta force and Rangers launched ground raids inside the country. The U.S. 
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enlisted as an ally the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, the principal remaining 
opposition to the Taliban take over of the Afghanistan, relying on them to provide the 
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bulk of ground troops for the campaign. U.S. reluctantly decided to help the faction 
Northern Alliance, providing the Northern Alliance with guns, funds, and horrific air 
cover, as in Vietnam, the United States believed its credibility was at stake. But the 
Northern Alliance's principal sponsors after the mid-1990s were Iran and Russia, and 
the forces that comprise it have often fought each other. Some of its warlords, 
chieftains and factions took arms and money from others, from the Soviet Union, and 
169 Russia which at one time was its major backer. Even India has aided it because of 
its hostility to Pakistan. Some of its most important leaders fought for the Soviet 
forces during the 1980s but others opposed them and in the fall of 2001 the Northern 
170 Alliance even hired dozens of former Soviet soldiers to advise them 
The northern city of Mazar-e Sharif fell a month later, and on November 13 the 
Northern Alliance entered Kabul as Taliban forces fled the Capital on December 9, 
with the fall of the Taliban's principal city of Kandahar American B-2s began carpet 
bombing a network of caves in the Tora Bora Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, the 
last stronghold of forces loyal to Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. On November 15 
anti-Taliban Afghan troops backed by British and American commandos" surrounded 
a cave where they thought Bin laden and a dwindling forces of Al-Qaeda fighters 
were hiding but he was not found. His whereabouts were still unknown up to 
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now. But according Jayanta Kumar Ray, the rapidity with which president Pervez 
Musharraf of Pakistan capitulated before American demands, in the aftermath of the 
episode on 11 September 2001, was indeed sturming. No less stuiming was the three-
way game of deception played by Musharraf after the commencement of the 
American war in Afghanistan. Musharraf went on deceiving the Americans the 
Pakistanis, and certainly the Indians. Pakistan offered shelter to 25000-30000 
Americans soldiers, and permitted American forces to use some of its airports. The 
carpet bombing of some regions of Afghanistan by the United States air forces, 
combined with the ground assaults by the Northern Alliance, led to the fall of the 
Taliban government in Kabul. Meanwhile, Pakistan deceived America by using 
American planes to secure safe passage for thousands of Pakistani commanders and 
soldiers in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, many Talibans and their leaders (perhaps even 
Osama Bin Laden) used these plans, disguising themselves as Pakistanis, and fled to 
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Pakistan, where they secured sanctuaries with the active assistance of Pakistan's Inter 
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Services IntelHgence (ISI). Recently Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden"s right-
hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has issued a vehement video calling for attacks on 
western interests world wide and regime change in Egypt and Saudi Arabia "the 
struggle against the corrupt regimes and the corruptors in two phase . . . In the short 
term, one must take aim at the interests of the Crusaders and Jews,'" Al-Zawahiri said 
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in the 95-minute video from Al-Qaeda s As-Sahab media. 
B. U.S. and establishment of Afghan interim regime 
After U.S. led coalition forces ousted Taliban regime international moves to 
solve the resulting political crisis focused on avoiding the chaos and destruction that 
had followed the Mujahideen (Taliban) takeover from the communist government of 
Mohammad Najibullah in 1992. On November 27, UN-sponsored conference in 
Bonn, Germany, was convened to settle for an interim government to replace the 
Taliban. The largest share of delegates represented the Northern Alliance, whose 
political leader Burhanuddin Robbani had retained international recognition even after 
being driven from Kabul in 1996. Supporters of former king Zahir Shah also 
participated, the result was an agreement that Hamid Karzai, a Pushtun tribal leader 
and supporter of the former king, would lead an interim administration for six months, 
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when a loya Jirga a traditional Afghan assembly of notables, would choose a new 
government. On December 22 Karzai and cabinet that included two women were 
installed in a peaceful ceremony joined by outgoing president Robbani and most of 
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the country's ethnic and political factions. 
Hamid Karzai, who was picked to head an interim authority in Afghanistan by a 
UN-sponsored international conference in Bonn, German in December 2001, sought 
to maintain balance among the country's ethnic and tribal groups while laying a 
foundation for national institutions. Although he was a Pushtun tribal, Karzai had an 
armed group of his own security in Kabul maintained by an international security. 
Assistance Force (ISAF) of 4,000 to 5,000 troops whose command was rotated among 
. . . . 1 7 6 
vanous participatmg countnes. 
However, there is scarcely any constancy in its views on the fiiture of Afghan 
politics. The Pentagon was insistent that it would withdraw US soldiers entirely when 
the fighting ended and when they captured or killed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders 
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on their list, which they never did. Bin Laden is still free as are most of his key aims. 
And although the United States was ready to see an international peace keeping force 
in Kabul under the British and Germans, it was also reluctant to see it established 
before fighting ended. To complicate the situation, the Northern Alliance opposed any 
extensive foreign peace keeping force. Russia believes the Northern Alliance alone is 
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the legitimate government of Afghan, Iran agrees with it too. 
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Kabul in May and declared 
that major combat activity by U.S. forces there was over. Still operation enduring 
fireedom, a U.S.-led coalition of 12,500 soldiers, battled throughout the year against 
terrorist opposition thought to be grouped around al-Qaeda loyalists of Osama Bin 
Laden and followers of ousted Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, and Hezbi Isalmi 
forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. All three leaders continued to elude capture. 
A separate International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) of 5,000 troops 
contributed by 31 countries was the security guarantor for areas directly under the 
control of the central government. In August NATO assumed responsibility for ISAF, 
and in October the UN Security Council authorized NATO to send ISAF troops any 
where in Afghanistan. This was intended as support for President Karzai. Pakistan's 
President Pervez Musharraf had called for ISAF to end what he called a power 
vacuum in Afghanistan. In July an exchange of fire between Pakistani troops and 
Afghans had led to charges that Pakistan had violated the Afghan border. After a mob 
ransacked Pakistanis embassy in Kabul, relations between the two countries became 
tense. 
Reports of raids and bomb attacks by Taliban tighter increased throughout the 
year although the degree to which they were coordinated was uncertain. In the 
summer the Taliban reportedly set up a new command structure for southern 
Afghanistan, its traditions base of support, and week"s later establishment of another 
178 Taliban command for northern Afghanistan was claimed. 
Vishal Chandra's conclusions in his book about the role and response of the 
West remain exceedingly crucial in the changing scenario. The ongoing US military 
operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the Durand line, (see Chapter I) 
which is backed by the NATO's expanded role in Southern Afghanistan, are 
significant to the survival of the Kabul government. But the key question here is for 
how long can West sponsor Afghanistan? Keeping in view the fact that Afghanistan is 
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almost decades away from security and stability, are U.S. and NATO prepared for that 
long haul in Afghanistan? U.S. forces in Afghanistan are said to be over stretched, 
and the NATO's third phase of expansion at best remains an ambiguous half-hearted 
mission. There any long-term commitment of the International community towards an 
externally sponsored security and the political process in Afghanistan remains 
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suspect. 
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The Karzai cabinet that was finally approved by the Loya Jirga represented a compromise 
between the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks of the Northern Alliance and members of the 
majority Pashtun ethnic group, who had felt sidelined by the interim government set up in 
December 2001.(Frank A. Clements, Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia, 
Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,Inc., 2003, pp.157-159). 
"^ Stephen Sego, n.l59, pp. 384-385. 
Russia believes that the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate government and its best-
known warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, is a corrupt leader who fought for the Soviets for 
nearly decade, Iran agrees with it. At the end of 2001 Dostum also became the Pentagon's 
military vehicle, but he (as well as other crucial Northern Alliance leaders) refiised 
initially to accept the interim agreement the anti-Taliban parties reached in Bonn in 
December 2001. Thus the US military opportunities in supporting the Northern Alliance 
turn out to be consummate political folly. (Gabriel Kolko, n.71, pp.112-113). 
Stephen Sego, "World Affairs", Britannica book of the y^ ear 2003,(Chicago: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc, 2003), pp. 390-391. 
Gabriel Kolko, n.71, pp.112-113. 
Stephen Sego, "World Affairs'", Britannica Book of the year 2004, (Chicago: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc, 2004), pp.358-359. 
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CHAPTER- 4 
U.S.'s New Strategy in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 
I. Post September 11 Challenges to the U.S. Foreign Policy 
The events of 11 September 2001 are often seen as a watershed for the U.S. 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan where U.S. declared war on terrorism as 
Afghanistan was accused to be a rogue state and a thriving base for promoting 
terrorism. The September 2001(9/11) events became a focal point and the U.S. led its 
forces to attack the Taliban regime in an attempt to destroy the foundations of Al-
Qaeda. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that the U.S. led its military to 
attack sovereigns" country under the war on terrorism. After U.S. achieved success in 
toppling the Taliban regime by launching a massive crackdown on Al-Qaeda's 
network, the U.S. was able to replace the Taliban's regime with a puppet government 
in AfghanistEin led by Hamid Karzai. 
However, behind and beyond war on terror U.S. emphasis on new threats, "weak 
states and rogue states" is an integral part of Washington's attempts to fusion new 
institutional arrangements at the global level that can more effectively deal with any 
present or future challenges to its hegemonic power. The U.S. National Security 
Strategy released in 2002, endorsed preventive war as a replacement for the cold war 
2 
strategy of containment, employing classic 'preventive war' logic. In the words of a 
former Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, Edward Morse 'along 
with the American campaign against terrorism another battle is being waged, perhaps 
no less important, the battle for supremacy in the energy sector between the two 
largest oil exporters - Saudi Arabia and Russia'. By selling its response to the 9/11 
strategy as part of a global war on terrorism, the United States managed to receive 
unprecedented international backing for its projection of military power in the 
4 5 
heartland of Asia, in the Caucasus and in the Middle East. After the discovery of a 
large energy resource in Caspian Sea and Central Asia, as the geography of a land 
lock country makes it imperative that it must depend on another country to run its 
petroleum energy resource through a pipe line route to the world market. Due to 
theses type of geographical difficulties, countries of the Caspian Sea and Central 
Asian region come to play a big role in the energy transport routes of land lock 
181 
countries. One of these countries is Afghanistan whose topography is such that it 
could become an alternative route for an oil pipeline. Afghanistan could provide a 
land-bridge from Central Asia and South Asia by running through to Pakistan and 
Indian ports for the world market. 
Since 2003, the U.S. has sought to recover some lost ground by using new 
strategic diplomacy threat discourse to provide a spring-board for a new hegemonic 
7 
multilateralism of promotion of democracy "to curbing proliferation and terrorism. 
While U.S. is faced with new threats which challenge its energy security wherever 
and in whichever country US interests exist, for instance, Saudi Arabia the main oil 
exporter to the U.S., is facing various factions of Islamist groups who are opposed to 
U.S.'s hegemony in the Arab world and these groups try to pressurise Saudi 
government to keep distance from the U.S. as they feel disappointed due to the US 
g 
stance on Palestinian-Israel dispute. Another threat perception to the US hegemony 
could be the Iran factor which is on the verge of developing nuclear technology 
which, in the judgment of the United States government would create an imbalance in 
the region. In addition, it is believed that Iran was backing Islamic groups (HizbuUah 
and Hamas) in this region to counter aggressive Israeli behaviour towards 
Palestinians. Iran was viewed by US as a state that would harm its political and 
economic interests with some of the Central Asian states if they develop relations with 
Iran because its location can help the landlocked Central Asian states by providing 
them with access to the sea. They consider Iran to be a better route through which its 
9 
gas and oil could be exported to Western markets. The U.S. administration is also 
worried about the growing instability in Pakistan where Islamic fiindamentalist groups 
are posing a stiff challenge to the Government. The U.S. is aware that if political 
power in Pakistan is captured by a group as a party which is opposed to the U.S. and 
if Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falls down in their hands or if Al-Qaeda expands its 
influence in Pakistan, it will be a serious danger to the interests of United States in the 
region. In addition to this, the United States is also aware of the fact that Pakistan 
government has not been watchful of the activities of its nuclear scientist, Abdul 
Qadir Khan, who could again try to sell nuclear technology to Iran, Libya or an Al-
Qaeda group, which would be a disaster for the United States. 
The emergence of China as a big economic and military power with its fast 
growing industrial base and China's aggressive campaign for searching an alternative 
182 
energy resource to fuel its industrial needs. China has surpassed the U.S. as the 
biggest exporter of goods in many areas such as in Iran and Africa and some Arab 
countries have started looking toward east for their oil export markets, especially in 
Central Asia and Caspian Sea region China had entered into an agreement to import 
energy from this region through its pipeline in west of China. As china has close 
proximity with Central Asian states, it is more convenient and economical for it to 
transport it both by rail and through a Pipeline. In addition, China has allegedly 
played a key role in developing lethal weapons and civilian nuclear projects of Iran, 
because China think that Iran could play a key role in countering U.S. hegemony in 
this region, and also to make the US aware about China's role in this region. It 
seems that "war on terror" is just a plan, in reality; the U.S. establishment is more 
concerned about the possible threats from its major rival states, notably China and 
Russia." 
Moreover, after the break-up of USSR, the re-emergence of Russia as a major 
economic and military power after a decade of instability has fiarther compounded US 
woes. Russia has a huge reservation of energy resources which could be used as a 
weapon to play a key role in the European market. Jn addition, Russia is also known 
to have devised a plan to play a key role by transporting its energy resources to 
12 Central Asia and through the Caspian Sea to Europe. Moreover, Russia has recently 
been the moving spirit behind the idea of a Gas OPEC, an organisation of natural gas 
producing nations. The new body was formalized at a meeting of the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 2007. It will unite Russia, Iran 
and Qatar, which between them account for 60 per cent of global gas reserves, with 
Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. Russia has swapped 
energy assets and developed joint upstream and downstream projects with all of these 
countries. The idea of a Gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as it would shift the 
alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. Russian 
politicians admit that the Gas OPEC will be called upon among other things, to offset 
Western efforts to control the energy markets. Russia is expected of using energy 
resources and arms export potentialities to project its influence across the world. 
Moscow defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran by supplying $ 700 million worth of 
Tor M 1 advanced air - defence missile systems to Tehran last year (2006). It was the 
biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000, when 
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Putin lifted an arms embargo imposed on Iran during Yeltsin's rule. Notwithstanding 
the nuclear controversy, Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common 
13 
energy strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. The post 
cold war model of war was seen as much less threatening, more diffusive, and less 
intense. 
With little doubt it can be said that after the 9/11 events the U.S. has been able to 
set up its military base in Afghanistan. Probably, it could be a long term plan for 
staying in this region to contain Iran, Russia, India, and China. Afghanistan has been 
well-known to be the base for containment and to act as the buffer state for the former 
empire power. Afghanistan is strategically located in the centre of the heart land and 
has also border connections with all these countries, "where its borders on the north 
are with the Soviet Union, (now Central Asian countries) on the west with Iran, on the 
14 South east with Pakistzin and on the east with China (Sinkiang) In accordance with 
these considerations, Afghanistan once again seems to have become an important 
factor in the strategy of the U.S., to control this region. A scholar has pointed out that 
'Afghanistan has become a symbol of monumental tragedy of geography. Its location 
has been the cause of misery for its people. Afghanistan lies in the region between the 
seats of historical empires in India, Persia and Central Asia. It has been a traditional 
invasion route for the subcontinent. It has been on the path of numerous invaders 
since ancient times.' As quoted by Sreedhar the growing US interests in 
Afghanistan today will create the ground for an emerging cold war. This time it will 
not be over ideology but over economic interests. Unfortunately, Afghanistan will 
again become the battleground for the emerging confrontations of resource wars, 
that is the emergence of giant energy producers and consumers on the one hand and 
on the other, what Michael Klave calls, "energo - fascism" in which, he avers, the 
17 Pentagon has increasingly become a global oil protection service". 
II. The Oil and Natural Gas Factor 
The September II, 2001(9/11) events in United States and the resulting conflict 
in Afghanistan signified not only the beginning of a new epoch in world politics, but 
also a new stage in the struggle for influence in Central Asia. The 9/11 attacks on 
World Trade Centre and Pentagon and the subsequent US led war against terrorism 
radically changed the equation. These events have involved the United States deeply 
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in this region which was previously treated as marginal to core American interests. 
Therefore, it can rightly be said that: "The world once again cares about the region... 
18 because it has oil and gas. . ." The events of 11 September, provided an excuse to 
the U.S. for attacking Afghanistan and moving its forces to settle its military base 
there with a long term plan. It is now increasingly questioned by the rest of the world 
whether war on terror was just a fa9ade for its more sinister designs. It is now being 
claimed that this strategy was not planed after 9/11 but it was actually getting shaped 
since the beginning of the end of cold war. The gaining of independence of some of 
the Central Asian countries from Soviet Union and after few years they discovered the 
hub of energy resources in these countries and the states around the Caspian Sea, so 
Afghanistan whose ftinction as an energy pipeline conduit from Cenfral Asia to the 
Indian Ocean was mapped out some years ago by a major U.S. oil and gas 
multinational. 
The post cold war model of war was seen as much less threatening, and less 
intense, therefore, the military and intelligence posture of the US designed to deal 
with the Soviet threat was imnecessary. Indeed, the fiindamental threats to American 
national security in the post cold war period no longer arose from military challenges. 
They arose from economic challenges from countries that could compete with 
American production machine. The entire sphere of military challenge was degraded 
to the level of subsidiary threat while the perception of the national interest shifted to 
the economic sphere. 
After the major disruption in oil supplies that occurred twice in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian upheaval in 
1979, the risks of overdependence on energy resources from an unstable and 
politically volatile region were driven home once again by Saddam Hussein's 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In addition the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf countries 
are not inexhaustible: at current levels of production they are estimated to last up to 
21 
the end of 21^' century at best. As Carter Said: "'the U.S. will become perilously 
dependent on increasingly costly imported oil we could no longer enjoy our freedom 
as a sovereign nation if we act in our foreign relations in this manner, and we would 
constantly live in the fear of embargoes." There was no doubt in the Carter admission. 
22 He had proposed a broad national energy policy. 
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Before the 1970s when the major oil companies still had access to the almost 
limitless reserves of Middle East oil adding new proven reserves was just a question 
of drilling some extra adjacent acreage. After the 1970s when these huge reserves of 
oil were removed from their control and nationalized by the OPEC revolution, the 
major oil companies concentrated their search for new oil fields; to replace those they 
had lost, in what were deemed to be politically safer areas, free from the threat of 
expropriation and nationalization. 
Failing to find any oil field within America itself, major U.S. oil companies 
began to move their upstream operations abroad. A study carried out by the US 
Department of Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 1995, noted that since the 
oil p)rice collapse of late 1985 and early 1986, the U.S. oil and gas industry has 
changed dramatically. The major oil companies have shifted much of their exploration 
and development efforts to targets outside the United States. This process continued 
throughout the 1990s. In 1991, the group of 20 largest US oil - producing companies 
designated as 'Majors' by the U.S. Department of Energy accounted for 55.7 per cent 
of U.S. domesfic oil production. But, by 2000, this figure had fallen to 45.2 per cent. 
This movement, away from the USA, was reflected in the geographical distribution of 
the US 'Major' oil reserves in 1985. 
In the beginning of the twenty - first century and with the competition of small 
and medium sized U.S. oil companies to acquire new oil reserves hitting up, and the 
exfraordinarily profitable opportunities in the Persian Gulf still out of bounds, the 
jostling crowd of multinational companies were forced to seek out opportunities in the 
so-called, new frontiers of oil exploration, 'the deep waters of oil exploration' the 
deep waters of Afiica's Atlantic coast and the Atiantic west of Shetland, Vietnam, 
Egypt, Malaysia and the Caspian and Cenfral Asian states of the former Soviet 
23 
Union. Especially, the available energy reserves in the Cenfral Asian region offer a 
viable alternative with energy production poised to increase sharply after 2010. But 
the geographical location of the landlocked nations of Central Asia reduces the 
alternatives for transportation of oil and gas to reliance only on the pipe line route, 
which in turn offers three difficult choices: the Chinese route with its construction 
24 difficulties; the India-Pakistan- Afghanistan route through the Caspian Sea. Though 
Russia is also a possible outiet to the sea; the first was through Russia and the network 
of Soviet era pipelines. This overland system was extensive, could deliver oil and gas 
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to Western Europe, and was already linked to the rich Tenghiz oilfield in Kazakhstan 
and to the Daulatabad gas field in Turkmenistan and to the gas fields in northern of 
Afghanistan developed by the Soviets. But at that time the internal situation in Russia 
was chaotic, and the transit taxes payable to the Russian state monopolies made the 
route expensive, therefore, the most feasible and economical outlet was though Iran, 
as the oil and gas could be delivered through existing pipelines to the Persian Gulf 
25 
But Iran was closed for U.S. oil companies because of the U.S. - imposed sanctions. 
But, according to Magsudul Hasan: there are other alternative route which Central 
Asian states could possibly bypass the Russia route; these could be: 
(A) Western route via Georgia to the Black Sea and onto Europe either across 
Ukraine, via Romania or via Bulgaria and Greece. 
(B) Southern - Western route from Azerbaijan to Georgia and onto the 
Mediterranean via Turkey. 
(C) To the Persian Gulf or via Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
(D) Eastern routes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China (see map-8). 
Despite geopolitical and security challenges, the third option to the Caspian Sea 
demonstrates the maximum potential at present. The Central Asian energy resources 
are mostly concentrated in the nation states adjoining the Caspian Sea - Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Statistics indicate that the Central Asian region 
accounts for only 2% of global oil reserves and 5% of proven gas reserves. However, 
the potential for the availability of natural gas is much greater. Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan jointly account for around 92% of the region's reserves. The Republic of 
Turkmenistan possesses over 40% of the region's reserves of natural gas followed by 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with 27% each. Kazakhstan thus possesses a substantial 
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amount of the region's oil and natural gas reserves. According to U.S. Government's 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) their first estimated total of oil resources of 
the region were put at 218 billion barrels, of which 32.5 billion were already said to 
be proven. After the building of a pipeline through Turkey to the Mediterranean 
which would come on stream 'after the turn of the century, Caspian oil production 
was forecast to reach around 3.3 million barrels per day by 2005, 4.5 million barrels 
per day by 2010, and 5.8 million barrels per day by 2015. In other words, within 
seven years, the Caspian would be producing as much as Venezuela, within twelve 
years its production would rival that of Iran and Qatar combined, and in twenty two 
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years its production would be nearly as much as Iran and Iraq combined. According to 
the EIA"s 1998 International Energy outlook Turkmenistan had the largest proven 
reserves with 101 trillion cubic feet (TCF) in energy terms equivalent to around 17 
billion barrels of oil. Uzbekistan had 66 TCF and Kazakhstan 65 TCF. Together these 
three new states held more gas than the USA and Canada combined although, as in 
the case of oil, new pipelines would have to be built to transport the gas to markets 
outside the former Soviet Union. Overall, it seemed that at last the USA had found a 
major source of additional oil and gas supplies which would give it powerful 
28 
motivation to take control of the region and possibly even a new Middle East (see 
annex-1 and 2). 
A reduced level of Russian support in the post - 1991 period led to a temporary 
downturn in the oil and natural gas production. However, this trend has been reversed 
in the post-1995 period with accelerated Western investment in the oil and natural gas 
sector. The politics of oil and natural gas in the region has been tilted in favour of 
exploration in preference to territorial dominance by either the concerned regional or 
global state actors or the involved commercial interests. This scenario may change if 
the volatility of the political situation in the Middle East impacts on the long-term 
supply of either petroleum or natural gas. Current trends indicate that the region's 
visibility as an energy supplier at the global level will only grow incrementally after 
2010. Even this will be dependent on the stabilization of regional and geopolitical 
rivalries in the area making movement of energy via cross border pipelines a cost 
29 
effective and secure process. 
The pipeline politics in which the Central Asian Republics (CARS) and 
Afghanistan were caught up have to be seen in the larger context of the quest for 
alternative energy sources by the industrial countries of the Organization for 
30 Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The United States has actively 
been involved in the region since the eariy 1990s. Beginning in the 1970s the U.S. 
government and private foundations funded detailed research on the region. At the 
time of the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARS), the United States 
was among the first to set up well-staff embassies throughout the region. 
One of the key concerns for the American policymakers has been how to secure 
31 
access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of the 21'' century. As 
quoted by Sreedhar: the object of the revived game is two fold: firstly, to establish 
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friendly relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil 
and gas resources. Secondly, to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. 
The landlocked nature of the Central Asian states creates obstacles to proposals for 
creating new alternative routes. Caspian Sea had become strategically important for 
the United States. In the words of Richard Cheney, speaking to an audience of U.S. 
businessmen in Washington in 1998, ''I can't think of a time when we've had a region 
emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant"'. 
Initially U.S. policy towards the Caspian and Central Asian States since the 
break up of USSR, USA had no vital national interest in either the Caucasus or 
Central Asia. Indeed, as Fiona Hill pointed out, had it not been for the rediscovery of 
the energy resources of the Caspian Sea, and the collapse of the Soviet Union", the 
regions would have likely remained a marginal backwaters of U.S. foreign policy. She 
also pointed out that it was not until major oil contracts were signed between U.S. oil 
companies and the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in 1993-1994 that the 
region really began to register on the radar screens of the American public, it was the 
commercial interests of U.S., oil companies in exploiting new energy reserves that 
gave U.S. policy makers specific interest to protect in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
' the U.S. has come to see Caspian resources as one of the few prospects for 
diversifying world energy supply away from the two Clinton administrations between 
1993 and 2000 these two, primarily oil-related U.S. objectives, protecting the interests 
of U.S. oil companies in the Caspian Sea, and diversifying oil supply sources became 
entangled with a third, geo-strategic objective: that of detaching the newly formed 
Caspian and Central Asian states from both the Russian and franian spheres of 
influence. Growing U.S. pessimism about the likelihood of Russia restructuring into a 
US-style 'model' economy and society appears to have prompted a new, more 
antagonistic attitude towards that country during the mid-1990s. Similarly, President 
Clinton's 1995 Executive order prohibiting U.S. companies from conducting business 
in fran, followed by the passing of the Iran - Libya Sanctions ACT in 1996. 
33 Zbigniew Brzezinski a key figure was highly influential in directing the 
Clinton Administration's attention towards the alleged geo-sfrategic importance of the 
Caspian and Central Asia. In the early 1990s, Brzezinski made extensive visits to the 
region as a consultant to the U.S. oil company AMACO. He had long been a mentor 
to Clinton's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and he warned the White House 
•» 
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that the USA would be making a serious mistake if it ignores, what he claimed, were 
its crucial strategic interests in the region. Consequently, coveted CIA officers, some 
of them well-trained petroleum engineers, were dispatched, to travel through Southern 
Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in order to gain further 
understanding of both their oil potential and their general political situation. In August 
1997, Albright and her state Department colleagues received a full CIA briefing on 
the Caspian/Central Asian region after which Albright concluded that working to 
mould the area's fiiture was one of the most exciting thing that we can do'. 
Possibly, the most important outcome of these discussions in the State 
Department was the decision about the role which future oil-and gas-pipeline 
construction would play. The Department acknowledged that some new pipelines 
from the region would probably have to pass through Russia, but insisted that "Russia 
should not be able to turn a valve and shut off all or most of the Caspian flow". Above 
all, there was to be no weakening in the USA's determination to block any pipeline 
construction southwards, through Iran, "the last thing we need; White House aids 
observed, is to rely on the Persian Gulf as the main access for more oil*. 
34 Little wonder then that Cheney viewed the Caspian region as strategically 
significant and by 1998, the strategy was becoming clear to incorporate the 
inhabitants of the Caspian, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus (with the 
exception of Armenia) into a vast US dependency, anchored upon the construction of 
a massive new oil and gas pipeline infrastructure stretching along an East-West 
energy corridor that linked Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. 
The story of seeking to build pipeline projects across Afghanistan (see map-1, 2, 
3, 4 and5)to Pakistan port and from there to the world market did not actually begin 
after 11 Sept. 2001, but it has been tried by Bridas an Argentinian oil company long 
time ago. Bridas was the first western company that was given access by 
Turkmenistan Government to drill its energy resources. In January 1994, Bridas was 
awarded the Yashlar block in the eastern part of the Karakum desert, with a 50-50 
share of the profits, with even more favorable terms of 75 to 25 when it was awarded 
the Keimur block near the Caspian. Bridas spent a large sum of $400 million in 
exploring its leases, and began exporting oil from its Keimur field in 1994. The year 
later it tracked gold in Yashar, with estimated reserves of 27 trillion cubic feet of gas. 
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or more than double of Pakistan's total reserves. Unlike oil, gas needs an immediate 
37 
and accessible market, and Bridas set about devising one with aplomb. As pipeline 
project that would pass from Central Asia to South Asia rested on ending of the 
Afghan Civil War, so the security needed to be built first. The Central Asian states 
feared that Afghanistan was still a fragile country and that the Afghan conflict cannot 
be contained for ever within its borders. They are looking South for oil and gas 
pipelines and communication routes. They want a government in Kabul which is 
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responsible and is a good neighbor for them. 
In November 1994, Bridas persuaded Niyazov to set up a working group to 
study the feasibility of a gas pipeline to Pakistan through Afghanistan. In March 1995, 
Niyazov signed a memorandum with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan 
commissioning Bridas to prepare a pre-feasibility study of the proposed pipeline. 
Bridas spent nine months in 1995 and 1996 flying in its executive jet from warlord to 
warlord in Afghanistan, and to Islamabad, Ashkabad, Moscow and Washington to 
persuade leaders of the feasibility of the project. This project suited to Pakistan's 
interest also, Pakistan wanted a pipeline to pass its port on the Arabian Sea and bring 
financial benefits, such as transit fees, but also to provide strategic and commercial 
links with the Central Asian states. The project was also attractive to the United 
States as the pipeline would bypass Iran which was being subjected to sanctions. In 
February 1996, Bridas singed a 30 year agreement with the Rabbani government in 
Kabul for the construction and operation of a gas pipeline by Bridas and an 
International consortium that it would create, the same month, he reported to Niyazov 
and Bhutto that he had signed agreements with the warlords, and now with the 
39 Taliban, (during Taliban regime ruled Afghanistan). As pointed out by Professor 
William O. Bee Man, an anthropologist specializing in Middle Eastern studies at 
Brown University, US support for the Taliban had nothing to do with religion or 
ethnicity, but only with the economics of oil. The UNOCAL consortium feared that as 
long as the country was split among squabbling warlords, the pipeline would never be 
built. Political stability was required to implement the $ 4.5 billion project and the US 
believed that the Taliban regime would be the most suitable government to achieve 
such a goal. Thus, in the aftermath of Taliban's conquest of Kabul in 1996, the State 
Department avoided criticizing the methods the Taliban used to establish control over 
40 
the country. John K. Cooley writes that by 1989, the US having at first 
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sympathetically watched (if not helped) the rise of the Pakistani - created Taliban, 
was observing with a mixture of sympathy and trepidation. The US oil company, 
UNOCAL, as it sought to negotiate with the Taliban authorization for energy pipeline 
from the ex-Soviet now independent. Republic of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. If successflil such agreements would probably be viewed by Brzezinski, 
the multi-national energy firms and like minded economic and political strategist" s as 
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one of the positive long-range outcomes of the Afghanistan conflicts. It could 
therefore, be argued that the US administration's endeavor to secure its oil base led it 
to support the UNOCAL project and the Taliban advent on the Afghan scene with a 
promise of stability, in 1994. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 Chris Targert, 
a UNOCAL executive said that pipeline project would now be easier to implement. 
The US administration was not a behind to appreciate the development within hours 
of Taliban capture of Kabul. US State Department announced that it would establish 
diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul. State 
Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectionable in the 
steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law, to him the Taliban appeared to be 
anti-modem rather than anti-Western which was not perhaps as worrisome. Senator 
Hank Brown who favoured the UNOCAL project also assessed the advent of the 
Taliban as a positive development in Afghanistan. The good part of what has 
happened is that one of the factions at least seems capable of developing a 
government in Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary of the State for South Asian Affairs, 
Karl Inderflirth's testimony before the Senate Committee in July 2000 which recalled 
the high hopes that greeted the Taliban movement in 1996 clearly indicate the US line 
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at that time, giving right of way through the temtories they controlled. For Pakistan, 
the Bridas project offered the greatest opportunities: an 875 miles gas pipeline from 
the Yashlar field, crossing Afghanistan to Sui in its Baluchistan province where its 
gas reserves and pipeline network originates, could be extended to the even bigger 
market of India via Multan in Sind province. Bridas proposed an open access pipeline 
so that other companies and countries could eventually feed their own gas into it. This 
was of particular interest to whoever controlled northern Afghanistan, where the gas 
fields developed by the Soviets, now inoperative, had once supplied to Uzbekistan. 
But Bridas did fall victim to the vicious international competition that these 
pioneering efforts had engendered. It had opened negotiations with other oil 
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companies such as UNOCAL, the 12"" largest in the U.S. With experience in Pakistan 
under Bridas sponsorship, Turkmen officials visited Houston in April 1995, and a 
UNOCAL delegation visited Ashkabad and Islamabad to discuss the Bridas proposals. 
But Bridas was running into problems with Niyazov, who was being advised by his 
aides that they were being exploited under the Bridas contract, blocked oil exports 
from Keimar. After the Yashlar discovery, Niyazov insisted on re negotiating both the 
Keimar and Yashlar contracts. But Bridas would not budge when UNOCAL 
expressed an interest in building its own pipeline from the existing Daulatabad gas 
fields, the profits from which would accrue to Turkmenistan. Niyazov, ignoring his 
contractual obligations with Bridas, saw both the financial and political advantage of 
engaging a major U.S. company, and with it, the U.S. government, in his 
impoverished country's development. 
Niyazov needed the U.S. and the U.S. was supportive if this was a way to 
prevent him from being dependent on fran. During a visit to New York, Niyazov 
summoned both Bridas and UNOCAL executive, and on 21 October 1995 signed an 
agreement with UNOCAL and its partner, the Saudi owned Delta oil company, to 
build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. '"We were shocked; said Bridas executive 
quoted by Ahmed Rashid, 'and when we spoke to Niyazov, he just turned around and 
said, "Why don't you build a second pipeline'". Henry Kissinger, one of many former 
U.S. officials whom UNOCAL had engaged as consultants, quipped at the signing 
ceremony that the deal was "a triumph of hope and experience'. With the Taliban in 
control of both Kabul and the provinces through which the gas pipeline would pass, 
Bridas and UNOCAL wooed them assiduously. Bridas sponsored a visit by a Taliban 
delegation to Buenos Aires in February 1997, and a Bridas office was set up in Kabul 
soon afterwards. Bridas envisaged a partnership with a Saudi Company for the 
fianding of the Afghan portion of the pipeline, and set up a separate consortium with 
western companies to build the Turkmen and Pakistani ends of the pipeline. It offered 
to start work immediately, without preconditions. On the other hand UNOCAL which 
handled public relations for the Taliban and sponsored visits to Washington and 
Houston had its hands tied by U.S. policy on Afghanistan. No pipeline could be built 
nor commercial terms discussed with the Taliban by U.S. companies until there was a 
funcfioning government in Kabul that was internationally recognized. The Taliban 
themselves were non-committal. While they favoured Bridas as a politically neutral 
company, the UNOCAL project carried the possibility of U.S. recognition for which 
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they were desperate. The competition also made them more demanding: they were not 
merely interested in receiving a rent for the pipeline route estimated at US $100 
million a year, but wanted the oil companies to build the infrastructure along the 
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route, such as roads, water supplies, telephone and power lines. In addition, as 
western exploitation of eastern natural resources tainted relations between emerging 
states such as Afghanistan, and western companies, business with oil companies was 
characterized by deep mistrust and manipulation. Thus, the Taliban exploited the 
rivalry between UNOCAL and the Argentinean oil company Bridas, over the 
construction of the pipeline, to lobby Washington for political recognition and to 
extort large sums of money. UNOCAL alone was believed to have spent up to $20 
million, unsuccessfully, to win over the Taliban. Niyazov, the dictatorial president of 
Turkmenistan, was engaged in a similar game, granting Bridas the rights of 
exploitation only to rescind them soon after in order to give them to UNOCAL, which 
44 had offered a much higher price. 
\n September 1997 Bridas sold 60 per cent of its company's stake in Latin 
America to the U.S. oil giant AMACO, in the hope that a U.S. company could 
influence Niyazov to cease off on its frozen asserts in Turkmenistan. UNOCAL had 
meanwhile become the target of attacks from its shareholders and from feminist 
groups in the U.S. because of its relations with the Taliban. By 1998 both the Bridas 
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and UNOCAL projects had become dead letters. As U.S. relations with Afghanistan 
were inflamed by the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania for which 
Osama Bin Laden was held responsible. In August 1998, the Clinton administration 
launched cruise missile attacks on alleged Bin Laden training camps in eastern 
Afghanistan. The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden 
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and imposed economic sanctions, the pipeline talks languished. 
As soon as George W. Bush was elected president UNOCAL and BP-
ARAMCO which had in the meantime bought Bridas, the Argentinean rival stated 
once again to lobby administration among whom were several of their employers. 
UNOCAL knew that Bush was ready to back them and resumed the consortium 
negotiations. In January 2001, it began discussions with the Taliban, by black 
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members of the Bush administration among whom was Under Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage, who had previously worked as a lobbyist for UNOCAL. The 
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Taliban for their part employed as their PR officer in the US Laila Helms, niece of 
Richard Helms, former director of the CIA and former US ambassador to Iran. In 
March 2001, Helms succeeded in bringing Rahmamllah Hashami, Mullah Omar's 
adviser to Washington. Apparently, he even brought a carpet as a gift for George W. 
Bush from the Taliban leader. As late as August 2001, meetings were held in Pakistan 
to discuss the pipeline business. At one of these, which took place in Islamabad on 2 
August, Christina Rocca, in charge of Asian affairs at the States Department, met the 
Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef 
While negotiations were underway, the U.S. was secretly making plans to 
invade Afghanistan, the Bush administration and its oil sponsors were losing patience 
with the Taliban; they wanted to get the Central Asian gas pipe line going as soon as 
48 possible. The "strategy of the Silk Route' had been resumed. U.S. academics, 
journalists and intellectuals denounced the White House's new approach. The U.S. 
had quietly begun to align itself with those in the Russian government calling for 
military action against Afghanistan and has toyed with the idea of a new raid to wipe 
out Bin Laden, wrote Frederick Star; head of the Central Asian Institute at John 
Hopkins University, in December 2000. Paradoxically, 11 September provided 
Washington with a casus belli to invade Afghanistan and establish a pro-American 
government in the country. When a few weeks after the attack, the leaders of the two 
Pakistani Islamist parties negotiated with Mullah Omar and Bin Laden for the latter's 
extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for the 11 September attacks, the U.S. refused the 
offer. Back in 1996, the Sudanese Minister of Defence, Major General Elfatih Erwa, 
had also offered to extradite Osama Bin Laden, then resident in Sudan but the U.S. 
American officials declined the offer at that time as well. Instead, they told General 
Erwa to ask Bin Laden to leave the country. "Just don't let him go to Somalia; they 
added. Because U.S. fears that Bin Laden will create further unrest, when Erwa 
disclosed that he was going to Afghanistan, the American answer was 'let him go' is 
it possible that the U.S. did not want to bring Bin Laden to 'justice"? Could it be 
because he has too many tales to tell? 
For Goe Vidal, the conquest of Afghanistan had nothing to do with Osama. He 
was simply a pretext for replacing the Taliban with a relatively stable government that 
would allow Union Oil of California (UNOCAL) to lay its pipeline for the profit of, 
among others the Cheney-Bush Junta. Vidal's view might not be far from the truth. 
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Karzai"s role during the interim government is cleariy that of a mediator of the 
interests of the U.S. oil companies in the pipeline business. Kalizad has a similar 
task. Two small oil companies chase energy and Caspian Energy consulting have 
already obtained permission from the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan to 
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resume the pipelme negotiations. 
So the assumption that the US strategy to establish a pro US Afghan government 
was to secure a pipeline route through Afghanistan come to light. As Sreedhar pointed 
out that the discovery of the huge energy resources in this region (Central Asia 
Republics) makes the west believe that it could make the region the Persian Gulf of 
the next Century. The Central Asian region has gained in importance as it could serve 
as a replacement once the oil reserves in the gulf start depleting seriously by the 
middle of the next century. It is in this context that Central Asia is again emerging as 
a murky battleground among big powers. The agenda is being set by geopolitics and 
oil. 
The object of the revived game is twofold: firstly, to establish fiiendly relations 
with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil and gas resources. 
Secondly, to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. The landlocked 
nature of the Central Asian states creates obstacles to proposals for creating new 
alternative routes. As insider accounts published in the British, French and Indian 
media have revealed that U.S. officials threatened war against Afghanistan during the 
summer of 2001. It is not an accident that these revelations have appeared overseas, 
rather than in the U.S. the ruling classes in these countries have their own economic 
and political interests to look after, which do not coincide, and in some cases directly 
clash, with the drive by the American ruling elite to seize control of oil - rich territory 
in Central Asia. 
The official American myth is that "everything changed' on the day four airlines 
were hijacked and nearly 5000 people murdered. The US military intervention in 
Afghanistan by this account was hastily improvised in less than a month. This is only 
one of countless lies emanating from the Pentagon and White House about the war 
against Afghanistan. The truth is that the US intervention was planned in detail and 
carefully prepared long before the terrorist attacks provided the pretext for setting it in 
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motion. Such events used to happen before also and can be compared with new 
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ones, as the attack comes in the wake of revelations by an author, James Bam Ford 
who wrote in his book, 'Body of Evidence,' of a secret plan for US military 
intelligence operatives to commit acts of terrorism against American targets . . . blow 
up buildings, shoot down civilian airliners, blow up American war ships, and 
assassinate American citizens . . . for political gains. Operation North Woods was 
signed off by all five Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Kennedy administration as a way 
to foment public support for a war against Cuba, who would be blamed for the 
terrorist acts. Rejected sternly by president Kennedy which, it is sometimes presumed 
may have contributed to his assassination, this 'Reich Tag Fire' approach to political 
gain may have been the model for September 11, shifting the blame this time to the 
Taliban homeland what would make a more irascible excuse for war? 
hi the aftermath of the horror of what many simply call 9/11 we find government 
investigators minting money. Now that strong evidence exists that the true reason for 
the war was oil, and it is certain knowledge that such a war could not have been sold 
to American people without some catastrophic catalyst event. 
As energy of oil and gas becomes the blood stream of this century, the booming 
of South and East Asia market was but natural. While, the world's gas map depicts 
numerous gas pipelines moving across thousands of kilometers from Russia, Central 
Asia and the North Sea to Western Europe, hardly any pipelines move Eastwards' and 
South wards. This is now set to change due to two important factors: 
(i) The increasing Asian demand for gas; and 
(ii) The ability of Asia to transport gas economically fi-om producers to 
consuming centers. 
Gas is transported globally as LNG and through transnational pipelines. By 2020, 
one-third of the world output, i.e., 1.35 trillion cubic meters, will be internationally 
traded, of which 50 per cent will be transported as pipe gas and 38 per cent as LNG. 
Given rapidly increasing Asian demand and the availability of huge gas reserves in 
Asia, piped gas and LNG will both be utilized and indeed will complement each other 
in the energy-mix of the principal consumers. The Asian Gas Grid envisages the 
setting up of a series of pipelines that will carry natural gas to the various 
consumption centers in East and South Asia. 
Now we could witness that Afghanistan still important for gas pipeline corridor 
for South Asia market, would be a major player for booming of India market. India is 
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vigorously pursuing gas pipeline project's both on its eastern and western land 
frontiers. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is expected to bring to India nearly 90 
mmcmd of gas which will be utilized as fuel power and fertilizer projects in north and 
north western India. 
India has also agreed to participate in the Turkmenistan - Afghanistan -
Pakistan pipeline project. The project is backed by Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) that aims at importing natural gas from the Central Asian nations to meet the 
growing energy needs. The steering committee meeting was called by the project 
sponsor, ADB, between November 28 and 29, 2007 in Islamabad that witnessed India 
formally becoming part of the project and the four nations signing the project ahead of 
Agreement and a Gas pipeline Framework Agreement. 
The proposed pipeline will have a capacity of 33 billion cubic meters of natural 
gas per annum. The 1,680 km pipeline will run from the Daulatabad gas field to 
Afghanistan. From there it will be constructed alongside the highway miming from 
Herat to Kandahar and then via Quetta and Multan in Pakistan. The final destination 
of the pipeline will be the Indian town of Fazilka, near the border between Pakistan 
and India. The cost of this international infi-astructure is estimated at S4 billion. The 
deal on the pipeline was signed in December 2002 by the leaders of Turkmenistan, 
Afghanistan India and Pakistan (see map-1, 2 and 5). 
As cited by Mr. Bums in his article is America's Expectafions vis-a-vis a 
future Indian role in Central Asia. "We are working with Delhi to encourage energy 
rich Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to establish oil and 
gas trade with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India". He wrote, "Thereby reducing the lure 
of long term contracts with Iran." What he left unsaid is the expectation-now well 
amplified in American policy documents-that India would help the U.S. pull Central 
Asia away from Russian and Chinese influence under its "Greater Central Asia*' and 
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"Regional Energy Market Access Program". 
Thus it is evident fi-om the above analysis that there is no doubt that U.S. moved 
to invade Afghanistan after 11/Sept, and set up its military base there, was viewed as a 
step to secure energy pipeline route. Antony Hyman writes that from a geopolitical 
point of view Afghanistan forms a potential •"land-bridge for bulk trade or oil and gas 
pipelines to be constmcted from the Central Asian states to markets in Pakistan, India 
and elsewhere in the world via Karachi or another Pakistani port on the Arabian Sea. 
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Irrespective of which government was in place in Kabul, Afghanistan's territory could 
provide access to world markets and an alternative to total dependence upon Russia's 
monopoly on trade route. 
III. Pakistan Factor in U.S' post-11 September Afghan Policy 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks demanded the attention of all those who were 
interested in South Asian dynamics. The attacks were a wake-up call for 
Washington and the West. The cost of abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and the 
growth of an extremist policy in Pakistan was too high a price for the U.S. to pay. 
Apart from cracking down on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. after publicly 
busting the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring in January 2004 has shown that nuclear 
non-proliferation is a key objective of American policy towards Pakistan. Soon after 
9/11, the then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, put Pakistan President Pervez 
Musharraf on notice - you are either with us or against us. The General had little 
choice in the matter. He had to be with the Americans. The ultimate fear that seems to 
be driving the U.S. is the following: what happens to Pakistani nuclear weapons in 
case an extremist. Islamist leadership was to capture power in that country. From time 
to time, there have been suggestions that the Americans want to be in a position to 
secure these nuclear weapons. Hillen's comments only go to confirm that the U.S. 
wants to be in a position to tackle any unauthorized proliferation in Pakistan. 
The Americans are attempting to be in a position to take on a leadership role if a 
proliferation problem were to take place once again in Pakistan. Is this the price that 
Washington has been able to extract in lieu of letting off the Pakistani military in the 
nuclear supermarket run by A.Q. Khan? That certainly seems to be the case. As 
pointed out by a report in February 2004, Western defence allies have agreed to 
include India and Pakistan in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PFP) after 
concerted persuasion by the U.S. such an arrangement would allow the two nuclear 
rivals of South Asia to consult the alliance in the event of direct threats to their 
internal and external security. With the change in its geographic focus, NATO plans 
to take control of several international military peace keeping operations under the 
UN mandate and both India and Pakistan are seen as major contributors to such fixture 
operations. It may be a matter of time that NATO might extend its operations to Iraq 
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that in turn may require peacekeeping troops from both India and Pakistan. The 
decision to accord a non-NATO ally status to Pakistan comes at a time when the 
country is under pressure regarding its nuclear program. 
However, from Najim Rafique"s conclusion about strategic concept in 1999, 
provides the institutional justification and direction for NATO's ftirther development, 
and is likely to remain the main blueprint for NATO's evolution during the next 10 to 
15 years. As Zbigniew Brzezinski; who served as fomer US President, Jimmy Carter's 
National Security Adviser, in his book The Grand Chessboard, defined the NATO 
alliance as part of an integrated comprehensive and long-term strategy for all of 
Eurasia in which NATO would eventually reach Asia, and where another military 
alliance would connect the Pacific and Southeast Asian states. 
If one agrees with the view point in an article about nuclear issue of Pakistan, 
could be an international issue in future. And with this issue linkage are found to 
events in Afghanistan that U.S. attacked Afghanistan after 11 September and set up its 
military base there to monitor Pakistan's nuclear proliferation issue. As U.S. fears that 
nuclear arsenal might fall in the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states as U.S. 
labeled it after few days of World Trade Center attack. 
Since November 2003, two episodes have highlighted some of the existential 
dangers that threaten the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent as well as 
the reasons that the country remains a source of serious proliferation concern. The 
first was an acknowledgement by the Pakistani government that it is conducting an 
internal investigation into the activities of some senior scientists at Khan Research 
Laboratories (KRL) the entity that produces enriched Uranium for Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons program - for possibly proliferating nuclear technologies, technical 
knowledge, and tactic know-how to Iran, in violation to Pakistani laws. And second 
there were two nearly successfijl assassination attempts on Pakistani President and 
Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf 
This issue in brief is divided into three sections. 
(i) The first review the controversy surrounding new disclosures that Pakistani 
nuclear entities and scientist constitute the hub of a clandestine international Cartel 
enrichment technologies. It analyses the likelihood and implications of the official 
involvement of the Pakistani government - or at least its military-in such activities, as 
well as the possibility that Pakistani entities and scientists have engaged in 
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proliferation activities unknown to state authorities. Rumors have long persisted that 
the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) transferred drawings, designs, starter kits, and 
tacit knowledge for centrifuge-based uranium enrichment as well as information about 
procurement networks to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. In addition, there was a set 
of documents obtained by United Nations (UN) inspectors in Iraq in 1995 that may 
indicate an effort by Abdul Qadeer Khan shortly before the start of 1991 Persian Gulf 
war to sell Iraq nuclear weapon design, drawings and gas centrifuge design 
information, and facilitate the procurement of equipment required to build them. 
These items have been provided for ongoing technological assistance. Washington 
Post reported on January 27, 2004 that Khan"s middle man allegedly also offered the 
Pakistani scientist's services to Syria and Iraq. However, these offers were not 
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accepted. When Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapons programmme in the early 
1970s, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhuto framed his country's aspirations in 
civilizational terms: as the quest for an "Islamic Bomb." Since then knowledgeable 
observers of Pakistani politics have dwelt on the linkage between Libyan and Saudi 
funding for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programmme and potential Pakistani nuclear 
technology transfers to regimes in the Middle East. However, from the 1980s 
onwards, Pakistani government officials have denied Bhuto's formulation, and 
portrayed the nuclear weapons program as a national enterprise driven by the strategic 
necessity of safeguarding their country's security against a conventionally more 
powerfiil India. 
Thus far the Pakistani government's official complicity in the nuclear trade with 
Iran, Libya, and North Korea remains unproven beyond doubt. But the evidence that 
Pakistani nuclear labs and scientists engaged in nuclear frades unknown to Pakistani 
military and intelligence agencies is equally murky. 
(ii) Beyond Pakistan's role in nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya, and North 
Korea, the two recent nearly successful assassination attempts on general Musharraf s 
life also raise serious questions about whether the Pakistan Army can ensure the 
safety of the country's nuclear arsenal and keep it from the covetous reach of terrorist 
groups and potential rogue collaborators within the military. After all, observers 
contend, if the army cannot guarantee the safety of its own chief-of-staff, what 
conceivable guarantees exist about its ability to ensure the safety of the dispersed and 
more numerous nuclear assets? The recent attempts on Musharraf s life suggest that 
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the President's inner security cordon may have been breached or that insiders within 
the army and its intelHgence agencies could be collaborating with the Al-Qaeda and 
other disgruntled sectarian groups to eliminate him. 
Most analysts draw analogues to the succession arrangements that followed 
General Zia's sudden demise in a mysterious plane crash in the summer of 1988 and 
believed that succession arrangements in the wake of General Musharraf s removal 
will be a relatively smooth affair as well. The consensus among most academic and 
U.S. government analysts is that the top leadership of the Pakistani Army is relatively 
moderate and, secular and generally pro-West. This is not to suggest that Islamists do 
not exist in army's ranks or that the entire officer Corps shares General Musharraf s 
domestic and external agendas. Indeed, the arrest of nearly 20 army officers for their 
alleged links with Al-Qeda and the Taliban in 2003 points in the direction of 
subversion and competing agendas within Pakistan's national security establishment. 
(iii) The recent attempts on General Musharraf s life reminds of the threats to 
Pakistan's long-term stability from the forces of Islamic fiindamentalism. Senior 
government officials and cabinet ministers and officials lower down have pointed 
fingers of suspicion at Al-Qaeda remnants and disgruntled Kashmiri and Afghan 
radical groups, which resent Gen.Musharraf regime's collaboration with Washington 
in its current war against terrorism. They suggest that Musharraf s decision to break 
with the Taliban and radical Islamist sectarian groups in the wake of the September 
11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the subsequent compound crisis with 
India has alienated these groups fi-om their former patrons in the Pakistani Army and 
its intelligence agencies. As a result, the radical Islamists are now seeking to eliminate 
General Musharraf in a personal act of revenge and then replace him with military 
leaders who would limit or perhaps reverse the shifts in Pakistan's domestic and 
extemal policies. 
Most independent observers of Pakistani politics believe that threats to General 
Musharraf s regime are largely the consequence of the nature of its break with the 
Islamic radicals, which is tactical and not strategic. But the fact remains that the 
Pakistani military maintains an unofficial alliance with Islamic religious parties and 
continues to pamper sectarian militant groups for domestic and extemal reasons. 
Domestically, it uses the Islamic fijndamentalist parties to keep mainstream, secular 
and ethnic political parties in check and ensures its continued corporate dominance in 
domestic Pakistani politics. 
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However, domestic factors aside, the Pakistani military is also reluctant to stamp 
out the power of the Islamist Parties and sectarian groups for compelling external 
reasons. In the past, the army had subcontracted Pakistan's national security policies 
in Afghanistan and Kashmir to some of these groups, and views them as long-term 
allies. During the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of the Islamic religious parties 
controlled seminaries, served as a recruiting and training grounds for the Afghan 
Mujahideen and later the Taliban. The army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) 
supported both successively in the elusive hope that a friendly regime in Kabul would 
ensure strategic depth for Pakistan against India. Similarly during much of the 1990s, 
and even to an extent today, the Paksiatni Army relies on Islamists to wage a low-
intensity war to tie down the Indian Army in Indian -Administered Kashmir (lAK). 
Although General Musharraf changed track and joined the United States in its 
war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This policy stems from Islamabad's long-term 
plans to play an influential role in Afghanistan's largest ethnic group. This duplicitous 
and contradictory alliance between the Pakistan army and religious political parties 
and other sectarian groups is the key reason that latter retains power and influence in 
domestic Pakistani politics. As long as the Pakistani army does not give up its 
ambitious plans to play a dominant role in domestic Pakistani politics or abandon its 
regional security agenda in Afghanistan and Kashmir, General Musharraf will find it 
impossible to take on the task of destroying the power of the Islamists or launching a 
serious domestic reform effort. To ensure that Pakistan is transformed into a modem 
and moderate Islamic state and as long as the military continues to rely on the 
Islamists to pursue its multiple agendas, the later will continue to consolidate political 
power, hastening the day when they might effectively come to confrol Pakistan's 
nuclear arsenal. 
In the immediate aftermath of attack on twin towers, the U.S. turned its policy 
towards Pakistan on its head and realized that it had to ensure Pakistan's support in its 
war on terror. As such, the US reversed its previous policy of applying sanctions on 
account of the nuclear tests and accorded the status of "major Non-NATO ally of 
USA to placate the military leadership in Pakistan. It has, ever since, turned a blind 
eye to the undemocratic policies of the Musharraf - led military administration in 
Pakistan. From 2002, Musharraf has put in place a sham system of democracy by 
allowing only yes - men to participate in elections. The US has allowed Musharraf to 
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continue the democratic facade and perpetuate his hold on power in Pakistan. It is 
largely because the US thinks that only alternative to Musharraf is chaos in Pakistan. 
There is an overblown apprehension in the US that if Musharraf goes then the Islamist 
opposition will take over and, as a result, a nuclear Pakistan in the hands of the 
Mullahs will be terribly unsafe for the world. 
In addition, it was most likely that Pakistan could come close to China to 
enhance its cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, as recently, US dealing the 
civilian nuclear agreement with India and especially after it became clear that the U.S. 
would not extend the same kind of offer to Pakistan, President Musharraf has been 
working on concluding a deal with China along similar Hnes. The two countries 
signed a framework agreement on energy cooperation during President Musharraf s 
visit to Beijing in February, 2006. 
During the celebrations to coimnemorate the 55'*' anniversary of Pakistan-China 
relations. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said that the two countries were working at 
enhancing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peacefiil purposes under 
international safeguards for the production of electricity. In addition, Pakistan is 
seeking Chinese assistance in developing its oil and gas sector. It is seriously pushing 
the idea of oil and gas pipelines from Gwadar in Balochistan to western China. At the 
same fiinction, Aziz Said that such a facility would provide China with a shorter and 
more economical route for its oil supplies from the Gulf region. Aziz also spoke of 
setting up a mega oil refinery "at Gwadar to fiirther facilitate China's oil imports from 
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our region. 
The war on terrorism is expected to be long drawn. The Pakistani military and 
intelligence services may retain strong ties with Taliban in Afghanistan. Like the 
Pakistani population, many among the Pakistani military or its nuclear establishment 
could be sympathetic to fiandamentalisfs causes and thereby, hostile to the United 
States. These sympathies could grow depending on the course of the war in 
Afghanistan or elsewhere. Such insider threats in Pakistan could pose one of the most 
vexing problems in the current crisis. Several observers have indicated that if Pakistan 
suffers a coup by forces hostile to the United States, the US military should be ready 
to provide security for the nuclear weapons or even to take the weapons out of 
Pakistan entirely without the permission of the Pakistani authorities, while other have 
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raised the possibility of asking President Mushrraf to allow the United States or China 
to take possession of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in such situation. 
Although such responses appear possible in theory, their implementation could 
be extremely difficult and dangerous. US military actions to seize or cripple 
Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets may encourage India to take similar action. 
However, this job may not be easy for U.S. or for India. 
Such harsh contingencies may be important to consider in order to protecting the 
vital interests of the United States and its allies. A better strategy, however, is to take 
appropriate steps to minimize the likelihood that such catastrophic scenario 
malerializes.^' 
This plan was attempted move along with the movement of NATO into 
Afghanistan, after the terrorist attacks on targets in the United States. For the first 
time in the history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the treaty (relating to joint defence 
clause). The US, recognized as the aggrieved party, did not make use of NATO's 
support and decided on an independent action against Afghanistan, freely shaping 
what it termed as the 'coalition of the willing. The anti-terrorist operafions started by 
the U.S. intensified the process of fiirther NATO expansion, at the same time 
reinforcing the international evolution of the alliance in terms of building more 
capabilities to meet the new security challenges of the 21^' century. 
The U.S. made it clear that without a fresh definition of its mission, NATO 
would not be able to efficiently oppose the new types of threats. The U.S. Defence 
Minister said that if NATO did not transform itself, 'it will not have much to offer the 
world in the 21^' century'. Perhaps keeping this in mind the NATO took command of 
the 5,000 strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 
August 2003. 
The new U.S. defence concept articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence 
Review Report' moved away fi-om 'region based' scenarios to 'capabilities based' 
planning, and underlined the need for forces that can handle two major conflicts and 
multiple smaller military operations, simultaneously. This shift in strategy moved the 
NATO focus of defence planning fi-om Southwest and northeast Eurasia to the 
southern and eastern region of the Eurasian landmass of North Afiica, the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia. The review notes that while large US forces are likely to remain 
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stationed in Europe, they will be called upon to be deployed elsewhere and to serve as 
instruments of power projection. 
Historically, NATO has followed America's military policies and security 
doctrines. In the context of the war on terror, the US has adopted fiindamentally new 
security and military doctrines. In this regard, the new US doctrine of preemption will 
be decisive in the transformation of NATO. The US national security strategy 
unveiled in September 2002 says that while the US will seek allies in the battle 
against terrorism, it will not hesitate to act alone if necessary. The new US doctrine 
also calls for transformation and moderation of NATO to meet new security threats. 
In Afghanistan, the US is pushing NATO but 'coalition of the willing* 
comprising some states of both the old and new Europe under US command, US 
relied on its CENTCOM instead the US is pushing NATO to deliver on an ambitious 
plan to extend its peacekeeping presence beyond Kabul and create links with 
American - led military operations in the South, in an effort to rout the remnants of 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 
As mentioned above Western defence allies have agreed to include India and 
Pakistan in the NATO's PFP programme after concerted persuasion by the US that 
such an arrangement would allow the two nuclear rivals of South Asia to consult the 
alliance in the event of direct threats to their international and external security. With 
the change in its geographic focus NATO plans to take control of several international 
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military peacekeeping operations imder the UN mandate. 
IV. Bringing Afglianistan into the "Bigger Central Asia" Project 
From 2005, a new geopolitical project is being discussed in strategic circles in 
the US, the so-called project for "the Bigger Central Asia". The core of this plan is to 
bring together Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics in a single military 
strategic and geopolitical whole, and possibly include some other neighboring 
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regions. In fact, this project was started slowly in the period immediately following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the newly-
independent states in 1991. Initially the US policy towards Central Asia centered on 
security relationship with Kazakhstan. This initial focus on Kazakhstan stemmed in 
large part from the need to secure the Kazakh nuclear arsenal and, in December 1993, 
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resulted in the signing of a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement to 
dismantle and destroy the country's more than 100 SS-18 missiles. 
By 1994, the US cemented its bilateral security cooperation with Kazakhstan 
through a defence doctrine and training. The neighbouring states of Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also joined Kazakhstan in entering NATO's Partnership 
for Peace Program (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO PFP served as the 
main avenue for Western security arrangement. The US approach towards Central 
Asia was also driven by over reaching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying 
goal of containing the infliience of China, Iran and Russia. 
Another US policy was even more ambitious with long term goals of 
democratization and marketization, a consolidation of regional security and 
cooperation and an open and unfettered environment to allow the development of the 
regional energy resources. This last goal effectively translated into an effort to bolster 
the territorial integrity and security of the Central Asian states mainly as a 
counterweight to Russian interference or manipulation. By 1999, the US Congress 
expanded a commitment to military agreement with Central Asia, to support the 
economic and political independence of both Central Asia and the Southern 
Caucasus'^ 
Apart from isolating this wide region and bringing it out of the (mono politic), 
influence of other great powers-Russia and China, the project may have been dictated 
also by the necessity of bringing Afghanistan out of the destabilizing influence of 
such neighbors as Pakistan and Iran and binding this country to more stable and 
western-oriented region of Central Asia. 
to general "the Bigger Central Asia" (BCA) project is in many ways a 
continuation of another geopolitical project - '"the Bigger Near East" (BNE), and it 
has in principle the same strategic aims, diversification of strategic interests and 
stabilization of the territory under dominant influence of USA. 
At the same time, according to this plan, Washington seeks to maintain an 
appearance of 'pluralism' by allowing Moscow and Beijing some role in the region by 
granting them the status (along with the West) of guarantors and donors in the 
modernization process attempted by the U.S. and giving them some illusion of control 
in the region. However, for the American strategists the role of China and Russia as 
'benevolent observers' is quite acceptable. However, anything beyond that will be 
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countered by the U.S. It is also being predicted that the U.S. may facilitate the entry of 
India and Turkey into the region to balance out China and Russia. The developments 
in Andizhan in 2005 and the drastic change in foreign policy of Tashkent have 
jeopardized the prospect of implementation of the BCA project. The main aim of the 
BCA was to transform Uzbekistan into the center of the integration process by 
persuading it to sign special agreements with Pakistan, cooperate with Japan to build 
railways in Afghanistan to create transport corridor to the Indian Ocean and free trade 
zone around the Fergana Valley with participation of other countries of Central Asia. 
This project proposes implementation of a number of organizational, technical 
and diplomatic measures to realize the American strategy. They concern strengthening 
of the role of the Pentagon and the State Department for more effective US presence 
in the region. It is also considered necessary to strengthen the role of NATO as one of 
the main instruments of the American strategy forming part of special BCA council, 
through which USA could coordinate and influence regional policies on a continuing 
basis. 
V. Containment of Iran 
Under the name of the war against terrorism, the United States has denounced 
Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil; openly encouraging the overthrowing of the current 
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regime. Moreover, there was a talk within the Bush administration of invading Iran 
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to depose the clerical government too. According to the Washington Post, the full 
secret version of the doctrine "goes even further" and breaks with 50 years of U.S. 
counter-proliferation efforts by authorizing pre-emptive strikes on states and terrorist 
groups that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the long range 
missiles capable of delivering them. The idea being to destroy parts before they are 
assembled. The document's top secret appendix is reported to name Iran, Syria, and 
North Korea. That will be the central focus of this new approach and it pledges to 
"stop transfers of weapons components in or out of their borders." A consequence of 
invasion of U.S. troops into Afghanistan and Iraq a year later caused Iranian 
77 government to take extreme caution. 
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The reason behind the new Bush approach was the heightened concern against 
terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks. One paramount American fear 
was that future terrorist attacks would employ chemical, biological, or, possibly, 
nuclear weapons. In the view of the Bush administration, Iran was linked to various 
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terrorist groups. In spite of Iranian government's strong condemnation of the 9/11 
attacks, Iran responded positively to cooperation in the war on terror under the 
auspices of the UN 'Geneva Contact Group' provided a forum for United States and 
Iran to meet and discuss Afghanistan. Though the Geneva group lived through 18 
months, with initial American success, the nurtured distrust and suspicions resurfaced. 
In American perception, Iran was accredited with close supervision of Hamas 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Peoples Front for the liberation of Palestinian territories, 
and that Tehran continuously abets in Hezbollah's efforts of acquiring WMD. Iran 
was also accused of direct guidance to Abu Musab Alzarqawi, propping of Ansar-ul-
Islam and of harboring 300 senior Al-Qaeda activists. 
Hezbollah, over the years, has definitely evolved itself into an entity which 
imparts stability to the political divisions within Lebanon. Hamas too wants to 
emulate Hezbollah's success, provided they are allowed to enter the political 
mainstream. 
During Clinton administration there was some breaking of ground in engaging 
the Iranians and Saudi Arabia in the spring of 1994, and produced evidence which 
implicated the Iranians in the Khobar Towers bombing, where 19 U.S. soldiers had 
lost their lives. Evidence collected by Saudi Arabia pointed towards some disgruntled 
Shia segments. Alkhobar bombings of 1995 were recently duplicated in Riyadh, on 
May 12, 2003, through Al-Qaeda machinations, with nothing in common 
ideologically; the incident was once again used to link Al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
Karine A incident could be termed as the most suspicious. On January 3, 2002, 
accusation was made that involved Karine A, a ship purchased in Lebanon by 
Palestinians was intercepted in the Red Sea with eighty crates of weapons loaded at 
the Iranian Freeport in the Persian Gulf, the island of Kish. During this time, Iranian -
US relations, in the post 9/11 environment, for better cooperation in Afghanistan were 
warming up, and therefore, to counter this, the interception by the Israelis in the Red 
Sea, was blown out of proportions. It was immediately followed up by Bush's state of 
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Union address, where Iran was included in the "Axis of Evil' trio. Khomenei fired 
back with commensurate vitriol who said that the Islamic Republic is proud to be the 
target of hate and anger of the world's greatest evil: "we never seek to be praised by 
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the American officials" 
As per U.S. perception, Iran always supports terrorist groups. US was also aware 
about Iran's nuclear programme where, after eight years of bitter fighting with Iraq, 
Iran accepted United Nations Security Council resolution to ceasefire in the war, and 
shortly after wards international isolation. It mended fences with the Gulf States, re-
established diplomatic ties with the major West European powers, and even better 
relations with the United States, 'the Great Satan' yet, when a combination of 
international and regional developments offered new opportunities in the early 1990"s, 
AyatoIIah's imperialist ambitions were quickly reasserted as an expansion of the 
country's military arsenal accompanied by sustained efforts to project Iranian 
influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, as well as in Central Asia and the 
trans Ca\icas\is. 
Iran renewed and substantially accelerated its nuclear development programme. 
There is a strong consensus among intelligence services and arms control agencies 
around the world that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Iran is known to have been 
shopping for nuclear know how and material in the west, the successor states of the 
Soviet Union, especially Russia - fi-om which Iran has acquired two reactors of four 
hundred megawatts thermal power and fi-om selected third world countries, such as 
Brazil, North Korea, and China, which have long been involved with the Iranian 
programme. For their part, the Ayatollah made no secret of Iran's interest in the 
Bomb, at least until they came under heavy American pressure to bridle their nuclear 
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ambitions following the 9/11 attacks. 
Currently, Iran seeks to develop a missile capability with a range of 
approximately 800 miles as well as at least the capacity to build nuclear weapons -
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reached the conclusion that Iran 
has pursued both uranium eiuichment related and reprocessing activities and a policy 
of concealment, although it did not conclude that Iran did have a nuclear weapons 
programme. Iran has subsequently signed a protocol to the Non-proliferation treaty 
that allows for "intrusive inspections" but has then objected to these, raising the 
likelihood that the diplomatic track has been exhausted and that Iran may now be set 
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on the development of nuclear weapons capability. There is apprehension that there 
could be a dominos effect and a nuclear test by Iran could prompt its neighbours to 
consider whether they should also pursue nuclear option. Saudi Arabia, Egypt. Syria, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey are some time referred to as countries that 
could fallow Iran and begin their nuclear ventures. Obviously, these countries may not 
pose immediate concerns, but all of them have once been suspected of acquiring 
nuclear weapons capabilities. For example, Saudi officials mentioned in early 2004, 
that they were interested in acquiring nuclear capability on lease from China or 
Pakistan. 
Once any regional country succeeds in possessing nuclear weapons, it might feel 
tempted or even urged to go nuclear to ensure regional security balance. A nuclear 
Iran means the emergence of the single regional superpower, and it might harm 
strategic balance among regional powers, especially vis-a-vis the Arab countries. It is 
no wonder Arab countries may be tempted to correct this strategic imbalance against a 
82 Persian country, by pursuing their nuclear capabilities. Moreover, Israel has already 
warned that it will not tolerate an Iranian nuclear capability, and might well take 
. 83 preemptive action. 
Moreover, Iran has reserved large energy resources which could play a key role 
in Indian subcontinent, such as, it could raise its influence over energy needs of South 
Asian countries especially, India. With the massive growth in Indian economy, it 
would need large amounts of energy resources, therefore Indian government has been 
initiating import of large-scale natural gas from Iran through cross border pipeline 
which is perceived as one of the best long term solutions to India's energy needs. 
Iran, with over twenty-six million cubic meters of gas reserves (sixteen percent 
of the world's gas reserves) is naturally interested in large scale supply of gas to the 
Indian subcontinent. The geographical location of Iranian gas resources makes India 
the best market for country's gas export in the coming years and Iranian policy 
makers have studied the Indian market for exporting gas in the form of LNG via a 
pipeline, for over ten years. In November 2000, Iran and India agreed to launch yet 
another feasibility study on the land and deep sea option of gas transportation to 
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India. According to the project studies of supplying gas through a pipeline, there 
would be three countries involved who would also gain significant benefits from this 
project. India will get energy for its growing needs, Pakistan will get both gas and a 
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heavy royalty and transit fees, Iran of course, would stand to gain the most financially 
and it would be a respite for the nation that the U.S. is trying to isolate, politically. 
Even though the recent advancement of the negotiations between India and 
Pakistan over security of oil pipeline which will be laid down in Pakistan's territory 
has been positive but the greatest impediment however, comes from the strong US" 
opposition to this project and its determination to isolate Iran and cut off its 
investments. There have been reports that the U.S. government is reconsidering its 
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opposition to the S 4.2 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (see map-3). But, 
according Vladimir Radyuhin quoted, in The Hindu newspaper, while, Russian natural 
gas monopoly Gazprom is developing the Southern part of the field in Iran, and is also 
ready to help build the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. The Bush administration has 
been basing its opposition to the proposed pipeline on the argument that it would help 
Iran, a potential target of future U.S. military strikes. US corporations are also going 
to be involved in the consortium; these companies might put pressure on the White 
House to back the pipeline. The companies would need the approval of the US 
government to participate in the pipeline construction. The US is clearly trying to use 
its influence against the pipeline from Iran due to its differences over the country's 
nuclear programme. Indian Ministry of External Affairs has come out with a report on 
US policy that cautions India about the possibility of sanctions being slapped on it by 
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the US under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Investment of over $ 40 
million and activities that directly enhance Iran's capacity to develop its oil and gas 
resources may attract sanction from the U.S. 
The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during her visit to New Delhi in 
March, 2005, emphasized the need for energy dialogue between the US and India, the 
underlying idea was to dissuade New Delhi from going ahead with Iran pipeline. The 
emergence of Iran as of vital interest for India and Pakistan is extremely worrisome to 
the US. The recent announcement by India's petroleum Minister, that Iran has agreed 
to research the possibility of extending the proposed 2670 km Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline to China also. It only adds to the US concerns about the possibility of Iran 
playing a substantive role in the economic activities of the region. The US is deeply 
involved in China's economy and Iran's position being elevated to the extent of being 
a significant player in that economy is anfithetical to American interests. 
Therefore, the US is trying to do everything to stop Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline 
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project. India-US Agreement on nuclear energy cooperation is seen as an incentive 
for India to withdraw from the pipeline project. 
Pakistan realized that the US is not willing to provide nuclear power plants to 
Pakistan to meet its growing energy requirements, in spite of concerted diplomatic 
efforts by Islamabad in this regard. In this backdrop, the Pakistani Government has 
been stepping up its efforts to finalize the agreement on at least one of the gas 
pipelines from Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan. However, any relenting to the American 
side on nuclear energy cooperation could be used as an incentive to pressurize 
Pakistan to retract from the Iran pipeline project. 
Subsequent to the India-US agreement on nuclear energy cooperation as India 
noted that there were uncertainties in Iran and this has been interpreted as a 
demonstration of lack of confidence in International bankers, who are already 
reluctant to underwrite the project owing to the fear of U.S. sanctions, would tend to 
88 be further discouraged by this. 
Another thing is that the rise of Iran's role in Middle East, whether in economic 
cooperation or improving relations despite old history of regional disputes with 
neighboring Arab countries would be in Iran's interests, and the most crucial thing is 
that Iran would really like these Arab countries to expel US hegemony out of Gulf 
countries. 
As we have seen recently, there have been exchanges of high level visits of 
officials from Iran to individual Arabian Gulf countries on a bilateral basis which 
culminated with the signing of many trade and security pacts. Saudi Arabia moved 
ahead in 2000 with a series of trade and mutual cooperation pacts with Iran. Both the 
countries signed a security agreement in April 2001 and a judicial cooperation 
memorandum of understanding in July 2003. Another security cooperation agreement 
was signed between Iran and Qatar in October 2002, encompassing cooperation on 
various aspects of border security, including measures to counteract drug running and 
money laundering. Undoubtedly, the historic dispute between the UAE and Iran over 
the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands has continued to impact upon relations between the 
GCC and Iran, and UAE and Kuwait have been crifical of Tehran's military buildup 
there, yet, both sides have emphasized on the peacefiil solution of the outstanding 
89 issues. In addition, the UAE has begun to explore joint projects that would help 
integrate their two economies, separated by only 180km. They are discussing the 
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possibility of laying under sea cables for transferring 1,000 MW of electricity. Iran is 
also offering Abu Dhabi gas supplies originating in Iran and Turkmenistan which 
straddles the Caspian Sea. Gas from Turkmenistan can be sent to the Gulf Shores 
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across the Iranian transit corridor. Recently, some regional experts argued that Iran 
is using the political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in its favour, 
leveraging the fact that Iran is the only route by which Afghanistan can maintain 
foreign trade. Afghanistan is becoming increasingly dependent on Iran for its transit 
trade route as a result of the tense Afghan-Pakistan relationship. The Kabul 
administration has avoided speaking publicly about Iranian influence in Afghanistan, 
as they believe as a result of political tension with Pakistan, that Iran is Kabul's last 
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significant open door to the world. Moreover, as Iran and Russia are the world's 
largest and second-largest holders of natural gas reserves, both support the idea of 
creating of a gas OPEC. Iran has an observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and is likely to be a member of an energy club Russia is planning for the 
CEO. 
At the Second Caspian Submit, the leaders of the littoral states-Russia, Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will sign a declaration identifying the areas 
of agreement for a proposed convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Even 
though the Caspian nations have made little headway on the sticking point of sharing 
the Caspian seabed and its resources since their first summit in 2002, Russian foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed the hope that the summit would lay down 
guidelines for resolving the outstanding issues with Iran, whose coastline is a mere 13 
per cent of the Caspian shore, advocates an equitable 20-per cent division of the 
seabed, while the littoral states favour a division along a medial line based on the 
length of their sovereign coastlines. The recent summit is expected to confirm the 
close positions Russia and Iran have taken against the presence of outside powers in 
the region and against the construction of underwater pipelines across the Caspian 
Sea, Ahmedinejad told the Russian media ahead of Mr. Putin's visit. Both Russia and 
Iran are more concerned with preventing the U.S. from straddling the Caspian Sea and 
the energy flows from the region. "We should not permit the Caspian question to turn 
into a challenge and a reason for anxiety of the Caspian states", the Iranian leader 
said. 
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While, historical factors continue to dominate the over all pattern of Iran -GCC 
relationship which is marked by suspicion and distrust towards Iran as well as the 
attitude of the United States towards Tehran. 
It was most likely that the amount of tensions between US and Iran would be 
increasing day by day. Recently President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited to the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman in May 2007, where Ahmaddinejad had launched a 
fierce attack on the United States, demanding the withdrawal of American troops from 
the region. This was in country which is seen as a key U.S. ally. In calling for an 
American exit, Ahmadinejad entered into a war of words with U.S. Vice President, 
Dick Cheney, who was touring the region at the same time. Mr. Cheney had issued a 
strong statement that "Washington would not allow Tehran to dominate the oil-rich 
Gulf, aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier John C. Stennis, that has been roaming the Gulf 
water for some time. Mr. Cheney said: "we will stand with others to prevent Iran from 
gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region". He said, Iran would not be 
allowed to block the sea lanes, through which the bulk of the global oil supplies pass. 
While the tone and tenor of Ahmadinejad"s address was not unexpected, the UAE 
President's remarks, as reported by a section of the Iranian media, certainly were, The 
Tehran Times quoted Sheikh Khalifa as saying : "the withdrawal of foreign fleets and 
armies from the region is one of our desires."' 
Several factors are promoting a closer relationship between Iran and major Gulf 
countries, which have begun to drift away from the U.S. first, anfi-American 
sentiments in the region is high. The spate of killings in Iraq, the seemingly endless 
sufferings of the Palestinians and the like are driving anger towards Washington to 
new heights. The leaderships of these countries can no longer ignore the popular 
mood. Ahmadinejad's visit, which could go a long way in deepening Arab-Iranian 
ties, has brought the issue of the presence of foreign troops in the region more 
prominently on the agenda. 
In fact the history of US-Iran rivalries did not begin after 11 Sept 2001, it 
actually began in 1978, when Shah of Iran, a pro-American was overthrown. United 
States security strategy in the Arabian Gulf has been dictated by its vital interests in 
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ensuring the free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the oil fields of that region, to 
ensuring the free flow of oil has also meant that the US had to develop a security 
policy that would preserve the independence of the Gulf Arab oil producers. This was 
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an inherently difficult proposition from the outset because they have never been able 
to develop an independent ability to defend themselves against Iraq or Iran; they have 
always required the United States to develop strategies for balancing or containing the 
potential threats of these regional powers. 
Until the overthrow of the Shah in 1978, US strategy had come to depend on a 
relatively benign and status-quo oriented Iran to maintain the balance of power in the 
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region in a way which helped preserve the independence of the gulf Arab states. 
US grabbed Afghan's civil war as a means to counter Iran, as the US 
administration during Clinton era, which had been following a policy of dual 
containment of Iran and Iraq, saw increasing Iranian role in Afghanistan as a 
disturbing development in the backdrop of rising Iranian influence in Central Asian 
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republic as well. It was convinced that the Taliban was put together not just to 
contain the Iranian role in Afghan affairs, but the Taliban were perceived to be a 
'trap' set up by the US, Saudi and Pakistan to drag Iran into a war with Afghanistan. 
A conspiracy theory sought to explain that since the Gulf war of 1991, the US was 
seeking to lure Iran into some war or the other that would serve as an opportunity to 
destroy its renovated military machine and further exhaust its economy - with the 
over all objective of restoring Iran to its former status as a piece of strategic chess -
board. And since the US would prefer to distract the war as far as possible from the 
Gulf region - to avoid repercussions that might prove hard to control later on - a war 
between Iran and Afghanistan would be ideal. 
Iran shares a 900 km long border on the east with Afghanistan with which its 
relations slipped to lowest point in late 1998, when ten Iranian diplomats and a 
journalist in Mazare Sharif went missing and were presumed to have been 
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killed, after the Taliban stormed Mazar- i-Sharif. It was later reported that 2,000 to 
6,000 Shia Hazara civilians had been systematically massacred by the guerillas after 
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recapturing the city. Iran amassed 70,000 Revolutionary Guards and conducted the 
99 largest ever ground and air exercises on its Afghan border as the relations continued 
to deteriorate. 
Therefore, the question of U.S. setting up its military base in Afghanistan after 
9/11 to contain Iran and preparing for a possible invasion of Iran could be viewed as a 
continuation of the unfinished job. Possibility of the U.S. using forces to engage Iran 
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looms over dangerously now. One could discern that the neoconservative ideas 
surrounding US foreign policy in the academic writings of Condoleezza Rice, Robert 
B. Zoellick and Kenneth M. Pollack in Foreign Affairs journal before and after the 
election of Bush Junior for the first term, Rice, who later became National Security 
Advisor in the next term said that administration's foreign policies must help attain 
the American values that the Clinton administration could not attempt. Writing on the 
eve of presidential election in 2000, Rice argued for a strong military so that it can 
deter war, project power and fight in defence of American interests if deterrence fails. 
Having criticized Clinton's defence policy about military expenses and deployment of 
forces, she argued in favour of building the military of the 21 ^ ' century rather than 
continuing to build the same on the structures of cold war. Secondly, the US military, 
she held must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile power in Asia 
pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf . . . In spite of it, the realization 
grew that the global defeat of Al-Qaeda was not going to be possible, the issue turned 
out to be a long-term strategy. This new focus would not so much solve the Al-Qaeda 
problem but help create a process that would undermine the operational foundations 
of Al-Qaeda by forcing nations in the region to redefine their behaviour. From a 
purely military point of view, Iraq is the single most strategic country in the Middle 
East. Its borders are common with six other countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Syria, Turkey, and Iran. In other words, fi-om Iraq-and with its forces in Afghanistan-
the United States would influence events in countries that ranged fi-om the Himalayas 
to the Mediterranean and fi-om the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the Red and 
Arabian Sea. Like its predecessor Mesopotamia, Iraq is the pivot of the Middle 
102 East. As quoted by Aijaz Ahmad in Frontline the U.S. has waged a cold war 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran for almost 30 years now, and has threatened a hot 
war (outright invasion) for a fiill decade. The occupation of Iraq, is designed partly to 
compensate for the earlier loss incurred when the Shah was overthrown, and partly to 
regain access to Iranian resources, either by invading it or by imposing upon it a peace 
on terms favourable to the US., in the energy sector. An accommodation between the 
US and Iran in the energy sector is not inconceivable. The Security Council is ready 
with a draft for tighter sanctions against Iran. The U.S. navy has assembled a vast 
armada in the Gulf and positioned all kinds of military forces to surround Iran for 
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psychological warfare and also for invasion, if necessary. 
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As quoted by Vladimir Radyuhin in The Hindu the Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin visited in the middle of October 2007, to reduce the danger of a US attack on 
Iran and consolidate the strategic relationship between Russia and Iran, as Russia saw 
that the threat of a US attack on Iran has grown all too big. The Pentagon has 
deployed the largest force in the region since the 2003 war, with half of the US navy's 
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warships position within striking distance of Iran. And it was likely that the U.S. 
was looking for more military bases to strike and encircle Iran, we could see from 
President Putin of Russia was trying to persuade states around Iran not to give bases 
for US to launch its military strikes on Iran. Putin tried to make the military option as 
difficult as possible for the U.S. the fact that Tehran was the venue of a five-nation 
Caspian summit, which was the formal reason for the recent Putin trip to Iran, served 
to deter U.S. warmongers. It destroyed the wall of isolation the U.S. had been building 
around Iran, improved the geo-strategic climate around that country, and 
demonstrated its neighbors' solidarity with it. The five Caspian nations Russia, Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan pledged to deny outside countries the right 
to use their territories for launching military action. "The parties underline that under 
no circumstances would they allow other nations to use their territory for waging 
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aggression or other military action against any oi the parties. 
After US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defence Robert 
Gates during one of the trip's visited Moscow, were bluntly told to drop their 
"vmilateral" approach and "periodic calls to use military force against Iran" as these 
undermine and impede our collective effort", but the momentum for war is building 
up. After two weeks, the Senate passed a resolution urging the administration to place 
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the US blacklist as a 'terrorist" 
organization'. Democratic Senator Jim Webb of Virginia, who voted against it, 
accused the White House of pushing through the resolution as "a back door method of 
gaining Congressional validation for military action." "It is, for all practical purposes, 
mandating the military option," he said. Recently, in last week of October 2007, 
the US officially announced its draconian sanctions on Iran. It has also virtually 
branded the entire Iranian Army, a terrorist force; the draft of tough measures against 
107 Iran includes sanctions against the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), the 
Iranian Defence Ministry and leading Iranian commercial banks. The elite Al Quds 
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force, which is part of the IRGC, has been accused by the U.S. of arming and training 
108 Shiite militias in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
From the above it seems that the moving of NATO into Afghanistan was 
perceived as a long term-plan of the US to enhance the security in the Gulf and the 
Middle East. Hamid Ansari wrote: an option that has been explored as an alternative 
is that of broad-basing the responsibility and co-opting European members of NATO 
on the pattern of arrangements in place for Afghanistan. The European Union's 
involvement in the Middle East process is of older vintage and has been useful 
though, rarely decisive. In 2004, an exercise was undertaken to explore the role that 
NATO could play in enhancing security in the Gulf and the Middle East'*. By the end 
of 2005, the organization was asserting that it is interested in Gulf security because of: 
(I) the changing security environment, (II) the changing nature of NATO itself, and 
(III) the new dynamics in the Gulf region itself that has been unfolding over the past 
few years. 
Three countries on the western, northern and eastern periphery of the region add 
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a significant dimension to the security calculus of West Asia. Theses are Israel, 
Turkey, and Iran. All are non-Arab countries, each has a distinct identity, has a 
distinct history of relations with the United States and is influenced by the security 
dynamics of West Asia. In case of Iran it has remained in the headlines for 27 years 
for having abandoned the Western alliance, disturbed the strategic balance in West 
Asia, and being an obstacle to an imquestioned American hegemony in the region. 
From Hamid Ansari's analysis and conclusion about this matter, the national security 
strategy of the United States of America, supplemented by the new NATO doctrine, 
provide the answer that 'West Asia is too precious not to be dominated, not to be 
reformed in terms of the Greater Middle East initiative'. 
VI. Containing the role of China in Central Asia and countries around Caspian 
Sea 
One of the most important results of the 9/11 attacks has been a shift in the 
United States policy towards establishing its hegemony from that of maintaining 
status quo. This shift, and the establishment of clear-cut US priorities, result from the 
realization of the danger posed by Al-Qaeda and similar groups operating outside and 
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within the existing state systems-whereas prior to 9/11, most of the attention of the 
U.S. security establishment was focused on the alleged threats from major rival states 
(notably China and Russia). 
The US policy to contain China has not actually begun after 9/11 but it began 
soon after the end of cold war, the theory put forward by John J. Mearsheimer, the 
author of the book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics who made an analysis of the 
US foreign policy after the end of Cold War, on the question of the ftiture perspective 
of US foreign policy in the 21*' century. In his analysis he puts China as the new rising 
super- power. He pointed out that the basic structure of the international system did 
not change much with the end of the cold war, and that there is little reason to even 
think that change is in the offing. He has tried to prove his point that there is 
considerable evidence from the decade 1991-2000 that security competition among 
the great powers is not obsolete, neither in Europe nor in Northeast Asia. He finally 
concludes that the emergence of China is the most dangerous and a potential threat to 
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the United States security in the twenty-first century. 
In the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent emergence of the newly-independent states in 1991, US policy towards 
Central Asia centered on security relationships. By 1994, with cooptation through 
defence doctrines and attempting to pursue Central Asian countries to enter NATO's 
Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), Central Asian membership in the NATO, PEP 
served as the main avenue for western security engagement. The US approach to 
Cenfral Asia was also driven by over-acting geopolitical considerations, with an 
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underlying goal of containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia. Once, during 
Afghan civil war, U.S. viewed stability in Afghanistan as the main variable in this 
sfrategy. Domination in Afghanistan was important to it to exercise power control 
over the Southern corridor to Cenfral Asia. This was the only way to enhance 
Pakistan's geopolitical standing with the west in shaping the fiiture evolution of 
Central Asia. This by itself would get Pakistan, economic and political rewards "by 
creating a regional dependence on Islamabad to ensure safety for traffic, in other 
words, the international acceptance of Islamabad's hegemony over the Southern 
approaches to Central Asia and the western gateway to China". It could quietly fit into 
American political and strategic objectives in the Central Asian region which provides 
ground for preventing Russian hegemony in the region, containing Iran and to play a 
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balancing role against emerging powers like China. The Control over the Pakistan-
Afghanistan corridor and creating an opening from the South would be vital for the 
West in gaining access to the oil and natural gas resources of the region also. The 
plan of the U.S. was to keep its presence in this region to lock out China from the 
energy business in the region, since Washington feared they could assist the Central 
Asian republics in setting up their own oil companies. 
Although, Russia was considered to be a loser in the long-Cold War, but was 
still trying to back China to be a powerftil state in order to provide a rival to balance 
the U.S. in this area. As, at present, the grand alliance of Western states which far 
outweighed Russia and was finally able to defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War 
still remains almost united and it was expected that they would stand together again 
against any Russian attempt to regain its former empire. Though China and Russia 
might imite diplomatically and rhetorically against American global hegemony, it is 
hard to understand how Russia's interests and the security of its vulnerable far eastern 
possessions would benefit by backing a Chinese bid for hegemony in East Asia. 
As China was also developing fast its economy, it is imperative that it would 
need a lot of energy resources to fuel its industrial growth. With this reason, China 
entered into a war for energy with the west in many parts of the world over energy 
reserves. 
A commentary in China Daily states that the current administration "no longer 
tries to hide China's growing economic weight in global affairs and the role it will 
have to play in order to sustain growth". This explanation is the key to the above 
philosophy in order to sustain its double digit economic growth. China has no choice 
but to become more active internationally. A major proportion of the oil and other 
natural resources that China needs to feed its growing economy are imported. Thus, 
Beijing has begun to aggressively woo energy and other raw material rich countries 
across Latin America, Africa and Central Asia. These countries also represent 
emerging markets for Chinese products, making them doubly valuable. 
For Beijing, ensuring regional peace and stability is thus critical and it is aware 
that it must play an active role internationally to secure this. Demonstrating its new 
leadership in a variety of international and regional forums, China hosted three major 
intemational summits in 2006: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
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Summit in June, the China-Africa summit in November, and the China-Asian Summit 
also in November. 
Ail three summit meetings underscored how Beijing is beginning to use 
multilateral forums as vehicles. The SCO, for example, binds the energy rich nations 
of Central Asia to China and represents a formidable alliance between Moscow and 
Beijing covering an area of 30 million square Kilometers or about three-fifths of 
Eurasia. The SCO controls a large part of the global oil and gas reserves and includes 
two of the world's five declared nuclear powers. For China, leadership of such an 
organization is not only prestigious but also helps it set up as an alternative to U.S. 
117 influence in the strategic Central Asian region. For the Central Asian republics, 
China's policy of studious non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries is 
a welcome change from America's prescriptive dictates. Moreover, Beijing provides 
these countries with economic development assistance and increased opportunities for 
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trade and investment. Beijing has been adopting a more offensive economic 
diplomacy towards Central Asia with the aim of stabilizing the region politically, as 
well as to push China's own interests. In fact, as the competition among powerfiil 
coimtries for influence in central Asia, China has been more successfiil in 
commercially penetrating into the region, responding and fiilfilling the immediate 
economic needs, especially the consumer goods requirements of these countries. 
China also revived the ancient "Great Silk Route" and used the metaphor to 
open up China's northern land border for direct links with Europe and the Middle East 
via Central Asia. A number of Eurasian highways, including rail and pipeline 
construction, are being planned, which will ensure a long-term role for China in 
Central Asia. The opening up of the frans-Eurasian rail road through Central Asia in 
1990 and the linking of Almaty and Urumchi by rail road in 1992 had brought in a 
dramatic change in the Sino-Central Asian frontiers. The triumphant tour by Prime 
Minister Li Peng to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in April 
1994 gave a new impetus to China's campaign for its Silk Route promotion. Premier 
Li, while resurrecting the Silk Road, reached agreements with Turkmenistan and 
others on oil production and pipeline constructions (see map-8). 
In an unprecedented move in June 1997, China's National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC) outbid US oil companies Texaco and Amoco and won a major oil 
concession, taking a 60 percent share of Kazakhstan's richest Aktyubinsk oilfield by 
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investing US $4 billion dollars. Again in August 1997, CNPC won a tender giving it 
60 per cent of developing Kazakhstan's second richest Novyuzen oilfield by investing 
US $400 million out of a total projected investment of U.S. $1.3 billion. The CNPC 
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is also planning to build a 2,000 mile-long pipeline across Xinjiang at the cost of $ 3.5 
billion to carry oil and gas to Chinese industrial cities as well as for exports to Japan. 
It is expected that China's enormous inroads into Central Asia, particularly its 
involvement in what is shaping up as the last great oil rush of the 20* century will 
have great geopolitical implications in the years to come. 
China is once again wielding influence upon the steppe Zone of the Eurasian 
heart-land. China's landward orientation assumes significance in the face of declining 
Russia's strategic proximity with India. It is also significant that the coimtries like 
Kazakhstan are talking about Central Asia as a bridge between Europe and Asia, 
therefore, creating a situation as well as establishing closer ties with China as an 
essential balance to offset pressure and renewed assertion fi:om Russia in the 
future. 
Apart firom this, as western part of China was locked deep in the interior of 
Eurasia, suffered a distance market, to find a port to carry manufactured goods. 
Western interior provinces with strong support fi-om Beijing attempted to mitigate this 
advantage by opening transport links with their neighbors. Yunnan province in 
China's southwest achieved considerable success in opening or improving road, river 
and rail links with and through Myanmar to ports (including several that were build 
by china) on the bay of Bengal. Myanmar*s location in the southeastern foothills of 
the Tibetan Plateau had, through many centuries, made it a natural transit route 
between southwestern China and Bay of Bengal. In addition, recently, China is 
looking forward to connect its railway to Iran by passing through Pakistan, as Iran, 
along with Pakistan, plays an increasingly important role in providing western China 
access to the Oceanic. China's adoption in 2000 of a program to accelerate 
development of its western regions made development of transportation lines to the 
southwest even more important. Pakistan was China's major partner in this regard. 
China has given many millions to Pakistan to modernize its railway system. While 
China's major transportation investments in southwest Asia have been in Pakistan, 
Iran has played a role via several railways projects that dovetailed with China's efforts 
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in Pakistan. The first of these Iranian projects was construction of a rail hne between 
Kerman in southeast Iran and Zahedan on the Iran-Pakistan border. Work on this hne 
was under way in 2002. When complete, this rail line will link the Iranian and 
Pakistani rail systems for the first time. Work was also under way on a new rail line 
extending southwest from Mashad directly across northeastern Iran to Bafq. This line 
was to be operational by early 2005. The completion of these new lines will mean that 
Chinese cargo moving via the Tedzhen - Mashhad link can proceed directly to 
seaports without having to take the long circuitous and crowed but previously 
required via Tehran (see map-7). 
While the major significance of these new, Chinese southwesterly lines of 
international transportation is commercial, they also have a strategic role. In the event 
of a U.S.-PRC military confi^ ontation that became protracted and in which the United 
States used it naval supremacy to blockade China's coast, China's ability to continue 
prosecution of the war would be influenced by its ability to import vital materials 
overland. In such a situation it would be extremely useful to have robust transport 
links via Pakistan and Iran and to have long-standing, cooperative ties '"tested by 
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In the end of 2004, Beijing also signed a $ 70 billion energy agreement with 
Tehran, China's largest organization of petroleum Exporting countries energy deal to 
date. China's state Sinopec agreed to buy 250 million tons of LNG over 30 years fi-om 
Iran as well as to develop the giant Yadavaran field. That agreement covered the 
comprehensive development by Sinopec of the giant Yadavaran gas field, 
construction of a related petrochemical and gas industry including pipelines. 
The Iran-China strategic energy cooperation will involve constructing a pipeline 
in Iran to take oil some 386 kilometers to the Caspian Sea, then to link up with a 
planned pipeline fi-om China into Kazakhstan. On signing the deal, Iran's petroleum 
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China also involved the Project of pipeline building of Iran towards south, where this 
route would seem to provide the US with the best incentive to date to cooperate with 
Iran by, in essence, competing with proposed Chinese backed oil pipeline 
project(pipeline route runs for nearly a thousand miles along the Afghanistan border 
with Iran and Pakistan serving the same oil fields in northern Iran and points towards 
south, preventing China from obtaining a defector monopoly holder on oil supplies 
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for South East Asia, the Chinese began negotiating that project in 1997, causing a 
great deal of consternation for the Clinton administration and major US oil companies 
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who stood to gain little in the project. 
Apart from China playing a key role in energy resources field of these regions, 
China is still trying to woo Iran for its economic and military growth. After the 
Iranian revolution of 1979, U.S. influence over Iran came to an end. China came to 
replace U.S., Chinese efforts to strengthen Iran clashed frequently with U.S. 
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June 2000 visit to China proclaimed that the two sides agree that the security and 
stability of the Persian Gulf should be safeguarded by the countries of the region free 
from outside interference. Beijing and Iran viewed that step-by-step, throughout the 
post-1979 era, the United States expended its military position in the Persian Gulf 
region. Jimmy Carter's 1979 announcement of U.S. assumption of direct military 
responsibility for Gulf security; Ronald Reagan's 1983 upgrading of Carter's Rapid 
Deployment Force to a full-fledged regional headquarters; expansion of Diego Garcia 
into a major forward support base; the prepositioning or supplies and equipment for 
combat in the Gulf construction or expansion of military use facilities in Egypt, 
Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the region; and the development of 
Persian Gulf war plans and training of U.S. forces to operate in a desert environment. 
The existence of this newly developed U.S. military power in Lebanon, Libya, 
Somalia, and Iran in the 1980s, and against Iraq in 1991 and again from 1998 to 2003, 
began to shape events in the Gulf region. 
Beijing and Tehran are in agreement that the growth of the U.S. military 
position in the Persian Gulf region is a manifestation of U.S. hegemony, inspired by a 
desire to confrol the region's oil resources as a step towards realizing the dream of 
global domination. They also agree that the U.S. push for hegemony over the Middle 
East is antithetical to the interests of both countries and of course, the vision of 
Persian Gulf without exfra regional military forces and with regional security affairs 
managed by the countries of the region themselves, can be taken as an alternate course 
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of development preferred by Beijing and Tehran. Given the nature of the Bush 
administration's rush to war in Iraq in 2003, where China had a major stake in oil 
development, and the subsequent US blocking of other Chinese attempts at securing 
energy independence, including UNOCAL, it is not surprising that Beijing is taking 
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extraordinary measures to secure its long-term oil and gas supply resources. Energy is 
the Achilles Heel of China's economic growth. This conflict was in areas where 
Sino-Iranian Cooperation threatened to diminish the military advantages the United 
States enjoyed vis-a-vis Iran and/or increased Iran's ability to threaten the sea-lanes 
and/or oil supplying states of the Persian Gulf This conflict between Beijing and 
Washington was manifest in the areas of nuclear energy, guided and ballistic missiles, 
and dual-use goods relevant to production of chemical or advanced conventional 
weapons. 
From Beijing's perspective, U.S. objections to China's nuclear and missile 
cooperation with Iran were at bottom manifestations of U.S. hegemony. It could be 
seem from its efforts to dominate the Persian Gulf, interference in the Persian Gulf 
and the bullying of Iran which created the problem. As Hong Kong's pro-PRC paper 
Wen Wei Bao commented in April 1995, 'during the 1980s U.S. military forces shot 
down several Iranian war planes. These U.S. moves prompted Iran to strengthen its 
strategic defence system. Therefore, if Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons 
as the United States has said, it probably is out of consideration of national defence 
strategy. Keeping Iran in a condition of military importance might be desirable from 
the stand-point of U.S. hegemonism. 
China and Iran signed agreement on nuclear cooperation in June 1985, because 
of mounting U.S. concerns. In mid-1986 Iranian decision to buy Silkworm missiles 
from China caused Reagan administration officials to mobilizing pressure on China. 
Washington tried to persuade Beijing that Silkworm may close the Strait of Hormuz, 
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severely disrupting the global economy. The motivation that China was trying to 
initiate cooperation with Iran in the field of military development/modernization, 
Chinese objectives underlying its military cooperation with Iran was due to the fact 
that as Iran is a major regional power and it was in China's interests to gain influence 
with this power. China's assistance to IRI militarily modernization also rested on the 
belief that a military strong Iran served China's interests by containing the United 
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States. 
In addition, it is likely that China will play a key role in Afghan economy also as 
Afghanistan's economic situation in 2005 generated both optimism and alarm. 
Obvious enthusiasm from international investors focused on opportunities arising 
from the need for goods and services to satisfy the domestic demand and the promise 
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of traditional exports of agricultural products and minerals. President Karzai spoke of 
the positive effects of Afghanistan's role as a land bridge connecting the Middle East, 
China, and India and welcomed investments in transportation and power 
. 129 generation. 
Apart from this, China's Africa push is already resulting in a sharp shift in the 
conceived geopolitical status quo. Beijing's influence is beginning to replace that of 
the United States and traditional European powers on the African continent. The 
rise of China's role in African countries makes U.S. aware that oil energy resources 
would be grabbed by China. At the May Day gathering of African leaders in 
Shanghai, the Chinese government promised $20 billion for the continent's 
development. Madagascar's President Marc Ravalomanana enthusiastically said "We 
in Africa must learn from your success". In January, the Chinese foreign ministry 
released a white paper that pointed out that unlike the U.S. and European investments, 
Chinese finance for Africa would be driven by equity and sustainable development. 
Technology transfer, the entry of Afiican goods into the Chinese markets without 
barriers and the entry of Chinese finance for development projects are the main 
elements of the Chinese strategy. With the U.S. and European aid at a low point and 
with resistance from the U.S. and Europe to compromise on the debt burden of 
Afiican states, the Chinese proposal was welcomed in many parts of Afiica. For 
people in the Heritage Foundation and in the White House, AFRICOM is as much a 
response to China as it is to the increased anti-terrorist efforts in the continent. 
As Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said "Afiica plays an increasingly 
important role in our energy security; since 9/11, the urgency of a stable source of oil 
has increased." 
Eighty per cent of the oil reserves discovered between 2001 and 2004 come 
from West Afiica, where the U.S. currently procure only 12 per cent of its total 
supply. West Afiica is a crucial site for U.S. interests' to a great extent. For decades, 
the oil regions in West Afiica have been "swamps of insurgency". As war over oil in 
West Africa have set the continent on fire, the US has thus far engaged with these 
conflicts through Afiica's national armies, who have increasingly become the 
protector or guard of large corporations. None of this can be justified directly as 
protection of the extraction of resources, so it has increasingly been couched in the 
language of the war on terror. The Pan-Sahel Initiative (created in 2002), Mali, 
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Mauritania and Niger In 2004, the U.S. extended this to the major oil producing 
countries of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia and renamed it the Trans-Sahara 
Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). After 9/11, the U.S. moved a special operations 
force into a former French foreign legion base. Camp Lemonier. In July 2003, the 
U.S. earned the right to deploy P-3 Orion Aerial Surveillance Aircraft in Tamanrasset, 
Algeria under the guise of the War on Terror. The U.S. government moved forces into 
various parts of Africa, where they trained African armies and have been able to 
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mtervene m the mcreasmgly dangerous resources war. 
Following the revolution in the international system in 1989-91, China's leaders 
concluded that U.S. hegemony-no longer deadlocked as the Soviet Union-was now on 
a rampant offensive and constituted the most serious threat to China's security. 
Chinese analysis developed a long litany of U.S. moves in a purported drive for global 
domination, attempts to subvert Communist Party of China (CPC) via human rights," 
thereby replication in the PRC, the US success in disintegrating the USSR; 
maintaining NATO when it was no longer necessary and admitting the new ex-
socialist states of Eastern Europe into the Western military bloc (a development which 
Chinese analysis styled the Eastern expansion of NATO"); encouragement of Japan to 
play a larger role in Asia and the world; encouragement of Taiwanese independence 
and separation from China; development of antimissile defences designed to nullify 
China's nuclear retaliatory capability; forging a sfrategic and military partnership with 
India; and drawing Cenfral Asia into the U.S. military system. In the Chinese view of 
things, the Middle East constituted a crucial arena of the post-cold war U.S. 
hegemonic offensive. The aim of U.S. policy in that the region was to bring its rich 
energy resources under U.S. confrol as a stepping stone to global domination. This 
Beijing believed was the true rationale behind the 1991 war against Iraq and the dual 
containment of Iraq and Iran. Washington was determined either to compel those 
regimes to bend to U.S. will or to replace them and the energy resources of the entire 
Persian Gulf brought under secure U.S. control. The U.S. dream of global domination 
would come closer to realization. United States global domination was antithetical to 
China's interests since the closer the United States moved to apply pressure on the 
PRC. "' 
Recently, U.S. tried pursuing India to sign nuclear agreement with U.S. was 
viewed that it was not all about energy as pointed out by Siddharth Varadarajan in The 
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Hindu; U.S. strategy after 9/11 was likely to make close ties with India to contain 
China as Mr. Bum's article provides clearly articulated deliverables that "India and 
U.S. can also do much more to create a stronger military partnership.'" He elaborates 
that the US and India need to complete a series of defence sales that would meet 
India's needs and complement India's overall defence relationship and build on an 
already impressive series of joint military exercises by improving the interoperability 
of our armed forces to respond to global contingencies. In the latter context, Mr. 
Bums mentions the post Tsunami quadrilateral naval effort involving the U.S. India, 
Australia and Japan. The post-Tsunami operation is the model on which the Bush 
administration would like to develop wider security cooperation between this group of 
133 four. The target of this gang-up is clearly, China. 
From an evaluation of many events given above it could be seen that the U.S. 
was trying to build its military base in Afghanistan after 9/11 as a long-term plan to 
contain China. The movement of U.S. forces into Central Asian countries after 9/11 
under the name of counter terrorism makes China suspicions that the U.S. is trying to 
contain them. The military exercise, Centraxbat-97, in which 500 paratroopers from 
the 82"^ Airbome Division of the US Army flew 19 hours and 12,320 kilometers to 
join a week-long exercise in Central Asia, as a part of the NATO sponsored 
partnership of peace, has been viewed by Beijing as the US containment of China and 
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a sources, of great security concem for it. China has been monitoring the presence 
of American troops very closely and Central Asian states have been attempting a 
delicate balancing act in their relations with Beijing and Washington. China's view 
was that, any military operations undertaken by Washington and its allies in 
Afghanistan should have specific objectives so as to reduce casualties of the innocent 
people. Beijing may not like the presence of American troops so close to its borders, 
but it does stand to gain from the additional fire power mustered against Islamist 
separatist movements in Cenfral Asia. Since the politburo of Chinese communist party 
has identified separatism in Xinjiang as the main threat to the stability of the People's 
135 Republic, its members may consider the US presence a price worth paying. 
China's concem in Xinjiang is not only about the ethnic and religious upsurge among 
the minorities but also about the protection of region's 30 billion tons of proven 
petroleum which are critical to China's energy security. Over the year, foreign oil 
companies have been exploring more oil in Tarim basin. China also can not afford the 
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situation to let loose in Xingjian as it may encourage the Tibetans and Mongols to 
intensify their struggle for independence. The instability and ethnicity linkages 
between China and Central Asian Republics worked as a contributor to organize 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The first meeting of what was to become 
a major regional grouping was held in Shanghai in 1996 and was attended by the 
foreign Ministers of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. An 
agenda was constructed around border security, combating insurgent Islamic forces 
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and the smuggling of Islamic literature, weapons and narcotics. This organization 
also could be viewed as a means for China's attempts to counter the hegemony of the 
US. As we have seen recently Anti-Terrorist war games organized by the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) got underway in Russia in August 2007, about 6,000 
soldiers, 1,000 combat vehicles and scores of aircraft had joined in practice combat 
skills in "Peace Mission 2007" a week-long drill in the Chelyabinsk region of Russia 
in western Siberia. 
It is the biggest military exercise staged by the SCO and the first one involving 
all the six member states - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. The military exercises by the six-nation bloc will be followed by a bigger 
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maneuver and expanded defence ties, the head of Russia's general staff said. 
VII. A long term plan to counter Russia 
The 9/11 events in United States and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan, not 
only changed world politics, but also brought a new angle to the struggle for influence 
in Central Asia. The energy war game makes the super powers to stay around Caspian 
Sea and Central Asia, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. After the 9/11 
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attacks, this area became strategically even more important. The US now sought to 
reassert its own overt influence on global geopolitical developments with a view to 
ensuring its own security. Vijay Kapur has pointed out that the major shift in U.S. 
foreign policy in the post 9/11 period has been that the US now tries to increase its 
influence in the newly independent nations comprising the commonwealth of 
independent states (CIS) or Central Asia. A reflective article by Vadim Solovelev 
entitled Washington Maintains the New World Order (December 25, 1998) contended 
that "Washington would maintain the new world order and Moscow's influence 
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would be both limited and slighted". This assertion was particularly telling on a 
security establishment, which found itself suddenly irrelevant in the backdrop of 
NATO's relentless eastward expansion and budgetary difficulties, which further 
eroded the operational effectiveness of the Russian military set up. America's 
unilateral withdrawal from the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) stocked 
more concerns in the Russian governmental set up, which felt that the US was also 
questioning its perceived 'military" primacy in the Near Abroad a Russian euphemism 
for the newly independent nations comprising the commonwealth of independent 
states (CIS). '"^ ^ 
Before the events of U Sept, one of the key concerns for the American 
policymakers has been as to find ways to secure access to the oil and natural gas 
reserves in the first half of 21^' century. The obvious focus was. Central Asia and 
Caucasus. After they declared independence, the United States encouraged the newly 
independent states to adopt western - style economic reforms and the integration of 
these states and the eventual elimination of the Russian influence in this region. The 
year 1994-95 was the year when the US emerged as a major player in Central Asia 
when it rejected Russia's claims to an energy monopoly. In February 1995, the US 
decided to support an energy pipeline running through Turkey and not Russia. State 
Department sources told Newsweek that the endorsement reflects major shift in the US 
policy towards Central Asia. The new approach, coordinated by the National Security 
Council, is designed to break Russia's grip on Central Asia's oil export. 
At the same time, the US was also playing a role in the Central Asian Republics 
(CARs) energy economy. It urged Turkmenistan to send gas to Ukraine and also 
offered Kazakhstan certain guarantees if Moscow turns off the oil tap. In May, 1995, 
the then under-secretary of energy, William White, toured Central Asia, urging the 
republics to regard themselves as important producers of oil and natural gas and to 
treat Russia and Iran as rivals. Also in 1995, Glen Rose, the head of the energy policy 
section of the State Department, said that Russian position must not be imposed on 
the states that prefer a more normal division of the Caspian. Washington does not 
recognise any spheres of influence. Till this time, denying Russia the right to 
influence the regional economy and politics seemed to be the major concern of the 
United States. Therefore, its commitment to multiple pipelines should also be seen as 
the continuation of the policy of denying Russia any significant role in the region. In 
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November 1999 Washington arranged for the signing of protocols on the construction 
of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for oil (See map-9). Washington has also told Georgia 
that any oil shipped out of the Caspian through its ports should go in part to Ukraine 
to alleviate its energy dependence on Russia. 
While Russia would not only like the export routes to be controlled by any one 
other than itself but also the control over the oil reserves will help the US to 
142 perpetuate its influence over Russia. These states, regard as hardheaded 
commercial interests, are viewed by Russian as 'incipient interventionism'. Russia is 
worried about these developments and the possibilities of hostile hands on pipeline 
taps. Russian has historic and legal claims to the Caspian Sea and has insisted that it 
must be made a party to any agreement on sharing oil and natural gas resources of the 
region. Russia attempts to control the flow of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Tvirkmenistan has been viewed in western perceptions as attempts by 
the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines for 
the north via Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control over the 
flow of oil and gas to western markets and will make the West vulnerable to Russia's 
political whims. Russian energy policy could also be a part of an overall policy which 
aims to keep the west out of the Central Asian states preserving it under an 
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exclusively Russian sphere of influence. With this scramble over energy resources 
in Central Asia, Afghanistan became a hot-bed of big power rivalries. The US was 
trying to make Afghanistan as a land-bridge to build a pipeline route from Central 
Asia to the world market. From Afghanistan to Pakistan's ports and to Indian market 
from these ports could also present an alternative for Central Asian countries to export 
their natural resources, gas and oil to the world market. As we have seen during 
Afghan civil war that both U.S. and Russia had a hand in backing factional groups to 
preserve their interests. As in Ahmed Rashid's conclusion about US that it was 
backing the Taliban against Russia. The Americans were supporting the Taliban either 
directly or indirectly through UNOCAL or through its allies, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia. But Ahmed Rashid focused on whether there was a revival of the old CIA-ISl 
connection from the Afghan jihad era; it became apparent that the strategy over 
pipelines had become the driving force behind Washington's interests in the Taliban, 
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which in turn was prompting a counter - reaction from Russia. Russians were also 
reported as having a hand in backing northern alliance as a counterforce to 
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145 Taliban. As President Boris Yeltsin said in 1998. 'by keeping the conflict in 
Afghanistan on the boil, Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to 
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maintain a military presence in the Central Asian Republics (CARs). It was in the 
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interest of Russia to keep the region unstable by arming the anti -Taliban alliance. 
Today's great game is also between expanding and contracting empires. As a 
weakened and bankrupt Russia attempts to keep a grip on what it still views as its 
frontiers in Central Asia and control the flow of Caspian oil through pipelines that 
traverse Russia, the USA is thrusting itself into the region on the back of proposed oil 
pipelines which would by pass Russia, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan are building their 
own communication links with the region and want to be the preferred route of choice 
for future pipelines heading east, west or south. 
An analytical article in Frontline, told us about a cold war which will emerge 
again between the West and Russia. The year 2007 will see the confrontation between 
Russia and the West over the energy resources of the former Soviet Union that gained 
new intensity throughout the past year. The west watched with mounting alarm as 
Russia skillfiilly used its vast oil and gas resources to set a new energy agenda that is 
not only reshaping the domestic and international energy markets but triggering shifts 
149 in global power equation, effectively eroding the West's post-cold war gains. 
The placement of American troop contingents in nations likes Uzbekistan and 
Georgia in the aftermath of the events of 11 Sept, ostensibly to pre-empt the forces 
promoting terror and instability, reinforced this feeling of vulnerability within the 
Russian political establishment. American interest in oil and gas pipeline development 
extending through Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, among other nations in the 
Caspian Sea region enabled Russia to demand its share in the shape of continued 
influence on developments in the region to the exclusion of the American efforts at 
marginalization. This proactive approach motivated the Russian establishment to 
fiirther reinforce and expand their economic and military relationship with the new 
nation states in Central Asia as a counterpoise to growing American influence, a 
scenario which saw growth of Russian military contingents in Central Asian nations 
like Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These troop placements were 
ostensibly to provide a bulwark against the movement of Islamic fiandamentalist 
groups into the region but also implicitly served to stabilize the undemocratic 
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autocracies; which became the norm for what passed for effective governance in the 
region 
Under the name of war on terror, U.S. had a hidden plan related to the energy 
poHcy, especially in Central Asia and in the Gulf. In the words of a Former Deputy 
Secretary of the US Department of Energy, Edward Morse, 'along with the American 
campaign against terrorism another battle is being waged perhaps one no less 
important - the battle for supremacy in the energy sector between the largest oil 
exporters-Saudi Arabia and Russia". In 2001, in pursuit of its national interests, 
Russia began a process of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil 
producer despite having labeled it as a country responsible for international terrorism. 
What Russia needs to determine is whether it should compete with the Gulf oil 
producers, that too, Saudi Arabia or, whether it should cooperate with them, and the 
profit made from supplying to the world energy market particularly the U.S. in 
competition with these states be worth the loss of influence in the region. 
The United States, Britain and Russia have particular interests in the internal 
stability of the Gulf region nations and in the political reforms in these countries. Its 
principal concern goes beyond the intricacies of the world energy market to a factor 
that can destabilize not only Russia but also many of its neighbors. This concern, in 
the words of Dr. Zlobin, is '"the inadmissibility of the expansion of politicized Islam, 
using terrorism as its method of struggle". With a large Muslim population of its own 
and several neighboring states with a majority Muslim population, Russia needs to 
support international policies that combat Muslim radicalism and its international 
manifestation in the form of terrorism. It has to walk the tightrope of managing an oil 
policy that will see it optimally exploiting its potential as an oil producer, while 
preserving political influence in the Gulf region and in international forums in defence 
. , . 150 
01 Its national interests. 
Although the USSR had theoretically no need for Middle Eastern petroleum, 
Soviet interests in the area's hydrocarbons lay in the possibility of preserving its own 
reserves by exploiting the low-cost resources of the region by denying them to the 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and to Japan in a prelude 
to ordering a general conventional war, and in contriving interruptions in supply that 
could be turned to the Soviet advantage by splitting allies from the USA in a divisive 
tactic to create oil shortages as a means of weakening allied commitments to US-led 
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security arrangements. In addition, according to Maqsudul Hasan Nuri that, of late, 
Russians are getting wary of the substantial increase in US-Turkish influence in the 
region and the resultant threat to Russian interests in the Caspian Sea. Strangely 
enough, the Russians do not follow a coherent and focused policy. Their foreign and 
defence ministries concentrate on security while those of fuel and energy are focusing 
on economic interests. Some of these objectives are to dismantle the US position of 
power in the region; and weaken the re-emergence of OPEC, and finally, strengthen 
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ties with Iran and join the Caspian via pipelines with the Persian Gulf 
RMSsia ass\imed the presidency of the GToup of Eight (G-8) in 2006, President 
Vladimir Putin called for redefining the concept of energy security so that it involved 
not only the security of oil and gas supplies for the consumer, but also the security of 
sustained demand for the producer. Putin's energy security model further threatens 
western interests because it replaces the so-called "liberal, open global oil market 
order" dominated by American companies with a network of long-term agreements 
and joint ventures with other energy-producing and energy - consuming countries in 
the developing world, such as China and India. 
In 2006, the Russian and Iranian Presidents agreed to coordinate their gas 
marketing strategies in European and Asian markets. Gazprom signed a memorandum 
of understanding with the Algerian state company Sonatrach, the second biggest 
supplier of gas to Europe after Gazprom, to cooperate in upstream asset swaps, joint 
bidding for assets in third countries, and in the LNO business. In September the 
Gazprom chief paid the first visit to Qatar, another major gas producer, to discuss 
cooperation in the field of gas. 
Recently, Russia has been the moving spirit behind the idea of a gas OPEC, an 
organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body formalized at a meeting 
of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on April 9, 2007. The 
idea was to unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which between them account for 60 per cent 
of global gas reserves, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas-exporting 
countries. Russia has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and 
downstream projects with all of these countries. The idea of gas OPEC has rattled the 
U.S. and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and 
leave them out in the cold. Russian politicians admitted that the gas OPEC will be 
called upon, among other things, to offset western efforts to control the energy 
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markets. In contrast to Europe and the US, India could benefit from the establishment 
of a gas OPEC. A priority task for the gas cartel would be to carve out gas exports 
markets to reduce competition among its members. This could lend greater 
momentum to plans to build the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, which would 
help Russia avoid clashing with Iran on the European gas markets by sending Iranian 
gas to Asia. Putin has confirmed Russia's willingness to provide financial and 
technological resources for the project. Putin has used the knockout combination of 
Russia's energy resources and arms export potential to project its influence across the 
world. Moscow defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, by supplying $ 700 million worth 
of Tor Ml advanced air-defence missile systems to Teheran last year. It was the 
biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000, when 
Putin lifted an arms embargo imposed on Iran during Yeltsin's rule. Notwithstanding 
the nuclear controversy, Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common 
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energy strategy, may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. 
Russia and Iran share strategic interests in Central Asia, the Caspian and the 
Caucasus. Putin pointed out during his visit to Iran recently that the two countries had 
jointly helped end the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990 and were working to 
normalize the situation in Afghanistan. Moscow and Tehran are both opposed to 
western plans to build gas and oil pipelines across Caspian by passing Russia and 
Iran; both covintries insisted at the Caspian Summit that such projects required the 
consent of all the five littoral states. Russia strongly supported Iran's initiative to set 
up an economic cooperation organisation of the Caspian nations and volunteered to 
host the first meeting of the new body in Astrakhan in2008. 
Putin's visit to Teheran strengthened an emerging strategic axis between Russia, 
Iran and Armenia as a counterbalance in the Caucasus to NATO-aspiring Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. Putin welcomed Iran's signing of an agreement with Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the Caspian Summit to build a railway line along the 
Caspian, linking Iran with Russia. It will be a part of the North-South Transport 
Corridor, a joint project of Russia, Iran and India. The Russian railways, the state-
owned railway company of Russia, is already involved in a multinational project to 
build a 350-km railway between the town of Astara on Azerbaijan's border and 
Kazvin on Iran territory. 
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Russia's natural gas company, Gazprom, has already invested $750 million in 
projects in Iran, and is planning to invest $1.7 billion in building an oil refinery jointly 
with Iran in the neighboring Armenia. The plant will process the oil pumped from 
Tabriz in northern Iran. Iran's Deputy Oil Minister Hossein Noqrekar-Shirazi said that 
the two sides had discussed further projects involving refineries, pipelines and gas 
fields in Iran during Putin's visit. Teheran supports Gazprom's possible involvement 
in the construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Another aim of Putin's 
visit to Tehran was to strengthen bilateral ties and give them a strategic dimension. 
Reports said that the two countries were discussing 130 economic projects together, 
worth more than $100 billion. During Putin's visit, both sides "agreed to increase the 
two nation' economic and business exchanges to $200 billion within the next 10 
years'', the Iranian President's website said. This would mean a 100-fold jump in 
bilateral trade fi-om the current level of $2 billion. Putin is reported to have told 
Ayatollah Khomeini that Russia was ready to "expand ties without limitations" with 
Iran. 
Russia is Iran's main arms and technology supplies, like combat planes, 
helicopters, diesel submarines, tanks and air defence systems. Teheran has given 
Moscow a long shopping list of weapon platforms it wants to buy. Russia has agreed 
to supply engines for Iran's new combat planes, Azarakhsh and Shafaq. 
Putin's visit to Iran demonstrated Russia's new assertive foreign policy, which 
crystallized as the Russian economy bounced back fi-om the crisis of the 1990s. The 
visit strengthened Russia's relations with Iran, raised its profile in the region, and 
imdermined the U.S. bullying tactics towards Iran. The rising tensions between 
US and Iran, and the U.S. threats to use military power to strike Iran made Russia 
issue several stem warnings to the US and its allies against using force in Iran. 
President Putin in his February speech in Munich, Germany, vowed to challenge 
Washington's policy of international dictates and unrestrained use of force. 
Addressing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit at Shanghai 
in June, 2007, Pufin called for the setting up of an SCO energy club. In fact, Russia 
has come a long way towards forming such a club, having signed long-term oil and 
gas deals with China, and strategic pacts with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
157 Uzbekistan for the purchase and joint development of their hydrocarbons. 
Recently, in May 2007 Russia signed two landmark pacts with Central Asian states to 
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build natural gas pipelines that would cement Moscow's control over the region's 
energy resources and thwart western efforts to divert their exports away from Russia. 
Meeting in Turkmenistan's city of Turkmenbashi on the Caspian Sea, the leaders of 
Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to construct a 1-bilion 500-km gas 
pipeline to export Turkmen gas via Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. Under a 
separate agreement signed in Turkmenbashi, Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan agreed to overhaul and expand a soviet-era gas pipeline carrying Central 
Asian gas through Uzbekistan to Russia. The two proposed pipelines will carry up to 
90 billion cubic meters of gas by 2028, Russia's Energy Minister Victor Khristenko 
said. This is a major success for Russia enabling it to retain control over the bulk of 
Central Asian gas exports. The deals are also a blow to an alternative plan lobbied by 
the United States to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea to ship Central Asian 
gas via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, by passing Russia. Mr. Putin's week-long 
tour of Central Asia was deliberately timed to coincide with an energy summit in 
Poland which invited the leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to 
discuss oil and gas routes to Europe around Russia. Russia and Kazakhstan also 
agreed to expand a pipeline that carries Kazakhstan's oil to the Russian Black Sea 
port of Novorossiysk (see map-5). So far, Russia has been the sole re-exporter of 
Turkmen gas to the European markets. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil 
and natural gas stocks which the U.S. and European Union were striving to divert 
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through a pipeline linking them with Azerbaijan to bypass Russia. 
European Union efforts to loosen Russia's energy grip by seeking alternative 
supplies from Central Asia via the Caucasus suffered a stuiming setback. But even 
before President Vladimir Putin agreed to the deal, expanding his control of 
Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's gas and oil exports, Europe's drive to diversify was 
running on empty. 
Russia supplies about 25% of Europe's gas and a growing proportion of its oil 
(see map-10). That is increasingly seen as a strategic weakness that could leave the 
continent vulnerable, to politically motivated energy blackmail. This was the fate that 
allegedly befell Ukraine and Belarus in 2006. Lithuania is currently under similar 
pressure after Moscow cut oil deliveries. 
Energy security will figure high on the agenda at EU-Russia summit in Samara. 
A key aim is to induce Moscow to sign up to the energy Charter, a set of rules 
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covering trade investment and transportation of oil and gas. But experts predict the 
Kremlin will continue to resist the scheme. Russia is focusing instead on increasing its 
market dominance firom production through to the point of sale, by expanding its 
investments in Europe (while denying European businesses reciprocal access). The 
state-controlled energy giant Gazprom now has a stake in 16 of the EU"s 27 countries, 
while the remaining are divided on the question of how to respond, Gazprom is busy 
maximizing its advantage. "Gazprom already had direct access to end-consumers in 
three of the biggest EU gas markets: Italy, Germany and France,"' said Katinka 
Barysch, in a study published by the Centre for European Reforms. In the UK, it 
hopes to raise its market share to 10% by the end of the decade. Not content with 
controlling pipelines, Gazprom is building power plants and gas storage facilities in 
various EU countries". 
Russia's other main tactics is its forging of bilateral deals that undermine a 
collective pan-European approach. Moscow's most spectacular success was the 
agreement with Germany on a Baltic pipeline that is to bypass Poland. But Mr. Putin 
has also dangled the prospect of individual supply and distribution arrangements with 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and a host of other energy-hungry EU members. 
Moscow's aggressive, and increasingly successful, attempts to entrench its 
dominant position have also undercut political and financial support for alternative 
European supply projects that would bypass Russia. One is the so called Nabucco 
pipeline to bring gas from the Caspian. Russia also deals with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan and has also raised possibly terminal doubts about the viability of US 
and European ideas for a Central Asia pipeline. While EU countries are looking for 
another route of pipeline energy to avoid dependence on Russia as EU foreign 
ministers agreed a counter offensive recently to intensify energy and other 
cooperations with Black Sea countries, including new neighbors Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Acting unilaterally, Poland is leading the efforts 
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to build East European links with Caspian Basin energy producers. 
After the Sudden death of Turkmenistan's long time autocratic ruler Suparmurat 
Niyazov in December gave the U.S. and the European Union a new chance to push 
through their strategic plan to build the Nabucco pipeline, which would run from 
Cenfral Asia through the southern Caucasus and Turkey to Europe, by passing 
Russia. The U.S will also lobby for the creation of an "Energy NATO" as against 
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Russia. The idea is to make Europe speak to Russia with one voice and force it to 
ratify the Energy Charter, which would give western companies free access to Russian 
energy resources and pipelines. "Energy NATO" would stop European nations from 
striking bilateral energy deals with Russia and prevent Russian companies from 
buying into downstream energy projects in Europe. Washington also seeks to block 
the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which would bring Russian gas 
directly to Germany across the Baltic Sea, and scuttle Gazprom's plan to expand the 
Blue stream gas pipeline - the Russian alternative to the Nabuuco project running 
from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea. 
In addition, India, China, Japan and South Korea are all looking to benefit 
from Russia's plans to diversify its energy export routes, which mostly go to Europe 
today. Moscow plans to increase exports of crude to Asia from 3 to 30 per cent and 
that of gas from 5 to 25 per cent by 2020. As Talmiz Ahmad pointed out that over 
the next 25 years, the energy requirements of Asia are expected to increase 2 Vi times. 
By 2020, one-third of the world output, i.e., 1.35 trillion cubic meters will be 
internationally traded of which 50 per cent will be transported as piped gas and 38 per 
cent as LNG. Given the rapidly increasing Asian demand and the availability of huge 
gas reserves in Asia, piped gas and LNG will both be utilized and indeed, will 
complement each other in the energy-mix of the principal consumers. 
The Asian Gas grid envisages the setting up of a series of pipelines that will 
carry natural gas to various consumption centers in East and South Asia. According to 
current estimates, the additional pipelines required to be set up would be about 22,500 
km., costing about 22 billion dollars. The Asian continent, particularly Russia, the 
principal Asian consuming countries and the major producing countries of the Gulf 
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are readily able to provide the financial and technological resources for the project. 
Further more; the SCO has also undercut the U.S. strategic position in Central 
Asia. It called on the U.S. to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces deployed 
in the region after 9/11 to support the anti-Taliban campaign in neighboring 
Afghanistan. It also encouraged Uzbekistan in 2005 to disallow a U.S. air base on its 
temtory. 
A confidential North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) report prepared in 
run-up to its summit in Riga, Latvia, in November, 2007, warned that Russia was out 
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to set up a gas cartel stretching from Algeria to Iran and central Asia, to use as a 
political weapon against Europe. 
Putin's natural resources nationalism has spurred a global wave of 
nationalization and consolidation of state control over energy resources from Central 
Asia to West Asia, from Africa to Latin America. Russian supplies of weapons to 
energy - producing developing countries, such as Venezuela and Algeria, embolden 
them to challenge the dominance of the United States. Resoiirces rich countries today 
control over 70 per cent of global energy resources, while the share of Western energy 
giants has shrunk to less than 10 per cent. This has thrown the West into a state of 
panic. 
The mounting global energy leverage that is increasingly coming to reside in the 
hands of Russia and its strategic partners is an irresistible power, literally unequalled 
in all human history, for it is the power to throttle or even to credibly threaten to 
strangle the highly industrialized economies of the West", warns W. Joseph Stroupe, a 
writer on energy geopolitics. Where has all the hype about the West's victory in the 
cold war gone? Marshall Goldman, associate director of the Davis center for Russian 
Studies at Harvard, U.S. claims that the U.S. is defenceless in the face of Russia's 
energy wealth which has made it more powerful now than at any time in its history. 
What drives the West especially mad is that its companies can no longer walk into the 
Russian energy supermarket and pick up assets as they like. Moscow has made it clear 
that foreign companies will only get access to Russian energy resources if they offer 
their own assets and technologies in return, and if Russian companies find these assets 
worth swapping. Explaining Gazprom's decision to develop Stockmen alone, Putin 
said that foreign companies had failed "to offer adequate assets" in exchange for a 
stake in the vast Russian field. 
To add insult to injury, Putin in October, 2007, approved plans to promote 
Russia's own crude oil Mix REBCO (Russian Export Brand Crude Oil ), which 
should eventually replace Brent as a pricing benchmark, and to set up the Russian fuel 
and Energy Exchange where the new mix will be traced in Roubles, rather than in 
dollars. 
A month later, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar urged NATO to intervene to stop 
Russia from flexing its energy muscles. "The alliance must avow that defending 
against such attacks using as a weapon is an Article 5 commitment, '"the outgoing 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on the sidelines of the Riga 
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summit, referring to the need to invoke the alHance's mutual defence clause. The 
comprehensive political guidance document adopted at the summit identified '"the 
disruption of the flow of vital resources'" among the main risks or challenges for the 
alliance for the next 10 to 15 years. While the NATO refrained from pointing the 
finger at Moscow, the U.S. has vowed to take on Russia in 2007. National Intelligence 
Director, John Negroponte, predicted a further worsening of relations with Moscow in 
the coming years. He accused Russia of attempting to exploit the leverage that high 
energy prices have afforded it, increasingly using strong-arm tactics against 
neighboring countries". 
"Russian assertiveness will continue to inject elements of rivalry and 
antagonism into U.S. dealing with Moscow, particularly U.S. interactions in the 
former Soviet Union and will dampen U.S. ability to cooperate with Russia on issues 
ranging from counter-terrorism and non-proliferation to energy and democracy 
promotion in West Asia", the top U.S. intelligence official said in his annual review of 
global threats for the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 11, 2007. The 
statement amounted to be the declaration of a new policy for containment of Russia. 
U.S. media readily responded to the call; It's time we started thinking of Vladimir 
Putin's Russia as an enemy of the United States", the Wall Street Journal fumed ". . . 
It is because the foreign policy of Russia has become, openly and often gratuitously, 
hostile to the U.S." 
Energy will be the main battle ground in a new cold war the U.S. is going to 
wage on Russia; and the direction of attack has been already identified. One is 
Georgia and the other is Ukraine, key transit countries for oil and exports to Europe, 
which the U.S. will try to put under its control by getting them admitted to NATO, the 
Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which transports Caspian Sea oil to Turkey, 
runs across Georgia, while Ukraine is the main transit route for Russian natural gas 
164 bound for Europe. In 2006, Washington put Georgia on the fast track for 
admission to NATO, together with several East European countries that have been 
waiting for their turn since 2002. The U.S. Senate also voiced readiness "to support 
efforts by Ukraine to join the alliance even though Ukraine's Prime Minister said his 
country had no plans to apply. 
Russia was convinced that it has already occupied the key global position and 
that it cannot be shifted out of that position no matter how vigorously the US and its 
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allies may try. Middle East instability is on the rise with no relief in sight. That 
solidifies Russia's new position, oil-rich Central Asia is moving firmly into alignment 
with both Russia and China. Europe is absolutely obliged to rely on Russia as regards 
energy, so is Asia. There is no way out in the near fiature, for at least a decade or two. 
Anyway, in that space of time, Russia easily could, if it were obliged by US 
unilateralism, apply tremendous economic and political pressure to severely damage, 
or credibly threaten to such damage, to the economies of the West. 
The global order is re-dividing into roughly two de facto blocs-one has the US at 
its core and the other has Russia-China at its core. Energy is the major dividing line 
between the two blocs. As astronomers say that at the center of a galaxy there exists 
an energetic black hole that fuels the entire structure and keeps order, and that 
sometimes, if the black hole at the center weakens, the structure can begin to come 
apart. If America is likened to the black hole at the center of the American "galaxy" 
then Russia-China is the black hole at the Center of a new Eurasian "galaxy'". 
From the above evaluation, it emerges that this region has become a battle 
ground for super powers and also for nearly emerging powers. Afghanistan will be 
one of the more geo-strategically significant nation for this region as Cheney viewed 
"the Caspian region is strategically significant" and by 1998, the strategy was 
becoming clear, to incorporate the inhabitants of the Caspian, Central Asia and the 
Southern Caucasus (with the exception of Armenia) into a vast US dependency, 
anchored upon the construction of a massive new oil and gas pipeline infi-astructure 
stretching along the East-West energy corridor that linked Turkey, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and ultimately 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. But Afghanistan has become the ground for 
energy war game between Russia and the US even before 9/11 as Ahmed Rashid 
wrote that 'the battle of wills between the USA and Russia will dominate fiiture 
pipeline competition. Russia remains adamant in keeping the USA out of its Central 
Asian backyard. "We can not help seeing the uproar stirred up in some western 
countries over the energy resources of the Caspian. Some seek to exclude Russia fi-om 
the game and undermine its interests. The so called pipeline war in the region is part 
of this game". Said President Boris Yeltsin in 1998. By keeping the conflict in 
Afghanistan on the boil Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to 
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maintain a military presence in the Central Asian Republics (CARs). 
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Recently, the US accused Iran for helping the resurgent Taliban forces in 
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Afghanistan. Of course, there is no evidence to prove that Russia has its hand in 
this job, but it could be viewed that Russia seems to agree with Iran because both 
Russia and Iran have become close allies and working together to expel U.S. 
hegemony out of this region. Infact, after US toppled Taliban regime in 2001, Russia 
also has tried to have the role in Afghan's internal affairs, at least the government that 
will come to replace Taliban regime should be pro-Russia party/group. After Hamid 
Karzai, who was picked to head an interim authority in Afghanistan by an UN-
sponsored international conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001, his own 
security in Kabul was maintained by an International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) of 4,000 to 5,000 troops whose command was rotated among various 
170 participating countries. But the Northern Alliance opposes any extensive foreign 
peace keeping force. Russia believes the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate 
government of Afghan, Iran agrees with it to. As Gabrial Koiko wrote that "after 
11 Sept, US compelled to rely principally on the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to 
provide the ground forces without which the Taliban would not have been driven out 
of the cities. But before Russian had covertly armed major components of the 
Northern Alliance after 1996 (many of whose leaders had earlier worked with the 
Soviets) in the hope it would create a buffer along its borders and prevent Islamic 
extremism from spreading to the newly independent former Soviet republics. After 
September 11, they supplied the Northem Alliance with a new infusion of tanks, 
artillery and other heavy equipment. If the Northem Alliance is oriented to any 
172 foreign nation, it is Russia. 
In our opinion, the events of September II, 2001, led the US to invade 
Afghanistan to topple (Taliban) Afghan-government hostile to U.S. and set up a new 
regime which was pro-US and then followed it policy by putting with NATO forces to 
settle in Afghanistan, could be viewed as a long-term plan to contain Russia and 
exclude Russia from Central Asia and Caspian oil and natural gas rich region. As 
Vladimir Radyuhin wrote: '"the top U.S. intelligence official said in his aimual review 
of global threats for the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 11, 2007. His 
173 Statement amounted to the declaration of a new Russian containment policy." 
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There is no doubt that the US is playing its cards closely riot, by cementing its 
ties with India and then moving NATO forces into Afghanistan. Siddharth 
Varadarajan wrote that: the controversy that nuclear negotiations between India and 
the United States tend to agree wholeheartedly, the nuclear agreement is not simply 
about energy. The real intention behind friendly gesture towards India came after 9/11 
events. As said by Mr. Bums in his article about America's expectations vis-a-vis a 
fixture Indian role in Central Asia, "'We are working with Delhi to encourage energy 
rich Central Asian states such as, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to establish oil and 
gas trade with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India". He wrote, "Thereby reducing the lure 
of long term contracts with Iran." What he left unsaid is the expectation now well 
amplified in American policy documents, that India would help the U.S. take Central 
Asia away fi-om Russian and Chinese influence under its "Greater Central Asia" and 
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"Regional Energy Market Access Program". 
The movement of NATO into Afghanistan, after the terrorist attacks on targets 
in the United States for the first time in history NATO, invoked Article 5 of the treaty, 
relating to joint defence clause. The US recognized as the aggrieved party did not 
make use of NATO's support and decided to take an independent action against 
Afghanistan, fi-eely shaping what it termed as the 'Coalition of the Willing: the anti-
terrorist operations started by the U.S. intensified the process of further NATO 
expansion, at the same time reinforcing the international evolution of the alliance in 
terms of building new capabilities to meet the new security challenges of the 21^ 
century. 
The U.S. made it clear that without a fresh definition of its mission, NATO 
would not be able to efficiently oppose the new type of threats the U.S. Defence 
Minister said that if NATO did not transform itself, 'it will not have much to offer the 
world in the 21*' century'. Perhaps it was with this in mind that NATO took command 
of 5,000 strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 
August 2003. 
The new U.S. defence concept articulated in the 2001 Quadrermial Defence 
Review Report moved away from region-based scenarios to capabilities based 
planning, and underlined the need for forces that can handle two major conflicts and 
multiple smaller military operations simultaneously. This shift in strategy moved the 
NATO focus of defence planning fi"om southwest and northeast Eurasia to the 
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southern and eastern region of the Eurasian landmass, North Africa, the Middle East 
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and Southeast Asia. The new US doctrine also calls for transformation and 
1 lf\ 
moderation of NATO to meet the new security threats. 
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CHAPTER-5 
Conclusion 
Afghanistan's history is quite unique where it's poHtical internal and external 
affairs was always mired in the projection of regional and super powers. Since ancient 
time Afghanistan had always been the land of conquest for other powers. With its 
geography which settled in the heartland it remained as a buffer zone of many former 
empires. During Cold War time Afghanistan was a buffer zone of ideology war which 
plunged it into the ground of proxy politics of super powers. When the Cold War 
ended again it plunged into Civil War which was exploited by regional powers as 
their vehicle against their rival states. Even in the 21^ * century the wounds of Afghans" 
who suffered from long history of battles are not yet better. After the event of 
11/September 2001 once again Afghanistan became the military base/ground for a 
super power for hunting down terrorist base/groups with a long term plan to secure 
military base in order to promote their energy interest. 
The US-Afghanistan relations had begun since the pre-World War II period. 
That time Afghanistan was under British rule and continued Russian expansionist 
pressure forced Afghanistan to forge close ties with the United States. Afghanistan 
hoped that making ties with the United States could enable British India and Tsarist 
Russia not to intimidate it. Since 1921 Afghanistan made the efforts to establish 
diplomatic relations with the United States but there was no major breakthrough at 
that time as the U.S. was aware of the fact that Afghanistan was still under Soviet 
influence. The U.S. also knew about Afghanistan-Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, 
in which the two states recognised their mutual independence and agreed not to enter 
into any political or military accord with a third state. The period 1917-1933 was the 
period of U.S. hostility toward the Soviet government; as after communist revolution 
Russia had called for world revolution to destroy the capitalist economic system. 
It was only in 1934, after the U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union, the U.S. came 
to sfrengthen the political and economic relations with Afghanistan. However, the 
U.S. yet did not set up diplomatic mission and still continued to deal with Afghanistan 
through British offices. That time the govenmient of Afghanistan demonstrated its 
confidence in America by granting a 75 years concession to the Inland Exploration 
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Company of New York for the development of Afghanistan's presumed petroleum 
deposits. But the agreement was done without consulting the Soviet Union which led 
to a quarrel between Afghanistan and Russia over the agreement because Soviet 
regarded that Afghanistan was still under its influence. However, later the Inland 
Exploration Company gave up its concession because of fearing possibilities of the 
outbreak of World War II. After the end of World War II the U.S. helped Afghanistan 
in importing its Karakul to American market as it got difficulty in finding market to 
export its Karakul. 
However, in 1942 the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan 
was established at formal level. When the German advance on Stalingrad led to fears 
that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to allies, eastern Iran or 
western Afghanistan were considered as significant locales for an alternate route. The 
presence of U.S. in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. 
In June 1942, the first U.S. ambassador was dispatched to Afghanistan. It seemed that 
the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan was the main reason behind the U.S. 
decision to forge close relationship with it. 
After the end of World War II the U.S. had emerged as the world leader. After 
World War II the containment of Soviet Union became the hallmark of die U.S. 
foreign policy. The U.S. had taken over Great Britain's historic policy of curbing 
Russian expansion in the direction of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the 
plains of India as it had a key position in any military advance toward the Soviet 
Union whether fi-om Iran or fi-om Pakistan. The U.S. got interested in Afghanistan 
more especially because its position was close to Soviet Union border. It was suitable 
for the post-war western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. After the 
end of World War II Afghanistan also came to realise that the power of Great Britain 
as a barrier against Soviet expansion had been replaced by the United States. During 
1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain balanced relationship with Soviet Union and 
the United States. Afghanistan refiised to join any chain of anti-Soviet alliances 
forged under American initiative. 
During Cold War period the U.S. policy toward Afghanistan remained quite 
complicated as it needed allies to contain the Soviet Union. The United States and the 
Soviet Union entered into competition in the field of aid by providing assistance to 
Afghanistan via loans which focused on aid for communications, infi-astructure, 
education, and agriculture. But the U.S. did not provide any military support to 
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guarantee Afghanistan's independence while Afghanistan was badly in need to 
modernize its military equipments. The U.S. did, however, proposed to Afghanistan 
that if it wished to obtain American arms, it should join the military alliance (the 
Baghdad Pact) but Afghanistan ignored to do that as Afghanistan was determined to 
keep a position of non-alignment or neutrality in its relations with the super-powers. 
Afghanistan felt that the U.S. refiased to provide Afghanistan with arms because it 
believed that such assistance was more likely to be used against Pakistan, as both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan were having clash over Pushtunistan issue. While the U.S. 
gave military aid to Afghanistan's neighbours such as Pakistan, Iran, and some other 
countries such as Greece and Turkey all with the purpose of bringing them into their 
military alliance which could be an effective containment of the Soviet Union on its 
southern frontier. This incident made Afghanistan gradually to turn to Soviet Russia 
for military aid. 
In 1978, a military coup put into power the Afghan communist party, which 
quickly signed treaties with Moscow when a popular rebellion threatened to topple the 
Afghan pro- communist regime. The U.S. worried that if the Soviet Union invades 
Afghanistan it could put its fighter bombers close to the oil jugular of the straits of 
Hormuz and could direct access toward the Indian Ocean from their newly acquired 
Afghan bases. 
There were many events indicating that the Soviet Union was creeping into this 
region. In 1975 Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels were maintaining a constant 
sxirveillance of the straits of Hormuz. Soviet Mig 25 reconnaissance aircraft made a 
number of flights over Iran. And there were several occasions of troop movements 
along the Soviet-Iranian border. In 1978, Soviet Union airlifted twenty thousand 
Cuban troops into Ethiopia, not only to assist its communist government in its war 
with Somalia, but dso to establish military facilities across the Red Sea from Saudi 
Arabia. Later that year, a pro -Soviet group in south Yemen took power, thereby 
giving Moscow a beach-head on the Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen soon launched 
an overt military attack on North Yemen. Terrorists launched operations against Saudi 
Arabia from South Yemen and guerrillas conducted attack in a border province of 
Oman and the same year Soviet had signed a friendship treaty with Turkey and some 
probing for an accommodation with Pakistan. 
The U.S. was facing the anger of Arab world which was disappointed with its 
role over Israel-Palestine issue and the aggressive behaviour of Israel to its Arab 
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neighbours. In late 1970 Arab world decided to keep distance from the U.S. and tend 
to accept the role of Soviet Russia instead. This event was a set back to the U.S. effort 
to portray the Soviet Union as the chief threat to the region and to forge an anti-Soviet 
alliance with moderate Arab states. The fall of the Shah of Iran led to the collapse of 
the balance of power in Southwest Asia. These incidents forced the U.S. to create a 
new security framework and reassert its power and influence in the region. The U.S. 
also planned to establish its military bases in Middle East. Probably this plan was the 
seed of the U.S. decision to move its military forces to settle in Afghanistan after the 
event of 11 September. 
To contain Soviet entry into Gulf countries the United States came to realise that 
Afghanistan's location could be frontier area or buffer zone state of Gulf countries. To 
suck the Soviet into Vietnamese quagmire therefore, in 1979 the CIA developed a 
comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan by giving clandestine support to 
Muslim guerillas, ranging from indirect financial assistance to the weapon support 
and encouraging the influx of foreign volunteers from different countries to join with 
the Mujahedeen forces (Islamic guerilla). In 1989 the pressure of heavy arms that was 
supported by the United States and its allies to the Muslim guerillas (mujahedeen) 
caused Soviet Union to withdraw its military from Afghanistan. 
However, the United States was aware of the fact that giving military support to 
these forces of Muslim guerillas (mujahedeen) would soon thereafter turn their fiiry 
on the United States. But the United States chose to give military supports to 
Mujahideen because Islam was a geopolitical reality in the region and the United 
States was in a difficult situation. At that time American policy makers still focused 
on the cold war threat of the Soviets communism that is why choosing to arm the 
Islamic ftindamentalists fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan was more important 
than worrying about the threats of those Mujahideen. The main goals of the United 
State at that time was only the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and if it 
could not do so at least made Soviet involvement as costly as possible. 
After an accord (Geneva Accord in April 1988) was signed between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, guaranteeing non-interference and non-intervention in each 
other's affairs; a similar agreement was signed between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in what both had agreed on non-intervention in Afghanistan and 
promised to act as guarantors of the Accord. This Accord paved the way for Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was completed in February 1989. But a friendly 
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pro-Soviet government had remained in power in Kabul after Soviet troops had left. 
The United States and its allies still continue to support seven parties of Islamic 
guerrillas to fight jihad and root out Afghan Pro-Soviet government which finally 
caused to an end of pro-Soviet Afghan regime in 1992. 
The withdrawal of Soviet forces and the fall of pro-Soviet Afghan regime in 
April 1992 put an end to the communist era in Afghanistan. The human tragedy of 
long traditional ethnic rivalry and its tribal tradition of the regional struggle for 
influence had come to ensure a power vacuum in Afghanistan once again. It turned to 
be the ground of civil war of ethnic rivalry within Afghanistan itself And soon it 
became the ground of proxy war of regional powers. They exploited the factional 
rivalry in Afghan civil war as their vehicle to preserve self interest or against rival 
state. The discovery of large source of energy, oil and gas in the newly emerged 
Central Asian countries and the Caspian Sea also encouraged outside powers to 
involve with their favorite factional group in Afghanistan that could preserve its 
interest. The landlocked Central Asian countries were looking for the alternative of 
land-bridge to run pipeline for flowing their oil and gas resources to world market. 
From a geopolitical point of view Afghanistan formed a potential 'land - bridge" for 
bulk trade or oil and gas pipelines to be constructed from the Central Asian states to 
markets in Pakistan, India and elsewhere in the world via Karachi or another Pakistani 
port on the Arabian sea. Afghanistan's territory could also provide Central Asian 
Countries an access way to world markets and could be an alternate to total 
dependence upon Russia's monopoly on trade routes. But it depended which 
government was in place in Kabul, therefore peace and stability in Afghanistan was a 
prerequisite to run the project of oil pipelines construction. 
Since the early 1990s the United States was impelled by the oil lobby to 
underestimate the consequences of the disintegration of the equilibrium in central 
Asia. The dismantling of Soviet power was perceived as the beginning of a lucrative 
period of exploitation, with U.S. oil companies controlling the vast energy fields of 
the region. These events made Afghanistan an arena in which regional rivals were 
competing to influence favorite group as stage to preserve its geopolitics and its 
interest in Afghanistan. While during 1994-1996 the battle of different facfional group 
was heading on collision, Taliban was the factional group that U.S. believed that it 
could be most suitable government and had the capability to bring stability in 
Afghanistan so that the desired goal could be achieved. There was no doubt that the 
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U.S. administration and its oil companied appreciated the development when the 
Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. 
The factional rivalry in Afghan civil war was also fit in the U.S. strategy of 
containing Iran. Since pro-American regime (Shah) was overthrown by an anti 
American group in November 1979, Iran posed a frontal challenge to the United 
States" hegemony in the region. In particular Iran's defeat became the focal to turn 
factional group rivalries in Afghanistan as anti Shiites. The United States (during 
Clinton administration) after the Gulf War focused on dual containment policy against 
Iran and Iraq. The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Talibans as 
they were in line with its anti Iran policy, as Taliban forces were supported by many 
Arab militants most of them were strongly anti-Shiite. They contributed accentuating 
the common prejudice among Afghan Sunni against the Hazara Shia, which was 
backed by Iran with the aim to counter the Pushtun Sunni (Taliban) that was 
supported by the United States, Saudi, and Pakistan. Fight fire with fire was the U.S. 
reasoning: combat the militant Shi'ism of the Iranians with even greater militancy and 
violence by some groups which were considered as orthodox Sunni Muslims. From 
time to time the U.S. has been using the proxy war tactic against Iran. Besides 
backing factional rivalries in Afghan civil war, to contain Iran the US also used 
Iranian Kurdish ethnic group against Iran and we could also see during Iran-Iraq war, 
where the U.S. itself was willing to back radical Suimi Muslims as well as Saudi 
backed Wahabist movements against pan-Shiites Iran. There was no doubt that why 
Iran perceived the Taliban as a creation of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with US support 
not just to contain the Iranian role in Afghan affairs, but the Taliban were perceived as 
a 'trap' set up by the U.S., Saudi and Pakistan to drag Iran into war with Afghanistan. 
A 'conspiracy theory' sought to explain that since the Gulf war of 1991, the U.S. was 
seeking to lure Iran into some war or the other that would serve as an opportunity to 
destroy its renovated military machine and fiirther to exhaust its economy, with the 
over all objective of restoring Iran to its former status as a piece of US strategic chess 
board. 
Apart fi-om political aspect the Taliban was also utilized as a southbound route 
of the Central Asian oil and gas. A route that would be projected and promoted in line 
of the Iranian route, certainly the Taliban appeared to serve the U.S. policy of 
isolating Iran by creating a firmly Sunni buffer on Iran's border and potentially 
providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Iran's monopoly on 
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Central Asia's southern trade routes. In view of the U.S. determination to block the 
route through Iran, the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor could emerge as the only 
alternative to unleash Central Asian energy potential. 
Well behind the scenes of the U.S. backed factional group (Taliban) in Afghan 
civil war it was also perceived that the U.S. would serve as a bulwark against Russia's 
influence in the region. After the collapse of Soviet Union the U.S. was still active in 
the clandestine operations, supporting extremist Islamic group to wage war against 
Soviet communist or pro-Soviet regime any where around the world especially in the 
third world countries. The U.S. did some contrary things. It continued to supply arms 
and training extremist Islamic group (Taliban) in spite knowing well that in future 
these groups will turn against itself, but the U.S. regarded that the fall of the Soviet 
empire was more important than the extremism of Taliban. The U.S. also feared of the 
Russian ambition and determination to control the flow of oil and gas from Central 
Asian countries. Russian energy policy could also be a part of an overall policy which 
aims to keep the West out of the Central Asiem states preserving it under an 
exclusively Russian sphere of influence. Russia also had supported a factional group 
that would deny to the U.S. to get foothold in Afghanistan's affairs. As President 
Boris Yeltsin said in 1998, by keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia 
kept the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the 
Central Asian States (CASs). As Russia feared that if Afghanistan falls under the 
control of extremist Islamic party (Taliban) which was sympathetic to Islamic 
insurgents in Central Asia and Chechnya, Afghanistan could be the place for prop up 
of this insurgent group. During the civil war (1992-97) between the neo-communist 
government and array of Islamist forces devastated the country of Tajikistan, 
especially Islamist fighter in Chechnya Russia found that the groups of this Islamic 
movement had link with Taliban. It was in the interest of Iran and Russia to keep the 
region unstable by arming the anti-Taliban alliance. Russia also reportedly had a hand 
in backing northern alliance when Taliban forces assaulted on the Shias of Hazara as 
they saw that Pakistan interference in Afghanistan through the Taliban provided an 
opportunity for American influence in the region. Russia and Iran were working 
together in supporting military supplies to northern forces. But eventually in 1996 
Taliban could defeat its rival group and brought Kabul under its control. 
However, the U.S. policy of making Taliban strong appeared broken down 
shortly after the seizure of Kabul. The U.S. found that Taliban had given hospitality to 
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the Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden, who was suspected by US agencies of having 
financed anti-American outrages, such as the bombing of a barrack in Saudi Arabia, in 
which US military personnel were killed. In addition it found that Bin Laden had been 
a significant source of funding to Taliban, and did not lessen the American 
mortification given Washington's strong stance against sponsors of terrorism. Indeed 
the U.S. was not so happy with such type of extreme Islamist group to be the 
Afghanistan's ruler. It could be the beginning of an integral part of the U.S. design 
that the Mujahideen (Taliban was a factional group of Mujahideen) could not form 
their own government after the eviction of the Soviets troops and pro-Soviet Afghan 
regime. The process also tried to moderate the Islamic tone of the Afghan resistance 
so that the government which would come to rule Afghanistan after the withdrawal of 
pro-Soviet regime would not be as extreme as that of the anti-American Ayatollah of 
Iran. The Taliban was suitable and had capability to bring stability to Afghanistan. 
Taliban was also serving the actual major U.S. interest, succeeded in evicting 
factional group of the Moscow-Kabul-Tehran nexus under the Rabbani - Massoud 
government in Kabul and eviction of the pro-Iranian warlords controlling Western 
Afghanistan. Even after the capture of Kabul in September 1996 the Taliban showed 
no signs at all of any intemal disunity or disarray. The unity of their political and 
military command kept getting stronger day by day. Besides, their success in bringing 
peace and order to the territory imder their control attracted volunteers from other 
factions including even the former communists. All these factors enabled Taliban to 
establish a durable government in the country. 
During 1996-2001 the anti-Taliban became major U.S. foreign pohcy thrust, 
applying various modes of coercion and sanctions to pressurize Taliban into political 
subordination. The U.S. needed an Afghan government that is multi-ethnic, broad-
based and observes international norms of behaviours especially which does not 
suppress women rights. But the actual split between the U.S. and Taliban was 
precipitated more by the presence of radical groups which Taliban had inherited the 
networks and training camps which had been established in the 1980s when 
collaboration between Islamic movements and the Afghan parties had been actively 
encouraged by the U.S. on Afghanistan soil. The secret development of Islamic 
radical camp was existed in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Soviets in 
Afghanistan in 1989. Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) saw the fall of the Soviet Union as 
a sign of total victory. They ignored the other international and domestic issues that 
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contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the mind of the Mujahideen it fell 
by the hand of God. The Soviet retreat was a sign of God's power, and if God had 
brought down the Soviet Union through the work of the Mujahideen, other evil 
nations were doomed to destruction. The next global primary targets of the 
Mujahideen were Israel, the United States and its interest which exist around the 
world. They regarded that the U.S. was most oppressive country in the world. 
In the early 1990s after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan Bin 
Laden and his Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) fiiends returned to Saudi and then they 
came against Saudi regime by branding the Saudi regime as the great hypocrites as 
Saudi Royal family had allowed the United States to use holy ground for its war 
against Iraq. Bin Laden was also against the U.S. for maintaining such a regime and 
enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam third holiest city after 
Medina and Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. Consequently, 
he was stripped his citizenship by Saudi authorities and he first moved to Sudan but, 
by 1996, he had returned to Afghanistan again where at that time Kabul was already 
under Taliban's control. From here Bin Laden forged an organic alliance with Mullah 
Mohammad Omar, to build up its Al-Qaeda base. While Bin Laden provided the 
Taliban with money and Arab fighters and the Taliban giving the Saudi dissident and 
his supporter's sanctuary and all the basic support that they needed to set up terrorist 
training camps and expand Al-Qaeda into a trans-national network. This Islamist 
extremist fi-om around the world including North America, Europe, Afiica, the Middle 
East, and Central, South and South East Asia. They continued using Afghanistan as a 
training ground and base of operations for their world wide terrorist activities. The 
Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory, permitted the operation of training 
and indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided logistic support to 
members of various terrorist organisations. From Al-Qaeda base in Afghanistan in 
1998, Bin Laden announced the creation of a new alliance of terrorist organisations, 
the international Islamic fi"ont for jihad against the Jews and crusaders, its interest 
which exists around the world, its allies and regimes, including moderate Muslim pro-
western governments. 
Since the defeated of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989, and the returning 
of Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) to different countries around the world, the United 
States had gradually been under the attack of terrorist group several time whether in 
its homeland itself or in foreign countries and whether on its military and its civilian. 
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The attacks happened more frequently especially in Gulf countries and Africa. The 
mount of tension with several incidents of terrorist attacks on the United States till US 
embassies in Nairobi and of the Dar-es-salam, Tanzania was bombed in 1998, the 
United States alleged that Bin Laden was mastermind behind the scene. The United 
States demanded the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden to appropriate authorities but the 
Taliban ignored to do so. In November 1999 the United Nations imposed economic 
sanctions on Afghanistan in response to the Taliban's refusal to hand over Bin Laden. 
The tension of the US-Afghan split over Bin Laden's extradition issue was going on 
till terrorists strike in the United States on 11 September 2001, in which about 5000 
people were killed. This incident confirmed that the U.S. homeland itself was 
vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies 
could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon U.S. cities. Terrorism replaced 
communism as the source of fear and loathing the war the United States has been 
fighting abroad since 1947 had finally reached its shores. 
The event of 11 September gave the U.S. a pretext to attack Afghanistan, root 
out Al-Qaeda base, replace hostile regime with pro-U.S. regime and set up its military 
base there. Such movement was perceived that there must be something that was 
covered by war on terror. It was not possible to plan and execute this policy within 
short time just after this event but it was happening since the begirming of the end of 
cold war. The event of 11 September 2001 in United States and the resulting conflict 
in Afghanistan signified not only the beginning of new epoch in world politics, but 
also a new stage in the struggle for influence in Central Asia. This event has involved 
the United States deeply in this region which was previously treated as marginal to 
core American interests. The U.S. policy focused on the energy security which was 
driven by a bitter experience where after the major disruption in oil supplies that 
occurred twice in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The Arab's oil embargo of 
1973 and the Iranian upheaval in 1979, the risks of overdependence on energy 
resources from an unstable and politically volatile region were driven home once 
again by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In addition the oil reserves of 
the Persian Gulf countries are not inexhaustible as the current levels of production 
they are estimated to last up to the end of twenty first century at best. As Carter Said: 
"the U.S. will become perilously dependent on increasingly costly imported oil we 
could and anger our freedom as a sovereign nation to act in foreign affairs and we 
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would constantly live in fear of embargoes."' There was no doubt during Carter 
administration he has proposed a broad national energy policy. 
The gaining independence of Central Asian countries from Soviet Union and 
following with the discovery of the huge energy resources in this region and Caspian 
Sea made the western to believe that it could make the region as the Persian Gulf of 
next century. It also could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the gulf start 
depleting seriously by the middle of the next century. It is in this context that Central 
Asia is again emerging as a murky battleground among big powers. The agenda is 
being set by geopolitics and oil. The plan of construction of a massive new oil and gas 
pipeline infrastructure stretching along an East-West energy corridor that linked 
Tvirkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. 
One of the key concerns for the American policymakers has been how to secure 
access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of the 21^' century, to 
establish friendly relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling 
the oil and gas resources and to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. 
The landlocked nature of the Central Asian states creates obstacles to proposals for 
creating new alternative routes. Afghanistan's location could provide alternate route 
for energy pipeline to the world market through Pakistani or Indian port. During 
Afghanistan's civil war the United States saw Taliban as suitable factional group that 
would bring stability to Afghanistan. But unfortunately Taliban which captured Kabul 
in 1996 turned to fire the United States' hope as both plunged into split over 
extradition of US wanted Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden till 2001. The events of 
11 September provided opportunity to the United States to replace Taliban regime 
with pro-US government so that the project of running oil and gas pipeline from 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia to southward (Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor or could 
beyond to India's port) would be easier. 
The movement of the United States and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 
September also was perceived that the U.S. setting up its military base there as a long 
term plan to monitor or secure the fiiture threat of nuclear power of Pakistan. Nuclear 
issue is a factor which has influenced the course of international politics and 
diplomacy since the end of Cold War. The west has feared the threat which comes 
from nuclear proliferation by a number of third world countries, including the South 
Asian neighbors India and Pakistan. The U.S. perceives that the spread of nuclear 
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technology know-how and weapon capability to these countries would pose a threat to 
its own security and the worid. The growing instability in Pakistan, where Islamist 
forces pose challenge to Pakistan Government, is also cause of concern. If Pakistan's 
government is captured by some party which opposes the U.S. and nuclear arsenal fall 
in this group's hand or some group which has sympathy with Al-Qaeda or Taliban it 
will be danger to the U.S. interests m this region. In addition with the loss of 
Pakistan's government control over nuclear proliferation of its scientist Abdul Qadir 
khan it could be sold to Iran, Libya or Al-Qaeda group. So what will happen if such 
lethal weapons fall in the hand of a U.S. enemy? That is the real worry of the U.S. 
today. 
From time to time there has been suggestion that the U.S. want to be in a 
position to secure these nuclear weapons. The United States was likely to go in 
position to tackle any authorized proliferation in Pakistan. After 11 September events 
the United States also had persuaded western defence allies to agree to include India 
and Pakistan in the NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP) and also planed 
to take control of several intemational military peace keeping operations under the 
UN mandate. Perhaps with the movement of NATO forces into Afghanistan after the 
terrorist attacks on the United States NATO invoked article 5 of the treaty relating to 
joint defence clause which was recognized by the U.S. as a coalition of the willing. 
The anti-terrorist operations started by the U.S. intensified the process of ftirther 
NATO expansion, at the same time reinforcing the intemational evolution of the 
alliance in terms of building new capabilities to meet new security challenges of the 
21^ century. The United States is pushing NATO to deliver on an ambitious plan to 
extend its peace keeping presence beyond Afghanistan and created links with 
American led military operations in the South, in effort to rout the remnants of 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 
The movement of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after 11 September is a 
part of the so called project that is the Bigger Central Asia. This project was started 
slowly in period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union which led to 
emergence of newly independent states in 1991. The core of this plan is to bring 
together Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics in a single military strategic 
and geopolitical whole, making stabilization of the territory and bring them under 
dominant influence of U.S. and possibly include some other neighbouring regions. 
This project proposes implementation of a number of organizational-technical and 
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diplomatic measures to realize the American strategy. To strengthen the effective 
United States' role in the region it is necessary to strengthen the NATO role. Perhaps 
with the presence of large number of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan could be 
a U.S. instrument to coordinate and influence regional policies on continuing basis. 
The movement of U.S. and NATO's forces in Afghanistan after 11 September 
was also perceived as a long term plan to contain Iran, and enhancing security in the 
Gulf and the Middle East. The United States is focusing on building its stronger 
military than ever that can deter war, project power and fight in defence of American 
interests in different field. This project would replace the cold war tactics which the 
United States focused on contairmient policy. During Afghan's civil war the United 
States used containment policy and proxy war tactics to threaten Iran as mentioned 
above. Since Iran revolution and overthrew of pro-US regime (Shah) in 1978, up to 
now Iran has disturbed the strategic balance in West Asia, and has been an obstacle 
to American's hegemony in the region. Various matters make the United States worry 
about the behaviour of Iran. Such as, it has been trying to get nuclear weapons which 
could create imbalance in this region. In addition, Iran has been backing Islamic 
groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter the aggressive Israeli 
behaviour toward Palestinians and some time Lebanon. Iran was perceived by U.S. as 
harmful to the political and economic interests that some of the Central Asian states 
have developed with Iran as Iran could provide alternate route for Central Asian 
countries to access the sea. They regarded that Iran is better route through which its 
gas and oil could be exported to world markets through Iran port. Moreover, the 
United States is more concerned about Iran playing vital role in its Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline (IPI) project to supply its energy resources to South Asia and probably would 
extend beyond to China. Iran and Russia are also playing vital role over energy of 
Caspian. Both of them are against the presence of outside powers in the region and 
more concerned with preventing the U.S. fi-om straddling the Caspian and the energy 
flow fi-om the region. 
The United States worry is also about security strategy of oil flow in the Arabian 
Gulf water that is the Strait of Hormuz sea lanes through which the bulk of the global 
oil supply pass could be blocked by Iran one day if U.S. and Iran enter into serious 
conflict. The United States has been trying to do everything to prevent Iran fi-om 
gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region. Therefore the question of the 
United States setting up its military base in Afghanistan after 11 September was likely 
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to be a long term plan to contain Iran and preparing possibly to invade Iran or 
possibly U.S. would use forces to manage with Iran if the situation come to explode. 
Afghanistan which content with large of U.S. military forces could be viewed as apart 
of long term plan to circle Iran. 
The United States is interested in Afghanistan particularly after 11 September in 
order to contain China. The clue of U.S. planning to contain China has begun after the 
end of cold war. Although the Cold War has gone but the basic structure of the 
international system did not change with the end of Cold War. From the decade 1991-
2000 the security competition among the great powers was not obsolete, either in 
Europe or in Northeast Asia. The rise of China is the most dangerous threat to the 
United States in the early twenty first century. Although, Russia just was defeated 
from long Cold War but still trying to back China to be a super power state to counter 
balance the U.S. in this area. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and following 
with the emergence of newly-independent states (Central Asia) in 1991, the United 
States started creeping into this region with the objective to contain China. The U.S. 
policy focused on relationship with Central Asian countries. It was also perceived as a 
plan to quit China out of this region, through defence co-operation of 1994, with 
doctrine and training to pursue Central Asian countries to enter NATO Partnership for 
Peace Programme (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO PFP served as the 
main avenue for western security engagement. The U.S. approach to Central Asia was 
also driven by overarching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying goal of 
containing the influence of China, Iran, and Russia. 
The tremendous growth in industry makes China aggressive in looking for 
energy resource to fiiel its need. China came to replace U.S.'s import market in areas 
such as Iran and Africa. Some Arab countries started looking east over their oil export 
market, especially in Cenfral Asia and Caspian Sea China had made agreement to 
import energy from this region through its pipeline to west of China. Recently China 
signed an energy agreement with Iran in strategic energy cooperation which involved 
constructing an oil pipeline from Iran to the Caspian Sea, from there to link up with 
the plarmed pipeline from China into Kazakhstan. China also planned to build train 
railway to connect western China-Pakistan-Iran so that China could transport energy 
from Iran by land. As China has close boundary with Central Asian countries it makes 
China easy to transport whether by railway linkage or Pipeline. China also revived the 
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ancient Great Silk Route which would open up China's northern land border for direct 
links with Europe and the Middle East via Central Asia. 
The most important U.S. concern about China is its key role in developing the 
lethal weapons and civilian nuclear project of Iran. China-Iran cooperation threatened 
to diminish the military advantages the U.S. enjoyed vis-a-vis Iran and increased 
Iran's ability to threaten the Sea-lanes and oil supplying states of the Persian Gulf 
This conflict between China and U.S. was manifested in the areas of nuclear energy, 
guided and ballistic missiles, and dual use goods relevant to production of chemical or 
advanced conventional weapons. China regarded that Iran could play key role to 
counter U.S. hegemony in this region. Such behaviour made U.S. aware about China's 
role in this region. 
Therefore, there was little doubt about the movement of the U.S. and NATO 
forces into Afghanistan after the event of 11 September. It seemed the U.S. centered 
on its security establishment and focused on the alleged threats from major rival states 
notably China and Russia. Moreover, the U.S. presence in this region could lock out 
China from the energy business as the U.S. feared that China could assist the Central 
Asian Republics in setting up their own oil companies. 
After 11 September, 2001, behind or beyond war on terror U.S. sought to 
reassert its own overt influence on global geopolitical developments with a view to 
ensuring its own security. One of the major U.S. foreign policy goals after 11 
September was to replace its influence in nqwly independent nations comprising the 
commonwealth of independent states (CIS) or Central Asia. The U.S. would maintain 
the new world order by rooting out and limiting Moscow's influence in this region. 
As Russia has a large reserved energy resources it can play a key role in 
European market by selling its energy to EU market while using its energy resources 
as a weapon against U.S. hegemony in Europe. Russia's attempt to control the flow of 
oil and gas from Caspian Sea and Central Asian countries has been viewed in the west 
as an attempt by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for 
the pipelines via north Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control 
over the flow of oil and gas to westem markets and will make the west vulnerable to 
Russia's political whims. Russian energy policy could also be part of an overall policy 
which aims to keep the west out of Central Asian countries and preserving it under an 
exclusively Russian sphere of influence. Russia tried to establish monopoly over 
energy resources of this region and dismantle U.S. power position in the region. 
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Therefore, denying Russia the right to influence the regional economy and politics 
seemed to be the major concern of the United States in the 21*' century. In addition the 
commitment to multiple pipelines was also perceived as the continuation of the policy 
of denying Russia any significant role in the region, such as U.S. signing of protocol 
on the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for oil. The U.S. also attempted to 
assure Georgia that any oil shipped out of the Caspian through its ports should go in 
part to Ukraine to alleviate its energy dependence on Russia. The scrambling over 
energy resources in Central Asia and Caspian Sea once again made Afghanistan a 
proxy war ground. The U.S. was looking for the way to make Afghanistan as a land-
bridge to build pipeline route from Central Asia to world market through Afghanistan 
to Pakistan's port or to India's market. This development took place after few years of 
the end of cold war and the disintegration of Soviet Union. Once when Afghanistan 
plunged into civil war both the United States and Russia used proxy war tactics to 
back favorite factional group which could preserve their interest. While the battling of 
various factional groups in Afghanistan was heading on, that time a factional group 
(Taliban) was in the line of US's interest but unfortunately the Taliban came to split 
with the United States over the issue of terrorism. Therefore, the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan after 11 September to replace hostile regime with a pro-U.S. regime. It 
was perceived as a long term plan to secure oil pipeline route or at least set up the 
regime which would make the U.S. goal easier and deny any Russia's influence in this 
region. Russia after the event of 11 September had given a green signal to U.S. of 
northern alliance support to hunt down Taliban. The northern alliance was Russia's 
favorite factional group and was considered suitable to be Afghan's ruler. Iran also 
agreed with Russia, as both of them had been trying to restrain the U.S. to step its 
foothold in this region. 
Recently Russia has been moving spirit behind the idea of a gas OPEC - an 
organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a 
meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 
2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which account for 60 per cent of global gas 
reserve, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. Russia 
has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and downstream projects 
with all of these countries. The idea of a gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as 
it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the 
cold. Russia believed that the gas OPEC could offset Western efforts to control the 
272 
energy markets. Russia is using energy resources and arms export potentially to 
project its influence across the world. Behind Russia's political objective to control 
Middle East petroleum is to deny to the members of the NATO and to Japan in a 
prelude to ordering a general conventional war, and in contriving interruptions in 
supply that could be turned to the Soviet advantage by splitting allies from the United 
States in a divisive tactic to create oil shortages as a means of weakening allied 
commitments to U.S. led security arrangements. 
Apart from this recently Russia defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, by supplying $ 
700 million worth of Torm 1 advanced air defence missile systems to Tehran last year 
(2006). It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran 
since 2000. Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursing a common energy strategy 
may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. Russia also supported Iran to 
build a railway line along the Caspian linking Iran with Russia. It will be part of the 
north-south transport corridor, a joint project of Russia, Iran and India. The Russian 
railway, the state owned railway company of Russia, was already involved in a 
multinational project. 
Recently world has witnessed rising tension between U.S. and Iran over nuclear 
weapon issue. The U.S. has also threatened to use military strike against Iran. In 
response Russia issued several stem warnings to the U.S and its allies against using 
forces in Iran and Russia vowed to challenge the U.S. policy of international dictates 
and unrestrained use of forces. 
Thus the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan after September 2001 attack 
on the Worid Trade Centre was probably a part of a long-term planning to ensure its 
presence in this region to contain Iran, Russia, India, and China. Afghanistan was 
well-known base of containment and buffer state for former powers. Afghanistan 
settles in the world's heart land and has its borders on the north with the Soviet Uiuon, 
(now Central Asian countries) on the west with Iran on the east and south with 
Pakistan and on the east with China (Sinkiang). In view of its geo-strategic 
significance Afghanistan would once again become significant for the U.S. strategy to 
control this region. As Nisar-ul-Haq, wrote: "Afghanistan has become a symbol of 
monumental tragedy of geography. Its location has been the cause of miseiy for its 
people. Afghanistan lies in the region between the seats of historical empires in India, 
Persia and Central Asia. It has been a traditional invasion route for the subcontinent. It 
has been on the path of numerous invaders since ancient times." During Cold War 
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time Afghanistan with the U.S. larger strategic interests created the ground for an 
emerging cold war (cold war era). This time it will not be over ideology but over 
economic interests. Unfortunately Afghanistan will once again become the battle 
ground for the emerging resources wars with the emergence of giant energy producers 
and consumers. Michael Klave calls it "'energo - fascism" in which the Pentagon has 
increasingly become a global oil protection service. 
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Annax-l 
Estimates of Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Region 
Azerbaijan 
Kazakhstan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Russia 
Iran 
Total 
Proven 
Oil 
BUlion 
Barrels 
3.6 
10.0 
1.5 
0.2 
0.2 
NA 
15.6 
Possible Oil 
Billion 
Barrels 
27.0 
85.0 
32.0 
1.0 
5.0 
12.0 
163.0 
Total 
31.0 
95.0 
33.5 
1.2 
5.0 
12.0 
178.0 
Proven Gas 
Trillion Cubic 
Meters 
0.3 
1.5 
4.4 
2.1 
NA 
0 
8.3 
Possible Gas 
Trillion Cubic 
Meters 
1.0 
2.5 
4.5 
1.0 
NA 
0.3 
9.3 
Source: US Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report (As 
Required by HR 3610), undated report attached to letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Robert Bynd, April 15, 1997, p.3. 
Adapted from: Rezwan Zeb, "USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus (1992-2003), 
Regional Studies, Vol.22, No.l, Winter 2003-04, p.65. 
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Annax-2 
Current and Future Pipelines in the Greater Caspian Region 
Name 
AIOC Earli Oil 
(South-North) 
AIOU Early Oil 
(East-West) 
AIOC Mam 
export pipeline 
(MEP) 
Caspian pipeline 
Consortium 
(CPC) 
Turkministan-
Afghanistan-
Pakistan 
pipelines 
Kazakstan-Chma 
Turkmenistan-
China 
Central Asia-
Turkey 
Iran-Turkey 
Type 
Oil 
Oil 
Oil 
Oil 
Gas 
Oil 
Oil 
Oil 
Gas 
Gas 
Route 
Baiai Novorossiisk via 
Groznyi 
Baku-Supsa via Tbilisi 
Undecided,preferable 
via Turkey 
Kazakstan/Tengiz-
Novorossiisk 
Doaletabad gas field to 
central Pakistan 
Chardzhou, 
Turkmenistan to 
Gwadar, Pakistan 
Western Kazakstan to 
China 
Chardzhou to China 
Kazakstan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan 
Northern Iran to eastern 
Turkey 
Capacity 
(Barrels 
day) 
120,000-^ 
120,000+ 
1,000,000 
1,340,000 
2 billion 
cubic 
feet/day 
1,000,000 
TBA 
TBA 
TBA 
lObcm/yr 
over 23 
years 
Length 
1,000 mi 
550 mi 
2.000+mi 
1 500 mi 
872 mi 
800+mi 
Approx 
3,700 mi 
Approx 
3,700 mi 
Approx 
1,300 mi 
600 mi 
Status 
Russian side 
inoperative 
Under 
construction 
Decision 
pending 
Contracts 
signed 
The civil 
war in 
Afghanistan 
is stalling 
construction 
Feasibility 
study 
pending 
Feasibility 
study 
pending 
Pending 
decision on 
the status of 
the Caspian 
Sea 
Contract 
signed, 
financing 
unclear 
Source US Dqjartment of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report (As 
Required by HR 3610), undated report attached to letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Robert Bynd, Apnl 15, 1997, p 3 
Adapted from Rezwan Zeb, "USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus (1992-2003), 
Regional Studies, Vol 22, No 1, Winter 2003-04, p 65 
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MAP-1 
Projected oil lines through Afghanistan 
Adapted from Narendra Taneja, "The Fire Down Below" Out Look, Vol.XLI, 
No 42, 29 October 2001, pp 57 
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MAP-2 
Proposed Pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan-Pakistan to India and 
Arabian Sea. 
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Adapted from: William Malay, 
1998,p.213. 
'The Perils of Pipelines", World Today, Vol.52, No.8-9, 
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MAP-3 
Gas and oil pipelines in Central Asia and the Caspian 
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Adapted from: Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern HistoryX London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2003), pp.4-5. 
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MAP-4 
Figure of Energy Key m the new Asian Architecture 
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Adapted from: Siddarth Varadarajan, "Energy Key in the New Asian Architecture'" The 
Hindu, 25 January 2006, p.l 1 
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MAP-6 
Oil and Natural Gas Export Infrastructure in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
Adapted from: "Rizwan Zeb, USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
(1992-2003)", Regional Studies, Vol.22, No.l, Winter 2003-04, p.67. 
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MAP-7 
Figure China's Southwest Corridor to the Sea 
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MAP-8 
Energy Pipeline Project- from Central Asia to China 
Adapted from: F William Engdahl, "China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War'', 
http.7/www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GL2lAdol.html, accessed on 23 August 2007. 
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MAP-9 
BTC oil pipeline: Southern-western route from Azerbaijan to Georgia and onto the 
Mediterranean via Turkey 
Adapted from: F William Engdahl, "China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War", 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GL21Adol.html, accessed on 23 August 2007. 
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MAP-10 
Figure of Europe's dependence on Russian gas 
Europe^s dependence on Russian gas 
Russia's state*controlied energy giant Gazprom supplies around 25% of 
Western Europe's gas imports, with Germany as ttie largest consumer. 
In 2004, Gazprom earned more than two-thirds of Its revenues, over 
$18 billion, from exports to 28 West and Central European countries. 
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Adapted from: Vladimir Radyuhin, "Energy War", Frontline, Vol.24, No.2, January 27-
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